






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
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PART THREE

THE ORIGINS OF NATIONALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA

## CHAPTER VIII




### CONTRIBUTION OF THE TWO WHITE COMMUNITIES TO THE POLICIES OF THE UNION.

In 1488, the Portuguese Bartholemew Dias was the first European to set foot on South African soil. Under the leadership of Jan Van Riebeeck, the Dutch occupied Cape Town in 1652, and their settlement went on even after the British took it over in 1806. To justify the Boers' claims on South African land, some politically-biased historians put forward absurd statements: on the one hand, they asserted that the country was a no-man's land; on the other hand, they acknowledged that African tribes had already lived there [1]. They reluctantly admitted the latter fact, and did not scruple to disparage African people implicitly or explicitly. The original Khoi-khoi, they said, were leading a nomadic life, wandering about in search of pasture for their cattle, and did not till land [2]. Scholars, however, gradually contributed to destroy that image, and to restore reality. The scientist Van der Merwe, for instance, showed that the Ba-phalaborwa tribe permanently inhabited Northern Transvaal since, at least, 960 [3]. The Reverend John Philip, a Superintendent of the missions of the London Missionary Society (L.M.S.) at the Cape of Good Hope, asserted that in 1822, one of the British settlers at Clan William applied for land. He was so pleased with the state of cultivation in which he found it, that he refused to accept it on the terms in which it had been offered to him [4]. Other historians described African knowledge of tillage as "impressive" [5].

To convey their feeling of belonging to that part of African land, the Boers called themselves Afrikaners [6]. Determined to set up their political hegemony, some trekked away from British rule to Natal, the Orange River Colony, and the Transvaal in 1836, and defeated the powerful Zulus on the Blood River on 16 December 1838 [7]. Afrikaners became a deeply-rooted community as time went by. However, they constituted only a minor fraction of the population, and the Blacks' numerical strength prompted their permanent fear of being dominated.

Fear was common to both white communities. To strengthen British authority, George Grey, Cape Governor from 1854 to 1860, encouraged European settlement in British Kaffraria [8]. Governor of the Cape in 1897, and then of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony from 1901 to 1905, Alfred Milner followed Grey's steps. Milner sought to secure British supremacy over the remainder of the population.



As he wrote to Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies: "Our first object and duty is to make sure of the position by strengthening the British element whether the Boers like it or not" [9]. To reach this goal, Milner intended both to encourage British emigration to the Witwatersrand gold fields and to denationalize Afrikaners. A continuous flux of British people to South Africa, would not only swamp the Boer element, but would also integrate the country into the British economic sphere. In March 1903, he proudly declared that South Africa with its 11,616 emigrants ranked amongst the most popular immigrant countries after the United States and Canada. However, his hopes for large-scale British immigration were never fulfilled [10]. The 1911 census reveals that 54.37% of the total population belonged to the Dutch Reformed Church (D.R.C.); and in 1946 there were still only 37.2% English-speakers against 56.9% Afrikaans-speaking people. In 1911, Africans formed 67.28% of the total population [11].

Although Europeans' fears were exaggerated for they had political power in their hands, they viewed their black counterparts as potential enemies likely to tread them down or to sweep them out of the country. For their part, African people were aware of the white man's dread and suspicion. To quote an African newspaper claiming to be "the Voice of the Native Races of South Africa":

There is an impression that every black man is moving about in his daily toil, harbouring a deep-sullen grudge of vengeance on the white man [12]

Time and again, African spokesmen protested against such a feeling. European anguish, they asserted, was groundless, and likely to bring about political unrest. A "South African Native Congress", based on the Western Cape, declared on 10 April 1906:

Much has been made of the numerical preponderance of the natives in this country, with the sinister object of agitating the public mind and keeping it in a condition of perpetual ferment, and Congress observes with regret that several colonial politicians, ministers of religion, and public speakers, have sought at various times, to impress upon British statesmen and the imperial authorities the need of unity among the white races in order to present a solid front against the imaginary bogey of a colossal native combination to oust the whites from South Africa [13].




But, Africans' repeated assertions of loyalty could not blur the Whites' deeply-rooted anxiety. As a result, Europeans undermined African development instead of fostering it, and turned the black man into a helot and a political outcast in his own country. In the following elegy, Moses Mphahlele, Secretary of the Transvaal branch of the South African National Congress in the 1920's, painfully described his people's debasement and plight under the colour bar system:

Africa my native land  
Was land of wealth and pleasant ease  
Of countless things made man to please.  
.....

I am looked upon as something vile  
By Briton, Boer, Jew and gentile  
They portion to themselves my land  
(Which) they rule with a firm hand.

I dare not move my swarthy feet  
Nor without permit change my seat  
A pass to guide me where to go  
Something a beast can fail to know [14]



Afrikaners indeed took hold of huge tracts of the most fertile land, and granted inadequate plots to the growing African population. They selfishly set aside the most highly-paid jobs for themselves, and condemned African labourers to inferior positions and wages [15]. To further widen the gap between the two communities, they also purposefully neglected Africans' education, and made them bear the heaviest brunt of taxation [16]. The black people could do little to better their situation. Their oppressors took care to crush down their opinion by debarring them from the franchise in the three Northern Territories.

Afrikaners' religious beliefs further strengthened their wish to keep the black community at a distance. Indeed, the D.R.C. doctrine sustained the concept of race separation for the sake of self-preservation. Like all other religions, it taught mankind unity and equality: "All men are in the image of God... and are of equal worth", it declared [17]. Nevertheless, that unity included the richest variety, hence the division of the human race into different peoples, each one characterized by its own nature and calling:

... He maintained the unity and diversity of man in order to restrict the expansion of mankind in its apostacy and insubordination to Him and to check

the expansion of sin in this way. In His mercy, He decreed a multiplicity of tongues and peoples and dispersed the human race over the face of the earth [18].

As far as the Boers were concerned, their divine mission consisted in the "evangelization of Africans" . . . . As a result, if they sought to uphold their cultural and biological identity, they were merely trying to fulfill God's commandments. Jan H. Hofmeyr, leader of the Bond which recognized no nationality of any kind save that of the Afrikaner's", and Minister of the Interior, acknowledged the Dutch irresistible fear to lose their identity:

We have all got that fear of the white man being drowned in a black ocean, and we have all got that fear of race mixture and miscegenation (An Honourable member: A justified fear). No, it is an unreasoning fear, it is largely an ideological fear... but it is there for all that, and we cannot get away from it [19].

Some outstanding black representatives such as Allison Wessels George Champion (1893-1975), and Davidson Don Tengo Jabavu (1885-1959) therefore rightly considered the colour bar as the implementation of the D.R.C. principles [20].

Looking back on the history of their country, some South Africans like E.E. Mahabane argued that the colour bar was, in fact, a British legacy. According to him, British statesmen paved the way for the segregationist policy in 1902 when they refused to extend the Cape franchise to the Northern colonies. He asserted that since then, "what all the governments of this country have done or are doing is to carry out the policy of the British government" [21]. The British, however, looked upon themselves as more liberal-minded than the Boers [22]. A close scrutiny of their policy reveals, in fact, their contribution to the repressive character of South African rule since the early days of their settlement. Indeed, when they took over the Cape Colony in 1806, Natal in 1843, the Orange River Colony in 1848, and the Transvaal in 1877 they aimed at setting up their 'supremacy , above all [23]. Like the Afrikaners and with their help, they sought to secure their hegemony by a firm control of the African population. As Earl of Carnarvon, Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1874 to 1878, clearly put it:

These tribes separately and collectively may easily constitute a serious and common danger to the whole European population. It seems to me now, as it has seemed to me in the past, that it is very desirable, by a certain unity of



action on the part of the European communities to reduce, as far as possible, that common danger by securing at least a principle of well-considered cooperation on their part. The bundle of sticks may be tied together very loosely or very tightly, but provided there is common action, the object is secured [24].

Fear of possible tribal rebellions as well as economic interests after the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley in 1867, and of gold in 1886, urged British authorities to encourage settlers to take up land, and to band together with the Boers against Africans. Amongst the many similar racial facets of British and Afrikaner administrations, there were the pass laws apparatus, the reserve policy, and the common goal to undermine chiefly power. In 1809, Earl Caledon, British Governor of the Cape Colony, extended the pass system formerly used to check the movements of slaves between rural and urban areas to African labourers [25]. In 1923, Jan Christiaan Smuts (1870-1950), then Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs, used the same device to provide white farmers and mining companies with cheap labour in his Native Urban Areas Act [26].

Owing to Theophilus Shepstone's influence on Natal Native Commission of 1846-47, the reserve policy was finally maintained in Letters Patent of 27 April 1864 [27]. This system was designed to meet the same targets as French policy of cantonement in Algeria. Indeed, as in Algeria, the black people in South Africa were confined in unfertile areas to leave as much land as possible to European settlers and to supply labour [28]. To quote Albert Thomas Nzula (1905-1934), one of the outstanding members of the Communist Party of South Africa (C.P.S.A.)

British imperialism has expropriated virtually all the land of the indigenous peasantry of the Union of South Africa, and has set up large farms. It has tied half of the peasantry to these European farms and has herded the other on to reserves turning it into a reserve pool of labour [29].

Finding the system very convenient to secure both land and labour, the South African Jacobus Wilhelmus Sauer (1850-1913), Minister of "Justice" and of Native Affairs, endorsed it in his 1913 Land Act, No 27. His sense of justice was rather peculiar for he managed to make African predicament more unbearable. So far, Africans had the possibility to buy land in European areas as an outlet to the over-crowded, impoverished reserves. Now, they saw that right withheld. In 1923, they were also debarred from towns, and many of them desperately wondered Siyangaphy: "where are we to go?" [30].



In 1894, Cecil John Rhodes (1853-1902) passed the Glen Grey Act. Premier of the Cape Colony, he also had a <sup>near</sup> monopoly of the producing and the marketing sides of the diamond and controlled part of the Gold industry with his De Beers Consolidated Mines and his Consolidated Gold Fields [31]. To secure labourers, he extended individual tenure to reserves and imposed a series of taxes on their inhabitants. The revolutionary aspect of his Act, however, consisted in the creation of local councils. Indeed, under its provisions, headmen were to be appointed members of such boards, and to them reverted the drudgery of levying taxes on their people for the upkeep of their location [32]. For the colonial power, such a measure presented the main advantage of alienating traditional authorities from their people. Later, General Smuts did not fail to notice it, and in 1920, he adopted the same general scheme in his Native Affairs Act [33].

George Grey sought to strengthen a master-servant relationship between Whites and Blacks. He proposed the integration of Africans into European capitalistic mode of production to provide the colony with labourers, tax-payers, and customers. "We should try", he pleaded, to make them "a part of ourselves, servants, customers of our goods, contributors to our revenue" [34].

His policy which was declared to promote the socio-economic welfare of African inhabitants, was not devoid of a certain amount of violence towards them. Indeed, in his scheme, they were to feel European power. He aimed at curtailing the prerogatives of traditional rulers, and at wrecking their subjects' allegiance to them. From now on, chiefs and headmen would be government employees, receiving salaries instead of their former tributes. He also thought of dividing up larger tribes into smaller ones, of clearing out a number of Africans, of rounding up the remainder in villages under European officers, and of providing European farmers with the best land thus secured [35].

Africans, resented his attempt to upset the socio-economic and political organization of their tribes. Their discontent found an outlet in the cattle killing tragedy of 1857, when believing in the prophecy of a young girl called Nonquase, they slaughtered their cattle and destroyed their crops in the hope that their ancestors' spirits would punish the white man and would do justice to them. It was a dreadful action like that of a man, who driven to the utmost despair, would commit suicide. Were not the Xhosas somehow killing themselves indirectly by getting rid of their unique wealth? According to Bundy, twenty or

thirty thousand died of famine, and the living, banished from their land as a punishment, sought employment on white farms, a process speeded up by the creation of special courts to try the "vagrants" [36].

One of the liberal elements of British policy was the Cape Constitution of 1853 which raised many misplaced hopes amongst Africans in the northern colonies. Indeed, unlike their fellows in Natal, the Transvaal, and the Orange Free State, Cape Africans enjoyed the franchise. However, the Cape Government gradually increased the franchise qualifications to limit the number of African voters.

Thus, racial, economic and political interests linked European communities, and their policies towards Africans aimed at controlling rather than at developing them. The South Africa Act of 1910 unified the Whites. In the twenties, they continued to advocate a rapprochement between them at the expense of Africans. At Graaff Reinet, Lord Buxton, then Governor General of the Union of South Africa and High Commissioner, asserted that:

It is as certain as the sun rises and sets that the two white races who inhabit it have got to live together for ever (cheers): Neither of the two can, or indeed should hope to absorb or to obtain ascendancy over the other, for they cannot and will not, but together they can form one great and prosperous nation (Cheers).

Believe me, the only alternative is the policy of the two Kilkenny cats... These cats were given the same barrel to live in, and instead of living in peace and amity, they preferred to fight, and very soon nothing was left of them but their two tails [37].

After its emergence in 1912, the South African Native National Congress (S.A.N.N.C) leaders' first target consisted in getting direct representation in the Union Parliament. They claimed a right of partnership in the management of their country, viewed themselves as their people's spokesmen, and elected to redress their grievances through constitutional channels [38]. As their task proved hard to perform, they alternatively sought the support of white sympathisers, of different bodies such as the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (I.C.U.), the African Political Organization (A.P.O.), the Communist Party of South Africa (C.P.S.A.), the Lekhotla La Bafo, a Basuto association, as well as of Great Britain. However, they gradually realized that their white supporters could not achieve much. To quote Solomon Tshekisho Plaatje (1879-1932), one of the most prominent African politicians:

A dozen of sympathetic members of Parliament have now and again delivered weighty protests against the anti-colour excesses of the Union Parliament, but in a House of one hundred and thirty members, their protests had about the same effect as a drop in a bucket of water [39].

They also understood that the different ideologies, aims, and methods of the various associations would unavoidably lead to clashes [40]. As far as the imperial government was concerned, it constantly reminded them that it had given up power in 1910, and therefore, it could not interfere in the Union affairs [41]. But how could they seek redress there if the Union government devised every means to stamp out African consciousness, and in the 1930's jailed and banned them? [42].

Unable to achieve a major success, the S.A.N.N.C. came to be looked down as a futile body in the 1930's, and some went as far as to assert that "the A.N.C. will remain a name and not a very prominent one" [43]. However, despite the pitfalls of the colour bar, the A.N.C. still survives.

## CHAPTER IX


## PROCESS OF STRATIFICATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIETY

A fundamental contradiction inherent to South African policy shattered the African way of life, and gave birth to bitter grievances. Indeed, on the one hand, Afrikaner authorities urged black people to develop along their lines in their own areas. On the other hand, they devised a policy of economic interpenetration by compelling them to sell their labour to European farmers and mining companies. Torn by two opposite forces, African people found their situation impossible. To mitigate their ordeal, their leaders put forward two main proposals on 6 April 1928; either they should be granted complete independence, or they should be fully integrated in the Union socio-economic and political structures. African people, they asserted, could keep up their traditional institutions if they were utterly free from European tutelage. As they put it:

The ANC of which the Council of Chiefs is an integral part is strongly opposed to the policy of segregation unless it is meant the creation of two states, one European and the other native. We cannot see how two peoples, living in the same country and under the same government control can develop separate nationalities and separate civilizations. It is our firm conviction that the Bantu people can only develop along their own lines if they have a country of their own and are free from European interference [1].

But if Africans were left aside, who should till the Europeans' huge estates? Who should enter the womb of the earth and toil to dig up the precious stones which made their voice heard and their power felt throughout the world? Indeed, although the poor whites did work underground, such tasks were chiefly performed by Africans.

As a result, African people were bound to become the pillars of their country's economic infrastructure. However, tribal land tenure hampered African movement toward European farms and mines. To sort out labour shortage problems, it became necessary to force the black people out of their lands. A brief survey of African land-ownership seems, then, necessary to assess the socio-economic change which took place.



## I. African system of land tenure and jurisdiction

There were two main types of property: tribal and family.

### 1. Tribal land


At the top of the African political system, there were politically independent and economically self-sufficient kingdoms such as the Xhosa or the Zulu ones run by paramount chiefs or kings [2].

These units were divided into fairly autonomous tribes or chiefdoms, usually cut off from one another by belts of unoccupied land. At the head of each tribe, there was a chief who had to acknowledge the paramount authority. In return, he could govern his tribe with the minimum interference from his senior chief [3].

The chiefdoms were, in turn, split up into districts administered by sub-chiefs and including several kraals called umzi by the Xhosas. The kraals themselves grouped all individual members who recognized a common family head or headman [4].

The traditional ruler was not the blood-thirsty despot as was generally believed. As pointed out by Dr Alfred Bitini Xuma (1893 - 1963) who in 1930 had been elected in absentia to the National Executive Committee of the SANNC under Seme, the normal form of traditional government was more democratic than autocratic [5]. Indeed, the chief's power was checked not only by his immediate superior, but also by a body of councillors or amaphakathi as well as by the tribal assembly.

The traditional ruler was expected to take into account his councillors' advice in all important matters. A chief named Faku, for example, was reported to have told the early missionaries: "I cannot give you a proper reply until I have consulted my councillors. I am but a child, I can only say what my great men say" [6]. The child in question was a grown up, but his metaphor meant he could do nothing without his councillors' assent.



Source: Map based on  
 SP.1455, U6-61, Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic  
 Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa,  
 This report is commonly known as the Tomlinson Report after the name of the  
 commission chairman.

The councillors could also sit as a court and were empowered to judge the Paramount chief himself. As a rule, "the King can do no wrong" and the elders who advised him to take a certain decision were responsible for any mistake that might occur in the government of the people [7]. However, there were a few instances where the traditional ruler displeased his elders. Sometimes, a jealous traditional ruler, for example, dispossessed more well-to-do subjects. It was recorded that at a festival, a subordinate chief's cattle "took longer to pass" than the paramount's. To seize his property, the latter accused the former of witchcraft. The councillors, however, could always summon the chief, and require reasons for his "eating the man up". If he could not justify his behaviour, they would compel him to give back the expropriated cattle [8]. In other circumstances, they could punish the guilty traditional ruler in several ways. They could refuse to attend the khotla or gathering for discussion of tribal affairs. They could also depose him and select another chief in his stead. They could flee together with their followers and offer their support and cattle to a rival chief. They could also set up an independent chiefdom [9].

The traditional ruler's authority was also tempered by a national assembly variously called pitso by the Sothos, Ibunga by the Xhosas, Khoro by the Vendas... The national assembly was convened to deal with unusual matters such as launching a fight... All members of the tribe were summoned to attend it and to take part in the proceedings. The traditional ruler often remained silent, weighing his people's opinions and finally put forward a general statement reflecting their will. Jacob Burry's Commission on Native Laws and Customs which reported in 1883 discovered that:

The power of making laws does not vest absolutely in the chief; the chief himself is subject to laws in force when he assumed the chieftainship. The laws are not usually made by the chief and his councillors without reference to the people... The laws have all grown up among the people and are only administered by the chief [10].

Likewise, in 1884, Henry Elliot, then magistrate of Tembuland, emphasized the democratic character of tribal government. He asserted that:

Under their own laws... every man had virtually a voice in the laws framed for the government of the tribe to which he belonged. All important matters were discussed by the chiefs and principal men of the tribe (usually in the chief's kraal). These meetings were public; every man belonging to the tribe could be present if he wished. Anyone, no matter how poor his position, could



explain his views, and he would be attentively listened to [11].

If the traditional ruler imposed his decision, the grassroots would simply neglect to carry out his order. For instance, a Pondo chief named Mapikela insisted on attacking the Mpondomise but most tribesmen did not follow him and the Pondos were severely defeated.

As a general rule, different pressures coming from senior and sub-chiefs, from the councillors and from the society at large contributed to mitigate chiefly authority. The traditional ruler was, then, frequently looked upon as the "father" or the "servant" of his people. Albert John Mvumbi Luthuli (1898 - 1967) who belonged to a family of traditional rulers and who himself urged by the elders of his tribe accepted the chieftaincy of Groutville reserve in 1935 asserted that "a chief is primarily a servant of his people. He is the voice of his people in local affairs" [12].

However, to almost any rule there are exceptions, and one of them was embodied by Shaka (1787 - 1828), an outstanding Zulu King who brought about important alterations to the traditional form of government. When he became a king, Shaka still kept councillors, but he took every important decision. He did not look for his subjects' assent, but imposed his will on them, and governed through fear. A military genius, he killed thousands of people, laid hands on their cattle, destroyed their harvests, and murdered potential rivals until he was himself assassinated by his brothers Dingane and Mpande on 22 September 1828. Xuma explained that his brothers resented his absolutism. To quote him: "It was his despotic rule that brought about his death at the hands of his brothers Dingane and Mpande" [13].

Shaka had lost his people's allegiance for "he died unmourned, and no murmur was raised against his murderers" [14].

As a result, when Theophilus Shepstone in the early days of Natal settlement and when later Union governors appointed themselves supreme chiefs and seldom consulted Africans in matters affecting them, they clearly took exceptions to "democratic" tribal institutions for the general rule.

Another misconception related to chiefly power over land. This did not belong to the traditional ruler as was generally asserted. The chief was merely holding it as a trustee for his people who received it from their common ancestors [15]. Tribal land was thought of as a link between the living and the dead. As a historian put it:

This was the land which the ancestors settled on and gained for the people; and now they lie buried under the very feet of the living, supporting and giving religious sanctions to the continuing existence of the tribe [16].

People's attachment to land might be conveyed by the testimony of an African witness Sprinkhaan before the Eastern Transvaal Natives Land Committee held on 23 October 1917. Sprinkhaan said:

Diamond was my chief and when he died I buried him there where we live today. If I go away, the white people will come and plough up his grave. Diamond's last words to me when he died were: "Remain here where I shall be buried and look after my son" [17].

In return for the land he granted to their tribesmen, traditional rulers, received tributes which were, however, redistributed in time of need. Tributes had first and foremost a political significance. Through them, tribesmen conveyed their allegiance, or Kondza in Xhosa, to their rulers. As Saunders pointed out:

It is usual for a chief to exact tribute and redistribute it among his subordinates. This is not merely a payment but a symbolic expression of his power and generosity and it was used as a means of binding the people to their chiefs [18].

Traditional authorities could expect cattle or part of their people's harvests. Cattle played an important role in tribal life, especially among the Nguni in Zululand. Indeed, cattle revealed a man's status: the more he owned, the higher his status was. They were an important source of food and clothing products. They namely provided milk, and their hides were used to manufacture blankets and cloaks [19]. Later, the Whites did not fail to notice the importance of cattle for tribesmen. To induce the Pondos to work in the mines, for instance, labour recruiters gave them cattle advances [20].

With the councillors' approval, traditional rulers were also entitled to grant land to strangers. These outsiders - who could be Africans from other tribes and later Europeans - were allotted enough land to build their kraals, to grow crops, and to graze their livestock. However, traditional authorities granted such land only for their lifetime, and their successors might require the new community to leave without feeling they were unfairly dealing with them [21].

In this light, one might understand why the documents signed by Shaka and Dinizulu (1868 - 1913) became controversial matters. Under European law, Shaka and Dinizulu "ceded" part of Zululand to the Whites. According to African customs, however, they did not grant a permanent right of property but gave only a limited right of possession. To quote Henry Selby Msimang:

Shaka himself signed what you might today call a treaty but it was nothing, it was merely a right of occupation which could be taken away at any time [22].

In fact, even under European law the so-called treaty signed by Dinizulu can be considered as null and void for he did so under unlawful circumstances. First, Dinizulu was not yet king, but only heir to the throne. Furthermore, Afrikaners kidnapped him in Nomgoma and took him to Paul Pietersburg where they compelled him to sign the document. Finally, Dinizulu was only about seventeen years old and as rightly explained by Henry Selby Msimang, a contract cannot be negotiated with a child who does not understand its terms.

In addition to land granted to individuals - whether original members of the chiefdom or strangers - there was pasture land. On this common property, people enjoyed grazing, hunting, and water rights [23]. That portion of tribal land was also designed to meet population growth. From it, plots of land were allotted to new households [24].

Within tribal land, there was another kind of property or family land.

## 2. Family land

Family land could refer to land received by each tribesman for residential and agricultural purposes from his chief. Each of the tribesman's wives was entitled to select at least one field for her own use provided that she did not

infringe upon other members' rights on land tilled or to be tilled.

South African tribesmen resorted to shifting cultivation. Crops belonged to them but not land. After the crops were reaped, fields were used as common pastures, but families retained their rights to till the ground as long as they lived in the tribe [25].

This general picture cannot purport to give an accurate account of pre-colonial African society. It reveals, nevertheless, a rational system implying rights and duties between traditional rulers and their people as well as some of the most prominent characteristics of tribal land tenure.

### 3. Salient features of the system

The most outstanding aspects of the system of land-ownership were: indivisibility, inalienability, and absence of wage-earners.

#### a. Indivisibility

Land belonged to the people who inherited it from their common ancestors. As a result, private land in the European sense was unknown in tribal society. Although plots of land were allotted to individuals, they were not marked out artificially and their "owners" did not possess any title deeds.

#### b. Inalienability

Here again, mainly because of its religious character land was not considered as a commercial asset. Bundy recorded an interesting example conveying the link between these two aspects of tribal land. In 1911 and 1912, a well-to-do Mfengu farmer called Stephen F. Sanjeca gave a talk he entitled "how I became a successful farmer" to a meeting of African peasants in Middledrift. He explained to his audience that unlike his parents who preferred cattle-raising, he set out to devote himself to cultivation. He expressed, then, his desire to purchase land to his father who shocked by his attitude, explained: "Buy land! How can you want to buy land? Don't you know that all land is God's and he gave it to the chiefs only?" [26].

### c. Absence of wage-earners

Contrasting with the individualistic outlook of western society, African community was characterized by a strong collective awareness. Individuals were above all, members of their families and an integral part of the tribe at large. Their economy was of subsistence only, their tools were archaic, but tribesmen generally enjoyed a fair amount of security. African society did not know the wage-earner whose sole wealth rests on his labour force. As members of the tribe, headsmen and their large families were automatically entitled to enough land to settle on and to make a living out of it. In time of depression, the chief's store to which they contributed through their tributes could always alleviate their plight. As a result, the socio-economic and political structures of African society formed a coherent whole. To quote official sources:

When the natives first came into contact with Europeans, they had a well-developed social and economic organization, which it would appear met their needs in a fairly satisfactory way. It had definite ways of meeting the various emergencies with which they were forced [27].

## II. Socio-Economic Change

The European advent started a new process of stratification amongst its population. Indeed, white settlement and the reserve policy entailed expropriation of African most fertile land, and the progressive pauperization of the great bulk of its inhabitants. A handful of Blacks, however, managed to become well off, and helped in their turn the emergence of an African intelligentsia. The industrialization of the country added the layer of labourers.

### 1. African Peasantry:

Amongst this portion of African population, one has to single out two sub-strata: African peasants in the reserves, and those living on European farms.

#### a. African peasants in the reserves

The reserve system was mainly based on an adaptation of tribal land tenure. However, communal land-ownership in the reserves came to be regarded as a serious hindrance to labour recruitment. Indeed, Africans enjoyed a relative

prosperity under it, and they did not feel, thereby, the need to work on diamond and gold fields. To meet the increasingly pressing needs of mining companies, European administrators set out to supersede tribal land-ownership by individual tenure, and to wreck traditional rulers' authority.

In 1894, the Cape Parliament passed the Glen Grey Act to implement the above policy. This Act was first applied in the Glen Grey area of the Cape Province. From 1898 onwards, a series of proclamations extended its scope to the greater part of the Transkei [28]. This Act and its underlying principles constituted a precedent to further legislation. Union officials clearly considered it as a model. In 1920, for instance, General Smuts, then Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs, asserted that "no important departure" had been made in the last twenty-five years after its passage [29].

Despising African men whom he considered as children, its author Cecil John Rhodes proposed to uplift them from habits of lust and idleness to the status of respectable labourers. In moving the second reading of his Act in the Cape House of Assembly on 30 July 1894, Rhodes declared:

it is our duty as a government to remove these poor children from a life of sloth and laziness and to give them some gentle stimulus to come forth and find out the dignity of labour [30].

To safeguard the supply of submissive labourers, Rhodes explained that Africans' awareness of their exploitation through missionary education and European contact had to be avoided. On the one hand, he advised government closer control of mission institutions. Indeed, these contributed to turn out black clergymen who might enlighten their fellows on their conditions of work. To quote him:

I have travelled through the Transkei, and have found some excellent establishments where the natives are taught Latin and Greek... There are Kaffir persons everywhere - these institutions are turning them out by the dozen. These people will not go back and work and that is why I say that the regulations of these industrial schools should be framed by the Government otherwise these Kaffir persons would develop into agitators against the Government [31].

On the other hand, he enforced the principle of territorial segregation implied in Shepstone's reserve policy. The poor Whites should be helped, he asserted, but

their daily contact with Africans might bring about clashes and therefore should be precluded. As he put it:

My idea is that the natives should be kept in these natives reserves, and not be mixed with the white men at all. Are you going to sanction the idea, with all the difficulties of the poor White before us, that these people should be mixed up with white men, and white children grow up in the middle of native locations? In the interest of the white people themselves, we must never let this happen [32].

In his mind, those silly children could not claim to be even second class citizens and have a say in the management of national affairs. To Europeans reverted the responsibility to pull the strings of those puppets in whatever direction they wished. "As to the question of voting", he asserted, "we say that the natives are in a sense citizens, but not altogether citizens - they are still children" [33].

Rhodes put his ideas into practice by developing individual tenure and creating local councils in the reserves. Section 2 of his Act deprived African chiefs of the right to allot land which the government now divided into locations. Under the provisions of section 4, Africans were to be granted more or less than four morgen. Every land-holder was liable to pay a fifteen-shilling quitrent on a four-morgen allotment, and three shillings for every additional morgen. As far as squatters were concerned, they were bound to pay a ten-shilling tax to be allowed to dwell on the commonage. Land reverted to the State in the event of rebellion of the registered holder, of his second or subsequent conviction for serious theft, or if he failed to occupy land beneficially.

Section 38 provided for District Councils. Under the terms of Section 39, these bodies were to be composed of six members appointed by the governor. As specified by section 46, the councillors received salaries. Section 48 empowered them to levy a minimum of five shillings on every land-holder. Section 33 compelled every African male capable of labour, resident in the district but holding no land, to pay a labour tax of ten shillings per annum. He was exempted from such obligation, however, if he had worked for three months during the previous year, or for three years, consecutive or otherwise. According to section 53, taxes were to finance the construction of schools, roads, bridges, and dams [34].



The introduction of individual tenure, the confiscation of land on some occasions as well as the labour tax were clearly intended to meet the Union labour needs. Africans could hardly be expected to occupy land beneficially for three years. Climatic conditions, natural disasters such as the rinderpest of 1896 - 97 condemned them to a very low production, even if they tilled their land according to more modern techniques. The too small piece of land granted to them without enough consideration for their large families also entailed overcrowding and the subsequent erosion of land. Furthermore the labour tax, which raised such a storm of protests that it was repealed in 1905, contributed to their pauperization, and drove them to swell the number of labourers.

The Glen Grey Act allowed the gradual extension of the District Council system to the Transkei by Proclamation, and this power had been later used. In 1917, twenty-one out of twenty-seven districts of the Transkei set up their own councils. The exceptions were four districts in Eastern Pondoland, and the districts of Mount Currie and Xalanga in Tembuland. The district council powers to levy rates under the Glen Grey Act were transferred to two general councils: the Transkeian Territories General Council or Bunga launched in 1903, and the Pondoland General Council established in 1911. These general councils were presided over by the Chief Magistrate. They included magistrates of the districts as well as two Africans elected by the council of each district. In the year 1915 - 16, the revenue of the Transkeian Territories General Council amounted to £77,000 [35].

Time and again, the Union authorities praised the Glen Grey Act for the local self-government it conferred on African people. In fact, they made much ado about nothing. Members of such local councils represented but a tiny minority of the African population. Moreover, the councillors did not seem to have any initiative in the work they performed. To quote official sources:

The council system had been developed too rapidly and on the wrong lines. The general council today observes all the forms of English Parliamentary procedure, but it is the form without the substance. The Natives are encouraged in the illusion that they are governing themselves, when in fact estimates are prepared by officials and revised by the government and the expenditure of every penny is carefully supervised by the Administration [36].

To sum up, the Glen Grey Act destroyed Africans' relative prosperity, and compelled them to sell their labour power. It also undermined their allegiance to

the authority of their tribal rulers now reduced to the status of amapoyisa or constables. As a colonial administrator later pointed out:

Individual tenure has some interesting consequences. In the first place, it is of great assistance to the government in the general Transkeian policy of breaking down the power of the chiefs and of substituting that of the Magistrates and of headmen in government pay. The native who is a landowner in his own right and at the same time an elector directly to a District council and indirectly to the General Council looks to other power than his chief [37].

People's alienation from their tribal rulers gave birth to a Native Vigilance Association in the Transkei. This body aimed at giving members of the new African intelligentsia privileged positions so as to check the reactionary influence of chiefs and headmen [38].

The Glen Grey Act finally contributed to shape Africans' new outlook toward land. Indeed, to overcome their ordeal in the reserves, they increasingly pressed for the right to buy land.

African peasants also dwelt on white farms. Their lot, however, was no brighter than their fellows' in the reserves.

#### b. African Peasants on white farms

African land was seized by the right of conquest, and by the creation of reserves. Land expropriation and African rebellion against it started since the early days of European settlement. Africans' deep-seated attachment to land cannot be explained only by its religious connotations. Land also represented the source of wealth and from the very beginning, Africans sensed that by laying hands on their land, the Whites were simultaneously jeopardizing their economic security.

Their rebellions against Europeans, however, entailed what they dreaded most. After every war, the Whites took over not only their best land and their cattle, but also secured their labour. As de Kiewet put it:

Actually the native wars were a process which gave the white community more than possession of the bulk of the best land. It gave them a considerable measure of control over the services of the natives. The land wars were also labour wars [39].

This process started after the wars of 1659 and 1673, when the Khoi-khoi despoiled of their land and of their livestock were compelled to sell their labour power to the Whites. Some historians like Marais for instance, contemptuously blamed them to work for Europeans: "the readiness with which they entered the service of the farmers", he said, "is another noteworthy feature of the lust of this race of nomads" [40]. This statement is to say the least paradoxical. How could they be "nomads" if they owned land and tilled it? Furthermore, once they lost their land and herds, did not work for the Whites constitute the only possible issue? If another alternative was available, why did he fail to mention it? Finally, how could forced labour be associated with lust? Marais's lack of uprightness could be forgiven to some extent, however. He was only echoing the strong prejudices widely spread amongst the Whites. Profligate, idle, childish were the common epithets thrown at Africans' head to justify their enslavement.

The Xhosa wars of 1835, 1846 - 47, 1850 - 53 and the Griqua rebellion of 1877 - 78 further contributed to Africans' despoilment. After each Xhosa war, the government took possession of more land which to the disgust of settlers they sold instead of granting it freely [41].

The Griquas, too, were ceaselessly harassed. A cornerstone in their history, - the discovery of diamond fields in Griqualand West in the 1860s - started the beginning of the end of the Griquas. Lusting after the precious stones, the Whites hunted down the Griquas who had to flee from one area to another in search of a possible sanctuary. After the Orange Free State farmers plundered Griqua farms at Philipolis, Adam Kok led his people in 1862 to the Drakensberg where they founded Griqualand East. Once again, however, the Whites followed hard on their tracks. In a desperate attempt to crush their tormentors, they set out to take up arms against them in 1877 - 78. Once more, however, the white vultures fulfilled their goals for the Griquas were destroyed and their long-coveted land was seized [42].

The Zulus who once inhabited the whole of Natal and parts of the Transvaal also fought many battles with the Boer Voortrekkers and the British to keep their land, but without avail. After the final Zulu war, Garnet Wolseley as a representative of the Crown promised in June 1880 that the Zulus would not be deprived of it "so long as the sun shone in the heaven" [43]. However, as S.T. Plaatje later pointed out, "the sun is still shining but Zululand has been cut into farms for the white

people and more are being contemplated to be cut up" [44].

South Africa then, was not a no-man's land where after a pleasant journey Dutch and British came and built up their houses. They had first and foremost to break Africans' resistance. Loss of their land caused a deep distress amongst Africans who from their former status of landowners were now reduced to a landless proletariat. Swallowing their pride, or overcoming their aversion for their white foes, they had to work on their masters' farms for survival.

The imposition of pass laws stimulated this drain of manpower. These coercive methods were first introduced in the Cape in 1760 to control the movement of slaves between urban and rural areas. Under Caledon's Proclamation of 1809, too, Africans could not move without passes [45].

Pass laws were meant to compel Africans to have a fixed abode and to enable them to discuss the terms of their contracts with white farmers. However, their real intentions consisted in keeping them in a state of destitution to become part of a cheap proletariat. Indeed, if the Cape Government really wanted Africans to have a fixed dwelling, why did they turn them out of their land? Furthermore, how could they possibly bargain for better conditions of work if their masters were to determine their fate as labourers? Assuming that they were given this opportunity, how could they check the terms of their contracts, illiterate as they were?

On European-owned farms, African labourers might be sorted into three categories: squatters, labour tenants, and full-time servants. These groups did not constitute clear-cut categories. Indeed, various governments constantly sought to reduce the squatters to the status of labour tenants, or servants. As a result, their conditions generally displayed the same characteristics.

#### Squatters

As a general rule, the squatters were bound to work on the land taken away from them and generously granted to Europeans. Prior to 1902, the squatters also provided the white farmer with their own span of oxen to till the land. In return, for the use of their ancestors' land, of their cattle as well as for their labour, the squatters usually received half of the harvest after deduction of the costs.

The Boer war altered this share-cropping basis and further contributed to the squatters' enslavement. Many lost their livestock in the war. As a result, the European land-owner now supplied the cattle with all its trekgoed, but he gave the squatters only a third or a quarter of the crops [46].

A consensual agreement governed the relationship between squatters and their employers. The absence of a specific contract, then, put the former at the mercy of the latter and their livelihood varied according to the white farmer's character and needs. Sometimes, the squatter would receive a share of the crop, or a cash payment his master was willing to offer him. Sometimes, he would have to give his services whenever and for as long <sup>a period</sup> as the white farmer would require [47].

The squatters also generally collapsed under the heavy burden of taxation. In the Cape Province, for example, they were taxed on the same lines as their black fellows in the reserves. In Natal and Transvaal, they were compelled to pay an annual rent. In Natal, it originally amounted to one pound per hut, and in 1903, it rose to two pounds. In the Transvaal, it was one pound for every adult male till 1903 when it increased to 30s per adult male, 10s for every five head of cattle above ten, as well as 2s 6d for every ten head of small stock above twenty [48].

Yet, despite the ups and downs of his condition - and he knew more hardship than anything else, - the squatter paradoxically became the target of real witch-hunting over the years. The Location Acts No. 2 of 1869, No. 6 of 1876, No. 37 of 1884 passed in the Cape aimed at reducing the number of "idle squatters" [49]. Act 33 of 1892 condemned the white farmer in the Cape to a cash penalty if he gave residence to more than the allowed number of Africans. In some districts such as Uitenhage, Alexandria, and Bathurst, this Act turned many Africans off the farms [50].

However, squatting being a source of benefit, especially to the absentee landlord, the Act was ignored on the whole. Its failure might explain the passing of the Cape Act No. 30 of 1899 which again allowed only restricted squatting of Africans on European farms. The inter-colonial commission of 1903 - 1905 also advised legislators to check the squatting evil. In 1908, a commission put forward the same recommendations on the ground that squatting prevented settlement

by young Europeans. To quote them, this system made it "increasingly difficult for young Europeans to secure the hire of ground, and a desirable class of farmers is thus displaced". [51].

The Private Location Act No. 32 of 1909, which superseded the Cape Act No. 30 of 1899, made room for these prospective farmers by driving off many squatters. Indeed, it set a limit to the number of Africans on any white farm [52]. It raised the licence fee to two pounds, and allowed the South African police to put the squatters in front of the alternatives of paying their licences - which the government sometimes purposefully withheld, - or of leaving the farms. As was expected, this legislation succeeded in reducing the squatting population from 35,418 in 1907 to 6,630 in 1931 [53].

The same restrictions on squatters were also imposed in the other provinces. In Natal, Law No. 2 of 1855 provided for the annual rendering to the government of accurate returns of African squatters, and of their families. The Transvaal government enacted the Squatters' Law, or Plakkerswet No. 2 of 1895 which allowed not more than five families on a white farm. In the OFS, Law No. 4 of 1895 again limited the number of African squatters on a European-owned farm to five families. This number could be increased by special permission. Chapter XXXIV of the Free State Law Book also prevented Africans from leasing or purchasing land [54].

Later, the Natives' Land Act No. 27 of 1913, its Amendment Bill of 1927, and the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 carried on the fierce repression of the defenceless squatter. The labour tenant's situation also left much to be desired.

#### Labour tenants

Unlike the squatter, the labour tenant was bound to sign a contract with the European farmer, and to serve him for a period of more than one hundred and eighty days. This contract was, in fact, a mere sham. Indeed, the labour tenant was not entitled to choose his master: labour requirements determined whether he should be granted residence on a farm or not. Furthermore, once on the European-owned land, he was faced with the insecurity of tenancy as he had no guarantee of fixed residence for more than a year. Like the squatter, he was usually confronted with a twofold alternative: either to agree to the payment of a licence

fee which amounted in his case to 10s, or to be forcefully removed to the overcrowded reserves which could not welcome him [55]. In most cases, then, the labour tenant was reduced to the level of a full-time servant, left unpaid or offered very low wages for the right to use his ancestors' land, whipped or jailed if he dared to challenge his master's authority [56]. To sum up his nightmare, one might say with Nzula that "in reality, contract labour is forced labour, a specific form of slavery. The bargain is a mere fiction, a leaf concealing actual slavery" [57].

### Servants

Servants were not slaves in so far as they could neither be bought nor sold as in bygone days. Their white masters, however, were prone to consider them as their personal belongings. The former gave their servants a home. In return, the latter were compelled to be constantly at their beck and call, or be jailed [58].

To secure the highest profit, the white farmer exploited not only his servant, but also the latter's family if they lived on his land. The servant's wife, for instance, would wash for the landlord's family, his children would look after the sheep, milk the cows, and so forth [59].

On the whole, European farmers enjoyed several advantages. Not only did they possess the privilege of owning land, but they also managed to secure cheap labour thanks to several devices: they mainly kept their labourers - whether squatters, tenants or servants - in a permanent state of uncertainty of tenure; they also over-saddled them with increasingly high taxes. As a result, the three categories of labourers had either to comply with their masters' whims, or be imprisoned, for there was no room for them in the congested reserves. Neither alternative was desirable for it meant avoiding Scylla only to founder on Charybdis. They were compelled, nevertheless, to opt for one of them.

Shortage of land, heavy taxation without any form of representation, ill-treatment of African labourers, and government's attempt to stop the development of independent African churches led to Bambatha's rebellion. The 1906-1907 Native Affairs Commission which investigated the causes of Natal's 1906 uprising considered the land issue as "the crux of the enquiry" [60].



In bygone days, land was plentiful and sparsely populated, and the problem of population growth could easily be sorted out. Under white rule, the squatters were first only compelled to render service, but as their numbers increased beyond the requirements of the farmer, a small rent per hut was imposed. As time went by, the conflicts between landlords and tenants became acute owing mainly to the increase in rent. Unable to meet higher rents African squatters were compelled to go. "It is just here that the crisis will be found", the commission asserted. Indeed, where were Africans to go as the reserves were already overcrowded, and as Natal government failed to put aside some land to meet the needs of the growing population.

The imposition of a poll-tax in Natal in 1905 also caused much unrest amongst Africans. According to a historian, it constituted the "spark that set alight the tinder-dry bush" [61]. The financial depression which followed the Anglo-Boer war, led the colonial treasurer, T. Hyslop, to introduce poll-tax legislation. He felt that the new tax which was to supersede the hut-tax would increase the revenue and meet labour needs.

The poll-tax had ill effects on the relationship between fathers and their sons. In olden days, children were customarily required to account for their earnings to their fathers. But the poll-tax made children less willing to help their parents and, time and again, many old men in several places complained about it [62]. A few years later, the High Commissioner Gladstone wrote that "in Natal a number of Natives went into rebellion largely owing to discontent with the collection of the poll-tax" [63].

The increased rents and taxes brought about indebtedness. Africans became confronted with a difficult dilemma: they had either to find out financial means to pay their taxes or to face harsh arrests. They usually tried to avoid imprisonment, but they became the victims of unscrupulous money lenders who charged them extremely high interest. The 1906-1907 Native Affairs Commission reported that in one case, an African agreed to work for twenty shillings a month to pay off his debt, the interest on which alone amounted to twenty-five shillings a month [64]. This was not an isolated case. According to a farmer from Impendhle, 90% of the local African population were indebted [65]. They could not sue their dishonest creditors, however, for lawyers were themselves guilty of financial extortions. The 1906-1907 Native Affairs Commission which recorded African opinion on the latter asserted that:

They did not go so far as one of Shakespeare's characters, and say, "Let us kill all the lawyers", but they did say frequently quite spontaneously, and with remarkable unanimity, as can be gathered from the evidence, that lawyers should be debarred from appearing in civil cases... They "fleece us and teach us lies" is one of their forcible, yet humiliating, expressions towards some members of (the) profession [66].

As a result of their increasing debts, Africans came to see overt rebellion as the only outlet to their demoralization. The 1906-1907 Native Affairs Commission stated that:

One prominent witness gave it as his opinion that debts so contracted had much to do with the revolt, the Natives having become callous and indifferent and seeing no other way of escape from the intolerable load of accumulating interest [67].

Despite their substantial contribution to the revenue of the colony, Africans were nevertheless denied franchise rights. On 10 April 1906, the South African Native Congress" declared that taxation without representation also led to the rebellion [68]. Talks about Africans' eventual exclusion from political representation had started as early as 1863. Law No 11 of 1865 endorsed the prevailing opinion against the attribution of voting rights to Africans and it deliberately required qualifications which Africans were unable to meet. In 1904, only two Blacks enjoyed the privilege of voting of the 904,041 African inhabitants in the colony [69].

The Natal rebellion also sprang from African labourers' resentment of their small earnings and of their ill treatment on white farms. Labour tenants received wages ranging from three shillings to five shillings a month. They were sometimes not given the full amount of their pay. They were also subject to corporal punishments if they dared to challenge their masters' authority. Absconding labourers who were arrested thanks to the pass laws apparatus and brought to court had to put up with further hardships. They could be beaten again by magistrates who were allowed "the use of a rod or cane", or compelled to work on public roads.

The lack of educational opportunities constituted another grievance. Relying mainly on missionaries, Natal government gave little pecuniary support to further Africans' education. Some had to leave the colony to get some training. Although they were "children of the soil", their education was neglected whereas Indians were provided with schools [70].

Ethiopianism also brought about much restlessness amongst Africans, European observers alleged. In a minute dated 12 October 1906, the Magistrate of Mapumulo Division said: "Personally I am satisfied that centres of Ethiopianism in this division are mainly to be found at the American missions, a creed which was a great factor in this rebellion" [71]. Fear of the movement led <sup>the</sup> Natal government to impose restrictions on the new religion. African clergymen were not allowed to set up their churches in a given area unless a missionary was on the spot to prevent seditious teaching. Colonial authorities sometimes dismantled African churches [72].

The combination of these restrictive measures grieved traditionalists and Kholwas alike. White rulers, declared Ilanga Lase Nata on 4 December 1903,

openly maintained that the black man is destined to be led, but not to lead: to be thought for by others, but not to think for himself. This applies with very marked emphasis upon the natives of Natal and Zululand, who are saddled at every turn with restrictions that stifle all the aspirations which lurk within their breasts -- restrictions in education -- restrictions in religion -- restrictions in bettering their conditions in the matter of migrating from colony to colony in order to offer their services to the highest market -- restrictions in obtaining the franchise -- restrictions even in the insignificant matter of walking upon the footpaths -- restrictions in fact whenever and wherever there is a possibility of enforcing them [73].

Despoiled of their land, oversaddled with taxes, subject to corporal punishment and to hard labour, denied their own faith, deprived of constitutional means of redress, Africans reacted. On 8 February 1906, they defied the Umgeni magistrate who came to collect taxes. The next day, they attacked a police squad sent to support him about twenty miles south-west of Pietersburg and killed two of them. Stunned by this unexpected resistance, Natal government proclaimed martial law and allowed militia raids to overawe the tribes. By the end of March, all seemed quiet, but a few days later, frightening events took place in which Bambatha was to play a leading part. Then Chief of a small Zondi tribe near Greytown, Bambatha had become himself a labour tenant and the prey of greedy money lenders. Followed by several thousand Africans, he seized the man appointed in his stead, and ambushed a police force before withdrawing across the Tugela river to Nkandhla forest. To put an end to Bambatha's insurrection, Natal authorities despatched a strong army of ten thousand Whites and six thousand Africans. On 10 June, Bambatha and his followers were finally defeated in a battle at Mome Gorge. Thirty Europeans and about three thousand Africans -- among them Bambatha -- were killed [74].

This general picture of a wretched African peasantry in the reserves and on European-owned farms would be incomplete if it overlooked the presence of a tiny nucleus of black landowners. Indeed, the government granted land to their collaborators such as the Mfengus, or Fingoes, for their services during wars against their kinsmen and allowed, thereby, the growth of an African middle class.

#### African "Kulaks"

Since the 1820s, the Mfengus were among those Natal Africans who were driven off by the expansion of the Zulu kingdom, and who sought refuge in the Ciskei and Transkei [75]. The Xhosas welcomed them, but they were not long to find out that they gave shelter to their bitterest foes. Indeed, the Mfengus played an important role in all large-scale wars launched by the Whites against them. During the 1834-35 war, they contributed to defeat the Xhosas in several ways. For instance, they carried messages to the British army, supplied them with 970 well-trained soldiers, hunted out the Xhosas from the bush to help the British shoot them more easily. In return, they were allowed to settle on Xhosa land, and to keep the 20,000 head of cattle they had seized.

During the 1846-47 war, British authorities encouraged the Mfengus to attack Xhosa villages in the Ciskei and Transkei and to lay hands on as many cattle as they could find. As they were allowed to keep the captured stock, they did<sup>not</sup> need telling twice. By the end of the war, they managed to seize over 20,000 head of cattle and 14,000 goats.

When the 1853-79 war broke out, the British relied once more on the Mfengus. These namely helped smother Rarabe Xhosa's insurrection, and caused the death of their leader Sandile [76].

By the 1850s, several Mfengus seemed fairly confident in their military potential, and in European dependence upon them. As a result, they became exacting, and pressed for grants of land. The government felt compelled either to allot plots of land or to deal with "the most dangerous and competent opposition the Whites have faced to that date in South Africa" [77]. They yielded to the Mfengu pressure in the end.

The Xhosa wars, then, provided the Mfengu collaborators with the opportunity of growing well-off through the allocation of captured booty, and through grants of large tracts of land. As a result, from subsistence farmers they came to be involved in the market economy. Many of them started to consider land as a commercial asset. In 1858, George Grey's Proclamation allowed Africans to purchase land. Two years later, the Peddie Mfengu alienated land from farmers in the district. The Magistrate R.G. Taunton and the Wesleyan missionary Davis who set up an agricultural society, expressed their astonishment in noticing the Mfengu's readiness to become its members. As the former put it: "the attendance and subscriptions were even more than could be expected, amounting to nearly £40 [78].

The 1865 Commission on Native Affairs revealed the increasing extent of Mfengu's cultivated land. Thirty Mfengu became landed proprietors with farms varying from 500 to 1500 acres. Other Mfengu rented as many as 50 or 100 acres of land. They also turned to trading activities, selling the grain they produced in excess for cash.

Their full integration in the market economy may also be conveyed through the keen competition between Mfengu members of the agricultural society and white farmers. The Rev. Davis told the commission that despite the drought, the Mfengu outworked, and the quality of their wares surpassed Europeans'. To quote him:

It was a universal remark in the district that the Fingo exhibition far excelled that of the Europeans' both as to the number and quality of articles exhibited [79].

The sale of their corn, wool, stock, poultry... enabled them, in return, to purchase land usually within Fingoland and British Kaffraria [80].

Furthermore, their communistic outlook gave way to a more individualistic, exploitative vision of social relations. Like European farmers, black land-owners hired out squatters, labour tenants, and servants. In 1883, a Magistrate told the Laws and Customs Commission that the "Fingoes are now trying to engage refugee Tambookies from Basutoland as servants as they pass through the district in search of work" [81]. Like the Whites, too, they aimed at getting the maximum profit at a minimum cost. Hlombein, a Mfengu farmer who owned 500 head of cattle told a Commission on Labour supply: "I endeavour to get the cheapest labour" [82].

African translation from traditional into cash economy was not ~~restricted~~<sup>and</sup> to the Mfengus. Other tribes such as the Ngqikas, the Tembus, the Xhosas, and the Sothos followed the movement. According to the 1865 Native Affairs Commission, about five hundred Ngqika peasants at Umgwali sold their wheat, butter, maize, and other goods to neighbouring tribes. Not far from Kingwilliamstown, more than three hundred families invested their proceeds in land [83].

The Tembus, too, attempted to adjust to the new economic forces. They mainly traded sheep and wool, and became well-to-do merchants. Thanks to their commercial activities, they managed to purchase European implements which they used to improve their agriculture [84].

In addition to the Xhosa wars and George Grey's 1858 Proclamation, the Glen Grey Act and the Boer War helped the emergence of a wealthy peasantry. Under the Glen Grey Act, African headmen as members of the local and district boards, and later of the general councils in the Transkei and Pondoland, took advantage of their position to feather their nest. A survey of the Transkei disclosed, for example, that some of the councillors owned as many as three thousand sheep, and most of them had two hundred sheep and fifty cattle [85]. The Glen Grey Act, then, contributed to the growth of a prosperous headman-bureaucrat-peasant class. Bundy went as far as to liken them to Russian economically and politically powerful Kulaks [86].

Furthermore, if the Boer war impoverished the great bulk of African peasants, it also allowed others to thrive. Wherever troops were concentrated - such as in Tembuland, and Griqualand - peasants produced grain and meat in excess, which they sold at remunerative prices to soldiers [87].

However, Africans' wealth did not last long for a series of events undermined it. There were, for instance, natural phenomena such as drought and East Coast Fever. In 1897, Rinderpest devastated the country [88]. In 1912, Bishop St. John called to colonial authorities' attention to the shortage of food supplies in certain districts of the Transkeian Native Territories as a result of severe, protracted drought. Ministers acknowledged the urgent need for remedial action to avoid widespread distress, but their efforts were greatly hampered by defective means of transport. Already suffering from the scarcity of fodder, the local cattle were further destroyed by East coast fever [89].

Legislation, too, aimed at preventing Africans from growing prosperous to meet the increasing need for labour. In his Land Settlement Act of 1912, for example, Fisher as Minister of Lands and the Interior categorically prohibited the "hypothecation, assignment, transfer, sublease, or subletting to Natives" [90]. A year later, the 1913 Land Act expressly curtailed Africans' right to buy land [91].

To conclude, African society underwent a process of stratification under European rule. Three categories of African peasants existed by the end of the 19th century. The first category included those African peasants living in the reserves and largely using traditional production methods to meet their needs.

The second category involved three kinds of African labourers working on European farms: squatters, labour tenants and servants. Insecurity of tenure and the imposition of heavy taxes contributed to their impoverishment.

The third category was composed of a nucleus of African landowners who used modern techniques, produced surplus of good, indulged in trade to sell it, and invested the proceeds thus realized by alienating more land. However, several factors such as natural disasters and government legislation undermined their integration in the cash economy [92]. Apparently, this landed bourgeoisie was hardly noticeable in the 1930s. A controversy about its existence reached a climax by that date. To those who asserted that an African middle class existed, others like J.L. Loke replied that they failed to notice it. Loke stated:

We seek it here, we seek it there, we seek it everywhere, but we cannot find the Native bourgeoisie. Where is it? Of whom is it composed? It is news to learn that there is a Native bourgeoisie class in South Africa [93].

Harold Wolpe, a sociologist at the University of Essex, also asserted;

(roughly prior to 1930) the State did extremely little to develop or assist agriculture in the Reserves. Statistics of food and other agricultural production are extremely sparse. Clearly, by the mid-1920s surpluses were either extremely small or non-existent and continued to decline [94].

The overall feature of the South African peasantry, then, seems to be their economic wretchedness. Together with missionaries, African Kulaks nonetheless contributed to the growth of an educated elite which played a leading role in the national movement.



## 2. Emergence of African educated elite

The Black intelligentsia in South Africa must be viewed as a product of missionary education, above all. The four provincial governments also contributed to its growth through a system of grants mainly derived from various taxes levied on Africans.

### a. African education in the Cape

The first school for African children owed its origin to the Reverend John Love. A former remarkable student at Glasgow University, Love became minister of Hoxton Presbyterian Church in Artillery St, London, a congregation generally known as the "Scotch Church". On 21 September 1795, he helped set up the LMS, and two years later, in April 1797, he was corresponding with Johannes Theodorus Van der Kemp, a Dutch philosopher and medical doctor who offered his services as a missionary [95]. Certainly thanks to the financial contribution of the Society, Van der Kemp managed to build the first mission school in 1799 near Kingwilliamstown in the Eastern Cape [96]. By 1820, about fifty missionaries, mainly from Scotland, left for South Africa and set up mission schools throughout the Cape Colony [97].

All denominations were to use English as a medium of instruction if they wished to receive the government grant of £30 a year proposed from 1841 onwards. To avoid external control, half the schools turned down the government offer. The missionary institutions which accepted soon found themselves under the supervision of the newly-created Superintendent-General of Education. They were also expected to turn out teachers capable of giving secular education. But missionaries neglected this type of instruction and devoted their efforts to evangelization. The rare visits of the Superintendent of Education, who remained the only inspectors for years, allowed this state of affairs [98].

Some schools attempted to provide Africans with industrial and teacher-training. In 1871, Lovedale girls' school opened an industrial department thanks to a New Year gift from the children of the Free Church of Scotland and to a yearly grant of £50 from the Cape government [99]. In this department, girls as well as women were trained as domestic servants or seamstresses. Other crafts such as carpentry, building, plastering, wagon-making, shoe-making, printing, book

binding and farming, were taught. The Cape counted other trade and teacher-training schools than Lovedale. There were Zonnebloem in Cape Town, the Wesleyan Institute in Grahamstown, and five schools started by the Cape Governor, Sir George Grey [100].

One may notice that the term "industrial" was used in a rather odd sense. One fails to understand, for instance, how domestic work could constitute an "industrial" subject. Moreover, the future of handicrafts was rather uncertain. Indeed, African products could hardly compete with articles of European manufacture. Africans themselves, especially those living in urban areas, were prone to use them. Early critics already viewed the teaching of handicrafts in primary schools as "a mere waste of time", and rightly so in such instances [101].

In many cases, this so-called industrial training was neglected and replaced by literary work [102]. The lack of appropriate equipment due to the scarcity of funds accounted for its failure. The 1903-05 inter-colonial commission acknowledged the importance of education, but did not consider it as an urgent matter for two major reasons. On the one hand, they asserted that South Africa needed only unskilled or semi-skilled labourers for the time being. On the other hand, they pointed out that such a training could not be provided at the public expense without adequate contributions from the students [103]. Thus, in addition to the various taxes Africans paid, they were expected to give fees. But the destitution of most of them prevented them from providing the necessary funds.

Industrial and agricultural education developed at a slow pace. In 1913, the Transkeian Native General Council set up under the Glen Grey Act started two industrial schools and an agricultural institute for fifty students at Tsolo. In 1916, the contributions of the same Council, of the Free Church of Scotland and of the government allowed the establishment of the South African Native College, Fort Hare, where a great emphasis was laid on agricultural training.

In May 1919, the Cape authorities appointed a Provincial Commission to adjust the syllabus of African schools to the practical needs of their pupils. This commission recommended a stronger government control over African education, advisory committees of African parents, local government bodies to supply finance, higher salaries for African teachers, a change in the curriculum with a stress on

agriculture and on handwork such as mat-making, carpentry, and weaving [104].

Missionaries as well as African people welcomed such provisions. In August 1921, the Chief-Inspector for the Cape Province, W.G. Bennie, who belonged to a family of Scottish missionaries and who was himself born and bred at Lovedale, took them into account in his Draft Primary Course for African Children. Unfortunately, the lack of government financial support hindered their implementation [105].

From the 1920s onwards, the Cape government took a more active role in the sphere of education. Ordinance 26 of 1920 made it free, and the provincial administrations had to shoulder its cost. The State purchased the missionary institutions' property and put up new buildings. It paid attention to African teachers' qualifications, and by 1921, over 70% of African teachers were certificated. It also devised a new lower primary course which included African languages, handwork, agriculture and domestic science. However, the lack of equipment hampered its effectiveness [106].

Despite the Cape administrators' efforts, the level of education was very low. In 1922, 70% of African children were still below standard II, and the ratio of those above standard IV was only one in twenty in all schools [107].

In 1927, other schools than Lovedale provided Africans with a relatively high type of education. The Wesleyan Training School at Clarkebury in the Transkei, for example, had departments of carpentry, tinsmithing, and the like. In the same year, the schools of Tabare and Baziga were teaching up to standard VI [108].

By and large, however, in the 1930s the overwhelming majority of African children did not go beyond the first standards in primary schools. Only 1,000 were in secondary schools in 1935, and of these sixty were in standards 9 and 10 [109]. In his memorandum of 26 October 1935, W.G. Bennie who retired from the post of Chief-Inspector for Native Education in the Cape province, emphasized the financial starvation preventing missionaries from providing Africans with a relatively high standard of education. He wrote:

While leaving the control of schools largely to the missionary churches, I consider it imperative that funds should be provided to enable Education Departments to ease the heavy responsibility falling upon the churches and the

people, in respect of the buildings used for school purposes. Suitable rent grants should be paid sufficient not only for their upkeep, but to compensate to some extent for the money expended in their erection [110].

He also deprecated their generally low standards officially justified by the so-called deficient mental powers of Africans. As he put it:

Having being connected with Native Education for sixty years as a pupil, teacher, inspector, virtual director... of native education in the Cape province, and finally as editor of a course of Xhosa school books, to which many Xhosa writers contributed, I can discover no such differences in the mental powers of the Native as compared with those of the White, as would justify the limitation of his education... And my observations agree entirely with the observations of others, also of long experience, whom I have closely questioned [111].

#### b. African education in Natal

In the northern provinces, too, African education generally suffered from inadequate provisions. Of these provinces, Natal was the most advanced. Very early, Natal government attempted to follow the Cape example, but they met two major difficulties. On the one hand, until 1856, there existed no machinery whereby grants could be channelled to help missionary bodies [112]. On the other hand, European settlers strongly opposed their initiative. As a result, their first contribution was postponed up to 1877 [113].

The government's regular subsidies allowed the extension of elementary education to Natal African pupils. In 1912, 232 elementary schools and five industrial centres catered for their needs. The government was then spending the yearly sum of £14,000 on these institutions which were all run by missionaries. 18,000 African pupils enjoyed the benefits of education, but the non-existence of secondary schools deprived many of further studies. \*

The spread of education amongst African population nevertheless received a great stimulus from the Phelps Stokes African Education Commission which in 1922 declared:

While the Natal system of education for Natives is second to that of the Cape Province in the liberality of financial support, it is far superior in general organization, effectiveness and adaptation to the real needs of the native people. With adequate financial support and some improvements now in

process, the Natal system should become the ideal for all other systems in Africa [114].

Natal colonial authorities did not remain indifferent to the Commission's encouragements. From about 1924 onwards, African education developed rapidly. The number of African institutions doubled, and high schools were set up. The Natal Education Department took over from the missionaries or started 100 out of 490 existing schools. By 1927, an intermediate school at Pietermaritzburg taught up to standard VI. Adams' Institution allowed African boys to take standards VII and VIII to enter Fort Hare University College [115].

The period 1930-40 witnessed a significant expansion of African education. From 1930 to 1935, the annual expenditure amounted to £110,000, and from 1936 onwards, it rose to £805,000. The Province of Natal then counted 640 primary day-schools, four intermediate boarding-schools, twelve secondary schools, nine industrial schools and six training colleges.

Typical institutions in Natal were St. Hilda's and Mariannhill. In St Hilda's, cookery, household management and gardening were taught. In Mariannhill, the boys were trained in carpentry, brick-making, stone-cutting, leather-work, shoe-making, tailoring and printing, and the girls became acquainted with lace-making and embroidery.

#### c. African education in the Transvaal

Before Union, African children took advantage of the scant educational provisions made for them. By 1910, over 10,000 African pupils attended some 220 small mission schools which all received little financial support from the government [116]. To get more funds, missionaries used to be involved in land transactions. They bought land from the government, and leased it afterwards to African converts. That was the case, for instance, of George Weavind, a Methodist missionary, who alienated several farms near Pocheffroom and handed them over to African lessees [117].

Missionary institutions suffered from an insufficient supply of teachers, too. The 253 mission schools registered by the end of 1913 included 453 teachers, the vast majority being Africans [118]. These teachers often lacked experience. They

were poorly-paid and had, thereby, no stimulus to improve their own education and their pupils'. By the end of 1913, three kinds of African teachers could be singled out: the fully-certificated, the provisionally certificated, and those holding no certificate. The maximum annual salary they were entitled to receive respectively amounted to £50, £40 and £20. In each case, the maximum salary was scarcely paid. In 1915, the Transvaal Council proposed the introduction of a yearly increment subject to a satisfactory report from the Inspector of Schools as an incentive to better teaching [119]. Greater efficiency, however, was expected from the institution of a European principalship in first class schools. All those providing a six-year course were included in this category.

Unlike Natal authorities who took over the control of nearly all primary schools, the Transvaal government continued to heavily rely on missionaries. In 1915, the Transvaal Council of Education declared:

The point that the initiative has been due to missionary enterprise needs special emphasis, not only because it is necessary to give credit where credit is due but because the close association of education with religious work has been a factor of primary importance in the development of native education in our country, and one of which the due account must be taken in any proposed reform [120].

The Transvaal administrators considered that the presence of various missionary institutions and the keen competition between them would provide African children with enough schools. Their indifference towards African education, however, constituted only a means to achieve their goal which consisted in protecting Europeans' skilled positions against African competition. The Transvaal Council of education pointed out in 1915:

It is met by strenuous opposition from the workmen and their representatives. There can be no question that their attitude is based on the fear of competition. It is felt and argued that, if he is given an opportunity, the native will slowly, but not the less inevitably, encroach on the field of labour now occupied by the Europeans, and this is to be resisted at all costs. The education of the native is to be the product of this policy of resistance to his industrial advance [121].

Other officials argued that Africans had to be maintained in a state of ignorance and destitution to remain useful and manageable. They believed that African knowledge of European education could be a dangerous weapon if it came within Africans' reach. It might make them aware of being exploited and

ultimately lead them to revolt. As they put it:

"The raw Kaffir" is usually held to be more manageable, reliable, and useful than one who has been educated to a certain degree of consumers of the value of his services. The colonist, therefore, would if pressed, give his vote in favour of "ignorance" that is "bliss" for the native, and prefer that his servants should enjoy their servitude to their being educated into competitors [122].

If some colonists thought that Africans' acquaintance with European education might jeopardize social order and should therefore be denied to them, a few European liberals upheld an antagonistic view. The latter believed that educational facilities would increase the productive powers of Africans and would enable them to contribute to the prosperity of the country. In 1915 the Transvaal Council of Education voiced this opinion in the following remark:

It is equally true that where he comes in contact with the European as a labourer under supervision, we want the best work possible for him, and therefore, his education as a condition of advanced efficiency should be proceeded with [123].

At no moment, however, did the idea of putting African and European education on the same footing come home to them. African pupils could claim only some modicum of education. From 1910 to 1952, of the 250,000 African children in school, only 3,500 or less completed standard VI [124].

#### e. African education in the OFS

From its beginning in 1833 up till 1878, African education in the Orange Free State depended solely on mission funds which were mainly derived from oversea sources [125]. Some of the financial support also came from Africans themselves. Indeed, although they already contributed to the government revenue through taxation, they were also asked to raise a special fund from their own pocket to subsidize their training.

Syllabi were first devised by the missionaries. They usually included the four R's: religion, reading, writing and arithmetic. They later laid a particular stress on practical subjects. From 1924 onwards, the Education Department of the Orange Free State became responsible for drawing curricula for Africa schools. African vernaculars and history were considered as important subjects. The

Education Department nevertheless paid little attention to secondary schools. Although neglected, these institutions prepared African children for the Junior Certificate Examination and for the Joint Matriculation Board Examination.

Until the 1920s, the absence of African inspectors undermined the efficiency of African schools. The missionary managers were to supervise themselves African schools which were often too far off from one another. As a result, the missionaries generally did not pay close attention to every one and were compelled to rely on the principal teacher of the school. The first inspector in the Orange Free State was appointed only in 1924.

African schools also suffered from a shortage of qualified teachers. Of the 370 African teachers in primary schools, in 1924, only 58 held certificates. A lower Primary Native Teachers' Course was introduced as late as 1944 [126].

African pupils' practical results somehow conveyed these various shortcomings. From 1910 to 1952, only 5% reached standard IV, 3% standard V, and less than 1% standard VII [127].

#### f. General characteristics of African education

As a rule, missionary bodies bore the brunt of African education. Their very existence encouraged the provincial authorities to heavily rely upon them. The provincial administrations then allocated only starvation contributions and neglected African education. The 1903-05 inter-colonial commission clearly deterred them from considering a compulsory or a general system of public undenominational education on the ground that the strong competition between missions would meet African educational requirements. As they put it:

The Commission does not recommend any measure of compulsory education for Natives, nor does it consider it advisable that any system of general public undenominational education, independent of existing missionary organization should be undertaken at present. Their own growing desire for it and the energy exhibited by the mission bodies to compete with each other in the matter of providing schools seem to assure considerable future expansion [128].

Provincial authorities' grants raised the problem of the secularization of African education. Missionaries realized that if evangelization was to be subordinated to secularization, the control of schools would slip out of their



hands unless they stood against government interference. This division between colonial officials in the four provinces and European clergy, together with sectarian rivalries amongst missionaries, hampered the progress of African education [129].

Missionaries had also to tackle the complex problem of selecting the language to be used as a medium of education. Should they choose one of the most outstanding vernaculars: Thonga, Sesuto, and Zulu, or one of the two European languages: English and Dutch? At the beginning of missionary education, the language of the people in a given area was automatically adopted by the school. However, the teacher who was appointed there by the Church generally did not know that language. Finding himself in hot water, he usually had to look for a position elsewhere or give up [130].

European opinions differed on the language question. Some politicians expressed themselves in favour of the retention of the vernacular. To urge Africans to forget their mother tongue, they argued, would deprive them of part of their identity, and would increase the danger of assimilation. Moreover, if they were to be granted some modicum of local self-government, then the use of the vernacular should prevail [131]. Later, the Union government attempted to create a standardized language by unifying different vernaculars. However, their initiative aroused a strong opposition amongst missionaries who had published religious and educational literature in African various dialects [132].

Educational opportunities for Africans remained very meagre. In the country as a whole, only 4.9% of African children were receiving education in 1935. In the same year, only 2.96% of Africans in state or state-aided schools were in or above standard VI. The number of African and European pupils in standard VI was respectively 8,400 and 37,600 [133]. The first national committee on African education set up in 1936 clearly revealed that it was slowed down on purpose to suit the labour needs of the ruling class. As they put it:

Just an elementary education for the masses in England was strenuously opposed by the ruling classes even as late as the nineteenth century because of the economic and social inconvenience it might cause, we find in the history of South Africa a similar attitude on the part of the white man towards the education of the natives... The introduction of elementary education on a wide scale amongst the "masses of heathens" might cause "social inconvenience" and

might even be dangerous [134].

On 24 March 1937, Jan Hofmeyr, the Minister of <sup>the</sup> Interior, Public Health and Education, delivered an interesting address in the South African Native College, Fort Hare, revealing European attitude toward African education. He pointed out that Africans were often required to develop along their lines, but no one bothered to define what these lines should be. As a result, African education was pushed into the background:

I do not like that phrase "the development of the native on his own lines". All too often it means either no development at all or as little development as possible [135].

He considered that the task of devising a distinctive system for African pupils reverted to African educated elite. Educated Africans were better qualified in this field than the government, he argued, for they had enjoyed the twofold advantage of being acquainted with both their cultural heritage and European civilization.

In fact, Hofmeyr's policy only meant postponing the problem of education. Indeed, on the one hand, Africans had first to be trained throughout the different parts of the country. On the other hand, when they came out, they were deprived of any channel to make their wishes known to the government.

#### g. African reactions to educational provisions

African politicians very early tried to contribute to the development of education by setting up their own schools. Selby Msimang, a leading member of the SANNC, recalled how his grand-father, the Reverend Daniel Msimang, one of the first African ministers of the Methodist Church in Natal opened several schools without any church help. As he explained: "It would appear the Church was not in any position to finance them" [136].

The activities of several African Churches conveyed African awareness of the crucial importance of education. The African Church founded by Joseph Napo Kanyane on 6 September 1889 had one school at Sophiatown. It included thirty pupils. The Ethiopian Church of South Africa initiated in March 1908 by Isaiah Goda Sishuba and Henry Reed Ngcayiya played an active role in the sphere of

education, too. It launched several schools at Nancefield (200 pupils), Belfast (35 pupils), and Middleburg (20 pupils). The Church of God and Saints set up by the American Negro William S. Crowdy also started one school with 35 pupils [137].

Ordained by the Congregational Church, John Langalibalele Dube opened Ohlange Native Industrial Institute in Natal in August 1901 [138].

Time and again, Africans further pointed out the failings of government educational policy, notably the glaring absence of government sponsored schools, the lack of a compulsory system of education, and the neglect of industrial training. In 1901, the Reverend Walter Benson Rubusana who later became a prominent member of the SANNC called for compulsory industrial training to meet the needs of Africans who were to live in a society based on European standards. As a result, he argued, racial segregation in curricula should be dropped. On 28 May 1904, Martin Luthuli, a prominent member of the Natal Native Congress, complained about the lack of government schools before the South African Native Affairs Commission. In 1905, the Bhaca and Xesibe tribal rulers in the Transkei pressed for compulsory education, and the question came up again in the Bunga - the Transkei General Council - as well as in church assemblies [139].

After Union, African politicians lodged the same complaints about African education. In October 1924, the SANNC judged that African education should be placed under the Union Government's direct supervision and related to the practical wants of Africans [140]. The following year, tribal rulers like Chief Senthumulo supported by educated Africans like Richard Victor Selope Thema, an outstanding SANNC leader, insisted on compulsory education [141]. Solomon Tshekisho Plaatje, another leading member of the SANNC, resented that Africans had to pay for white children's schooling [142]. Alfred Bitini Xuma, who was in the limelight of local politics and became president of the African National Congress for nine years from December 1940, denounced the lack of financial support by the government. He asserted that of the £8,000,000 spent on education in 1929, only £567,296 went for African training. This amount, he reckoned, was nearly thirteen times less than the sum earmarked for the other sections of the population [143]. African spokesmen were also aware that the neglect of African education aimed at maintaining African people in a subordinate position. The African politician, Albert Luthuli disappointedly noted:

Since (Africans) had been cast for the role of hewers of wood and drawers of water, their education, must equip them to hew wood and draw water. The 3 R's became luxury subjects [44.]

Thus, although bearing the heaviest brunt of taxation, Africans were niggardly provided with education. For several decades, they were compelled to depend upon the charity of missionary institutions to reduce the gap between them and the white man. However, missionary education suffered from many flaws which hindered African progress. The education the latter received from the former was limited to the teaching of religion and of the 3 R's. The few missionary managers could not properly control schools which were often very remote from one another. The supply of teachers was insufficient and when these were available, they lacked pedagogical experience and no financial stimulus urged them to improve their knowledge and their pupils'. Furthermore, divisions between the various missionary bodies, and between them and the government, made the situation worse.

The government introduced industrial training, but was reluctant to shoulder its cost. Yielding to European workers' pressure, the government purposefully maintained Africans in a state of ignorance and poverty to leave them unaware of their exploitation and to preserve white skilled positions. As a result, African technical education was neglected. African pupils hardly reached a reasonable standard which would allow them to hold posts in the public service at the end of their training.

Dissatisfied with the missionary and the government educational systems,<sup>the</sup> African elite took the initiative to set up schools sometimes thanks to the financial support of American philanthropists. By and large, however, their individual efforts could not meet a nation-wide thirst for knowledge. Furthermore, the authorities considered that American help might jeopardize the master-servant relationship they were striving to keep up and, thereby, curtailed their initiative.

### 3. Industrialization and the growth of an African wage-labour force

Owing to the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley in 1867, and of gold in Johannesburg in 1886, South Africa underwent an industrial revolution, a turning point in South African history. Industrialization completed the process of stratification of South African society by allowing the emergence of African

wage- labourers with links in the reserves.

Although part of the labour force used in the mines was imported, a special emphasis will be put on the conditions of work and life of South African miners as well as of South African labourers employed in ancillary industries to which the diamond and gold fields gave birth.

South Africans' early reactions to their conditions will also be pointed out so as to later assess how far bodies such as the SANNC and the ICU, for instance, voiced their grievances and managed to fulfill their expectations.

a. Diamond Production and Ancillary Industries, 1870 - 1899

Henry Barkly, Governor of the Cape in 1870, apparently gave a genuine account of the first diamond discovery. According to him, a farmer named Nickerk showed beautiful Orange River stones to John O'Keilly, a trader. Nickerk allowed O'Keilly to have one of the stones. The latter took it at once to Hope Town, and let a Civil Commissioner called Chalmers know about the find. The stone was then sent to a Dr Atherbone of Graham's Town, who after inspecting it asserted it was a 21.4 carat diamond worth £500 [145].

The news soon spread. Diggers rushed to the Orange and Vaal Rivers, and found that their banks were rich in diamonds. However, it was not until the end of 1869 that systematic search for diamonds was undertaken. In March of that year, a stone weighing eighty-three and a half carats, and known as the "Star of South Africa" was discovered on a farm located in Griqualand. Between 1874 and 1882 diggings were converted into mines under the titles of "De Beers' Mine", "Kimberley Mine", "Du Toit's Pan Mine", and "Bulfontein Mine" [146].

Some of the first African labourers were brought to the diamond fields by European farmers and traders, and later they were recruited by labour agents or "touts" at the rate of one pound. Others, induced by the many goods such as brass, copper and iron wire, knives, hatchets and guns purchased by the returning workers, went to the mines of their own free will. To quote one of the pioneers, a Mr Ingle:

By the end of 1870, a good many of these natives who had been at work in 1869, had reached their homes with the good things in the shape of brass and copper wire... and straggling parties of twos and threes began to come from all directions, all being readily engaged by the miners and beginning to bargain for their wages before engaging themselves [147].

Guns, in particular, constituted a strong incentive at that time, for when traditional rulers noticed they could be sold on the diamond mines, they sent out their subjects to arm themselves. Indeed, in the 1870s, Europeans in the North East of the South African Republic and in Basutoland were challenging the authority of chiefs, and to resist their attempt at undermining it, the latter believed that guns were necessary. As a witness put it:

These natives have been pouring in crowds into the diamond fields for seven years at the rate of 300,000 a year, each gang of from 30 to 40 men, after a journey on foot of often 1,000 miles, during which many of them die of starvation, and cold, remaining and working only just long enough to supply each member with guns and ammunition ie. about three months, and then returning to their land. They carry back no money, but simply a gun, and they come for nothing else.

The English government permits the sale of guns to them indiscriminately, and it is a well-established fact that 300,000 have been then disposed of. These natives declared war upon the Transvaal government a few months ago, and we now see what all this preparation meant [148].

In the 1870s, wages usually amounted to ten shillings a month. They were too low to attract African workers, and mines occasionally suffered from shortage of labour supply. African hands did not receive a stable salary, and their wages varied according to the fluctuations of supply and demand. When in June and July 1880, about four thousand Basuto labourers left the diamond fields, mines almost remained at a standstill, and as a result, wages rose [149]. However, when labour was obtained from the North, wages fell off. Between 1882 and 1889, African workers earned from fifteen to thirty shillings a week, twenty-five shillings being the average. Together with this cash wage, they were provided with lodging, and generally with firewood. In some instances, however, mine-owners failed to pay them, hence their discontent. In 1898, G.W. Barnes, the Protector of Natives at Kimberley mine wrote:

I regret to say that the natives working in some of the mines are not treated as well as they might be. Not that there are any complaints of cruelty or violent treatment but great dissatisfaction is apparent... on account of the non-payment of wages. I have had several cases brought to my notice during the

past year of the most glaring injustice with respect to the native wages, and this in the case of large gangs of labourers, and it is no wonder that from the mines there is such a cry of shortness of labour [150].

Since the early days of the diamond diggings, too, a huge gap between African and European pay was noticeable. Europeans received from £4 to £5 a week. In addition to their wages, overseers even got a percentage of the value of the diamonds discovered. Different reasons were put forward to explain Europeans' higher rates. The Whites were more skilled; they were to be enticed to come to South Africa for the local supply of trained workers was small: in 1888, amongst the Europeans employed at Kimberley mine 55% were of British extraction, 43% of colonial, 2% from other countries. At De Beers mine, 65% were of British extraction, 30% of colonial, and 5% came from Europe and from America [151]. However, the difference between European and African wages was not unconnected with the colour bar, too.

Legislative measures such as the pass system, the squatting laws, and the Glen Grey Act were devised to meet the mining companies labour needs. In 1871, the Cape Masters and Servants Act compelled African labourers to carry "certificates" specifying the terms of their contracts. Their employers were safeguarded from desertions and from diamond thefts by two strict regulations. First, their servants were forced to have their certificates endorsed at the term of their contracts. Then, they were delivered passes by officers. African workers were not allowed to leave the diamond fields before they got the latter pass for which they had to pay a one shilling fee [152].

In case of diamond thefts, claim-holders were entitled to search their employees' person and property without warrant. If diamonds were found, they were supposed to be the master's property unless the contrary were proved. Several penalties were laid down to put an end to diamond thefts. African labourers were subject to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a period not exceeding one year. Lashes not exceeding fifty could also be inflicted. To further strengthen this Act, stern measures such as Proclamation 18 of 1872, and the Cape Masters and Servants Act of 1875 were passed. The latter, in particular, allowed the summary apprehension of a servant for desertion.

In Natal, too, a proclamation issued in 1874 compelled Africans coming into the towns to register as daily labourers or "togt" men. Unless they were togt men,

owners or renters of a house, or employed by such owners or renters, Africans were not allowed to stay in the boroughs of Pietermaritzburg or of Durban for more than five days. Such labourers were forced to pay a fee of two shillings and six pence a month in advance for wearing a togt badge which was considered as a favour done to them. This proclamation remained in force until 1902, when an Act allowed boroughs to devise bye-laws regulating togt workers' conditions of residence in towns.

In addition to the pass laws, the Cape Location Acts No. 2 of 1869, 6 of 1876, 37 of 1884, also drove many Africans off European farms, and compelled them to become part of a cheap labour force. The Glen Grey Act of 1894 which imposed heavy taxes on Africans in the reserves, and which provided for confiscation of land in case of rebellion, constituted another means to swell the labour market. Furthermore, natural catastrophes such as drought and rinderpest in 1896-97 increased this flux of manpower from rural to urban areas.

By 1888, a system of housing African labourers was adopted at the Kimberley and De Beers mines. Finch who visited some of the compounds said they were prison-like, enclosed by ten-foot high sheets of iron. African workers were not allowed to go outside as long as their contracts compelled them to serve.

Compounds were first designed to stop thefts. Finch described the "ordeal of the searching room", where completely naked, Africans had to undergo a close and humiliating scrutiny of their mouth, nose, ears, and of other "conceivable and inconceivable lodgement for a diamond", and to perform various gymnastic exercises [153]. African workers in the compounds also suffered from lack of cleanliness which caused various diseases and a high death rate [154]. A Native Hospital was available, but African labourers were often sent there when it was too late to cure them [155].

However, mine managers found compounds convenient for they allowed them to search their African employees only once at the end of their service. Compounds offered other advantages: they prevented more frequent desertions and strikes. If the latter occurred, the leaders were more easily found out and apprehended. This inhuman institution was also said to help decrease African workers' apparently strong taste for liquor. However, mine owners themselves regularly served their African employees a certain kind of cheap ~~brandy~~ called "Cape smoke" [156].



The discovery of diamonds gave birth to secondary industries, and notably to railway works. In this field, too, European managers had to cope with the problem of an uneven labour supply depending upon the reputation of their works. In places such as East London where African treatment and wages were relatively satisfactory, there was no difficulty in meeting the demand. Nevertheless, in 1885 Africans from Middledrift district were reluctant to work for a daily wage of three shillings.

Africans from Keiskamashoek, too, refused to work on railway construction unless an officer paid them directly at the end of each week. Like the diamond mines, railway works suffered from the drink evil, and in some instances, Africans did not allow their children to go there, decreasing thereby the supply of labour. Africans' reluctance to work on railways, terrain obstacles, the industrial depression of 1880 and the subsequent decrease in the revenue slowed down the construction of railway lines. By this date, only fifty miles from Durban were built, and in 1886, the line reached Ladysmith.

Furthermore, in Natal the colonial government used compulsory labour for the construction and maintenance of roads. African workers were required by magistrates and sent out by their chiefs. Forced labour was very unpopular amongst African employees. They received low wages; they were compelled to work for a period of six months; sometimes, the same men were ordered out over and over again [157].

#### b. Gold-mining and ancillary industries, 1886-1899

On gold diggings, African labourers had to put up with the same hardships as on the diamond mines. They were namely compelled to work hard for very low wages; they were victims of the pass system; they were forced to live in the same awful compounds; they were ill-treated, but at the expense of their health were induced to stay longer on the mines through the use of alcohol and of prostitution.

In 1886, the Witwatersrand was proclaimed a gold-mining area. Mining companies were exclusively European-owned, and enjoyed government support. As far as Africans were concerned, they were deprived of the right to get mining licences, to trade in minerals, to dwell on proclaimed ground, and to set up shops on such

grounds [158]. Such discriminatory legislation clearly conveyed that Africans could claim only the status of labourers.

The bulk of the labour force working in the gold mining industry was composed of non-Whites drawn from Portuguese East Africa, from all over Southern Africa, - namely from Bechuanaland and Swaziland, - as well as from Natal and the Cape Colony. In 1886, one thousand five hundred Africans were already working on the gold fields. Gold companies employed few Africans from the South African Republic itself. In July 1896, it was reported that out of nearly 43,000 Africans working within a three mile radius of Johannesburg centre, less than one thousand came from the Republic.

African labourers were acquired in several ways. Some were brought by prospectors and diggers. Others were recruited by labour agents. The Rand employers often paid large sums to recruiters who hired African workers under long-term contracts [159]. However, few African labourers fulfilled their contracts owing to the recruiters' misrepresentations of their wages, of the nature of their work, and of their conditions on the mines. When confronted with reality, Africans were generally disappointed. They discovered that, in fact, their wages were extremely low, and their conditions of work very hard. Mine owners believed that non-white employees should receive a low pay so as to compel them to stay for a longer period. Africans came to the mines, they said, just to earn money to meet certain needs, and then, they went back to their kraals. Hennen Jennings, consulting engineer to H. Eckstein and Company told the 1897 Industrial Commission of Inquiry that "they come, in fact, only... to make enough money to return to their kraals with sufficient means to enable them to marry and live in indolence" [160].

However, African workers resented their low pay and tried to take advantage of the keen competition between mining companies to better their situation. Indeed, as a result of a rivalry between mine-owners, there was no fixed scale of wages. African labourers, then, frequently deserted to offer their services to employers giving higher rates. As they received as much as £4 for every labourer supplied, recruiters often encouraged African miners to break their contracts. In its first report, the Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines stated:

So long as the total supply is deficient, it is to be (feared) that eager competition between managers to secure labourers will be inevitable. This competition has in some cases taken the regrettable form of overt attempts to bribe and seduce the employees of neighbouring companies to desert their employers [161].

Since the very beginning of the gold-mining industry, the colour bar based on the principle that the competent man is always the white man condemned African labourers to inferior positions, and consequently, to a lower pay than Europeans'. In 1895, African workers received between £2 or £3 a month. In 1894, the average monthly wages of European employees already amounted to £23. 1s [162]. Such a gap was due to the colour bar, to the dearth of skilled labour, as well as to the economic and political power the Whites enjoyed, and which enabled them to bargain for better conditions of work, and for higher rates of pay than the non-Whites [163].

In 1896 - 1897, rinderpest further contributed to decrease African labourers' wages. Rinderpest did so much harm to cattle that Africans, in their despair, called it zifonzonke or "every disease". One of its effects was to drive many Blacks onto the Rand labour market [164]. This additional supply of labour allowed mine management to cut down African wages in 1896, and once again in the following year [165]. Two years later, in 1899, to induce traditional rulers to provide mining companies with a steady supply of labour, an industrial commission proposed to offer them premiums [166].

To prevent a pre-employment bargaining in the labour market by Africans, and later their desertions from mines, employers called for a severe pass system. The Republican government agreed, and between 1885 and 1889 enacted a series of laws that divided the Rand into labour districts and introduced a system of permits to seek work [167]. The Chamber of Mines carried on agitating for special pass laws in such labour districts, and the Volksraad finally yielded to its pressure. Law 23 of 1895 compelled Africans to get a district pass as soon as they entered a gold field which had been proclaimed a labour district. This pass gave them three days to look for work, and if they wanted this period to be extended, they had to pay a fee. When they found a job, their pass was kept by their employers until the expiration of their contract. Then, their employers would provide them with a new pass. If they failed to carry it, they were liable to be arrested [168]. Law 31 of 1896 condemned African employees without a pass to a penalty not exceeding

three weeks with hard labour for the first offence. For the second offence, they were liable to pay a fine not exceeding £5 or to imprisonment not exceeding four weeks with hard labour. For any subsequent offence, they were to put up with up to ten lashes as the court judged fit [169].

Under the terms of Law 23 of 1899, pass offices in Johannesburg, Boksburg and Krugersdorp were provided with waiting rooms where all non-white workers without a pass could be detained for up to six days to be identified by their employers. As might be expected, such an institution led to dangerous practices, especially on the part of those mine owners needing labour [170].

To further control and exploit African labourers, the mine management on the Witwatersrand imposed the compound system which was first set up in Kimberley diamond mines [171]. In these compounds, they were to experience another set of horrific conditions. Although mine owners complained time and again about "the liquor curse", they were directly responsible for such a situation. Indeed, as early as 1881, President Kruger allowed the Hungarian Jewish entrepreneur Alois Hugh Nellmapius to start a manufacture of alcohol in Pretoria: the De Eerste Fabriek in de Zuid Afrikansche Republiek Ltd. Several mine owners invested in this distillery. The manufacture soon opened scores of canteens - 147 in 1888, 552 in 1892 - selling cheap liquor to the Rand miners. To draw more customers, liquor retailers grouped themselves in a powerful trade organization, the Witwatersrand Licensed Victuallers' Association (WLVA), and used Belgian, French, German, and American prostitutes namely from New York City as barmaids. The manufacture which took up the name of Hatherley Distillery in 1892 allowed its shareholders to enjoy several advantages. It mainly provided them with handsome dividends as well as with a more stable labour force [172].

Soon, however, the Witwatersrand mine managers began to question themselves about the wisdom of using alcohol to attract and stabilize their labour force. By 1895, the Chamber of Mines reported that between 15 and 25% were unable to work because of drunkenness, increasing thereby the scarcity of labour [173]. African workers also became less manageable, and to put down their disturbances, mine managers had often to resort to cruel methods as testified by several witnesses before the 1903 Transvaal Labour Commission. Amongst the witnesses, several men had a direct experience of conditions in the compounds as they were before and just after the war. A former compound manager at the Crown Reef mine spoke of

"(Africans) drink sodden condition, want of discipline and general moral decay" [174]. Another wrote:

No man, with any claim to manhood, could have gone thru those (pre-war) experiences and not have realized the indescribable horror of it. To say that I carried my life in my hands is putting it mildly; it was a constant case of having to quell riots among natives frenzied with drink, and I fear that in the process I had over and over again to adopt methods which... would ordinarily have qualified me for gaol. I have never used a revolver tho I always carried one, but I have been thru riots with a heavy sjambok and with that quelled the disturbances but almost at the cost of some natives' life. The horror of it I shall never forget [175].

In 1896, the Chamber of Mines set out to prohibit the sale of liquor to all miners. President Kruger and his supporters initially opposed its change of policy, but the Volksraad finally passed Act No. 17 of 1896 including a "total prohibition" clause to be implemented on 1 January 1897 [176].

This Act, however, met with strong opposition from the State President, his Executive, the Owners of Hatherley Distillery and the WLVA. As a result, during 1896 and the first half of 1898, the "total prohibition" clause was infringed every day on a large scale [177]. On 20 January 1898, the Chamber of Mines through its President George Rouliot, a man of French nationality, once again complained about the drunkenness of African labourers and its evil effects. He wrote:

Although our supply of natives is not over-plentiful still we would not feel the pressure so much if all our natives were in a fit state to work. 20 to 30% of labourers are incapacitated through drunkenness and a great many of the accidents occurring in the mines are due to the same cause [178].

In its first issue in 1899, the Transvaal Leader was still requiring immediate action against the illicit liquor syndicates.

From mid-1896, too, several groups such as Kruger's local officials, the non-propertied middle class, and above all the Rand ~~clerk~~ <sup>clerk</sup> men shocked by the quick spread of venereal diseases, disgusted by public displays of indecency, and offended to learn that continental prostitutes accepted black as well as white customers, urged the Pretoria government to suppress prostitution. With this end in view, the Volksraad enacted laws.

Aware that prostitution and liquor constituted additional means to exploit

them, Africans expressed their discontent. Saul Msane, then compound manager at the Jubilee Mine and who was to play an important role in African nationalist struggle as well as Sebastian Msimang addressed an 800-strong working-class meeting in the Wesleyan Native Church on 16 May 1899 [179]. They unanimously adopted resolutions requiring the total prohibition of liquor. In May-June 1899, African labourers again reacted against their exploiters:

...at one of the mines 600 boys destroyed the illicit liquor store, together with all the elaborate equipment of electric alarms and signals with which the store and adjoining premises were fitted. The reason given by the natives for this action was that the store was too much of a temptation to them, so that all their money was spent on drink [180].

However, owing to the systematic bribing of the Morality Police, to the influence of former New York City pimps, prostitution continued to thrive in Johannesburg [181]. With alcohol and prostitution, their inevitable accompaniments remained. Diseases, accidents and a high death rate affected the Rand African labourers.

Gold mining on the Rand brought about profound consequences for <sup>the</sup> South African economy. In 1889, with a population of 25,000 Europeans and 15,000 Africans, Johannesburg became the largest centre in South Africa. To meet the various needs of its inhabitants, and of the Rand community, to provide mines with machinery and other articles, several ancillary industries were set up. For the transport of all the required goods, railway and road construction became a necessity. Between 1888 and 1890, 2,014 miles of railways were built up. There were 889 miles in the South African Republic, 442 in the OFS, 390 in the Cape Colony, and 293 in Natal. Several lines passed through Johannesburg, gradually giving it the appearance of a spider's web. Johannesburg was connected with the coal deposits in the Eastern Rand, with the Cape in 1892, with the Portuguese port of Lourenço Marques in 1894, and with Natal in 1895. Africans railway workers usually received higher wages than those employed on roads where compulsory labour continued to be used [182].

On the whole, the African situation in the mining industry left much to be desired before the Boer War. The war raised hopes amongst African inhabitants who took part in it, and who stood by the British. Their expectations were entertained by Milner as well as by the representatives of philanthropic bodies in London who pressed for an improvement of African labourers' situation. As early

as 1899, Milner then Governor of the Cape Colony defined his policy in the following terms: "The ultimate end", he declared, "is a self-governing white community supported by well-treated and justly governed black labour" [183]. A year later, in a letter dated 9 November 1900 and signed by Thomas Fowell Buxton and Travers Buxton, respectively President and Secretary of the British and Foreign Anti-slavery Society drew the attention of the colonial authorities in London to the ruthless methods applied in the South African mining industry. They also urged them to take steps to better the lot of African labourers employed there. To quote them:

The war in South Africa is drawing to a close. It is submitted that it is in the highest degree to provide safeguards, especially in mining districts, against the appearance of slavery under the form of ... labour taxation and the oppressive exercise of pass and compound systems which are liable, if not strictly kept within due limits, to gross abuse [184].

As a matter of fact, amendments were brought notably to the evil system of recruiting and to the inhuman pass laws apparatus. Yet, despite these improvements, mining companies experienced a serious shortage of labour supply. After the war, the number of workers had, in fact, increased from 30,000 at the peace time to 40,000 by the end of the war. Nevertheless, mine-owners complained that this increase in manpower did not meet their requirements. To explain this disquieting situation, mine-managers alleged that military authorities during the war gave Africans large sums for their services which had to be spent before they would come and work in the mines [185]. They believed, then, it was just a question of patience and they were willy-nilly prepared to wait. As time went by, however, black labourers were still slow to appear despite the improvements devised to attract them. A scrutiny of the measures introduced, and of their impact on Africans' situation in the mines becomes then necessary.

#### c. Twentieth Century Problem: Competition between Europeans and Africans, 1900-1912

British administrators paid particular attention to the defective system of recruiting. Before the war, such a system did not come under a central body [186]. Labour agents agreed to supply a given employer, and received large sums from him for the black workers they brought. However, labour recruiters were generally very greedy, and such a system of recruiting proved costly and

ineffective. Indeed, labour agents did not scruple to sell the labourers they hired for one employer to another who would pay them again. They also did much harm to the Blacks. Attached to their land, Africans usually resisted being dragged onto the industrial labour market. Nonetheless, many yielded to recruiters' promises. As a result, they generally came unaware of the real nature of their obligations. In a letter dated 6 December 1901, and addressed to Chamberlain, Milner himself acknowledged the fact that "natives are in many cases compelled to work on terms not voluntarily or not intelligently accepted by themselves" [187]. So, when confronted with reality, they often took the first opportunity to abscond from the mines although desertion constituted a criminal offence under the law. They frequently escaped thanks to the encouragements of labour recruiters enticed by the prospect of additional fees. In an attempt to control them, a single responsible organization, the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA), was set up in 1900 [188]. In the future, labour recruiters were bound to get a licence from the Commissioner for Native Affairs. They were liable to severe penalties and could lose their licence for any misconduct. The Transvaal government also took the responsibility of ensuring that black workers understood the terms of their contracts and voluntarily accepted them. Indeed, under the new regulations, a government official would grant them a passport after checking that they were aware of the nature of their obligations, and were willing to comply with them. To control the fulfilment of such contracts new steps were taken. Inspectors had, indeed, been appointed. They were entitled to redress grievances, and if these were beyond their powers, they were allowed to bring the case before magistrates or before the Commissioner for Native Affairs.

The pass laws system was simplified too. A single passport was substituted for the numerous passes African workers were formerly bound to take under various circumstances. This passport included a record of all the services they performed from the time they left home until when they went back to it. Furthermore, African labourers and no longer their employers were required to keep this passport. From now on, black employees had nothing to pay for their passport unless they lost it. Arbitrary deductions from wages were also forbidden [189].

Flogging of African workers was also legally suppressed. Under the provisions of Proclamation No. 11 of 24 June 1901, the penalty of lashes imposed by Law No. 22 of 1895, and by the Native Pass Law on Goldfields of 31 January 1899 was abolished, save sections 18 and 149 of the latter law. On 23 July 1901, Kitchener



then High Commissioner for South Africa and administrator of the Transvaal, and Richard Solomon, legal adviser to the Transvaal administration signed Proclamation No. 19 to confirm the previous one. On 17 August of the same year, Chamberlain forwarded a letter to Milner in which he approved of the progressive steps taken by the Transvaal authorities. However, he urged them to take the laws in force in the West Indies as a model and to suppress all corporal punishment: [190].

The problem now consists in analyzing whether all these legislative measures designed to alleviate African employees' plight in the mines and increase labour supply were actually implemented and achieved their purposes, or whether they remained just dead letters.

As far as black labourers' recruitment was concerned, one might point out that the WNLA did not have a monopoly upon it. This body was chiefly concerned with hiring Africans, <sup>from</sup> mainly from Rhodesia, German as well as British East Africa, Uganda, West Africa and the Congo Free State [191]. Any employer or group of employers were still allowed to recruit their labourers independently [192]. The WNLA, then, exerted only a partial supervision over labour recruiting, and thereby, the system remained open to much the same corrupt practices. As a result, African employees carried on complaining about labour agents' deliberate misrepresentation of their wages, their conditions of work in the mines, and of their life in the compounds. W.C. Cumming, Secretary to the Native Affairs Department, once visited the South Nourse compounds and asked a labourer who had absconded and who had been recaptured why he deserted. The black employee told him that he had been recruited by an agent named Tsengiwe who had promised him a monthly rate of £3. 15s. However, on arrival at the mine, he was offered only £2. 10s. The black worker protested, but the mine owner threatened him that if he refused the wages given to him he would get no work. The labourer who was "a stranger in a strange land" felt compelled to accept the terms offered him, but later sought the first opportunity of escaping [193].

Headman Assegai Mbuli, labour delegate to Johannesburg, reported on 5 November 1903 that African labourers had no other alternative than to accept the low pay offered them. If they refused to work for the wages they were given, they were detained for six days in a "protection camp" until new masters would come up and hire them. The new employers, however, had to pay six shillings per man and per day spent in the camp. Black labourers resented such a system. They looked upon

the so-called "protection camps" as jails, and felt they were being sold to new employers as if they were slaves [194].

Africans resented their low wages. In January 1903. African labourers were recruited at a minimum rate of 45s per month. In April, their wages rose to 50s for surface workers, and 60s for underground employees [195]. Labour supply remained inadequate, however, and mine-owners generally refused to give higher rates. During an important discussion held in Johannesburg on 22 May 1903, the Chamber of Mines set out to keep African wages at the same rate [196]. They considered that the higher the wages, the longer their periods of "idleness" would be [197]. African workers, however, complained they were not given appropriate rates. According to headman Makubalo Nthaboti from Queenstown, mine-owners compelled them to work on Sundays, but did not count that work as overtime, and accordingly, did not grant them extra pay [198].

Pass laws, too, remained a burden. Indeed, African labourers who had fulfilled their one-year contract, and those who looked for work independently were not allowed to choose their employers. They were given only six days to find work and during that period, they were compelled to report themselves every night to the Pass Office. If they failed getting a job during that short period, they were not allowed to stay any longer, and if they did so, they were arrested and compelled to pay a fine of up to £5. If they could not pay such a fine, they were condemned to one month imprisonment with ~~out~~ without hard labour [199]. H.S. Cooke, Pass Commissioner and Chief Inspector, reported that some mine managers continued the practice of deduction of pass fees although it was unlawful now [200].

Although corporal punishments constituted an infringement of the law, according to G.Y. Lagden, Commissioner for Native Affairs, African workers complained that they were still being beaten [201]. H.S. Cooke declared that a few mine-managers carried on flogging their black employees, sometimes for no other reason that they were unable to understand their orders. Probably the same H.S. Cooke promoted later to the office of Director of Native Labour in Johannesburg, and Deputy Director of the International Labour Office, asserted that:

The introduction of Cornish miners immediately after the (Boer) war, who were much too prone to emphasize their commands by a kick or a blow did not help to remove the depression of natives who had much ground for complaints [202].

Headman Thomas Zwedela appointed to inquire into Africans' treatment in Johannesburg mines confirmed the above statement. He reported that African employees had been flogged by overseers, and he added: "I personally spoke to the men who had been flogged and saw the marks on their bodies" [203]. He also pointed out that overseers locked them up for days for trivial offences, and during that period they were not paid [204].

The Transvaal government as well as the industrial authorities also failed to deal properly with Africans' situation in the compounds. After a visit to Johannesburg, the delegate Chief Sipendu, reported that the rooms were too small and badly ventilated. Some of them, he added, were "unfit to be inhabited by human beings" [205]. In the compounds, Africans were again badly treated. W.G. Cumming, Secretary to the Native Affairs Department, declared that at one compound the urinal was very far and caused inconvenience to the Blacks, especially at night. Some of them who could not wait until they arrived at the urinal and had urinated on the veldt had been fined. Another worker complained that when caught, he had been tied to some poles, left there all night, and was released only after daybreak. At the same compound, one or two employees said they had been compelled to work thirty-two days before receiving their monthly pay [206].

This state of affairs existed mainly because black labourers had not an appropriate channel to express their grievances. Disturbances amongst Africans on the mines frequently occurred [207]. Riotous workers, however, were kept in a detention room commonly called "stokes". Later, all mines were connected by telephone with inspectors who proceeded to the mines as soon as they could and dealt with the case [208].

The ruthless treatment of African workers was all the more unfair that these men had to face the dangers of mining every day. Every day, they went down into the bowels of the earth, praying that they would not be buried under the falls of rock due to explosions [209]. Every day, they worked in unhealthy conditions. The air, spoilt by fumes from explosions, was bad. The sudden change of temperature from underground to the surface caused colds and pulmonary diseases [210]. Pneumonia, tuberculosis, septicaemia and other diseases were rife in the mines. Pneumonia returns were as follows in 1910: 28.97 per 1000 per annum in the Premier Diamond Mine, 26.66 per cent in the Crown Mines, 84.50 per 1000 a year in the De Beers Diamond Mine. The incidence of tuberculosis on African labourers' . . .

death rates also preoccupied the government and mining companies [211]. Septicaemia was prevalent in some mines, too. Inspectors reported that a certain number of Blacks constantly suffered from wounds received underground. The contact with infectious matter inflamed their injuries which became difficult to treat, and sometimes the patient died. To explain the occurrence of Septicaemia, industrial authorities frequently referred to the neglect of African workers who let the disease develop until it was too late. But how could they complain when life taught them that their employers looked upon them as mere commodities and that their welfare constituted the least of their worries? Describing their feelings towards Africans, Europeans themselves asserted that the "white man regards the Black as necessarily untrustworthy and beneath his serious considerations" [212]. Furthermore, assuming that their white masters sympathised, what could they get as no provision was made for their illness? In Natal and the Free State, there was no law granting compensation to injured workmen. In 1905, the Cape Government passed the Workmen's Compensation Act applicable to Europeans as well as to non-Whites. The procedure, however, was so complex that very few resorted to it. The Transvaal Workmen's Compensation Act of 1907 dealt with only white persons. Clause 22 of the 1911 Native Labour Regulations Act entitled African labourers and their families to a compensation for injuries and death occurring out of or during their employment. However, this compensation was paid by mine-owners only as a matter of grace [213]. Act 15 of 1911 deprived African labourers of a compensation for temporary incapacity by omitting to mention them [214]. Supplementing the Miners' Phthisis Allowance Act No. 34 of 1911, the Miners' Phthisis Act No. 19 of 1912 which came into force on 5 May of the same year left the situation unaltered. The new Act created two funds: a Miners' Phthisis Compensation Fund and a Miners' Phthisis' Insurance Fund. The former fund was designed to relieve persons who had contracted the disease and received contributions from the government as well as from mine-owners according to the number of their employees. The latter fund was designed to assist persons or their dependents who were likely to contract the disease. Workers contributed through deductions from their wages. The fund also received various fines imposed for contravention of laws and regulations enacted for the improvement of ventilation in the mines and so forth. As European employees exclusively contributed to the fund, benefits out of it were granted to them only [215].

Bad treatment and illness brought about a high death rate and a great number of desertions. In 1904-1905, the death rate amongst Africans reached 55.4 per 1000

per annum, and in 1905-1906, 31.2 per 1000 [216]. At the beginning of 1912, ministers thought it necessary to stop the recruitment of African workers from Nyasaland because of the high mortality rate [217].

The number of desertions was also high. The following chart, for instance, reveals that in May, June and August 1904 the exodus of African labourers exceeded their influx [218]. In 1910, the yearly desertion rate amounted to 15% or 30,000 out of 180,000 labourers employed [219]. An equally high rate of desertions prevailed in 1912 when 13,000 African workers escaped from the mines [220].

A high death rate combined with a great number of desertions led to a depletion of African labour. On 19 November 1903, for instance, a commission appointed to enquire into the situation of unskilled labour stated:

That the demand for native labour for the Transvaal Mining Industry is in excess of the present supply by about 129,000 labourers and... it is estimated that the mines of Witwatersrand alone will require within the next five years an additional supply of 196,000 labourers.

That there is no adequate supply in Central and Southern Africa to meet the above requirement [221].


The commission findings were confirmed by the WNLA report of 31 December 1903 which pointed out that mines were employing only about 38% of their respective needs [222].

The Whites in South Africa raised a storm of protests against the "lazy natives" who were responsible for such a crisis and considered that measures should be taken to compel them to work in the mines. Before a labour commission, General Ben Viljoen advocated the breaking up of African tribes and further taxation upon their inhabitants "who lived on the finest lands in South Africa paying practically nothing for them" [223]. Others expressed their deep discontent against missionaries and philanthropists in London who did much harm to their white fellows in South Africa by educating the Blacks, and urged them to mind their own business. As they put it:


It would be better for all of us if they were to leave our "poor heathen" undisturbed and turned their attention to the dirty and unromantic heathen English whom they will find in large numbers at their own doors [224].

CHART SHOWING COMPARATIVE VARIATION OF INFLUX AND EXODUS  
OF NATIVES IN PROCLAIMED LABOUR DISTRICTS  
1904

INFLUX 

EXODUS 

MINES AND WORK



Source: PP. 1905, LV-LVI, Cmd 2401, Labour in the Transvaal Mines, April 1905:

Chart available between pp 62-63

Over and over again, the Whites in South Africa renewed their protests against those idle Africans who were better off now owing to the large sums they pocketed during the war while the Whites were fighting. To quote a South African paper:

Before the war the farmers got as many servants as they wished, and it is only due to the fact that while white men were ruining each other, the black man was laughing in his sleeve, and making the money that keeps him from going back to hard work on the farms. He is today far better off than he was before hostilities commenced, but his money cannot last and if proper legislation is brought into force whereby the black man who does not work must pay for his idleness, it will not be long before many of the natives who are at present squatting under their own fig-tree, and allowing their wives to do the manual labour, will have... to earn their bread by the sweat of their brow [225].

In an attempt to meet the labour shortages, Chinese ~~men~~ were recruited in 1904-1905. In the gold mines of the whole Transvaal, 20,885 Chinese were working on 31 December 1904, and they were 31,424 on 28 February 1905 [226]. Scandalous measures were used to enforce discipline. The Chinese were not satisfactory ~~workers~~ and as a result of criticisms from South Africans as well as from British MPs, they were repatriated in 1906 [227].

After 1906, then, with the repatriation of Chinese labourers, and with the problem of the poor Whites, the mining industry was once more faced with the question of organization of its labour force. Mine owners and the government disagreed upon that issue. On the one hand, mine managers and their technical experts wanted to employ African labourers who had been working for years in the mines, and who had acquired some skill, or more responsible posts. For instance, Peterson, general manager of the Goldenhuis Estate Gold Mining Company, stated before the Mining Industry Commission that:

We have some of the Kaffirs who are better machine men than some of the white men. I have boys who have been working on the mine from twelve to fifteen years, and they are better than many on the Rand nowadays.

Question: Can they place holes?

Answer: Yes, they can place holes, fix up the machines and do everything that a white man can do, but of course, we are not allowed to let them blast.

Question: If the law was not what it is, do you think they could blast with safety?

Answer: I do not think; I feel sure about it. I have had experience with natives since 1879 and I know what a native can do [228].

Mine managers and their engineers also thought that they could realize benefits if fewer European labourers were unnecessarily employed. To quote a Mr Way:

The trouble with the mines is that underground the white labour so-called is no labour at all; it is merely supervision. One of the greatest economies to be made in my opinion is at present we have far too many white employed on the mines. In my opinion, two men are employed underground doing work one man could do easily [229].

On the other hand, Europeans <sup>workers</sup> looked upon unskilled labour as "Kaffir's work" and considered they were entitled to higher positions and wages, whatever the circumstances. After 1906, they were backed up by pressure groups which were able to influence government policy to their advantage. In 1911, two acts were passed: the Mines and Works Act, No. 12, and the Native Labour Regulation Act, No. 15. Under the provisions of the Mines and Works Act, individuals other than "coloured persons" were granted certificates of competency in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The Act specified that the certificates given to coloured people in Natal or in the Cape were not valid in the Northern provinces. The Act also imposed a colour bar on many kinds of work.

As to the Native Labour Regulation Act; it notably provided that breach of contract on the part of African labourers was a criminal offence, depriving them, thereby, of the strike weapon [230].

To sum up Africans' situation before 1912, one might say that European advent in South Africa constituted a cornerstone in the history of its people. Before the Whites set foot in their country, Africans enjoyed a relative security due to their communal system of land-ownership. Since their arrival, however, Europeans started a process of stratification and of pauperization of African society. Three main classes could be singled out: the peasantry, a growing educated elite, and an emergent wage-labour force. By the end of the nineteenth century, three categories of African peasants existed: those living in the reserves, those working on white-owned farms, and a nucleus of well-to-do black landowners. To reduce Africans living in the reserves to the status of wage-labourers, severe laws were enacted which became more intense because of the new demands of the mines. Africans were, then, oversaddled with heavy taxes; they were alienated from their traditional rulers who under the Glen Grey Act were charged with levying these taxes; they also ran the risk of confiscation of their small plots of land if they rebelled.



Amongst the black labourers working on European farms, there were the squatters, the labour tenants, and the servants. Like their fellows in the reserves, legislation aimed at impoverishing them so as to compel them to serve their white masters.

A handful of Africans, however, managed to thrive. These were the collaborators who were granted land and cattle for their services, the headmen who as members of local councils under the Glen Grey Act became government employees, and those African peasants who availed themselves of the war to sell their goods at high prices.

Another important stratum was composed of African intelligentsia which emerged thanks to the combined efforts of missionaries, above all, of the different provincial governments, and of African Kulaks.

The third major layer included the emergent labour force working on the diamond and gold fields, and in the ancillary industries to which they gave birth. By and large, the diamond mines helped the emergence of an African collective consciousness, mainly by allowing a huge concentration of labourers from all over the country. As pointed out by Gwayi Tyamzashe who in 1872 was the first African to complete his theological studies at Lovedale, and to serve as a preacher on the diamond fields, one could find "Bushmen, Koranas, Hottentots, Griquas, Bublapipe, Damaras, Baralong, Barutse, Batsewella, Bengana, Basutu, Magwata, Magubi, Maswazu, Matswetsway, Matonga, Matabele, Maponda, Majengu, Batembu, Maxooa, and more" [231],

Like their fellows in the rural areas, the new working-class had much ground for complaints. They were victims of the pass laws which made them liable to imprisonment and to flogging, and compelled them to sell their labour-power at a very cheap price. Although some of them acquired some skill, they were still condemned to occupy unskilled positions, and to get lower wages than unskilled European labourers. They were also ill-treated in the mines and in the compounds, and subjected to forced labour on roads. African workers protested against the ridiculously low pay they received in return for the exhausting work they performed underground, and could provide mass support.

However, if for the first time these men from different tribes experienced a new feeling of belonging to one common entity and the same hardships, their lack

of stability and cohesion prevented them from forming the basis for an organized political movement. Indeed, communal tenure of land still allowed them to enjoy a relative security. They were not yet proletarians utterly dependent on their European masters to earn their living, and their stay in the diamond mines was usually limited to only a few months. As S.M. Molema pointed out:

Kimberley Africans were not... true proletarians who by definition are men who have no way of earning a livelihood, except by the sale of their physical labour. They were still men with rights to the land, and they could live even without going to work for the white man [232].

Moreover, the absence of one common language further cut them off from one another [233].

The problem will consist in analyzing how far the different bodies which emerged after 1912 and which claimed to represent African people were aware of their conditions, and how far they managed to redress their grievances.

## CHAPTER X

## THE UNION ACT 1909 AND AFRICAN NATIONALISM

Lack of uniformity characterized South African legislation. Indeed, the government of each province devised their own laws and granted their African population the political status they wished. By and large, however, the Cape administrators evolved a more liberal policy than the Northern Colonies authorities. Indeed, unlike the Boer Republic, the Cape administration allowed African people to take part in the political life of the colony. Later, African leaders rightly considered the Union Act which kept the Cape franchise but did not extend it to the Northern provinces as the natural outcome of previous legislation. For a better understanding of African reactions against the Union constitution, a close scrutiny of African political status before its enactment seems then necessary. Furthermore as every colony developed its own history, the non-white franchise question must be dealt with in the four provinces separately.

### I. The Cape Franchise and the Northern Principle

#### 1. The Cape Franchise

The history of African franchise in South Africa was rooted in two antagonistic principles ; the Cape authorities' view, and the Northern governments' standpoint. The former advocated a non-racial franchise, and put Africans and their European fellows on the same footing. The latter, however, denied equality between Blacks and Whites in both Church and State. African subjects were considered as belonging to an inferior class, and consequently, their disabilities did not allow them to have a say in the management of their own country.

The Cape progressive policy existed long before the enactment of the Cape Constitution of 1853. Soon after his arrival in 1819, Dr John Philip of the London Missionary Society stressed the oppression of the Africans by the Boers who plundered their farms, and stole their cattle with impunity [1]. Largely as a result of his efforts, Ordinance 50 was passed on 17 July 1828. Its preamble repealed all existing laws from which the Hottentots suffered so far. It read:

Certain laws relating to and affecting the Hottentots and other free persons of colour lawfully residing in this colony require to be consolidated, amended, or repealed, and certain obnoxious usages and customs which are injurious to those persons require to be declared illegal [2].

Ordinance 9 of 1836 also bore the same progressive feature. Under its terms, municipal boards were set up in towns and villages, and non-Whites as well as Europeans could vote or stand for election provided they complied with the prescribed requirements. All people who occupied or rented a house of an annual value or rent of £10, and who paid at least six shillings in taxes per year, were entitled to vote.

The same liberal principle governed the Ordinance of 1843. A year before its enactment, in a despatch dated 15 April, Lord Stanley, then Secretary of State for the Colonial and War Departments, explained to Governor George Napier that a compromise had to be found to safeguard the interests of all classes within the colony. He stood against a high proprietary qualification which would entail, he asserted, the exclusion of African people who constituted the poorest class. However, he pointed out the danger of a low economic requirement which, because of the great number of Africans, could jeopardize the situation of Europeans. The British who were the least numerous, he said, would particularly feel its effects [3]. As a result of these discussions, the Ordinance of 1843 provided that owners of immovable property worth £50 or more, and householders who paid at least a £1 yearly tax were eligible for membership of the municipalities [4].

In 1848, too, British administrators displayed the same sympathetic concern about African franchise. In a despatch dated 29 July 1848, the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope H.G. Smith wrote to Earl Grey that the most industrious Africans deserved such a privilege. As he put it:

I deem it to be just and expedient to place the suffrage within the reach of the more intelligent and industrious of the men of the Colony, because it is a privilege which they deserve... No man's status is in this free country determined by the accident of his colour [5].

The proprietary qualification was this time fixed at the minimum rate of £10 [6].

The Cape Constitution of 11 March 1853 also allowed African people to have some say in the management of their own affairs. In a despatch of 14 November 1852 to

the Colonial Secretary Sir John S. Pakington, the Governor of the Cape-Cathcart- asserted that unlike savages, the Hottentots who were issued from mixed marriages were rather advanced in civilization and, thereby, able to appreciate the advantages of political representation [7]. Fear that racial discrimination would bring about a rebellion might have also spurred British authorities to enact a colour-blind constitution. The chief-justice J.H. de Villiers probably hinted at such a danger when he stated that "the worm when trodden upon will turn", and that "men cannot be treated as children" [8].

In a despatch dated 14 March 1853 and addressed to the Governor Cathcart, the Duke of Newcastle who was then the Colonial Secretary explained that Her Majesty was concerned, above all, with uniting her subjects, and considered that the best means to achieve that goal consisted in avoiding racial segregation. To quote him:

It is the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government that all her subjects at the Cape, without distinction of class or colour should be united by one bond of loyalty and a common interest, and we believe that the exercise of political rights enjoyed by all alike will prove one of the best methods of attaining this object [9].

The period between 1886 and 1892, however, was to witness an increasing fear of African electorate. When in 1886 the Transkeian Territories were annexed, and their African inhabitants were allowed to qualify for the franchise on the usual terms, the Whites dreaded being outnumbered by African voters. As a result, a Parliament Registration Act was passed in 1887. The new measure provided that "no person shall be entitled to be registered as a voter by reason of his sharing in any communal or tribal occupation" [10]. This provision led to 30,000 Africans being struck off the voters' roll [11].

In 1892, a Franchise Act was also passed, aiming at avoiding the danger of a powerful African electorate. The Property qualifications were raised from £25 to £75. Moreover, African people who were generally illiterate were required to sign their name under the watchful eyes of the registering officer. This educational requirement was met, however. Indeed, political parties' agents taught Africans to sign their name and helped them appear on the voters' roll [12].

The danger of the African electorate was, in fact, more imaginary than real. Indeed, the Cape franchise had a very limited impact in the colony itself, and a

few black people were already aware of that reality. The African journalist and politician John Tengo Jabavu (1859-1921), for instance, declined to stand for Parliament in 1883 on the ground that it included only white members, and an African there, could exert very little influence [13].

The emerging African intelligentsia particularly resented the restrictive aspect of the 1887 Parliament Registration Act. John Tengo Jabavu, then editor of Imvo Zabantsundu, or "Native Opinion", protested against it at once. On behalf of his black fellows, he addressed a petition to the Queen. He pointed out to Her Majesty the requirements which Africans could hardly meet. According to the eighth section of the 1853 Cape Constitution, the Blacks had to satisfy an ownership and occupancy qualifications which rose from £10 to £25. The 1887 Registration Act also exacted two qualifications which increased the burden of African population. Under its terms, Africans were not entitled to vote unless they complied with an income clause. Furthermore, they were deprived of the exercise of their political rights if they collectively occupied tracts of land. The provisions, he objected, ran against the decision of Her Majesty's government:

that in conferring upon the Colony the boon of a representative constitution, it is exceedingly undesirable that the franchise should be so restricted as to leave those of the coloured classes who in point of intelligence are qualified for the exercise of political power practically unrepresented and that any particular portion of the community should be deprived of its share of its management of its local affairs [14].

Such provisions, he asserted, fostered the political preponderance of one class on the remainder of the population. Jabavu was chiefly grieved with the seventeenth clause referring to the traditional system of land tenure. Such a system, he stated, was recognized by the government. A Fingo himself, Jabavu reminded Her Majesty that in 1845 she allowed Sir Peregrine Maitland to grant the District of Fort Peddie to the Fingoes in return for their loyal services. He also stressed that African people no longer lived in "a state of barbarism". Being essentially an agricultural and a pastoral class, they also usually occupied cheap buildings of the value of less than the required £25. As a result of these repressive measures, a great number of Africans were indirectly denied political representation. Therefore, "a grave injustice" will be done to the African class if Her Majesty approved of such an Act. African people, he concluded, were discontented for they paid their taxes and were, thereby, entitled to be represented in the Parliament of the Colony [15].

The Blacks apparently received some support from the European section of the population. Indeed, one month later, Jabavu noted that the Cape Times carried on handling the African franchise question. The newspaper pointed out that the Registration Act jeopardized only the interests of non-white people. The lines Jabavu quoted read:

The franchise is not the same for white men and black, even though in the letter no sign of any such distinction appears. The Registration Bill sets aside the Constitution Ordinance in one important particular affecting solely the interests of the natives [16].

However, if the Cape government accepted the underlying principle of equal political rights between Blacks and Whites, the Northern Colonies strove to keep a master-servant relationship between the two sections of the population at the expense of the former.

## 2. African political status in the Northern Colonies

Despite the overall limited impact of the Cape laws on African situation, the Boers resented what they called "the philanthropy", or "the sentimentalism of British administration" [17]. In 1836, they trekked away from the Cape Colony to settle in Natal, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal. Economic, political, and religious reasons compelled them to go on exile. In a "Manifesto of the Emigrant Farmers" dated 1837, the Boer leader Piet Retief explained that the Cape progressive laws deprived them of their former slaves whom they wished to keep. As he put it:

1. We despair of saving the Colony from these evils which threaten it by the turbulent and dishonest conduct of vagrants who are allowed to infest the country in every part; nor do we see any prospect of peace or happiness for our children in any country thus distracted by internal commotions.

2. We complain of severe losses which we have been forced to sustain by the emancipation of our slaves, and the vexatious laws which have been enacted respecting them [18].

Two years later, one hundred and twenty emigrants presented a document entitled "The Memorial of the Emigrants" to the Cape government. They again gave as their reasons for emigration "the degrading laws" which they were compelled to suffer, and the "vagabondizing of the Hottentots and of the Blacks to whom this and also offensive acts were allowed with connivance and impunity" [19].

In addition to their economic grievances, a curious mysticism prompted them to refuse being put on a par with the dark race. They believed they were God's "chosen people", and as a result, they could not yield even part of their predominance to the Blacks. In 1876, Piet Retief's niece, Anna Elizabeth Steenkamp, maybe summarized better than any other complainants all the motives which urged the Voortrekkers to leave the Cape. She wrote:

The reasons for which we abandoned our land and homesteads, our country and kindred, were the following:

1. The continual depredations and robberies of the Kaffirs, and their arrogance and overbearing conduct, and the fact that in spite of the fine promises made to us by our government, we nevertheless received no compensation for the property of which we were despoiled.

2. The shameful and unjust proceedings with reference to the freedom of our slaves; and yet it is not so much their freedom that drove us to such lengths, as their being placed on an equal footing with Christians, contrary to the laws of God, and the natural distinctions of race and religion, so that it was intolerable for any decent Christian to bow down beneath such a yoke; wherefore we rather withdrew in order thus to preserve our doctrine in purity [20].

Despite the trekkers' antagonism, Africans were enfranchised in Natal. The Royal Charter of October 1856 granted the vote to every adult male over twenty one years who owned immovable property worth £50 or rented such property at the yearly rate of £10 [21]. No colour bar divided the different sections of the population. Every British subject who met the required property qualifications were entitled to exercise his political rights [22].

However, political equality between Blacks and Whites in Natal was to last for less than a decade. In 1863, the Natal Executive Council came to consider the question of political representation of non-Whites, and talks about their eventual exclusion seemed to prevail. Both the Chief Justice and the Attorney General of Natal contended that Africans were still under customary law, and could not exercise European franchise rights. To sustain their arguments, they argued that as long as Africans were governed by the 1848 Royal Instructions and the 1849 third Ordinance, they could not enjoy such political rights. The Colonial Secretary, the Duke of Newcastle, and the Lieutenant Governor Scott replied, however, that the measures referred to did not deal with the franchise of Africans, and as a result, they could not disqualify them.



This controversy in the Executive Council about the link between civic rights and traditional laws led the authorities to discuss the socio-economic change which affected African society. Scott pointed out that although the Blacks officially remained under customary law, a few amongst them had managed to adopt a European style of life. He mentioned cases of Africans who were no longer polygamists and who were fully integrated in the market economy. He thought there was no reason to dread this potential African electorate which could not really influence government policy neither in the time being, nor in the future. As a result, he believed it would be unfair to withhold African political rights.

Reflecting these views, a bill "disqualifying certain Natives from exercising the electoral franchise" was submitted to the legislative council in May 1864. This bill excluded Africans under customary law from the franchise. It gave the vote, however, to civilized Africans who complied with the following requirements. Africans who had inhabited the Colony for at least twelve years, who had a crime-free record, and who met the ordinary property qualifications were entitled to vote. However, after drastic amendments aiming at depriving Africans of their political rights, this version of the franchise bill became law No. 11 in 1865 [23].

According to the second clause of the new law, Africans were bound to comply with the following requirements. They were compelled to be over twenty-one years old, to have dwelt in Natal for twelve years, to own immovable property of the value of £50 or to rent such property at £10 a year, and to earn an annual income of £96. The procedure to be registered on the voters' roll was also made purposefully complex. Africans had first to obtain "a certificate of good character" signed by three qualified European voters, and endorsed by a justice of the peace or a resident magistrate. Under the terms of the third section, the Blacks were also required to send together with this certificate and other less important documents, a petition to the Lieutenant-governor. According to the fifth section of the law, however, the Lieutenant-governor was not bound to approve of their application. Under such instances, the number of African voters in Natal was not difficult to guess. In 1904, out of an African population of 904,041, only two Blacks possessed the vote [24]. In 1907, amongst the 23,686 registered voters there were 23,480 Whites, 150 Indians, 50 coloured men, and 6 Africans [25]. Europeans who constituted 99.1% of the whole electorate enjoyed an indisputable political hegemony. To quote Brookes: "To speak perfectly frankly...

the Natal scheme is undoubtedly a mere disingenuous device for maintaining a political colour bar without saying so" [26].

The Natal Native Affairs Commission of 1881-82 revealed that illiterate as well as educated Africans were yearning for some modicum of representation. The traditional rulers Faku and Teteluku spoke on behalf of the former group whereas Nambula and Makulula presented the views of the latter to the commission. All witnesses declared themselves in favour of representation in the legislative council. Brookes who commented the evidence given to the commission asserted:

With regard to the franchise or rather representation, the Native witnesses... are unanimous in desiring a representative or representatives as advisory members of the legislative council. They are quite willing to have a European as a representative and entirely agreeable to his being nominated by the government. But they do want <sup>one</sup> ~~some~~ definitely to speak their views, and to expand the legislature's views to them [27].

In the Orange Free State, Africans experienced the same frustrations as their fellows in Natal. When in 1848, the British set up their supremacy on the territory, Africans enjoyed the same political privileges as the Cape Africans. In 1854, however, the Bloemfontein Convention granted the Orange Free State its independence, and it immediately adopted a constitution conferring the franchise only to Burghers who were defined as:

1. All white persons born in the State.
2. All white persons who have resided in the State for one year, and have immovable property registered in their names to the value of at least 2,000 Rds.
3. All white persons who have resided in the State [28].

In the Transvaal, too, Africans were reduced to the status of political outcasts. The Grondwet, or constitution, of 1858 forbade political equality between European and African people either "in church or state". When the South African Republic was annexed in 1877, Shepstone also looked upon Africans as backward people, and consequently denied them the franchise. His proclamation read:

Equal justice is guaranteed to the persons and property of both White and Coloured, but the adoption of this principle does not mean and should not involve the granting of equal civil rights, such as the exercise of voting by savages, or their becoming members of the legislative body, or their being entitled to other civil privileges which are incompatible with their

uncivilized conditions [29].

A few years later, law No. 4 of 1890 which set up two Volksraads in the Republic did not alter <sup>the</sup> African political situation. It provided that "persons of colour, bastards, persons of openly bad behaviour and unrehabilitated bankrupts" were not eligible for either volksraad [30]. The Grondwet of 1896, too, did not allow non-whites to be on a par with Europeans [31].

The African section of the population, nevertheless, believed that their situation would improve after the Boer War. Were their hopes based on realistic grounds?

### 3. The Vereeniging Treaty, 31 May 1902, and African disillusionment

The Cape precedent, Milner's declarations, and African cooperation with the British during the war raised hopes amongst African people. In a confidential letter addressed to Selborne and dated 22 March 1898, Milner criticized Boer autocratic rule in the Transvaal. "The whole power in the Transvaal", he said, "is in the hands of the Boer oligarchy armed to the teeth, and there is no reform party among that oligarchy" [32]. He suggested some reforms notably dealing with the education of Africans, and their situation in the mines. The African population should have considered his reform proposals very cautiously, however. Indeed, Milner never thought of utter equality between Blacks and Whites. Like the Boers, he believed in the separation of the two races. For instance, he clearly expressed himself in favour of a different type of education for Africans, and did not call in question the necessity of a pass-laws apparatus. Neither did Milner promise to grant them the franchise. He was in favour of British hegemony which he sought to secure at the expense of the African population. On 28 February 1901, the General-Commandant Lord Kitchener who was dispatched to discuss peace terms with General Louis Botha at Middleburg declared:

As regards the extension of the franchise to Kaffirs in the Transvaal, and the Orange River Colony, it is not the intention of His Majesty's government to give such franchise to the "Kaffirs" - even if it is given after these colonies are granted representative government, it will be so limited as to secure the just predominance of the white race [33].

The Treaty of Peace concluded at Vereeniging on 31 May 1902 left the Africans' political situation at a standstill. This Treaty was signed by Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner on behalf of the British government, by S.W. Burger, F.W. Reitz, Louis Botha, J.H. de la Rey, L.J. Meyer and J.C. Krogh acting as the government of the South African Republic, by C.R. de Wet, W.J.C. Brebner, J.B.M. Hertzog and C.A. Oliver, acting as the government of the Orange Free State. The eighth clause of the treaty read: "The question of granting franchises to Natives will not be decided until after the introduction of self-government" [34].

To safeguard white supremacy, too, the inter-colonial commission of 1903-1905 advocated the principle of separate representation. The commission was presided over by Godfrey Lagden, and gathered representatives from each province. There were W.E. Stanford and F.R. Thompson from the Cape, S.O. Samuelson and Marshall Campbell from Natal, J.N.O. Quayle Dickson and J.B. de la Harpe from the Orange River Colony, as well as J.C. Krogh and J.A. Hamilton from the Transvaal. The commission members particularly focussed on Africans' political rights in the Cape. The growing number of Black voters there seemed to arouse a deep anxiety amongst them. As they put it:

The Native population of the Cape Colony is about a million and a half out of which a quarter of a million are adult male Natives and potential voters. The present number of Native voters is, therefore the merest fringe of the impending mass, and in view of this fact, the full magnitude and gravity of the question may be apprehended [35].

The relatively small number of African voters, they believed, was already powerful enough to exert a strong influence in any election taking place in the Eastern or Western Divisions. To quote them:

In the Cape Colony Natives had been admitted to the franchise on equal terms, with the result that in the Eastern Divisions such as Victoria East, Queenstown, Wodehouse, Aliwal North, and Tembuland, the Native voters by throwing their weight in favour of one or other of the two European parties now existing can already determine the issue of an election...

The growing power of Native vote is not confined to these Eastern Divisions. On the contrary, the movement westward of these people towards the seaports and inland towns is noteworthy. Port Elizabeth already has 1,114 Native voters; Cape Town, Woodstock and Wynberg 478; Humansdorp, 80; Victoria West, 46. In five only out of the forty-six constituencies of the Cape Colony are there no Native voters [36].

The commission members dreaded that Black voters in the Cape would increasingly influence the government policy maybe later at the expense of the European section of the population. The Whites in any constituency, they stated, would resent ~~being~~ <sup>be</sup> represented by a member returned against their wishes by <sup>the</sup> African vote alone. Nor would they tolerate, they said, a Ministry dependent upon a majority consisting of members owing their seats to the Black electorate.

Then, they dealt with African franchise in the Northern Colonies. They pointed out that in Natal, only two black voters were registered whereas in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, Africans were denied their political rights although they deserved them. Indeed, the commission admitted that in these two colonies, the non-Whites complied with the usual qualification requirements. As a result, they promised to grant them some modicum of representation when they deemed it necessary. As they pointed out:

One object of the commission's recommendations is to secure in due time in these colonies also a measure of representation to the Natives, which hitherto has not been accorded to them. In favour of this it may be urged that they are rising in the scale of civilization; they are in many cases increasing in material wealth, including the holding of land; they are becoming good workers in mines and more or less skilled in other industries; they contribute to the revenue in direct and indirect taxation; their labour is a valuable economic factor in South Africa, and for these reasons their interests should be represented in the legislative bodies of the country, otherwise such interests might unduly suffer from lack of expression and publicity [37].

To avoid Africans out-numbering Europeans and, thereby, the so-called danger looming over their head, the commission advised the respective governments to restrict the existing rights in the Cape, and to create new ones in the Northern Colonies. They felt, however, that they could not withhold the Cape franchise overtly. As a result, they proposed to take it away indirectly by altering the franchise procedure. They were, nevertheless, willing to extend the Cape limited franchise rights throughout South Africa, always bearing in mind that white hegemony should be upheld. As they clearly explained:

The commission recognized it was unnecessary and impracticable to take away the franchise from Natives where they already had it, all that is needed being to change the manner in which it should be exercised. It also felt that in those parts where the Natives have not in the past had any vote or any form of elected representation in the legislatures, it is likely to be advantageous to the State and conducive to their contentment to give them the same privileges as elsewhere in South Africa, provided this can be done without conferring on

them political power in any aggressive sense or weakening in any way the unchallenging supremacy and authority of the ruling race, which is responsible for the country and bears the burden of its government [38].

After hearing all these views, the commission unanimously came to the conclusion that separate voting should be granted to non-white electors, and that separate members should voice their grievances in Parliament. To quote them:

... in each colony now self-governing, or when it becomes self-governing, there should be created an electoral district or districts in which Native electors only shall vote for the election of a member or members to represent them in the Legislature, and that there should be separate voters' lists and separate candidates for Natives only [39].

Later, the Natal Native Affairs Commission of 1906-1907 also recommended the same scheme of separate representation. [40].

Africans naturally resented the segregationist policy of the various provincial governments. The handful of Europeanized Africans who met the ordinary qualifications found the curtailment of their rights particularly unfair. They made their grievances known not only in South Africa, but also to the Home Government. On 4 October 1904, the Reverend Samuel Jacobus Brander, the Reverend Joshua Mphothen Mphela, and Stephen Ngato appeared before the South African Native Affairs Commission as representatives of the European Catholic Church in Zion. One of their goals, they said, was to put the Blacks on an equal footing with the Whites mainly through education. For the time being, they apparently approved of the principle of segregation as far as the great mass of illiterate people were concerned. When Brander was asked whether "it would be a good thing for you Native races to run side by side with the white races in everything just like the two rails of a railway line", he agreed. The Church representatives, however, stressed the fact that <sup>the</sup> African educated elite ought to be granted the same political status as Europeans. They claimed a right of partnership in the management of the country, and would struggle to get it through constitutional means. They did not think they would ever reach the standard of civilization of white men and were consequently willing to accept their supervision provided they were allowed to represent the views of their people in municipalities, for instance, and to advise the government in African matters [41].

On 7 October 1904, other Africans from the Transvaal gave evidence before the 1903-05 commission. They regarded the franchise as a symbol of manhood and citizenship. James B. Mama thought "that the Natives of this Colony should have the franchise - because that is a thing which will make a people of us" [42]. They, too, resorted to the so-called "civilization test", and singled out westernized and illiterate people. The former who at least understood what the franchise meant should be granted political rights. As John Makue put it, "As regards voting, I think it would be much better that we should get the franchise and be able to vote. I do not mean that the raw Native should, who does not understand what it is" [43].

On 25 April 1905, the Transvaal Native United Political Association addressed a petition to King Edward VII. Its representatives deprecated the government present class legislation which denied them any political status, and pressed for a revision of article 8 of the Vereeniging Treaty which left them unrepresented until the introduction of self-government in the colony. They also expressed their fear of being excluded from the franchise to which they felt entitled, once the Transvaal would become a self-governing dominion [44].

On 10 April 1906, the South African Native Congress of the Western Cape whose interests embraced not only the Cape but also the wider South African scene asserted that taxation without representation brought about the recent Natal rebellion. Responsible government, they said, had been prematurely granted to the colonies where the average settler tended to bully the Blacks, and they pleaded for the retention of the Imperial government prerogative of veto [45].

The Orange Free State African inhabitants also yearned for a democratic government. In June 1906, the Native Congress of this colony forwarded a petition to King Edward VII to protest against the exclusion of all Blacks, the educated ones included, from the franchise. They prayed the Imperial Government to let them have a share in the management of their own affairs, especially in the municipal councils which were law-making bodies [46].

On 13 July of the same year, J.T. Jabavu and thirteen other Africans sent a petition to the House of Commons. They expressed their sympathy for the Transvaal and Orange River Colony African inhabitants. They asserted that colour alone could not justify their political Segregation, and considered that injustice as a serious breach of the British Colonial Empire constitutional principles [47].

The Natal Native Congress held meetings at Pietermaritzburg first on 30 April 1908, then between 9 and 10 June of the same year. In October, the Congress petitioned the Colonial Secretary. They pointed out to him that government nominees could not represent African views, and asked for the extension of the franchise to the black inhabitants of the colony. They stressed the danger of being left without representatives in the Legislative Assembly which was also "the taxing house". As they explained: "for if it is right to tax people, it is right to give them representatives to say whether the taxes should be lessened..." [48]. The signatories of the petition were Stephen Mini, M.S. Radebe, A. Mtimkulu, Theo Ntombela, Dyer Nxaba, Posselt Gumede, L. Lutayi, M. Sivetye [49]. The Zulu traditional ruler Stephen Mini, and the methodist minister Abner S. Radebe were to become a few years later early members of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC).

Africans were, then, clearly in a state of political turmoil before the National Convention was convened to discuss a constitution for the future Union of South Africa. Not one single African attended it, and they dreaded that the prospective Union government would set aside their political rights.

## II. The Union Act, 1909, and the emergence of the SANNC

Smuts who is sometimes referred to as "the father of the Constitution" had been over several years corresponding with J.X. Merriman whose ideas he generally shared. In a letter dated 31 August 1905, he wrote to him: "I have always and ever shall continue to look up to you with feelings of veneration as to one who... has stood up for the true South African ideal" [50].

In a private letter dated 4 March 1906, Merriman revealed his opinion about the African franchise question to Smuts. He said he loathed the Blacks, but unfortunately no white politician could ignore their presence in the country. Their paramount concern consisted in safeguarding the white race hegemony. To achieve that goal, two avenues were open to them: they should either adopt the Cape progressive policy, or resort to the Northern principle [[51].

In his reply of 13 March 1906, Smuts expressed his sympathy for the Blacks who had been despoiled of their land, and who deserved more consideration. He would not grant them the franchise, however, for he firmly believed it would not help



the great bulk of African masses to sort out their problems. To quote his own words:

I sympathize profoundly with the native races of South Africa whose land it was long before we came to force a policy of dispossession on them, and it ought to be the policy of all parties to do justice to the Natives, and to take all wise and prudent measures for their civilization and their improvement. But I don't believe in politics for them... I would therefore not give them the franchise which in any case would not affect more than a negligible number of them at present [52].

In a letter dated 14 June 1908, J.A. Hobson, English radical member of the New Reform Club Political Committee, enquired how far the coming federation or unification of South Africa was likely to affect the position of Africans. A month later, on 13 July 1908 Smuts confessed that South African politicians were greatly divided over the issue. As a result, he deemed it wise to make them first and foremost ratify the constitution, and to discuss the franchise question later. As he declared:

My view is that the franchise laws of the several colonies ought to be left undisturbed, and that the first Union election ought to take place thereunder, and that the question of a uniform franchise law be gone into only after the Union has been brought about [53].

The disagreements Smuts foresaw actually occurred when the National Convention met in October 1908 to discuss his draft of the future Union Act. There will be analyzed the first resolution adopted by the National Convention, then African reactions to them.

#### 1. British-Afrikaner Compromise, or the National Convention of 1908

The National Convention met at Bloemfontein in October 1908 under the chairmanship of J.H. de Villiers. The Cape delegates were: De Villiers, J.X. Merriman, J.W. Sauer, F.S. Malan, L.S. Jameson, J.W. Smartt, E.H. Walton, W.E.M. Stanford, J.W. Jagger, H.C. Van Heerden, G.H. Maasdorp, J.H.M. Buk; the Natal delegation consisted of F.R. Moor, E.M. Greene, T. Hyslop, C.J. Smythe, T. Watt. The Transvaal deputation included: Louis Botha, J.C. Smuts, H.C. Hull, G.H. Farrar, H.L. Lindsay, S.W. Burger, J.H. de la Rey. The Orange River Colony sent: A. Fischer, M.T. Steyn, Vice President, J.B.M. Hertzog, C.R. de Wet, A. Browne [54]. These statesmen discussed two major issues: the Union question, and African

political status. Smuts believed that both issues were important. He thought, however, that the Convention should hold the problem of African political rights in abeyance, and agree first on the future South African constitution. Against his expectations, however, discussions first dwelt on African franchise, above all. Various disagreements divided the Convention members. Some such as Sauer and Botha expressed themselves in favour of a uniform system throughout the country. Others such as Schreiner stood against a uniform franchise, and wished a federal constitution instead. Another cleavage occurred among the former group for a unitary system did not necessarily bear the same meaning for them all: should they adopt the Cape policy, or the Northern principles in the four colonies?

Both Sauer and Botha wanted a uniform policy, and a strong central government to implement it. According to Sauer, however, African political rights already recognized in the Cape should also be acknowledged in the Northern Colonies. According to Botha, Africans had no legitimate claims, and the Cape non-racial franchise could not be tolerated in the Northern Colonies.

Schreiner argued that the sovereign Parliament which Sauer advocated would be powerless to counteract the Northern Colonies influence, and the Northern tradition would consequently prevail. As a result, to prevent a great number of Africans from being deprived of their political rights, he advised a federal constitution.

Merriman advocated that the whole franchise question should be discussed later by the Union government. He pointed out that the Whites found the Black man in the country, and they could ignore neither his existence nor his rights. They were trustees for the non-Whites he said, and were looking after the political rights which had been granted to them.

Colonel Stanford who was then Head of the Native Affairs Department in the Cape emphasized the advantages of the franchise. On the one hand, he pointed out, the franchise allowed Africans to reach a higher standard of civilization. He referred to the Transkei Territories General Council as a virtual "Native Parliament" elected by themselves, including black members only, and raising revenue amongst them through taxes. On the other hand, he declared, if Europeans provided Africans with a channel to voice their grievances, they would not leave them to simmer in their minds until they led to chaos and anarchy.

Percy Fitzpatrick ridiculed the notion of the so-called civilization test which nobody so far had defined. He unfortunately contradicted himself for he supported the principle of equal rights for all "civilized men" in South Africa.

The representative of Natal, Sir Frederick Moor, delivered the most unbelievable speech. He favoured a federal constitution and wanted an immediate settlement of the franchise question at the expense of Africans. He forgot that under a federal constitution, the Cape government would have ~~lost~~ their non-racial franchise, and he would have been unable to prevent them from taking such a step. He also argued that uncivilized men should be denied any political status. A civilized man, he tried to define, was a man capable of adjusting himself to a "civilized" community. He ended up, then, by defining nothing, and nobody got much farther forward. To justify white supremacy, he repeated the well-known prejudices against Africans. The Blacks were unable to progress, he asserted, because they were incapable of sustained effort. He forgot that the white settlers in Natal were well-known for their laziness colloquially referred to as "Natal fever", and were dependent on the sustained efforts of black labourers to whom they owed their wealth and comfort.

Then, Abraham Fischer spoke for the Orange River Colony. His lack of uprightness was also conspicuous. A civilization test, he stated, was neither education, nor the improvement of property. Was it to be a liquor test?, he asked. He forgot, however, that Europeans like him supplied Africans with cheap liquor to provide themselves with the labour power they badly needed.

Sauer once again urged the other members to adopt the Cape non-racial policy. He argued that permanent peace could never be rooted in injustice. If they really strove for peace and order, they should then grant the franchise to the non-Whites.

General Hertzog opposed Sauer's arguments on two grounds: to give political rights to Africans would on the one hand, compel them to lower the qualification standard; on the other hand, African voters would soon swamp Europeans.

F.S. Malan thought to avoid the colour bar by compelling Africans and Europeans alike to comply with the same qualifications. He required the Blacks to get a certificate of citizenship, however.

General Botha, then, reminded them that their first duty was to bring about the union of the white races. He urged them to shelve the franchise question which would be dealt with later.

General de Wet then rose to assert that God had cut off Blacks and Whites, and to instil wrong ideas of equality in the former's mind was in contradiction to His decrees.

Then, Malan rose to express his opposition to the scheme consisting in uniting the white races first, and in tackling the franchise question later. According to him, a Union which allowed the roots of discord to live on would not be a genuine one.

The Convention members clung to their principles, and the atmosphere became stormy. General Botha suggested the appointment of a committee to deal with the thorny question of African franchise. The committee met for ten days, and finally arrived at the following compromise: African voting rights as they existed in each colony would remain in force; the Cape non-racial franchise was entrenched, and could be altered only by a two-third majority of both Parliament Houses in joint session; only persons of European descent could be eligible for membership of either House of Parliament. The Cape delegates then surrendered an important privilege: Cape Africans were still entitled to vote but they could no longer be elected to Parliament. Schreiner refused the compromise. The Convention other members also felt uneasy when Malan moved that the following phrase be inserted in the Constitution preamble: "trusting in the guidance and blessing of God Almighty". As far as Fischer was concerned, he "did not want such holy words to appear in an Act". General Hertzog feared they would be "accused of hypocrisy through the insertion of these words". Merriman felt these words would be out of place as "a colour bar had been drawn in the Constitution". Smuts alone had no problem of conscience. "The Constitution", he said, "is not a man's work. It bears the impress of a Higher Hand" [55].

While the National Convention was sitting, Union societies were set up to persuade the white population of South Africa to approve the draft Constitution. In October 1908, the representatives of eleven societies assembled in Durban and formed an association with a central executive as a coordinating body. The Whites generally accepted the National Convention proposals, but the Northerners

criticized the Cape African franchise. The Convention members then undertook tours throughout the four provinces to explain the draft Constitution, and the opposition was gradually overcome.

In the Orange River Colony, Europeans objected to the presence of non-White voters in the parliamentary constituencies of the Cape Province. Fisher discussed the document with members of the Colonial Parliament, and thereafter they addressed meetings throughout the colony, and succeeded in gaining support for the draft Constitution. On 4 March 1909, Sir John Fraser, the leader of the opposition, finally yielded.

In the Transvaal, a few Afrikaner lawyers strove to stir up opposition against the draft Constitution. They particularly dreaded the extension of the Cape African franchise to the northern provinces. But, both Botha and Smuts addressed public meetings in Pretoria and in several other towns, and on 17 March, Botha informed Merriman about the inhabitants' almost unanimous agreement to the Bill.

In the Cape Colony, G.J. Van der Horst, editor of the Cape, and W.P. Schreiner, led the opposition against the draft Constitution. Van der Horst feared that the Cape Colony would be under-represented in the Union Parliament, and that its liberal non-European franchise would be marred. Schreiner considered that the Bill did not safeguard the rights of the non-Whites who constituted the bulk of the South African population. His objections were not groundless. Smuts, the author of the document, wrote that:

There was a vast majority of people in South Africa opposed to the Native Franchise... On the first occasion the Parliament met it could be swept away. It was found necessary that there should be some check on some arbitrary action. It was not a powerful check, perhaps it was not a check at all. It had been put in there, but he did not think it meant much [56].

On 19 March, Botha also wrote to Merriman that the Cape Colony would be in the minority with twenty seats for the Progressives against thirty-one for the South African Party (SAP).

After the Colonial Parliaments endorsed the principles laid down in the draft Constitution, the Convention representatives approached the British government to secure their assent. The Conservatives as well as the Liberals welcomed the

unification of the self-governing South African colonies in a British dominion. However, a few liberal MPs urged the government to use their influence in favour of the non-Whites. In the House of Lords, Courtney believed that the British government should press for the repeal of the European descent requirement for membership in the Union Parliament. He made it clear that the government of a non-European majority by a small white oligarchy would unavoidably bring about discontent and unrest.

In the House of Commons, too, a few British politicians deprecated the colour bar clauses of the draft Constitution. Sir Charles Dilke (Liberal) regretted that it ignored the vast majority of the South African population. He believed that the predominance of the Boer Republican principle would wreck the power of the British Empire instead of strengthening it.

J. Keir Hardie, (Labour) also attacked the Bill. He reported statements put forward by Botha, Smuts and other prominent South Africans to convey their intention to destroy the Cape African franchise. The Bill, he warned, would cut off the non-Europeans from the Whites.

E.J. Griffith (Liberal) pointed out that the Bill had been drafted by an all-white Convention, and had been opposed by several non-European leaders. He considered that the bill in its present form would impair Africans' obedience to white rule and stressed the fact that the practical effect of the imperial veto would amount to nothing. As he put it:

The security of South Africa, the security of white rule in South Africa, depends to a large extent upon the willing and active loyalty of the subject races, and we must be careful not to strain that loyalty too far [57].

Three other MPs attacked the colour bar. W.P. Byles (Liberal) looked upon it as a "poisonous principle which vitally affects the honour, character and reputation which England has built for herself before the world". G.H. Roberts (Labour) asserted that it would compel non-Whites to use revolutionary means to free themselves from it. A. Lupton (Liberal) advised the government to amend the Bill while circumstances still allowed it: South Africa was disunited and British troops were still there. On 19 August, while moving the third reading of the Bill, the Prime Minister voiced the House of Commons objections to the colour bar clauses, and expressed the hope that the South African leaders would take them

into account. Then the third reading was unanimously accepted.

After several political debates, in December 1910 Herbert Gladstone was appointed Governor General of the Union of South Africa, which was inaugurated on 6 May. On 21 May, Gladstone asked Louis Botha to form a Cabinet. Three days later, Botha completed his Ministry, and on 31 May published the results. The Ministry consisted of:

Louis Botha	Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture.
J.W. Sauer	Minister of Railways and Harbours.
J.C. Smuts	Minister of the Interior, Minister of Mines, and Minister of Defence.
J.B.M. Hertzog	Minister of Justice.
F.S. Malan	Minister of Education
H.C. Hull	Minister of Finance
A. Fischer	Minister of Lands
H. Burton	Minister of Native Affairs
F.R. Moor	Minister of Commerce and Industries
D.P. De. V. Graaf	Minister of Public Works
C.O.G. Gubbins	Minister without portfolio [58].

## 2. African response to the National Convention

Unlike the Coloured people whose African Political Organization, or APO, protected their rights, the black section of the population did not have such a body to act on their behalf. They suggested that an African Convention should be held at the same time as the National Convention to press for the extension of the Cape non-racial franchise to the Northern Colonies. Such a meeting did not take place, however, for the Cape educated elite feared it would jeopardize their only privilege. As they explained:

It is reasonable for Africans of the Northern Colonies to be restless: they have always been excluded from the enjoyment of civil rights... The Cape Africans are in a different position altogether. Their civil rights are not doubted by anyone... There is no fear that the Cape delegates will speak for anything other than the retention of civil rights by the Cape Africans of whom they have wide experience. Any agitation by Cape Africans would have the effect of discouraging our delegates and also make them appear as though they are ignorant of their obligation [59].

Nevertheless, the African elite in the four colonies followed the National Convention deliberations with extreme attention. Time and again, they expressed their disapproval of the colour bar which now affected even the Cape.

On 22 October 1908, the "aboriginal natives of South Africa resident in the Transvaal" petitioned the National Convention. They reminded its members that they were unrepresented in the local Parliament so far, although they contributed directly and indirectly through pass-fees, the customs tariff, and so forth. They requested that body to apply the Cape generous policy all over South Africa. According to them, Africans who complied with the qualifications should enjoy the same political privileges as the European population. Africans unable to qualify should be protected through separate representation as advised by the South African Native Affairs Commission [60].

Between 24 and 26 March 1909, a South African Native Convention including delegates from the four colonies was convened at Bloemfontein to discuss the draft of the future Union Act. They renewed their protests against class legislation and the colour bar, and called for the extension of the Cape franchise so that they should enjoy the same political privileges as the Whites [61].

Several church ministers who claimed to voice African grievances appealed to the National Convention to remove from the Draft Act all sections curtailing Africans' rights to elect representatives of their own race to Parliament. The Blacks who had reached a reasonable standard of civilization were dissatisfied with the proposed Union Act. They were deeply grieved with the principle of discrimination overtly stated in article 44 of the proposed constitution, and which restricted the membership of the future Union Parliament to British subjects of European descent only. Such a clause, they asserted, should be removed, for it cut off Blacks and Whites into two hostile factions [62].

On 21 June 1909, the Transkeian Territories General Council forwarded a petition to the Cape governor. They reminded him of their loyalty to the British Crown which conferred political privileges upon them. They deprecated the introduction of a colour bar into the Union Act which denied them the right of being elected to the Union Parliament. The petition was signed by Dalindyebo, Veldman Bikitsha, Simon P. Gasa, Enoch Mamba, George Tamangile, Buchanan Moshesh, Aaron Njikekelana, S. Milton Ntloko, Mbizweni Jojo, Paul Nkala, Falo Mgudlwa, and Henry Shosha [63]. Amongst the signatories of the petition, Dalindyebo Oliver (1865-1920), Paramount Chief of the Tembus for thirty-six years, member of the Transkeian General Council, was to become one of the honorary presidents of the SANNC at its founding in 1912 [64].



In July 1909, another petition signed by W.P. Schreiner, A. Abdurahman, J.T. Jabavu, and others were sent this time to the House of Commons. They reminded its honourable members of the Cape colour-blind constitution which granted Africans the same political status as Europeans. They were law-abiding subjects, had never misused their political rights which should be kept for the sake of peace. They called into question the political discrimination allowing only British subjects of European descent to become members of Parliament [65].

On 31 August 1909, J.T. Jabavu published a very poignant article in Imvo Zabantsundu. "The blow had fallen", he wrote, for the South African Act was passed without the amendments the African mass had hoped. He thanked W.P. Schreiner as well as African and coloured delegates who appealed to the people and Parliament of England. He urged the Blacks to stop relying on the Imperial authorities who had been deaf to their prayers, and could do nothing now. He asserted that "those who are trying to make the Natives to believe otherwise are encouraging them to live in a fool's paradise" [66]. He stood against the rumoured appointment of Winston Churchill as a governor-general of South Africa. Churchill apparently made some promises, but did not fulfil them. As Jabavu put it: "Such an appointment would be, we think, resented by the whole of South Africa. We want a man of fixed and steady principles, not a political mountebank however clever" [67].

In his Papers, Plaatje recorded British promises to African people, and hinted at by Jabavu. On 28 February 1906, William Byles moved the following resolution which had been unanimously adopted by the House of Commons:

That in any settlement of South African affairs, this House desires a recognition of imperial responsibilities for the protection of all races excluded from political rights, the safeguarding of all immigrants against servile conditions of labour, and the guarantee to the native population of at least their existing status with the unbroken possession of their liberties in Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and other tribal countries and reservations [68].

Churchill who was then Under-colonial Secretary unreservedly accepted the above resolution for he said:

We accept fully the proposition that there is an imperial responsibility for the protection of native races not represented in the Legislative Assembly... I hope it may always be in my power to assert the right of any British subject of any race or colour, however humble may be his position, and however distant

any land in which he dwells, to the sympathy and respect of the House of Commons... A self-governing colony is not entitled to say one day "hands off; no dictation in our internal affairs", and the next day to telegraph for the protection of a brigade of British infantry [69].

The Blacks in South Africa, Jabavu carried on, had been disappointed by the Imperial Government, and could no longer rely on them. He urged all Africans to band together with their European friends, to refuse to support any existing white political party, and to set up a new party of their own so as to secure further political rights. To quote him:

The Native and Coloured people must now realize that an entirely new chapter in South African history is opening, in which they will have to depend on themselves, and their South African European friends for the securing and maintenance of their civil and political rights. They must become united politically, and refusing to cling to any of the present political parties, must work for the creation of a new political party in the State which will unite the religious and moral forces - European and Native - of South Africa upon lines of righteous legislation, justice, fair play irrespective of race or colour [70].

Africans banded together and set up the SANNC so as to secure whatever political rights they could. The SANNC was an all-black body, however, and on this ground Jabavu remained aloof.

### 3. The Bloemfontein Conference, 1912, and the emergence of the SANNC

Pixley Ka Isaka Seme, the principal founder of the Congress, and its president from 1930 to 1937 came back from Oxford - where he was studying law - to South Africa in 1910. He found himself immediately immersed in an atmosphere of crisis and bitter disappointment. Africans were victims of British- Afrikaner compromise which denied franchise rights to the great majority of them, and reduced them to the status of political outcasts. At the time of Union, apart from the South African Native Convention no nation-wide organization existed to protect African rights. The South African Native Convention itself was not a permanent body. Africans tried to fight back, nevertheless, by sending petitions to the National Convention, and to the Imperial Government. They did not present a strong united front, and as a result, they struggled without avail. Some saw this failing, and urged Africans all over the country to bury their tribal quarrels, and to acquire a wider outlook of their political situation in the

country if they were to achieve any success. On 24 October 1911, he wrote in Imvo Zabantsundu:

The demon of racialism, the aberrations of the Xhosa Fingo feud, the animosity that exists between the Zulus and the Tsongas, between the Basotho and every other native, must be buried and forgotten... We are one people. These divisions, these jealousies, are the cause of all our woes, and of all the backwardness and ignorance that exist today [71].

Seme who had established himself as an attorney in Johannesburg thought that the most effective means to counteract European racial policy was to set up a Union wide inter-tribal political organization. This body would be the mouthpiece of African people. To quote Henry Selby Msimang, Seme's clerk and typist, and one of the founding members of the SANNC:

There were certain activities in the Transvaal by the Transvaal Congress which struck his attention, and he evolved this idea that it would be best to organize a bigger thing... so that there could be better relations between tribes and that would perhaps lead to the whole African people speaking with one voice [72].

Firmly convinced that cooperation was the only road to success, Seme asked Msimang to forward letters proposing a meeting to all known leaders in the country, and in the protectorates to discuss the idea of a national organization. As the replies were generally favourable, notices of a future meeting at Bloemfontein were dispatched. On 8 January 1912, African personalities from all Southern Africa gathered in Bloomfontein. Seme reminded them of the colonial yoke which condemned them to an inferior socio-economic and political status. Their aim today, he carried on, was to set up a national organization to look after their rights. He addressed his audience in the following terms:

Chiefs of Royal blood and gentlemen of our race, we have gathered today to consider and discuss a theme which my colleagues and I have decided to place before you. We have discovered that in the land of our birth, Africans are treated as hewers of wood and drawers of water. The white people of this country have formed what is known as the Union of South Africa, a Union in which we have no voice in the making of laws, and no part in their administration. We have called you therefore to this conference so that we can together devise ways and means of forming our national Union for the purpose of creating national unity and defending our rights and privileges [73].

Then Seme put forward the idea of a bicameral body with an Upper and a Lower House to represent traditional rulers, and commoners respectively. Amongst the most prominent traditional rulers who helped set up the SANNC, there were Chiefs Sayso, Molembo, and Sekukuni [74]. From the neighbouring Territories, there were Prince Mahnya Ka Mbandene, Regent of Swaziland, Chief Maama, descendant of Moshoeshoe the Great and representing the Paramount Chief of Basutoland, Chiefs Montsioa Molema and Makiwane from Bechuanaland [75]. The group of outstanding educated Africans who contributed to launch it included Alfred Mangena, Henry Selby Msimang and his brother Richard, W. Thomas Mtobi Mapikela, the Congress speaker, E.J. Mqoboli, Congress first senior chaplain, George D. Montsioa, Saul Msane, Levi Thomas Mvabaza, Walter Benson Rubusana, Meshash Pelem and so forth [76]. Next, the conference appointed a committee to draw up a Constitution, a goal which was finally achieved in 1919 [77]. Seme also launched the Congress newspaper thanks to the financial help of the Queen Regent of Swaziland and to the cooperation of Daniel Simon Letanka who agreed to merge his Morumioa, or the Messenger, into the new Abantu-Batho and which he was to publish for the next twenty years [78].

#### 4. The SANNC Constitution

The SANNC aimed at dealing with all questions affecting the black population in South Africa. On 1 August 1914, a first draft Constitution was read and amended. On 3 August 1915, the National Congress representatives again expressed their dissatisfaction with the proposed Constitution, and entrusted a Select Committee with revising it or drawing up a new Constitution. The Committee met under the chairmanship of R.W. Msimang from Johannesburg. It included African leaders from the four provinces: J.T. Gumede and W.W. Ndhlovu were from Natal. The Reverend E.P.B. Koti and W.P. Rubusana came from the Cape. From the Orange Free State, there were J.B. Twayi, T.M. Mapikela and the Reverend A.P. Pitso. Dr S. Letanka and S.M. Makgatho stood for the Transvaal. E. Tshongwana represented the Transkei and B. Nxumalo came from Swaziland. At its meeting at Bloemfontein on 2 August 1918, the National Congress Executive Committee discussed the draft Constitution, and finally adopted it.

Congress defined its objectives as follows: it purported to unite all existing public or private associations, to voice Africans' opinions about government legislation and their aspirations, to seek redress of their grievances through constitutional channels, to act as a supra-tribal body and educate Africans on

their obligations towards the government, to cooperate with European Societies, Leagues or Unions pressing for a fair treatment of Africans, to set up a National Fund thanks to voluntary contributions, periodical subscriptions, levies or other payments. The National Congress included three major groups: hereditary chiefs, the elected representatives of Basutoland, Swaziland, Bechuanaland, ordinary delegates and leaders of affiliated organizations. The Chiefs were granted a privileged position. They were hailed as Honorary Vice-Presidents, and were to attend any Congress meetings either in person or by representation, and their decision was final. Ordinary delegates were to stand for branch members in Provincial as well as National Congresses. Affiliated bodies of a provincial nature were to be represented by delegates at that level; those of national status were to take part in the National Congress.

The National Congress was to meet annually during the Easter holidays. Meetings of the National Congress were to be convened if a minimum of twenty ordinary delegates voted. Extraordinary meetings could also be held when required by two Provincial Congresses at least. The National Congress was to be the final arbiter in all matters submitted for its decision.

The National Executive Committee was responsible for carrying out the National Congress resolutions. It was to hold office for three years, and the National Congress could remove its officers by a majority vote. The Executive Committee consisted of a President-General, a Secretary-General and nine Vice-Presidents: five Provincial Chairmen and a representative for each of the Territories.

The President-General was charged with several responsibilities. With the advice of his committee, he was to implement the policy defined by the annual congress to appoint officers, committees and commissions, to visit the provinces and territories, to address public meetings, to take part in conferences, and to receive deputations.

The Treasurer-General was to preside over and control a Treasury Committee composed of the Provincial Treasurers. The Secretary-General's duties consisted in keeping a general register of membership and in appointing inspectors to check provincial and branch books. Like the treasurer, he was to preside over a coordinating or "organizing" Committee made up of Provincial Secretaries.

Provincial Congresses were to elect each a President or Provincial Chairman who was ex-officio a member of all branch committees and of the National Executive. A Vice-Chairman, a Treasurer, a Secretary, and three to five District Agents - who linked the Provincial Executive to branches and chiefs - formed the Provincial Executive.

Provincial sub-committees could be started under the chairmanship of their provincial representatives. The "Records and Parliamentary Committee" was to record grievances, prepare petitions, resolutions, and evidence for government commissions. It was also to examine bills, acts of Parliament, and the administration of justice. It was also to keep in touch with Provincial and Municipal Councils and other local authorities. An "Education and Labour Board" was to study all questions related to education and all labour matters, including contracts, wages and fair treatment of African workers. A "Land Settlement Board" was to scrutinize all problems affecting reserves and townships.

The Provinces controlled the local branches of Congress. The Provincial Chairman was to visit chiefs and branches annually, inspect the state of their organization, and forward a precise report to the National Congress. He was responsible for the execution of all National Congress decisions.

The branches were to inquire into grievances and hand over all membership fees to the Provincial Treasurer. Each branch could send a delegate in the Provincial and National Congresses.

By 1920, the Cape Congress had branches in Ndabeni, Cape Town, East London, Huguenot, Richmond Hill, Korsten, New Brighton, Uitenhage, Humansdorp, Queenstown and Kamastone. New sections were set up at De Aar, Beaufort, Aliwal North and Herschel. The total membership had reached 1,200 and Zaccheus Richard Mahabane, then President of the Cape Congress, pointed out that they could already influence African opinion.

The Transvaal Congress included some 3,000 members in 1920 and 2,000 in 1921. At the National Congress headquarters, Johannesburg became the centre of African politics. The Transvaal branch was presided over by Sefako Mapogo Makgatho from 1912 to 1913, and then by S. Peter Matseke.

Dube's Natal Native Congress which had been established in 1901 joined the National Congress. It had branches in Durban, Pietermaritzburg and the northern coal mining centres like Newcastle. The Natal Native Congress did not apparently withdraw from the national body after Dube resigned as President-General in 1917.

The Orange Free State Native National Congress which appeared before the inter-colonial commission of 1903-1905 joined the National Congress in 1912. Its branch network included Bloemfontein and Kroonstad. It also displayed a certain activity in other centres like Thaba Nchu. By the 1920s, Bloemfontein regularly welcomed the yearly National Congress. Like the branches in Natal, those in the Free State did not keep a recorded membership, a clue to the paucity of their organization.

Membership fees varied. Paramount Chiefs were expected to raise £50. This sum was to be handed over to the Treasurer of the Provincial Congress. One third was to be given to the Treasurer-General. Each branch was to provide £5 for its Province. In this case, too, monies were to be paid to the Treasurer-General via his provincial counterparts. The territories were to contribute each £100 which were to be paid by their Paramount Chiefs to the Treasurer-General [79].

The Select Committee therefore made an interesting attempt to define Congress theoretical structure and the scope of its activities. In practice, however, the organization of Congress left much to be desired. Most of the work was done by correspondence, meetings took place occasionally, and a lack of coordination between Congress officers hindered its functioning. From Xuma's standpoint, "there was no coordination of any kind. Each officer acted as his own master. The Treasurer received and administered funds according to his absolute discretion; the branches everywhere almost acted independently" [80]. Henry Selby Msimang also reported that the relationship between Congress members was "rather loose. It was not definite" [81]. Msimang further stated that the Upper House of Chiefs never functioned properly. First prompted by the 1913 Natives' Land Act to join the movement, tribal rulers gradually looked upon Congress as a future body, especially after the failure of the 1914 and 1919 deputations to England. The same disappointment could be noted in the Territories. H.S. Msimang said: "the Protectorates seemed to have gone out of the picture. They lost interest because they thought perhaps they were not so much affected by the laws of the Union as we were, and it was becoming very expensive for them" [82]. As a result of the chiefs' disaffection, the SANNC's treasury slowly dried up.

Owing to the scarcity of funds, many able educated Africans were compelled to earn their living outside the organization. S.T. Plaatje, who was Secretary-General, became less involved after his visit to the United States in December 1920. Horatio Isaiah Bud-Mbelle, who held the same post in 1917, resigned in 1919 to work for the Native Affairs Department as a translator. Charlotte Maxeke, founder of the Bantu Women's league, had to open an employment bureau to survive.

The geographical distance between urban communities embittered the financial burdens of Congress organizers. 500 miles separated Kimberley where Plaatje lived from Durban, the headquarters of Congress during Dube's presidency (1912-17). Josiah Tshangana Gumede, based in Natal, had his secretary Khaile in Johannesburg. Although Seme worked first with Mveli Skota in Johannesburg, he had later to deal with James Calata living at Cradock, in the Eastern Cape.

Congress was later confronted with additional obstacles. The government repression under the Native Administration Act of 1927 and the Riotous Assemblies Amendment Act of 1930 deprived Congress of some of its leadership.

The emergence of rival bodies such as the International Socialist League (ISL) in September 1915, the ICU in January 1919, the native conferences set up under the terms of the Native Affairs Act No. 38 of 1920, the Joint Councils of Europeans and Natives initiated in 1921 deprived Congress of a potential membership. Personal rivalries between African politicians further undermined the influence of Congress. A.B. Xuma pointed out "...there were interminable misunderstandings and wranglings amongst the leaders which created manifold obstacles to the progress of the Congress" [83].

By and large, then, African leaders referred to pre-Union legislation as the major source of all their woes. Indeed, European authorities in the Northern colonies devised every legal means to maintain a master-servant relationship between Whites and Blacks. Africans also became increasingly dissatisfied with the Cape policy. Although liberal in principle, it progressively included a few segregationist features. Prompted by the earnest desire to uphold white supremacy, and by a growing fear of a powerful black electorate, the Cape government deliberately introduced new qualifications which Africans could hardly meet.



Their involvement by the British side in the Boer war, Milner's declarations about a few mild reforms, led African people <sup>to</sup> cherish hopes for a better socio-economic and political situation. However, the Vereeniging Treaty placed white hegemony above all other interests, and ignored their expectations. Africans expressed their frustrations through several petitions to various official authorities in South Africa and in Great Britain. They felt entitled to the same political privileges as Europeans. Their education, their integration in the cash economy, their contribution to the revenue through direct and indirect taxation allowed them to comply with the required qualifications, and they bitterly resented being denied a share in the management of their country on the ground of colour alone.

The Union Act brought their disappointment to a climax. This measure introduced a new colour bar for Cape Africans saw their former rights curtailed. Unlike their black fellows in the Northern Colonies, Cape Africans could still vote, but from now on, they were excluded from Parliament membership. African people looked up to the franchise and to political representation as the embodiments of manhood and citizenship, and they refused to be reduced to the status of irresponsible children.

Once again, their various provincial organizations put forward the same grievances. Africans felt entitled to the same political privileges as European settlers for several reasons. They bore the burden of heavy taxes; they improved their social and economic conditions. Furthermore, Cape Africans had never misused their franchise rights, and therefore, the so-called danger looming over Europeans' heads was manufactured to set them aside from the political life of their country. Their claims fell on deaf ears, however, and they got nothing despite the support of European sympathizers like W.P. Schreiner.

The Union Act more than previous legal measures contributed to the growth of African nationalism in several respects. Africans' failure to make themselves heard allowed them to realize their organizational weakness on the national scale.

They became aware of the need for a wider cooperation between Africans from all over the country if they were to achieve any success. As a result, the new intelligentsia banded together with traditional rulers to set up a nation-wide body: the SANNC. This body claimed to be the mouthpiece of the nation, and set out to act on behalf of African people at large according to constitutional norms.

## CHAPTER XI

## IDEOLOGIES

Of the several strata now making up African society, the emerging intelligentsia unquestionably spearheaded African opposition to the segregationist character of colonial rule. The missionary educated John Tengo Jabavu (1859-1921) appeared as the most outstanding African politician up to the time of Union. Seme, another product of missionary institutions, exerted a significant influence on South African politics after the Union. These prominent figures had other characteristics in common in addition to their European education. Both displayed the same broad vision of <sup>the</sup> African situation. Both urged their countrymen to cast their eyes beyond the narrow barriers of their own tribe or province and pressed for a Union-wide cooperation between them.

Paradoxically enough, however, these two leading personalities were to open one of the first breaches to African solidarity which was apparently so dear to them both. Although aware of the little impact European sympathizers such as WP Schreiner could exert to protect his black brethren, and of British statesmen's failure to fulfil their promises, Jabavu's inner faith in the Whites remained unbroken. He invited his countrymen to transcend racial prejudices, to work hand in hand with Europeans, and when Seme set up his all-black organization, he chose to remain aloof.

Were these divergent attitudes of educated Africans indications of antagonistic opinions about the kind of society they wished to live in, or contrary to all appearances did they all cherish the same ideal? How far were their aspirations shared by tribal elites, and by the African mass at large?

African elites underwent three major influences: Christianity as brought about by missionaries, Ethiopianism and Pan-Africanism.

### I. Missionary impact

Of the three above-mentioned influences, missionaries' impact was by far the most important. Through their teaching, European missionaries instilled new

concepts and norms to African children, moulded their character, and contributed to the growth of a westernized intelligentsia.

### 1. Educated elite

Black politicians in South Africa were the product of missionary education; some of them managed to carry on their studies in Great Britain or in the United States. As lawyers, teachers and clergymen, they occupied a privileged position allowing them to remain in touch with their people, and to assume their role of leaders.

#### a. European type of education: importance of Lovedale and Fort Hare

The bulk of African leaders attended various missionary institutions. Lovedale, however, stood as an exception to all missionary bodies by its non-racial character, the quality of its curriculum, its high standard and the number of its passes. Scottish churches were at the origin of this great achievement. They sent William Govan to open it in 1824. At first a mission station, Lovedale - thus named after the Reverend John Love of the L.M.S. - started its career of higher learning on 21 July 1841. It humbly began with an enrolment of eleven Africans and nine European pupils but thanks to the stature of its Scottish teachers such as W. Govan, Dr James Stewart, Lovedale soon became famous in the country [1].

Lovedale philosophy was based on the principle that men in a given community are interdependent, and the backwardness or the progress of some are necessarily felt by others. As a result, Lovedale devoted itself to further the spiritual and material condition of its students. According to one early historian who described its genesis, aims, and results, Lovedale was "haunted by the saying that to keep a man in the ditch you must stay there with him" [2].

Lovedale pupils were provided with primary education. The records of the Cape Education Department for the years 1884, 1885, 1886 conveyed the prominence of Lovedale over the seven hundred existing schools in the colony. During that period, it had the highest number of passes with 597. It was followed by the Wellington European Girls' School with 411, and by Healdtown Native School with 257 [3]. Lovedale also remained for many years the only centre in the country to

provide non-whites with secondary education [4]. It contributed to turn out hundreds of teachers. Between 1873 and 1886, it again took the lead in the whole colony by granting 184 Elementary Teachers' Certificates [5].

Lovedale institution paid a particular attention to "industrial" education. At the time of Dr. James Stewart born in Edinburgh on 14 February 1831 and who became an important member of its staff in 1867, Lovedale set up one of the most well-known workshops in the country. It acquainted its students with some useful trades such as printing, book-binding, building, carpentry, shoe-making, wagon-making, black-smithing, telegraphy and nursing [6]. In 1871, Lovedale took a further step. Thanks to a financial gift from the Free Church of Scotland, and to a £50 yearly grant from the Cape Education Department, Lovedale opened an industrial department where women and girls were trained as seamstresses, domestic servants and so forth [7]. As already pointed out, the term "industrial" was applied rather oddly, and some of the handicrafts which were taught should have been done away with as they could by no means compete with European articles. Nevertheless, the kind of education Lovedale offered was generally much appreciated as shown by the increasing number of its students. The Girls' School, for instance, had the following enrolments: 1873: 66; 1878 (war): 46; 1883: 67; 1888: 77; 1893: 137; 1898: 104; 1903: 156; 1908: 147; 1913: 187; 1918: 218; 1923: 211; 1928: 235 [8]. Lovedale renown spread beyond the frontiers of the Cape colony, and students from all parts of the Union of South Africa, from the protectorates of Bechuanaland, Basutoland, Swaziland, Southern and Northern Rhodesia as well as from Nyasaland, Tanganyika, the Belgian Congo, and Kenya flocked to it [9].

Lovedale was considered as the mouthpiece of non-whites. One of its distinguished members was Dr A.W. Roberts. Although he shared the racial prejudices of his contemporaries towards the Blacks, he once challenged the Union government to protect their rights, and was to lose his post as senator as a result. Dr Roberts came to Lovedale as a teacher in 1883. Owing to his discovery of various stars, he became fellow of the Royal Astronomical Society in 1894. A few years later, in 1898, he was elected to the Royal Society of Edinburgh. In 1920, the Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs, General Smuts, appointed him as a representative of African people in the Senate. When General Hertzog who succeeded General Smuts introduced his Native Bills, Dr Roberts spoke on behalf of the black population and voted against them. He was dropped when the time came to

reappoint senators [10].

In Lovedale, then, were gathered favourable factors which were directly instrumental in creating the new African elite. There, the future black leaders had the privilege to enjoy the teaching of men endowed with a remarkable intellect. They also had the opportunity to meet fellow students from different nationalities, speaking different languages, and displaying different customs. These various stimuli broadened their outlook and fostered their initiative. Rubusana, Thema, Molema, J.T. Jabavu's sons might be mentioned as some of the famous Lovedale African pupils. Walter Benson Rubusana (1858 - 1936) studied at Lovedale until 1882.

Richard Victor Selope Thema (1886 - 1955) passed his school higher examination in Lovedale in 1907.

James M. Thaele (1888 - 1948) attended Lovedale Institution from 1906 until about 1910.

Alexander Macaulay Jabavu (1889 - 1946), the second son of J.T. Jabavu, studied at Lovedale.

Davidson Don Tengo Jabavu (1885 - 1959), the oldest son of J.T. Jabavu, studied at Lovedale, too.

Although their father J.T. Jabavu did not study at Lovedale, he was nevertheless connected with it for several years. In 1881, he was invited to come to Lovedale to edit Isiqidimi Sama Xosa, a Xhosa version of the missionary newspaper Christian Express. His interest in politics led to clashes with Lovedale authorities, however, and he left the editorship of the paper in 1884 [11].

In the early days of its development, Lovedale appears as a very progressive institution at that time. Unlike other missionary bodies which focussed only on religious teaching, Lovedale offered a wide range of activities which led to its rapid expansion. However, in the mid-thirties, this once most prestigious college introduced a colour bar between the White teachers and the few Africans on its staff [12].

African leaders attended other missionary institutions than Lovedale. In the Cape the industrial school opened at Healdtown by the Reverend William Shaw, then Superintendent of Wesleyan missionaries, and which had the Reverend John Ayliff as first principal in 1855, also helped turn out future prominent black leaders such as E.J. Mqoboli, Selby and his brother R.W. Msimang, Saul Msane, Meshach Pelem and H.R. Ngcayiya [13]. L.T. Mvabaza received part of his training in St. Matthew's College and Zonnebloem in Cape Town. J.T. Gumede and D.S. Letanka attended the Native College at Grahamstown. In Natal, Adams College had J.L. Dube as one of its pupils. In the Transvaal, S.M. Makgatho and H.S. Msimang were among the first students enrolled at Kilnerton Training Institute.

The Livingstonia Missionary Institute in Nyasaland also gave Black South Africans an outstanding spokesman. Clements Kadalie (1896 - 1951) completed his secondary schooling there, qualifying as a teacher [14].

As a general rule, too, African leaders took up legal, teaching or clerical professions. A. Mangena, P. Seme, R.W. Msimang, J.D. Montsioa, M. Skota, S.T. Plaatje and Bud-Mbelle belonged to the first group. Alfred Mangena (1879 - 1924) was the first African to qualify as an attorney [15].

Pixley Ka Isaka Seme (d. 1951) was sent by the American Congregationalist missionary, S. Pixley, to the Mount Hermon School in Massachusetts. He then attended Columbia University where he passed his B.A. in 1906. Thanks to the financial backing of missionary benefactors, he entered Jesus College in Oxford to study law. In 1910, he was admitted to the bar at the Middle Temple in London. He went back to South Africa the same year, practised as an attorney in Johannesburg. His office was almost opposite to that of the Indian Lawyer Mahatma Gandhi. Seme later worked together with Mangena who had his office in Pretoria [16].

Richard W. Msimang (1884 - 1933) was one of the first students at J.L. Dube's Ohlange Institute, and later attended Healdtown in the Cape. He then spent nine years in Britain where he qualified as a solicitor at Queen's College, Taunton, Somerset. In November 1910, he went back to South Africa and started practising in Johannesburg [17].

George D. Montsioa (b. 1885) completed his legal training in Britain, and later became a solicitor at the South African Supreme Court. He practised law in Pietersburg, and then in Johannesburg [18].

Horatio Isaiah Bud-Mbelle (1870 - 1947) worked as an interpreter at the Supreme Court, and later at the High Court of Griqualand West at Kimberley. He studied privately for the civil service law examination, and would have qualified as a magistrate had Africans been allowed to be appointed to the bench [19].

Henry Selby Msimang (b. 1886) spent his youth at Emakhosini mission station in Swaziland. In 1903, he entered Kilnerton training institution in Pretoria as one of his first pupils. He later studied at Healdtown in the Cape where he qualified as a teacher. He worked as a clerk to the lawyer Seme, and often consulted Mahatma Gandhi when he had to take up cases [20].

Like H.S. Msimang, T.D. Mveli Skota (b. 1880s) did not study law. Nevertheless, he was connected with courts where he served as an interpreter at times [21].

Amongst the prestigious leaders who identified themselves with African movements, and who had performed teaching duties, there might be mentioned the names of Dube, Gumede, Plaatje, Makgatho, Thaele, Maxeke, Masabalala, and Pelem. John Langalibalele Dube (1871 - 1946) studied at the Amanzimtoti Training Institute. In 1887, he went to America where he attended Oberlin College. In 1892, he returned to South Africa, and served as a teacher for the American Board Mission at Amanzimtoti.

Sefako Mapogo Makgatho (1861 - 1951) was one of the first students enrolled at Kilnerton Training Institute after it was set up by the Methodist Church in Pretoria. The sponsorship of missionaries and of his family allowed him to go to Britain in 1882 where he studied education and religion at Ealing in Middlesex until 1885. After his return to South Africa, he joined the staff of Kilnerton in 1887, and taught there until 1906.

Josiah Tshangana Gumede (1870 - 1947) who was educated at the Native College in Grahamstown in the Cape, became a teacher in Somerset East, and later in Natal.

Solomon Tshekisho Plaatje (1879 - 1932) received his only formal education at Pniel mission station of the Lutheran Berlin Mission society where he later taught for several years.

Meshach Pelem (1859 - 1967) studied at Healdtown where he qualified as a primary school teacher in 1879. He taught in the Cape for several years.

Charlotte Makgomo Manye Maxeke (1874 - 1939) received her elementary and secondary education in Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth. In the 1890s, she went to the United States where she studied at Wilberforce University in Ohio. At Wilberforce, she passed her B.S. in 1905, met and married the Reverend Marshall Maxeke, another South African [22].

Samuel Makama Martin Masabalala (b. 1877) was educated in Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth. Later, he sometimes worked as a teacher.

Some outstanding leaders such as J.L. Dube, S.M. Makgatho, E.J. Mqoboli, Z.R. Mahabane were both teachers and clergymen, two professions which were not incompatible with each other. Dube started studying theology in 1897 in Brooklyn, USA. Three years later, he was ordained by the Congregational Church. Makgatho was a methodist preacher, and used his position in the church for recruiting new members for the National Congress. Mqoboli (b. 1860) was trained first as a teacher, and then as a methodist minister.

Zaccheus Richard Mahabane (1881 - 1971) studied at Morija in Basutoland together with D.D.J. Jabavu, and in 1901 he qualified as a teacher. He worked as a teacher, court interpreter, and started theological training in the Cape.

Reverend Henry Reed Ngcayiya (1860 - 1928) served as a teacher, court interpreter, and later was ordained a minister in the African Methodist Episcopal Church.

Sometimes, family bonds strengthened the cohesion of the educated elite. For instance, the sister of Bud-Mbelle became Plaatje's wife, and his daughter married R.W. Msimang [23]. E.M. Cele was related to Dube.



These lawyers, teachers and clergymen often displayed an early interest in the masses' socio-economic and political grievances, and strove to redress them by organizing themselves. By 1900 - 1901, J.L. Dube together with M. Luthuli, Saul Msane and others launched the Natal Native Congress. Dube served as President, and J.T. Gumede became its secretary and vice president. The Natal Native Congress later joined the SANNC.

In 1906, SM Makgatho established a Transvaal Teachers' Association as well as a Transvaal Native Political Union which later under his leadership merged with the Transvaal Native Congress, a branch of the national body [24].

At the time of Bambatha's rebellion, in 1906, A. Mangena petitioned the British government on behalf of Africans threatened by court martial in Natal, introduced a case against the same authorities, charging that their proclamation of martial law was illegal [25].

J.L. Dube and Walter Rubusana convened the South African Native Convention which met at Bloemfontein in 1909 to oppose the colour bar provisions in the draft Constitution. The same year, Rubusana and Mangena accompanied the deputation to Britain to lobby against it.

The lawyers P. Seme, R.W. Msimang, G.D. Montsioa and A. Mangena, the teachers S.T. Plaatje, J.T. Gumede and M. Pelem, the clergyman E.J. Mqoboli played a key role in the foundation of the SANNC in 1912. Unable to attend the Bloemfontein Conference held that year, J.L. Dube was elected in absentia as Congress first president. S.T. Plaatje became its Secretary General and G.D. Montsioa its recording secretary. E.J. Mqoboli served as its first senior chaplain [26].

Another important factor in the growth of African national consciousness was the emergence of Fort Hare, the first university college for Blacks in South Africa. Before Union, successive governments in the four provinces strove to lay down a master-servant relationship between Whites and Blacks. Although more "liberal", the Cape nevertheless maintained this policy. George Grey and Cecil John Rhodes stressed the importance of integrating African people into the capitalistic mode of production as a submissive force. This dominant goal ruled the franchise, land, as well as educational policies in the four provinces.

To provide European capitalists with useful servants, bare literacy was needed, hence the casual attitude of the different provincial governments towards Africans' education. In the four provinces, Africans' schooling largely depended on missionaries' good will. However, the lack of a general and precise system of education as well as the scarcity of funds led to poor results on the whole: the great bulk of African children seldom completed primary education; very few reached Lovedale, the only centre providing secondary education for many years; the best elements were compelled to travel abroad to get university degrees. By the Union Act, the provincial authorities and not the central government, were still to be responsible for African education. In other words, the Union Act perpetuated the uneven development of African education in the four provinces. By setting up Fort Hare University<sup>College</sup>, the Cape carried on taking the lead in educational matters.

The opening of the University College of Fort Hare was the culmination of missionaries' and Africans' earnest efforts to spread education amongst Africans. As early as 1878, Dr James Stewart of Lovedale made his first public plea for an institution of higher learning for Africans at a missionary conference in London. His concern for the welfare of Africans and his belief that educational advantages should be extended to them, again appeared in 1904 when he told the inter-colonial Native Affairs Commission:

Education proceeds or progresses in a country from above downwards, not from below upwards. It is the few who become thoroughly educated who stir the ambitions of the rest, and it spreads all through [27].

His persistence began to bear fruit for a year later, the commission recommended "that a Central Native College or similar institution be established and aided by the various states for training native teachers and in order to afford opportunity for higher education to Native students" [28].

A group of Europeans and Africans continued to press the idea of a college. The European members were: Colonel C.P. Crewe, Dr Neil Macvicar, J.W. Weir, J.W. Sauer, and K.A. Hobart Houghton. The African members were J.T. Jabavu, H.I. Bud-Mbelle, and Reverend John Knox Bokwe [29]. Themselves a product of missionary schools, these outstanding Africans realized that their education allowed them to be the leaders of the people and to speak on their behalf. They were aware of their brethren's unquenchable thirst for western education. Indeed, for many

Africans, knowledge symbolized the white man's power, and they yearned to get it, too. Zachariah Koedirelang Matthews (1901 - 1968), one of the first students to enter Fort Hare University College, and in 1949 president of the Cape branch of the National Congress, related how his father, at one time a poor miner in Kimberley, used to insist on European education as a road to equality between Whites and Blacks. He wrote:

...I hear again in my memory the words I heard so often from my parents. Education was the weapon with which the white man had conquered our people and taken our lands. It was often thought, my father would say, that the white man had conquered because he had superior weapons, guns. But our people were not always without guns. In some of the wars such as those of 1878 and 1896, our people had guns, too, but had lost. No, he would insist, the real reason for our defeat was white man's education and the black man's lack of it. Only by mastering the secrets of his knowledge would we ever be able to regain our strength and face the conqueror on his own terms [30].

Personal reasons also contributed to make them feel the necessity of developing African education more acutely. Indeed, in 1901 J.T. Jabavu unsuccessfully tried to enrol his son Davidson Don Tengo at Dale College, a high school for white boys in King William's Town and he had to send him overseas to a Friend's school in Colwyn Bay, in Wales [31]. As a devoted father, J.K. Bokwe was anxious about the future of his children Rosebery Tandwefika and Frieda who were both at Lovedale [32].

The project of founding a University College received a wide support of the part of African population. The Transkei Territories General Council, or Bunga, an African local government body - voted £10,000 towards its foundation. The United Free Church of Scotland also offered a site at Fort Hare as part of a contribution of £5,000. The South African government promised a grant of £600 [33].

The first council of the University met on 17 November 1915. It included Reverend James Henderson as chairman, and Reverend John Lennox, both belonging to Lovedale, G.H. Hofmeyr, head of the newly formed Union Department of Education, Edward Dower, Secretary of the Department for Native Affairs, Reverend R.F. Hornabrook, from the Methodist Church in South Africa, J.T. Jabavu representing the donors of the contributions to the scheme. On 8 February 1916, Botha, Thomas Watt, Minister of Public Works, and Dower opened the College [34].

Fort Hare followed Lovedale tradition, and tried to meet African needs in several ways. Thanks to J.T. Jabavu's pressure, in particular, Fort Hare became a co-educational institution. Indeed, when Dr Alexander Kerr - Principal of the College from its foundation until his retirement in 1948 - informed the council that lack of accommodation made it impossible for him to accept two women students' applications, J.T. Jabavu vehemently protested on the ground that the College had to prepare its male and female students for their future life together. As Dr Kerr put it:

When... I ventured to surmise that these applications could not be entertained by the Council, I was startled by the vehemence with which their cause was pled by the African members, and particularly by Mr J. Tengo Jabavu, who declared that there was little point in educating their young men if their future wives were unable to offer the companionship and community of interest which only an educated woman could give. The argument was, of course, unanswerable, so with the best grace possible I promised to make some temporary arrangement which would allow these two women to be received [35].

Fort Hare was also far ahead from other schools by taking into account the social milieu of its students in syllabuses. Subjects such as history, geography, and biology, for example, included data drawn from their immediate environment. At the same time, Fort Hare took care to widen its students' outlook by referring to other societies. The French revolution, for instance, constituted the staple of the matriculation syllabus in history. It also provided its students with a range of academic courses to prepare them for industrial, agricultural, and teaching careers [36]. D.D.T. Jabavu voiced his people's satisfaction for the kind of education Fort Hare offered. To quote Kerr:

... D.D.T. Jabavu wished to reply on behalf of his people. He said that he felt it his duty to inform the sympathetic friends that the theory... of running African education on special lines adapted for African needs, had not always been acceptable to the African who helped to build the College. Indeed, in 1905 they were alarmed lest than the then prospective authorities should apply the theory to their disadvantage, and give the Black people a stone instead of bread... He was therefore glad to say that through the educational management of the Principal who had proved a genuine and wise friend of the Africans..., the theory no longer awakened misgivings [37].

More progressive than Lovedale, Fort Hare introduced its students into a colour bar-free world, and made them self-confident. At Lovedale, the staff shared the common prejudices against Africans. They believed that such subjects as mathematics, latin, and physical sciences were beyond Africans' understanding

[38]. After thirty-one years at Lovedale, Dr. A.W. Roberts told the Economic Commission of January 1914 that the Black "has mental drawbacks and physical drawbacks... he has not the belief in himself the white man has" [39]. At Fort Hare, the European teachers such as Dr. Alexander Kerr, William T. Murdock, Clifford Dent, and Bishop Smyth considered their African students as capable as European ones. Of Dr Kerr, Matthews wrote:

He came to us more importantly of all, free of the racial attitudes common to the country. He treated us as he would have treated any group of students. Unlike many European teachers, he never seemed to assume that as Africans we would be less competent, less able to understand what he had to teach, or less capable in any way merely because we were black [40].

Murdock, a mathematics teacher, destroyed the myth of Africans' inferior capacities, and turned out able lecturers in that science. Dent completed the process by teaching physics which soon became a popular subject. Bishop Smyth dealt with his African students as responsible human beings [41].

The number of Africans who passed the junior certificate test was as follows: 1901-10: 59; 1911-20: 62; 1921-30: 569; 1931-34: 1084. The matriculation passes numbered 253 during the period 1901-1934 [42]. Up to the 1930s, then, Fort Hare trained only a very limited number of students. However, like Lovedale, its name was to remain imprinted on the history of black nationalism in South Africa. Indeed, Fort Hare provided some of the most prominent National Congress leaders who later fought against apartheid. They were Menasseh Tebasso Moroene who joined the National Congress in 1935, Rosebery Tandwefika Knox (1900-1963), a treasurer of the National Congress from the 1940s up to 1954 and speaker at the national annual conferences in 1950 and 1951, his brother-in-law Z.K. Matthews, V.T. Victor Mboobo and Joseph A. Mokoena, both members of the National Congress executive committee in December 1949, Arthur Elias Letele (1915-1966) who joined the National Congress Youth League in the 1940s, Tennyson Xola Makiwane, a National Congress representative from the 1950s onwards, Philemon Pearce Duma Nokwe who set up a National Congress Youth League branch at Fort Hare, Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela who became president of the Transvaal branch of the National Congress, and then its deputy under Albert Luthuli, Alfred Nzo who joined the National Congress in 1957, and was elected its general secretary in April 1969 [43].

In the 1920s, African intellectuals were in the limelight of the political scene of their country. It would be interesting to study their relationship with African kings and chiefs, and to assess how far the latter contributed to the national consciousness of the people.

## 2. African kings and chiefs

As in the Gold Coast, African kings and chiefs and the new intelligentsia in South Africa did not constitute clear-cut categories owing to their blood, marital, professional ties, and sometimes, to their common European education.

### a. Blood, marital, and professional ties

Natal province apparently produced the highest number of 1920s African leaders related to Royal Houses. It was followed by the Cape and Transvaal. Some prominent educated Africans had ties with leading tribal families in Basutoland and Nyasaland. From Natal, might be mentioned Seme, Dube, the two Msimang brothers. Although from a very poor Tonga family himself, Seme married a daughter of Dinuzulu, the Zulu Paramount Chief [44]. By 1926-1927, Seme served as legal adviser to the Swaziland Paramount Chief, King Sobhuza, who sought to take back his land which had been gradually robbed by Europeans through constitutional channels [45]. Dube descended from the Ngcobo line of chiefs, and kept a close relationship with Zulu tribal rulers [46]. Selby and Richard Msimang had royal blood in their veins through their mother who was a daughter of King Langalibalele's eldest brother [47].

From the Cape, there were Rubusana, Montsioa, and Molema. Rubusana was the son of a councillor. In 1902, he accompanied the Tembu Paramount, Dalindyabo, to Britain for the coronation of Edward VII. Montsioa was the grandson of the Paramount Chief of the Baralongs. Molema was the son of a leading family of the Baralongs too.

From the Transvaal might be cited Makgatho who was the son of a chief possibly at Mphalele, near Pietersburg in the northern Transvaal, where he was born.

Thaele and Kadalie were related to royal families outside the Union. Thaele was the son of a Basuto Chief. Kadalie was the grandson of Chiweyu, Paramount

Chief of the Atongas in Nyasaland [48].

b. African kings and chiefs and European Education

A few tribal rulers such as Stephen Mini and Oliver Dalindyebo (1865-1920) received a European education and played a relatively important role in national movements. Chief of a Christian Zulu group that lived around the Edendale mission in Natal, Mini became a member of the Natal Native Congress since its inception in 1900-1901, and sometimes served as Head of the Upper House of the National Congress in 1912 [49].

Educated Africans emerged as the most influential members of their society. Missionary education as well as industrialization and government legislation contributed to the decline of tribal rulers' power and prestige. Many became colonial appointees and lost the allegiance and support of African masses.

European advent and labour needs created by industrialization altered the usual relationship between tribal rulers and their people all over the country. In the Cape, successive governments carried out a policy aiming at undermining their socio-economic and political standing [50]. Lieutenant General Cathcart, Governor of the Cape in 1852, deprived them of their land by allowing missionaries to hold it in trust for their converts, and thereby, of their influence upon their subjects [51]. Sir George Grey, Governor of the Cape in 1854 and 1860, followed Cathcart's policy and further diminished their authority: their tribes were broken up into small ones; they were displaced by European magistrates; reduced to the status of amapoyisa or government employees, and receiving stipends instead of their former tributes, they lost their people's allegiance [52]. The Glen Grey Act of 31 August 1894 further curtailed the remnants of their power. Indeed, one of its goals was to do away with communal tenure in favour of a new system based, to some extent, on European conceptions of property. Every tribesman was to get a plot of land not from his chief as in bygone days but from the colonial administration [53]. The Glen Grey Act also created district councils and location boards composed of headmen. These were compelled to levy various taxes which despite the provisions of clauses 35 and 53 were not generally used for their welfare [54]. As government civil servants, headmen had now their hands tied. They saw their people bend under the weight of heavy rates, but they had to cringe to their masters for fear of being themselves stripped of their

possessions, jailed, exiled, or killed. They had to suffer, however, a great unpopularity amongst their people.

By Proclamation No. 352 of 1894, and Proclamation No. 152 of 1903, the Glen Grey Act was extended to the Transkei. There traditional rulers were also deprived of their judicial, economic and political powers. European magistrates supplanted them not only as judges but also as guardians of the land. Although the Transkei included several tribes such as the Griquas, the Pondos, the Tembus, the Fingoes, the Transkei government chose to ignore tribal divisions and tribal authorities. Irrespective of tribes, every district was divided up into locations. Each location included about one thousand inhabitants for whom a headman usually elected by the people and appointed by the Transkei government was responsible. Those headmen—civil servants received yearly salaries varying from £12 to £36 depending upon length of service, but they had no actual power [55]. An African councillor declared:

The people were saying the reason why their resolutions were not adopted was because the magistrates cut them down when they remained behind after the Council had risen... That matter was the sole topic of conversation amongst the natives when they went home [56].

They had no control over the funds they collected from Africans and which were used for other purposes than their well-being. As explained by an African councillor:

This money was collected from people who were poor, and they expected the council to look after all disbursements carefully. In the Report of the Surveyor there was no detailed statement of the roads constructed during the year... They should have a clear report, giving details as to the cost of construction work done during the whole year... [57].

At a non-European conference convened by the Native Affairs Commission in 1924, a speaker pointed out that tribal rulers became mere figureheads [58]. In 1926, similar opinions were put forward. Chiefs were no longer respected because chieftainship was dead. Their power to redress their people's grievances was taken away. A European magistrate supported this opinion by asserting that "headmen were in the unhappy position of being responsible for anything that was wrong in their locations, without having any power to put it right" [59]. Some traditional rulers such as Victor Poto, a leading Pondo Chief at Libode, tried to



resist the erosion of their authority by the Transkei government. Poto carried on settling disputes between his people although the Transkei government did not recognize his court. However, bold chiefs became very few [60].

In Natal, the Government also sought to avoid all risks of rebellion by wrecking chiefly power. As explained by Pine in a confidential despatch dated 5 September 1854:

The people are split up into a vast number of petty tribes under their respective chiefs who cannot so readily combine for mischief at present, but who will assuredly become troublesome if we foster instead of checking their powers [61].

Natal government devised several means to undermine the authority of traditional rulers. They required them, for instance, to supply labour for public work such as the construction of roads. Because they were compelled to meet their demand, or because they felt strong with government backing, some chiefs became despotic and called upon the same men over and over again. Generally used to a more democratic system of government, their people resented the new autocratic character of their rule and their partiality. Soon traditional rulers were confronted with a dilemma: were they to please the colonial authorities or their people? They were condemned in the first case to lose their stipends, and in the second alternative their prestige. Their anguish might be detected in the following words of a chief:

In these latter days, I am no longer their chief, you have put my people over my head, they are greater than I; if any of them do wrong and I attempt to punish them by fine or any other means they acknowledge the justice of it, but as it is impossible to please two parties in a case, the losing one runs off to the Magistrate, and I am told that I have no right to punish or to fine, and that I must restore the fine. When you want labourers for the harbour works or the public roads, then I am a chief, then I have people... You pay me nothing and you allow me to get nothing from my people, one day you object to my ruling and then again you threaten to punish me if I do not make my power felt by the people enough to make them go to work [62].

Their people, too, felt themselves stifled: they had no channel to voice their grievances to the Government, and they could not express their feelings to their chief. As clearly explained by an old chief, they could but let their anger simmer:

There is no channel through which we can communicate our grievances to the Government. Whenever a meeting is called by authority our chiefs will not permit any of their followers to give vent to those feelings I have already given you a lengthy illustration. Our chiefs feel bound to keep in well with the authorities on account of the stipend each draws year by year. And so by these and other means it has become habitual with us to refrain from speaking on matters which lie near the heart and which unless uttered and in some manner attended to must ere long tear the whole people to pieces and cause our once fair organization to fade and decay [63].

The Transvaal tribal rulers were also associated with the Colonial administration. They were, for instance, offered premiums to supply mining companies with labourers [64]. The latter's resentment against ill-treatment in the mines usually recoiled on their recruiters.

In the Orange Free State, the colonial government went even further. They sought to shatter the whole tribal system of land-ownership and to do away with chieftainship. In 1891, President Reitz overtly declared that:

The main objective which civilized South Africa should bear in mind are:

1. To get rid of the tribal system as being an imperium in imperio of the most pernicious kind
2. To abolish chieftainship [65].

From this general picture of chieftainship in the four provinces, a few conclusions might be drawn. With European advent and industrialization, African people were compelled to comply with their new masters' rule. They realized that their own tribal chiefs lost their autonomy, and were reduced to the status of performers of the same rule they were bound to obey. As a result, they increasingly identified them with colonial policy. Their situation came to a deadlock: they could express their grievances neither to colonial administrators nor to their natural representatives as in olden days. They could not vent their discontent in open rebellion for their white rulers were stronger. Would they follow the new elite and the constitutional struggle they offered?

### 3. Africans and nation-building

The black intelligentsia sometimes set up themselves as the continuators of the famous Kings Shaka and Moshoeshe who started the process of nation-building, they said, long before European arrival. From 1818 to 1824, various tribes occupying the vast area between the Drakensberg and the sea either fled from

Shaka's regiments or were welded into the Zulu political structure. In the latter case, the Zulu Royal lineage imposed its traditions, the Zulu dialect became the language of the nation, and all inhabitants whatever their origin became Zulus owing allegiance to Shaka [66].

Africans also regarded Moshoeshe as a model. The second son of an average village headman, Moshoeshe was a man from a rather humble origin. However, his remarkable wisdom and diplomacy won him an important following. Moshoeshe was brought up according to traditional customs. An aspiring King, he realized that adherence to them would attract him many followers. He married several wives - presumably between 140 and 200 - to build up a large community and secure allies. He displayed a great magnanimity towards his enemies. After his victorious battle over Shaka's warriors at Thaba Bosiu, Moshoeshe sent them thirty oxen to feed themselves on their way back to their country [67]. When the Ndebele attacked him in 1831, he also sent the retreating soldiers a gift of cattle with the following message that brought him a wide fame: "Hunger brought you here. Take these cattle to eat on your way and go home in peace" [68]. He was also generous with his own people allowing them cattle loans, and providing the destitute with food when crops failed. After the missionaries' arrival in his country, he also refused to adopt a lifestyle which was alien to the great bulk of his people.

Africans' admiration for such men as King Shaka and Moshoeshe was conveyed amongst other writings in a sketch edited by the secretary general of the SANNC in the 1920s T.D. Mveli Skota, and published in 1932 under the title The African Yearly Register. Skota wrote:

Moshesh, or Moshoeshe Mokhashane, like King Tshaka, was a fine specimen of a man... Moshesh was not of royal blood, but by his diplomacy and dexterity, he installed himself as head and ruler of the Basuto Nation... He succeeded in assembling into a nation the remnants of various tribes scattered throughout the country [69].

Now, the new elite took upon themselves the uphill but not impossible task of nation-building. Like their prestigious ancestors, they strove to band several ethnic groups together. Unlike their ancestors, however, they elected to resort to constitutional means. As a general rule, they yearned for an all-inclusive society. Blacks and Whites and Coloured: all would have a place therein, and peace and harmony would reign between the various communities [70]. Their claims

to the franchise clearly conveyed that they rejected any inferior status. In their prospective society, they were to enjoy the same socio-economic and political privileges as the present ruling class. But to share equal rights with the Whites, should they discard their Africanness, or should they retain it? Educated Africans were confronted with a difficult choice, indeed. Their attitudes toward African culture varied, but two schools might be generally singled out: one could be represented by Dube and Thema, the other by Seme and Molema.

As far as Dube was concerned, his countrymen's failings grieved him at one time. Ignorant, superstitious, lazy, stupid, they apparently deserved all the contempt the Whites so often displayed towards them. However, his Black fellows were neither inherently nor irrevocably wicked. Lack of education only entailed their present backwardness and, therefore, the possibility to uplift them still remained. In 1909, he wrote:

Yes, the greatest affliction of our nation is its ignorance. It is the black man's ban. All his barbarism and wicked customs, all his witchcraft and superstition, all his indolence and carelessness in the labour market all his social degradation and abject poverty, all his pathological stupidity and political misunderstanding is attributable alike to one cause... almost every native ill is traceable back to this common source of ignorance, and when I say to ignorance that is but another way of saying to want of education [71].

The Zulus, Dube explained, were keenly aware of their shortcomings. They longed to be acquainted with European high culture to be relieved of their heavy burden. As a result, they welcomed missionary work as a blessing. As Dube put it:

My people are thirsting for knowledge, are lingering after enlightenment, are ashamed of their stark nakedness and their empty minds. Our ignorance crushes us down. We cannot rise even to be helpful to those that rule us, so long as this impotence lies so heavily upon us. Relieve us of it. Help us to rise to those better things we hoped for on your coming. That is what we pray. That's England's duty [72].

Zulu thirst for knowledge must have been a conspicuous fact for officials such as R. Haggard and Charles Saunders did not fail to notice it. Saunders told Haggard that the poorest Zulus were ready to make concessions to share the White man's education. Even the house boys, he carried on, would spend one shilling a month out of their ~~very~~ low wages to be taught at an evening school. On visiting Zululand, Haggard had himself the opportunity to hear a widespread story

conveying Zulus' yearning for European culture. The Zulus said their kings had gone and they wished to substitute a Lord called Knowledge for them. According to Haggard, Zulus' keenness for education constituted an irreversible process, and "something" had to be done to meet it. Haggard simultaneously warned the authorities against the danger of providing the Zulus with a thorough education which could ultimately put them on a par with their white masters. However, to take an opposite attitude and ignore Zulu eagerness for education would also jeopardize European supremacy. Haggard insistently pointed out the Zulus were determined to get the knowledge for which they were craving whether the government liked it or not. If the authorities failed to fulfil their requirements, the Zulus would certainly look for the dangerous help of the Ethiopian Church or of black teachers who because they knew the 3 Rs felt confident enough to challenge white hegemony. As a result, the government should take all appropriate measures to circumvent those imminent dangers looming over their head. To quote Haggard:

It may be urged that according to my own showing, to educate the native would be to create a danger on the principle that knowledge is power. But in my view, <sup>(with)</sup> he ultimately attain to that education if not by the assistance of the White, then through the dangerous aid of the Ethiopian Church or with the help of black teachers who have contrived to acquire some imperfect learning and who will naturally be more or less hostile to European dominance. Surely it is better that the Bantu should receive his instruction from the ruling European race... than through these unfriendly elements [73].

If there was no doubt about Zulu thirst for European education, Dube voiced only the expectations of the more liberal section of the population.

The more conservative Zulus were rather annoyed by those black youths aping British manners and clothes without success. According to Haggard, one of the eldest men of the tribe angrily pointed out:

Our children try to be white but white they will never be. Black they were born, and Black they must remain until they die [74].

Dube aimed at furthering Zulu interests, above all, as the title of his pamphlet clearly suggests it. He did not speak on behalf of African population as a whole... Indeed, in the other provinces, too, Africans strove to get some knowledge. In 1915, for instance, the Transvaal Council of Education reported that it was within almost everybody's experience to see a group of grown ups painfully spelling out the works of an infant primer [75]. One may assert that

Dube's views about leadership were rather narrow in scope, and to say the least paradoxical for a so-called "opponent of narrow tribalism" [76].

His disparagement of African customs might be explained by the fact that he was born and bred in a Christian environment and missionaries' widespread prejudices eventually left a mark upon his personality. Indeed, Dube was born at Inanda Mission station where his father who had been converted by Reverend Daniel Lindley served as a pastor. His teachers at Amanzimtoti Training Institute were American missionaries. In 1897, he went to the United States to study theology at a seminary in Brooklyn, and three years later became a clergyman in his turn.

Furthermore, Dube was concerned with raising funds for the upkeep of his Ohlange Institute. In 1904 he travelled to the United States for that purpose [77]. To praise European culture might have constituted a strategy to reach his goal. It was through blandishment that the crow in La Fontaine's fable gave its cheese to the fox.

Thema pointed out the new casual and condemnable attitude of the Whites toward their black fellows. The former firmly believed that the cursed Canaan doomed to be "a servant of servants" in the Bible was no more and no less than the African. This fundamental religious belief prevented Europeans from understanding why black people were pressing for a better position. Africans were doomed to be "hewers of wood and drawers of water", and slaves they were to remain. Europeans considered they did their best to acquaint Africans with a higher civilization and were not prepared to do more for the time being. "We have saved them", they said, "from self-destruction, from the tyranny of their autocratic rulers, the cruelty of their superstitious beliefs, and freed them from the slavery of African ignorance and barbarism. What more do they want?" [78]. Africans should understand once and for all that to put them on an equal footing with the Whites was impossible for two main reasons: the civilizing process was a slow one, and it took the Whites two thousand years to achieve their present standard; discrepancies between the two races became so marked that to bridge the gap now was unthinkable. As a result, Africans were bound to cringe to their white masters' rule.

Africans naturally discarded the master-servant relationship thus imposed upon them and reacted in two ways: some chose to transcend their present discontent by living in the past, an attitude which gave birth to the phrase Mayibuye I Africa,

or "Let Africa come back" [79]. Such an attitude brought about happy memories of the "good old days" when Africans lived in a state of freedom and wealth. However, Thema argued, this was a child-like happiness for their soul was blurred by ignorance and superstitions. They now realized the oppressive character of their present conditions because they were freed from them, and because their outlook on life had been consequently widened. Thema and many other educated Blacks believed that missionaries brought light to them, and in that light they were determined to remain. They were to share the knowledge of Europeans, their comfort and pleasure all the more as Africans and Europeans were alike in several respects. They were human beings endowed with the same intellectual capacities and with the same feelings. The only difference between them, Thema asserted, was only skin-deep. As a result, neither group was entitled to rule the destinies of the other. Instead of struggling against one another, they should work hand in hand for the progress of mankind or what Thema called "the gathering achievement of the human race" [80]. The newly educated Africans were to play a key role as leaders of the masses. In an article entitled "The Duty of the Bantu Intellectuals", Thema wrote: "It is their bounden duty to interest themselves in the welfare of the people and that the people look to them for a lead in social, economic, and political matters" [81].

A prime mover of the SANNC, Seme discarded Dube's and Thema's axioms and asserted that Africans had no reason whatsoever to be ashamed of their customs. Genius could not be the privilege of a particular race. It could come out everywhere, at any time, and in different ways. Not even in science could one find two identical atoms and cells. As a result, to try and compare various races according to the same criteria constituted a wrong step and could but lead to erroneous statements. As he put it:

The races of mankind are composed of free and unique individuals. An attempt to compare them on the basis of equality can never be finally satisfactory. Each is himself. My thesis stands on this truth; time has proved it. In all races, genius is like a spark, which concealed in the bosom of a flint, bursts forth at the summoning stroke. It may arise everywhere and in any race [82].

Africa, Seme asserted, was once the crucible of a lofty civilization. In 1905-1906 Seme directed British attention to African past architecture. With the same emotion, he invited them to wonder at the unrivalled grandeur of Egyptian and Ethiopian pyramids. He reminded them of all those Africans well-known for

their wisdom and their deep knowledge of languages such as Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Arabic, and Chaldaic, of sciences such as meteorology, hydrography, botany and geology. African officers of artillery, generals, and lieutenant generals, he said, displayed undisputed talents and built up a high reputation both in the cabinet and in the battlefield of Peter the Great in Russia and of Napoleon in France [83].

To further convey the magnitude of African achievements, Seme urged them to cast their eyes south of the Sahara, too. They were to see how for the sake of freedom, Congolese were prepared to "fight like men, and die like martyrs." [84]. They were to admire Bechuanaland's King Khama who deliberately gave up the vain royal paraphernalia, left the comfort and pomp and safety of his gold and ivory palace "to wander daily from village to village through all his kingdom, without a guard or any decoration of his rank, a preacher of industry and education" [85]. They were also to acknowledge Abyssinia and Zululand as seats of science and of religion. They would not fail either to look up to Congo and <sup>the</sup> Gambia people who were striving to make peace prevail over war [86]. All these past and present deeds allowed every individual from that unfairly despised continent to proudly claim like Seme: "I am an African" and to jealously keep up his Africanness against the chill wind of adversity [87].

Seme, admitted the postulate that nations rise and fall. Africa lost its greatness but her people anxiously expect her regeneration amongst the other nations of the world. To quote Seme:

O Africa

.....

Thy doors unlocked, where knowledge in her tomb

Has lain innumerable years in gloom.

Then shalt thou, waking that morning gleam

Shine as thy sister lands with equal beam [88].

Seme advised his countrymen to look for inspiration in Africa's glorious past to catch up their cultural lag. Yet, he simultaneously urged them to secure a foothold in the industrial world mainly by sending their children to famous schools in Great Britain such as Edinburgh and Cambridge, or in Germany. To this new intelligentsia would revert the crucial task of nation building.



In his book The Bantu, Past and Present, Molema praised African civilization by pointing at the numerous flaws in European culture, above all. It is true, he asserted, that Africans of bygone days were pagans worshipping several deities inhabiting the earth, the air, stones, trees, and other material objects. But in these early stages of their development, they already had an idea of God as a Supreme Being. The Bechoana and Basuto called Him Modimo (the High), the Zulus Umkulu-nkulu (the Great Great One), the Hottentots Gomja Ticquoa or Tikxo from which the Xhosas were said to have derived their Tixo. Although omnipresent and omnipotent, that God was rather remote and inactive, however. They also believed in the immortality of the soul and in such beliefs, one might already notice some of the essential features of today's great religions [89].

Molema added that these elements of a superior faith were unfortunately interwoven with superstition, but he invited upright men to leniency. Indeed, were not superstition and witchcraft two outstanding curses all over Europe during the Middle Ages? In England, for instance, during the reign of James I (1603-1625) hundreds of people were sentenced to death or had to put up with the agony of torture for heresy. At his accession in 1603, James I passed an Act against witchcraft conveying, thereby, the widespread beliefs of that time [90].

In 1665, a justice of the realm, Chief Baron Matthew Hale trying two cases of witchcraft thus addressed the jury:

That there are such creatures as witches, I make no doubt at all, for, first the Scriptures have affirmed so much. Secondly, the wisdom of all nations hath provided laws against such persons, which is an argument of their confidence of such a crime [91].

The two accused women named Rose Cullender and Annies Drury were hanged, Campbell reported in his Lives of the Chief Justices. Molema asserted that the last execution for witchcraft in England took place in 1792. Even Spain, the most religious country in Europe, and Germany which claimed to be the most civilized western nation sentenced to death their last witches in 1781 and 1793 [92].

Molema also reminded Europeans that during the period of Tacitus, Germans' way of life did not differ from Africans'. They were illiterate and, therefore, incapable of deep knowledge and reflection; they dwelt in huts thatched with straw; they wore the skin of some animal; cattle and game provided them with food;

they also allowed a great part of their land to lie waste [93]. As to African polygamy, missionaries made too much fuss about it for it had been practised by the British, too [94]. Furthermore, one may add that in the case of Africans, polygamy was a source of labour, and the practice of lobola could be seen in that light. Deprived of the contribution of his daughter who got married the tribesman naturally expected a compensation.

As a result, all cultures of the world went through various stages and, at one time, African civilization also shone. Proud of some of their traditions, Africans instinctively felt that missionaries were seriously impairing them, and the conservatives resisted their intrusion. As early as 1830, one African apparently pointed out that if European pastors brought the gospel to them, they were simultaneously taking their land [95]. Under their influence, too, Africans had to give up their identity. They were forced to adopt European religions, Christian names, and a western style of life. The first bishop of Xhosa country revealed how early missionaries, conditioned by their background, made not only peripheral but also serious mistakes. To quote him:

The missionary should study the language... He should also inform himself of the laws and customs and modes of thought and not go among them and with one word of condemnation set down the natives as wholly and utterly wrong... and with one sweep of the pen try to blot out the customs of generations [96].

Time and again, the black intelligentsia in South Africa and their fellows in the Gold Coast stressed the importance of self-reliance, cooperation, and mobilization to build up the kind of society for which they were longing. Jabavu already warned them against the danger of relying too heavily on Europeans who either ignored them or sympathised with them but could not help them much. He also pointed out the need for cooperation. Nation formation, Jabavu and other Africans believed, required the sum total of all energies available in the country. They consequently paid a special attention to education of the masses through schools and newspapers.

With European advent, Africans became increasingly aware of the power of knowledge, and especially, of technical education. To get it, they were willing to contribute towards its cost, not only through taxation, but also through voluntary contributions. As early as the 1870s, African "kulaks" started to invest in education. In 1877, the Mfengus paid as much as £3,000 to set up

Blythwood secondary and teachers' training school in Fingoland [97]. They also began to send their sons abroad to get the education for which they were craving.

Rubusana and several other outstanding Africans pressed for industrial training. On 23 September 1904, delegates of the Native Vigilance Association stressed the importance of this kind of education before the South African Native Affairs Commission. The deputation was composed of E.T. Mpela and B. Kumalo, ministers of the AME Church, J. Lavers and Peter Thaslane, both of them cartage contractors, J. Mocher, a mason, A. Jordaan, a Cape boy, and J. Twayi, a cart driver. They expressed their strong disapproval of the rudimentary industrial training Africans were receiving so far. They insisted that to become skilled workers, Africans should learn to think and not perform tasks mechanically. To quote them:

Every native knows how to plough ground and to sow seed... That is not what is wanted. They must be taught to study the soil, and they must be enabled to study everything, so that they can improve. With the industrial education given at present, even in becoming a mason, they are only taught to take a brick and some clay, and to put it down in its place. That is not industrial education enough. When they know these things, they must learn how to make contracts and they must know all other branches of work which will make them skilled workmen [98].

To get a proper industrial training and be taught the know-how of different skills, they proposed to share its cost with the government. Their contribution would include taxes as well as small fees paid by the pupils. As to the government, they would help them by setting up appropriate institutions, and by enabling them to secure suitable jobs at the end of their schooling [99].

The delegates' claims, however, were limited in scope. They stressed the fact that they were speaking only on behalf of the "enlightened" inhabitants of the Orange River Colony. This portion of the population included educated men as well as illiterate people who were "progressive in their mind and civilized in their mode of living" [100].

On 4 October of the same year, a few members of the Ethiopian Catholic Church in Zion appeared before the South African Native Affairs Commission. The delegates were: Reverends Samuel Jacobus Brander from the Cape, Joshua Mphothleng Mphela from the Transvaal and Stephen Ngnato from British Bechuanaland. These

African clergymen explained that several difficulties prevented them from providing six hundred children with adequate industrial training. They were compelled to leave the AME Church which committed itself to supply them with schools and teachers at its own expense, but failed to fulfil its promises. Furthermore, as the government did not recognize this church, they were refused grants in aid. As they paid too many taxes and could not afford subsidizing schools themselves, they asked for government financial support. The ultimate goal of their teaching was to enable Africans to become white men's equals after a span of time of about fifty years. Black people, then, would enjoy the same social and political rights as Europeans, and like them, they would have a say in the management of the country [101].

Dissatisfied with the kind of education their children received from missionaries and from the government, African leaders became eager to better their people's conditions. They were willing to sacrifice part of their salary to share the white man's knowledge, so as later to enjoy the same socio-political rights. With this end in view, they sought to foster the rapid development of African colleges where the "right system of education would be given", an education which was to take into account African needs. Sections 13 and 14 of the SANNC 1919 constitution provided that some of the goals to be achieved were:

13. To establish or to assist the establishment of National Colleges or Public Institutions free from denominationalism or State control;

14. To originate and expound the right system of education in all schools and colleges and to advocate for its adoption by State and Churches and by all other independent bodies in respect thereto [102].

Black intelligentsia in South Africa as in the Gold Coast viewed newspapers as important channels of information and mobilization of the masses in the four colonies. In the Cape, the first newspaper for Africans was Isiqidimi Sama Xosa started on 1 October 1870 thanks to the initiative of Dr James Stewart of Lovedale Missionary Institute. Lovedale staff already viewed newspapers as important educational channels. To quote him, "The period when newspapers begin to live in the history of any people is an important era... The Newspaper of the present day is undoubtedly a great educator" [103]. Later Molema asserted: "Isiqidimi did mark the commencement of a new era in the history of African people and, indeed, the paper played a significant part in stimulating the development of African political consciousness" [104]. Later Jabavu contributed to this paper from 1881

to 1884 [105]. He had started his career as an outstanding journalist, however, with Imvo Zabantsundu or African Views, a paper which spurred African political awareness although a few Africans found his advocacy of African interests insufficient. After his death in 1921, his sons Alexander Macaulay and Davidson Don Tengo took over the editorship of the journal. In 1898, Rubusana founded Izwi Labantu, a Xhosa paper based in East London. From 1923 to 1928, Kadalie launched a Union paper, the Workers' Herald to which Thaele - who ventured into journalism with his ephemeral newspaper The African World - contributed a few articles.

In 1904, Dube founded Ilanga Lase Natal, The Natal Sun, the first paper in English and Zulu in Natal. It was later edited by Gumede around World War I.

The Transvaal African leaders also established a series of important papers to foster the political consciousness of their African audience. By 1907-1908, the versatile writer Plaatje who moved from Mafeking to Kimberley started a new paper Tsala ea Becoana subsequently renamed Tsala ea Batho or The Friend of the People. In 1910, Mvabaza launched an English-Xhosa weekly Umlomo Wa Bantu in Johannesburg. About the same date, Letanka established Motsoalle or The Friend, later renamed Morumia, The Messenger, a weekly also printed in Johannesburg, and primarily addressing Setswana speakers in the northern Transvaal. From 1912 to 1914, two other prominent SANNC leaders Makgatho and Mangena published the Native Advocate. Founded by Seme, the SANNC influential newspaper Abantu Batho or The Voice of the Native Races of South Africa included Letanka, Makgatho, Mangena, Mvabaza, Thema, and Masabalala in its staff at one time or another [106]. Abantu Batho clearly stated its duty toward African masses in the Union: "The times of the heathen era ended", it specified, "and the industrial future is with the intelligent educated man who must lead his most ignorant brethren in all the departments of national life" [107]. For nearly twenty years - from 1912 to July 1931 - Abantu Batho commented the Union government "native" policy, recorded Africans' reactions against it, and fearlessly fought for African rights.

The Orange Free State also had its African newspapers. In 1901 with the financial backing from the Chief of the Baralong Silas Molema, Plaatje edited the first Setswana-English weekly, Korana ea Becoana or Newspaper of the Tswana which lasted for six or seven years [108]. In the early 1920s, Selby Msimang who moved from Johannesburg to Bloemfontein published the Messenger-Morumia for two years thanks to the financial support of Chief Walton Zaccharias Fenyang, a member of

the SANNC, too [109].

The SANNC devised another way of keeping in touch with the grassroots by combining the existing associations in the Union. Section two of its 1919 constitution provided that one of its aims was:

2. To unite, absorb, consolidate and preserve under its aegis existing political and educational Associations, Vigilance Committees and other public and private bodies whose aims are the promotion and safeguarding of the interests of the aboriginal races [110].

For a better contact with the black population, the SANNC set up branches in the various provinces. In these branches lawyers were entrusted with the important task of sorting out people's difficulties. Section II of the 1919 constitution specified that one of the SANNC objects was:

II. To record all grievances and wants of native people and to seek by constitutional means the redress thereof, and to obtain legal advice and assistance for members of the Association and its branches and to render financial (aid) where necessary with objects hereof [111].

The SANNC aimed at enlarging its activities by cooperating with the neighbouring territories, a goal stated in section 16 of the 1919 constitution and which read:

16. The Territories and the Protectorates shall be within the pale of the Association and shall be represented at its annual meetings by the Chiefs and their nominees and with such representation and no other shall be deemed to be incorporated with the Association [112].

A close scrutiny of the same constitution suggests that the impact of this organization on African inhabitants would be rather limited. As stated in section 20, the National Congress was to meet only once a year during Easter holidays. According to section 21, however, special meetings could be convened whenever it was though necessary. An extraordinary meeting could be called by the Executive Committee whenever required by a resolution passed by a two-third majority of two provincial congresses at least [113].

European historians generally tended to depict traditional rulers as blood-thirsty warriors who resorted only to violence to recover their rights. In fact,

some of them tried to protect themselves against the aggressive character of European rule and civilization through constitutional channels. That was the case, for instance, of King Solomon Ka Dinuzulu who in 1928 launched a National cultural Liberation Movement known as Inkatha Yakwa Zulu. The preamble of the movement constitution described the kind of society for which the people of Kwazulu were yearning. Like the new intelligentsia, they regarded western culture as a model which was not, however, to be followed blindly. They indeed believed that European political institutions set up by human beings were not perfect, and consequently, they opposed all forms of cultural domination of neo-colonialism as "a serious threat to the whole life and existence of a people" [114]. They would rather select the most progressive features from both European and African civilizations. The three first articles of the movement constitution read:

1. Understanding the concept of culture as embracing the totality of values, institutions and forms of behaviour transmitted within a society as well as material good produced by man, and believing that our national unity and models for development should be based on values extrapolated from our cultures and adapted to our present day needs and situation.
2. Accepting the fact that we have many things to copy from the western economic, political and educational patterns of development, and striving for the promotion of African patterns of thought and the achievement of African Humanism otherwise known in Nguni language as Abuntu and in Sotho language as Botho.
3. Realizing the fact that African political institutions are not undemocratic and rejecting the cultural domination and arrogance responsible for the belief that only the Western partisan political system is perfect [115].

The movement constitution also stressed the importance of cooperation between first the Kwazulu inhabitants, then between the various ethnics in Southern Africa, and to a larger scale between all movements aiming at abolishing people's exploitation. As specified in the movement constitution their aims were among others:

- a. To foster the spirit of unity among the people of Kwazulu throughout Southern Africa and between them and all their African brothers in Southern Africa and to keep alive and foster the traditions of the people.
- b. To help promote the development of the people of Kwazulu spiritually, economically, educationally and politically.
- c. To establish contact with other cultural groups in Southern Africa with a view to the establishment of a common society.

f. To cooperate with any movement or organization for the improvement of the condition of the people...

l. To inculcate and foster a vigorous consciousness of patriotism and a stronger sense of national unity based on a common and individual loyalty and devotion to our land.

m. To cooperate locally and internationally with all progressive African and other nationalist movements and political parties which work for complete eradication of all forms of colonialism, racialism, neo-colonialism, discrimination and to strive for the attainment of African Unity [116].

This movement was more radical than the SANNC. It did not request only a share in the management of the country. It claimed "self-determination and national independence" [117]. It sought a wider mass support and its organization was more coherent. All citizens under 18 and regardless of sex were entitled to membership. A central committee and various sub-committees were to be set up. The central committee included not less than twenty-five members. From amongst them were elected the President and a General-Secretary. Of the twenty-three remaining members, twenty were elected by the Movement General Conference which was to be held every five years, and three were nominated by the President of the movement. The movement was to be patronized by Ingonyama as King of the Zulus and his successors and likewise by all chiefs and deputy-chiefs, the former as Patrons in Chiefs of the movement, the latter as patrons of the movement in their respective regions.

Members of the central committee were compelled to comply with the following qualifications. The President of the movement was to be a Kwazulu citizen of over 35 elected by each delegate to the General Conference. The other members were bound to be Kwazulu people of over twenty-one, to pay a membership fee, to be literate and conversant with the language of the Kwazulus, to be supported by at least ten sponsors, to possess a crime-free record. If prospective members had a criminal record, the central committee determined whether their offences were serious enough to entail their disqualification [118].

At district and lower levels were established regional committees, constituencies, and branches. The central committee had amongst other tasks to define regions in rural and urban areas. Each region was headed by a committee composed of a district chairman, a regional secretary, a regional women's secretary, a regional youth secretary, a publicity secretary, two trustees



appointed by the regional committee and subject to the approval of the central committee and of each branch representative.

The duties of regional committees were numerous and important. They consisted in promoting the objects, ideals and interests of the movement, organizing Kwazulu citizens on a broad basis and recruiting new members for the movement, supervising the yearly renewal of members, raising funds for the movement, implementing the national headquarters instructions, publicizing for the movement candidates in any parliamentary and local governmental elections, supervising the activities of the various constituencies and branches of the region, enlightening members of the movement about government policies and activities by organizing political meetings and by forming economic committees to discuss problems of regional and national development. International political issues were also to be discussed by political committees. Throughout this comprehensive list of regional activities, one might notice similar characteristics with the SANNC policy, namely the discussion of government measures and the political education of the masses. However, the movement aimed at a more direct and effective relationship with the grassroots through political meetings in urban and rural areas. It also sought a direct representation of the Zulus at Parliament level.

A district chairman with overall responsibility over units of the movement in a region presided over meetings of the regional committee and the regional annual conference. He had to forward reports on regional activities every month to national headquarters of the movement and to remit regional funds to the national headquarters not later than seven days after they had been collected [119].

Each region was divided up into constituencies which had to be registered at national headquarters. Each constituency was in its turn headed by a committee elected every five years and including a chairman and a vice-chairman, a secretary and his assistant, a treasurer and deputy treasurer, a publicity secretary and his assistant.

Each constituency committee had to perform the following functions: to organize members of the movement and recruit new ones, to raise funds for the movement through membership subscriptions, to cooperate with regional officials for the promotion of the movement objects, ideals, and interests, to encourage members of the movement to work collectively for the betterment of the economic situation of

the Kwazulu people, to publicize candidates in any parliamentary and local government elections, to be responsible for all branches in a constituency.

All constituency officials were elected by secret ballot every five years at a constituency annual conference composed of ten members from each branch; three members from a women's brigade, three from a youth brigade, and four individuals who were not members of a youth or a women's brigade. The constituency committee had to work in close connection with the regional committee [120].

Each constituency was again divided up into a number of branches consisting of not less than thirty paid up members, annually elected by secret ballot, approved by the central committee and registered at national headquarters.

Each branch was again headed by a committee including a chairman and a vice-chairman, a secretary and his assistant, a treasurer and deputy-treasurer, a publicity secretary and his assistant. The committee members were to perform the following duties: organize members and recruit new ones, raise funds for the movement through subscriptions, cooperate with constituencies' officials for the promotion of objects, ideals and interests of the movement, encourage members of the movement to work collectively for the improvement of the economic and political situation of Kwazulu citizens as well as of black people in southern Africa, publicize candidates in any parliamentary or local government elections, carry out all activities determined by the constituency executive committee. Every branch was accountable to constituency officials [121].

Were closely affiliated to the movement a women's brigade and a youth brigade at all levels. A women's brigade aimed at mobilizing women and children through their upbringing toward the objectives of the movement. Each brigade was headed by an executive committee composed of a chairman appointed by the president of the movement in consultation with the national women's council, an executive secretary, a treasurer and other officers elected at a general conference of the women's brigade. The women's brigade secretary had to perform the following duties: to devise and carry out plans for the activities of the women of the movement, and to implement instructions received from the central committee according to the approved policy of the movement.

The National women's council which helped the President of the movement appoint

the women's brigade chairman included a member of the executive committee, a regional women's secretary, and two members from each affiliated organization [122].

The youth brigade of the movement was entrusted with the "vanguard role of upholding and consolidating the gains of the movement" [123].

Central and lower committees were all headed by a national council including members of the central committee of a legislative Assembly, a district chairman, two officials, the secretary of each region, ten representatives of security forces when they could be secured, six representatives of trade unions, one representative of each affiliated organization, members of the executive committee of the women's brigade, and representatives of the youth brigade.

The National Council was to meet at least twice a year. A chairman presided over all meetings of the National Council, over the general conference and over the national rallies of the movement.

The National Council was entrusted with important functions. It was the policy-making body of the movement. A quorum of no less than two-thirds of its members had to be reached to decide which legislative, financial, or administrative proposals were to be included in the programme. The National Council was empowered to discuss any recommendation or resolution made by the central committee, and by the various regional, constituency, branch or any other committees of the movement. It could order the production of any report, document, or moneys <sup>from</sup> any member or official of the movement, provided such an order was written by the chairman; It could also refer any subject to a sub-committee for detailed scrutiny.

The National Council had disciplinary functions, too. It could discharge, suspend, or fire any official or any member who had infringed any provision of the constitution. Such an official or member was entitled to appeal to the Appeal Board of the National Council [124].

Undoubtedly, the constitution of the Inkatha yakwa Zulu was skilfully drafted. It is unfortunately difficult to assess the immediate impact such a movement had on the indigenous population of Southern Africa as extremely scarce literature about it is available now. However, the movement found an enthusiastic supporter

in Chief Gatsha Buthelezi who accepted its aims in the 1970s [125]. Buthelezi attacked the oppression of Africans by the white-ruling community. He pointed out that:

Although discrimination is against all non-white groups, it is the Africans who are not free to sell their labour to the best labour market. Africans are the only racial group who are not allowed to enjoy normal family life... (and) all other racial groups can almost move freely in South Africa except Africans [126].

He declared himself fully committed to a shared struggle between the citizens of Kwazulu and between all Blacks in general. He went as far as requesting the South African police to put an end to faction fighting in the Msinga region. As a general rule, however, Buthelezi and his councillors advocated non-violence [127].

To mobilize the urban population, Buthelezi restored to life branches of the Inkatha Yakwa Zulu which included members from all walks of life especially on the Witwatersrand and in Natal [128]. He enjoyed an unequalled popularity as a leader. In Soweto, he addressed a crowd of 10,000 and more. A survey, carried out by an advertizing-research firm Quadrant, asked the following questions to Africans in Soweto: "Which person do you admire most?". Buthelezi scored the highest mention by over 10% of these informants [129].

As a general rule, the new black intelligentsia was the product of missionary education. Lovedale, Fort Hare, Healdtown and other institutions helped turn out some of the most influential African leaders. The non-racial character of Lovedale at the beginning of its development, its high standard owing to the quality of its distinguished teachers contributed to broaden the outlook of its black students.

African politicians such as P. Seme, J.L. Dube, C. Maxeke carried on their studies abroad and, namely, in Great Britain and the United States. Their closer contact with European culture there further widened the scope of their intellectual capacities, and made them more self-confident in front of their European rulers.

The SANNC representatives were generally lawyers, teachers, or clergymen. Their professions allowed them to be in touch with large audiences and naturally

ranked them as suitable leaders of their people.

Blood, marital and professional ties constituted favourable factors for the cohesion between educated Africans and between them and their traditional rulers. In some instances, the traditional elite and the new intelligentsia shared the same European education and they both took part in the political activities of their country, and especially, in the foundation of their first national organization.

Educated Blacks spearheaded their people's opposition to colonial rule. African inhabitants could no longer rely only on their chiefs whose power and prestige had been undermined by missionary education and by Government policy.

The industrialization of the country further wrecked the chiefs' authority by depriving them of their people to meet the mining companies labour needs.

Black leaders continued to rely on British liberalism although Great Britain gave up power in 1910. They chose constitutional devices to redress their people's grievances, hence their various petitions and deputations. Violent uprisings took place, but they were one after the other stamped out. In the long run, Africans understood the uselessness of ruthless means, and preferred to resort to constitutional channels.

South African politicians also believed in the principles of self-reliance, mobilization, and cooperation. They sought to foster their people's political awareness through a proper education adapted to African requirements in schools set up thanks to their initiative. They also viewed newspapers as necessary vehicles of information about the government legislation and as spurs of African national consciousness. The African names of their newspapers clearly conveyed their target: to reach African audiences.

Through these various devices, South African leaders aimed at building a new society. They all acknowledged European civilization as a model worth to be taken into account. However, they generally stood up against blind imitation, and set out to select and keep the most progressive characteristics of both European and African cultures.

## II. Ethiopianism and Nationalism

The relationship between Ethiopianism and politics constituted a controversial issue. A few scholars tended to consider it only<sup>as</sup> a reaction against missionary control. Others like Houghton engrafted political implications to this religious movement. Houghton declared that:

The formation of independent Native churches and all separatist organizations usually denoted by the term "ethiopianism" are nothing but the self-articulated expression of a national consciousness which is in the process of birth [130].

The terminology applied to African churches also raised several discussions. Were they to be called "separatist" or "independent" bodies? A missionary in South Africa from 1937 to 1942 and a prominent historian, Bengt G.M. Sundkler, preferred to call them "Bantu Independent Churches" [131]. George Shepperson, another well known historian, rightly pointed at the illogicality of some social scientists who wrongly applied the term "separatist" to African congregations which were independent creations, and which had broken away from no recognized missionary body [132]. B.A. Pauw who studied the religion of the Thlaping, an African tribe inhabiting a reserve called Toung in the northern Cape, asserted that both terms "independent" and "separatist" were, in fact, unsuitable for they referred to European missionary churches, too [133]. To avoid the pitfalls of misnomer, the phrase African churches will be generally used in this study, but the distinction between "independent and "separatist" bodies will be taken into account in special cases. After a short scrutiny of the movement origins, there will be examined the attitude of missionaries and colonial officials towards it and its impact on African nationalists.

### 1. Origins of the movement

Since its inception, Ethiopianism conveyed Blacks' protests against all forms of racial discrimination as practised by Europeans. Some Africans resented the action of prejudiced missionaries who stripped them of their African identity, undermined their institutions, and imposed an alien religion upon them. They consequently set out to establish their own churches. Yet, if the Blacks were eager to feel at home by retaining their African personality, they simultaneously refused to give up their Christian faith. The two broad types of African churches

- "Ethiopian" and "Zionist" - constituted both emanations of African aspirations, but they did not call into question Christian faith. Ethiopian churches kept Christian liturgy while Zionist bodies tried to find out a compromise between European and African cultures. Worship in Zionist bodies included traditional healing ceremonies, beating of drums, dancing, singing hymns according to tunes borrowed from the African background [134]. African churches, then, represented the outcome of a culture contact. This explains why Sundkler stated that it provided only "old wine in new wineskins" [135].

Nehemiah Tile was the first South African to express the wish to combine Christian faith with African cultural legacy. Tile was born in Tembuland. He received his formal education at Boloto and later studied theology at Healdtown, the most famous school after Lovedale. In 1880, he was ordained minister of the Wesleyan Methodist Church [136]. His original ideas about religion, his desire for independence, his involvement in politics and in tribal affairs brought about clashes with his white superior. He had a heated argument with the Reverend Chubbs who charged him with "taking part in political matters, stirring up a feeling of hostility against magistrates in Tembuland, refusing to inform him of his activities, and donating an ox at the circumcision of Dinjebo, heir to the Paramount Chief of the Tembus" [137]. After this quarrel, Tile left the Wesleyans. In 1884, he set up a "Tembu National Church" with the support of Ngangelizwe, the Tembu Paramount Chief. But, as a result of the Cape Government pressure on him, Ngangelizwe ceased to help the Church. Although the Church lost its original impetus, it still survived after Tile's death in 1885 [138].

~~Stephen Motsambi~~ Stephen Motsambi, who lived at Doornfontein, Johannesburg left the Wesleyan Methodist Church founded by G.B. Mvuyana, and of which he was the present head. He seceded from the Wesleyans, he said, because he disapproved of their method of baptizing the people. He preferred that this religious rite be performed in a river [139].

Some Africans rebelled against the colour bar within white churches. Although European missionaries preached equality between human races, in practise they adopted a paternalistic attitude towards their African converts, looked upon them as children unable to take the reins of their destiny, refused to ordain them as priests or, if they did so, always appointed them to inferior positions which compelled them to obey their white masters, and therefore, deprived them of any

initiative [140].

Racial segregation led to a schism between Mangena M. Mokone (1851-1936) and the Wesleyan Methodist Church. Mokone was born at Bogkaka, in the Transvaal. Baptized a Christian in 1874, he started <sup>studying</sup> ~~A~~ theology at Pietermaritzburg a year later. In 1880, the Wesleyan Methodist Church appointed him to Natal, and two years later to Pretoria [141]. A zealous preacher, he was entrusted with the control of several churches, but his long career and his hard work were finally overlooked, and a young white missionary was preferred to him. Deeply grieved, he resigned from the Wesleyan Methodist Church in 1892, and launched the "Ethiopian Church" [142].

Mokone heard European missionaries refer in their sermons to Psalm 68:31: "Ethiopia shall soon stretch her hands unto God" and to him this verse meant the ultimate self-government of African churches by black leaders [143]. A manifesto he wrote together with other members of the Ethiopian Church - Gabashane, Kumalo, and Xaba - betrayed his resentment of white control and his craving for independence. The manifesto was addressed to black American bishops at a conference held in Pretoria in April 1899. Pioneer missionaries taught their African converts to be more responsible, they asserted. Black churches constituted only the outcome of their teaching, and the present opposition of European missionaries seemed paradoxical. These "alien masters", they pointed out, should realize they could achieve no more. They spent a great deal of money as well as a few lives for the evangelization of the black race. They obtained insignificant results, however, for they knew nothing about the people they had to deal with, about their language, and about their customs. They belonged to another race, had different ideas, and did not always support Africans. A study of missionary work in several countries allowed black clergymen to conclude that it should be undertaken by themselves to achieve a permanent success. The services of missionaries, they stated, were needed by the Whites in colonial towns to save them from their sins and their degradation [144].

Lucas Thomas Madhleni Zungu, from Weenen, Natal, was baptized by the Christian Apostolic Church in Zion in 1896. He left it to set up the African Christian Baptist Church of South Africa on 27 September 1907, for the Reverend Daniel Briant, under the influence of the Reverend Le Roux, refused to nominate African ministers or evangelists [145].



The neglect of Africans by European ministers sometimes brought about a few withdrawals from the latter's churches, too. Matthews Nagato, for instance, said he first belonged to the DRC at Elim, Pretoria, which ran European as well as African religious bodies. However, the DRC tended to disregard the latter. As a result, he parted with it to join the Church of God and Saints of Christ founded before 1914 by Prosper William S. Crowdy, an Afro-American [146].

Some missionaries' suspicious attitude toward their African converts also brought about secessions from European churches. James Babulana Tsambo from Knight Central Location, Germiston, stated that he broke away from the Church of England because the Reverend Bennett did not believe that his absences at catechist meetings were due to illness. He left the Church of England, then, to join the African Catholic Church started by John Lalepa Melife in 1908 [147].

Economic and political pressures also contributed to the emergence of Ethiopianism. The movement initiated by Enoch Josiah Mgijima in the 1920s must be seen in this context. Mgijima was born at Bulhoek in 1868, the third of four sons of Jonas Mayikeso Mgijima, a Mfengu peasant. The Mfengus were already compelled to flee from their homes in Natal during the Shakan wars. They found refuge among the Gcaleca, but by the time they reached them around 1820, they were already impoverished. The Mfengus used their alliance with the British to call for more land concessions, but the 214 square miles allocated to Africans proved insufficient. As a result, Jonas Mgijima moved in 1865 to settle at Ntabelanga, in the Queenstown region.

Enoch Mgijima was born in the Kamastone Location where the bulk of African inhabitants depended on land for their livelihood. But the scarcity of land brought about a decline of African agricultural production. A series of natural disasters and diseases further hit African farmers. The rinderpest epidemic of 1896 killed three fourths of the cattle herds, and the East Coast fever of 1912 destroyed nearly a third. High taxes and other devices engineered by agrarian and mining interests imposed additional burdens on them. Unable to live from the product of their land, an increasing number of Africans were compelled to work on European-owned farms and companies to survive.

Europeans as well as Africans informed the Native Land Commission which was collecting evidence in 1914 about African farmers' plight. A.G. Bain, the

Queenstown magistrate, described Kamastone as follows:

The location is overcrowded, certainly with stock and fairly crowded as regards population. They feel the pinch every year in the winter with their stock. They are not self-supporting in regard to crops. They sow mostly mealies, but they seldom have a crop. The ploughing is not good and of course they had not have very favourable rainy seasons of late years, and soil erosion is spoiling their lands [148].

W.C.P. Jones, the superintendent for native locations at Whittlesea, confirmed Bain's observations:

The droughts are very severe and the erosion of the soil is spoiling the land. The average number of morgen per unit is 7.24. The population per square mile is 42. The amount of stock held generally does not increase. In bad times, stock die and in good times, they sell off the surplus. If you went through the location, you would find every little patch ploughed up. They could not live properly on the produce from their arable lands without the selling of their stock and the money brought down from the mines [149].

Ena Makalima, a member of the SANNC and a resident of a Kamastone sub-location declared: "the natives of Oxkraal and Kamastone are packed like sardines; they cannot move" [150].

Around World War I, Africans experienced new economic difficulties and disasters. First, they had to put up with wartime inflation and higher taxes. Then the flu epidemic of 1918 wiped out nearly a thousand Africans in the Queenstown region alone. Finally, the severe drought of 1919 lasted several years, destroying many crops and killing animals.

The South African government simultaneously deprived them of any hope of alleviating their hardships. The 1913 Natives' Land Act denied to Africans the right to mitigate land shortages by buying some plots of land in white areas. The SANNC delegates who appealed for a redress of social, economic and political inequities returned empty-handed from England. As a result, a growing number of Africans became dissatisfied with the European-controlled system, and looked for an outlet. Mgijima's religious conceptions offered them the solace they were seeking to escape from an essentially hostile environment. In 1920, Walter Dinca, one of his followers, denounced the European system as follows:

You want everybody to follow your religion, which is becoming indigestible to the Natives "because", as the Abantu-Batho correspondent puts it, "it has been made an instrument of power for the establishment of European supremacy and domination in the world. Having discovered this dissimulation, Natives are now going to form their own religion, or Christianity; because the European Christianity deplorably failed to christianize not only the Natives but the Europeans themselves... The Biblical advice that "love thy neighbour as thou lovest thyself" has no effect on Europeans... "Do unto others as thou wouldst they unto you". Do Europeans quote this? Yes, and they write volumes; but when we closely scrutinize their doings and their attitude towards the blacks we find to our disappointment that their religion or Christianity spells the exploitation of the blacks in this country. Hence the insane phrase, "South Africa a white man's country... "Can any sane black man follow this religion which is out to exterminate the Natives of this country? [151]

Such attitudes and other factors naturally prompted missionaries to react against the growth of African churches.

## 2. Missionaries' reactions

Some missionaries viewed African churches with hostility mainly because they deprived European-led congregations of part of their membership, and thereby, undermined their influence. During his visit to South Africa in 1898, the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church bishop Henry McNeal Turner won over 6,000 adherents: 4,000 from the Wesleyan Mission, about 1,000 from the Church of England, another 1,000 from Scottish missions, and nearly 40 from the London Society. Consequently, the AME Church membership rose from 3,975 to 10,800 [152].

James Mata Dwane (1881-1916) also debarred European churches from a potential membership. Dwane had been an evangelist of the Wesleyan mission in 1875. In 1881, he was ordained minister at Port Elizabeth by the Reverend W. Sargeant of the same mission [153]. After a successful fund-raising tour on behalf of the Wesleyans in Britain in 1894-95, he made up his mind to set up his own church. Leenhardt described the process of his thoughts in the following terms:

He became aware of his dignity as a man and as a Black, and thought that if the Whites did not grant black men equal rights, the latter should learn to progress without the former's help. He felt strong for the Whites congratulated him; he had some money which the Whites gave him; he would do his duty, and would devote his energy and that money for the well-being of his people through different methods than the missionaries.

"Africa for the Africans", he thought. On his return, he gave an account of his travel to the Whites who had sent him and informed them he no longer

belonged to them, and he would administer the funds he had been given for the welfare of his race. He broke away from the Wesleyans [154].

In 1908, his "Order of Ethiopia" gathered some 3,500 members [155]).

The development of African churches led missionaries to dread the eventual setting up of an African National Church which would hinder the evangelization of African people, and oust the white man from the country [156]. Indeed, some African-controlled churches grew relatively powerful with branches throughout South Africa. It was the case of the "Ethiopian Catholic Church in Zion" started in 1904 by Samuel James Brander after he broke away from the Church of England. According to David Phola, Springs Location, The Ethiopian Catholic Church in Zion had congregations in various places: Boksburg, Pietersburg, Bloemfontein, Johannesburg, Vereeniging and Springs. These congregations were respectively headed by P.O. Brander, the Reverend Dhane, Stephen Ngoato, P. Sidwaba, Cornelius Aaron, and David Phola [157].

However, the danger of a powerful African National Church looming over the head of Europeans seems exaggerated. Indeed, African churches were generally too small bodies to really jeopardize social order. The Reverend F.H. Burke who served as a missionary of the Assemblies of God in Southern African since 1921 depicted the competition between church leaders and their lack of unity. He wrote:

Some of these leaders might have had a certain training in church leadership, but the great majority has no training whatsoever as they emerge from the rank and file of uneducated men. This explains the continual changes, separations, and re-separations among them. There is a certain real hunger for leadership training among them, but at the same time a certain suspicion against anything organized by churches, even on an undenominational basis. They are afraid of being absorbed by another greater body, and reluctant to join in any venture which they feel might reduce their identity [158].

Statistics also revealed that the thirty African Churches in South Africa in 1913 rose to 800 by 1948 [159].

Some missionaries resented African clergymen's newly-acquired independence, and tried to present Ethiopianism as a subversive movement. They blamed African church leaders' lack of education, and denounced it as a possible source of unrest. In an article which appeared in the Christian Express, Xaba, a prominent representative of Mokone's Ethiopian Church, tried to counter their attacks:

We greatly appreciate a sound education, and we badly need men who have received it; but a mason builds up his foundations with all kinds of stones... I know several churches of which certain pastors did not get a special training to perform their tasks. They were shepherds, gardeners, warehousemen, policemen, farmers, and wagon-drivers. All this existed before the Ethiopian Church was set up [160].

Some missionaries also tried to stain the reputation of their African competitors. In 1901-02, the American Zulu Mission reported more favourably on African churches. It asserted that:

In the most important point, moral purity, while there are many individual back-slidings, there is encouragingly little lowering of the standards or careless laxity on the part of the churches [161].

Deprecating African clergymen's independence and wishing them to remain within their fold, white missionaries created judicial worries to them, too. For instance, Zulu church leaders, who received circulars from the Foreign Mission Board in the United States urging them to support themselves, believed that self-support meant self-government. By the end of 1897, African preachers at both Table Mountain and Johannesburg broke away from the mission taking half of its membership. At Lower Umzimkulu, they set up the Zulu Congregational Church under the leadership of the Reverend Simungu Bafazini Shibe.

The American Zulu Mission resented this secession, and created judicial worries to Shibe and to his followers to wreck their authority. The new church was charged with preaching to its members that "it was quite time they shook off the power of the white man, and controlled their own affairs", an accusation likely to cause colonial administrators' discontent [162].

### 3. African churches and colonial authorities

Many African churches did not call into question colonial rule. On the contrary, they sought government recognition, but under missionary pressure, it was often refused. In February 1897, Dwane, Mokone, and Joseph Napo Kanyane - who left the Anglican Church in Pretoria and set up an "African Church" in 1888 according to the informants Henderek Pholatsi from Krugersdorp, Molife, living near Springs, William Mautland from Germiston location, or on 6 September 1889 according to Jeremiah Morhapi from Sophiatown, New Clare - applied to the

Transvaal government for the recognition of the Ethiopian Church which was granted [163].

Dwane's speech on 5 December 1897 during the inauguration of the Church of St Pierre again revealed his law-abiding attitude toward colonial authorities. He declared:

The AME Church teaches the most sacred duties to its members notably that every soul is subject to a higher power. For there is no power but from God and the authorities are established by God [164].

Black clergymen followed suit. P.J. Mzimba, a Fingo who split from the United Church of Scotland in 1898 and founded his "Presbyterian Church of Africa" with a recorded membership of 6,500 communicants and 20,000 adherents also sought to be acknowledged officially. However, like many other secessionists, Mzimba was seen as a rabble-rouser and was consequently refused a licence. According to a contemporary critic, this action "had a salutary effect in checking the evil influence of that secession" [165].

Several years after its foundation in 1897, the "African Gaza Church" in Pretoria addressed a petition dated 28 December 1914, calling for government recognition. Alarmed by the increasing number of African churches, the Union government turned down its request. As Buxton, Governor General and High Commissioner of South Africa, put it:

It has not been the practice of the government hitherto to accord recognition to the Native separatist churches of which there is today a very large number including many which cannot be regarded as other than mere mushroom growths [166].

Missionaries' opinion about that church also weighed a great deal in the Union government decision. Indeed, the ministers who forwarded the Gaza Church petition disapproved of the new body's doctrine and behaviour. In their minute No. 228 of 2 March 1915, they argued that a church should be acknowledged by the religious world before asking for state recognition [167].

Isaiah Shembe, the founder of the "Nazareth Baptist Church" about 1903, strongly deprecated anti-white and anti-government activities. He dismissed from the Church all people who spoke against Europeans. For Shembe, the Whites had

brought the word of God and to fight against them was to stand against God.

In the 1920s, some Nazarites joined the ICU. Shembe explained to them that the ICU opposed the government, the missionaries and the Whites in general. On his advice, they returned their membership cards, an action which was obviously resented by the ICU representatives [168].

In this context, it would be interesting to analyze African politicians' attitude toward Ethiopianism.

#### 4. Impact of Ethiopianism on black politicians

African nationalists' attitude towards Ethiopianism varied. Some were closely related to the movement. Charlotte Makgomo Manye, later Mrs Marshall Maxeke, President of the Women's section of the SANNC - the Bantu Women's League - heard that Mokone had started his own church while she was studying in the United States. She wrote to him, suggesting he should get in touch with the AME Church, and seek affiliation with that body [169]. In 1928, she attended an AME conference in America [170].

The Reverend Henry Reed Ncgaiya was ordained Minister by the AME Church. He left this body, and together with Isaiah Goda Sishuba, he launched the "Ethiopian Church of South Africa" in March 1909. He became President of the Ethiopian Church with E.J. Mqoboli as his assistant. Both Ncgaiya and Mqoboli were outstanding leaders of the SANNC. The following table reveals that their Church had branches all over Southern Africa [171].

Abner S. Mtimkulu, another prominent member of the SANNC, joined the movement. Ordained a minister in the Wesleyan Methodist Church, he broke away from it to become President of the "Independent Bantu Methodist Church" [172].

Other African spokesmen such as Saul Msane, S.T. Plaatje, J.L. Dube and D.D.T. Jabavu showed a rather lukewarm interest in the activities of Joseph Booth, a British missionary who, according to Shepperson, "kept the pot of Ethiopianism boiling in South Africa" [173].

TABLE 1

## BRANCHES OF THE ETHIOPIAN CHURCH OF SOUTH AFRICA

<u>NAME OF PLACE</u>	<u>PERSON IN CHARGE</u>	<u>MEMBERSHIP</u>
Johannesburg	Rev. Stephen Dhlamini	200
Germiston	Rev. John Mrwebi	100
Boksburg	Rev. Michael Caluza	120
Benoni	" " "	---
Springs	" " "	---
Leslie	" " "	---
Bethal	" " "	---
Lydenburg	Rev. John Mzama	90
Belfast	Evan. Johannes Ngema	50
Pretoria	Rev. Richard Matsepe	200
Bon Accord	Rev. Jacob Israel	200
Middleburg	Evan. Isaac Msendani	100
Standerfontein	Rev. Frans Mrwebi	90
Voksrust	Evan. Matthew Mbata	---
Wakkerstroom	Rev. John Mnisi	56
Scweizer Reneke	Evan. Albert Jantjes	160
Witbank	Evan. Johnson Nzoyi	40
Bloemfontein	Rev. David Jantjes	60
Ermelo	Rev. Saul Hlubu	120
Machadodorp	Evan. S. Mangqalaza	30
Morgenzou	Rev. Butelezi	40
Carolina		
Amsterdam		
Amesfort		
Piet Retief		
Cibidi		
Hendrina		
Mo'lamba (Swaziland)		
Warmbaths		



Some SANNC politicians kept aloof from Ethiopianism. That was the case of Henry Selby Msimang, for instance. Although his father Joel Msimang set up an "Independent Methodist Church of South Africa", at no moment in his Autobiography did H.S. Mismang deal with his eventual involvement in the Ethiopian movement. His talk about the foundation of the Ethiopian Church further conveyed his ignorance in that field [174].

To conclude, Ethiopianism should be seen as an alternative rather than a contributor to political nationalism. Disillusioned by the wide gulf between Christian principles of equality and justice and the hard reality of the colour bar within European churches and in the South African society at large, Africans sought solace and comfort in their own churches.

Despite the general outcry Ethiopianism raised in European circles, its promoters generally confined their activities to the religious sphere. Since the early stages of their development, African churches sought official recognition, remained law-abiding towards colonial authorities, and tried to impress upon African inhabitants the value of Christian principles. As a result, they helped African people's integration in a multi-racial society and diverted them from political unrest to which their manifold grievances were likely to lead.

But, under the pressure of European missionaries who regarded African clergymen as dangerous competitors, the government looked upon Ethiopianism suspiciously. The novelty of the phenomenon and later the involvement of some SANNC leaders in the movement intensified colonial administrators' antipathy. They refused to acknowledge the existence of African churches, and made their representatives the scapegoats of conflicts between Whites and Blacks, which to a large extent, their segregationist policies brought about.

### III. Pan-Africanism and Nationalism

In the United States and South Africa, the Blacks grappled with comparatively the same problems: poverty, illiteracy and lack of political rights. Black South Africans were therefore likely to find Pan-African views congenial. B.T. Washington's achievements in the field of education, W.E.B. DuBois's struggle for civil rights, M. A. Garvey's claim for black power appealed to some black politicians in South Africa. Black South Africans' attitude toward Pan-African

thinking varied, however. African disappointment after the failure of the SANNC deputations to England in 1914 and 1919, the increasing ruthlessness of white rule and economic pressures brought to bear on some Africans who attacked Washington's idea of accommodation to white domination. On the contrary, others were frankly hostile to Garvey's slogan of "Africa for the Africans" alone.

### 1. B.T. Washington

Booker Taliafero Washington (1858-1915) asserted that the progress of a country depended upon the educational opportunities given to its people. As he put it: "if you hold a man down in the gutter, you have to stay in the gutter with him" [175]. He set up Tuskegee Institute in Alabama on 4 July 1881 [176]. He recommended both classical and "industrial" education, but particularly insisted on the latter. The "industrial" subjects taught in his school included farming, brick-making, brick-masonry, plastering, printing, blacksmithing, carpentry, saw-mill work, harness-making, shoe-making, laundrying, sewing, cooking and mattress-making. Washington believed in the beneficial influence of such training on individual behaviour. In a speech delivered before Women's New England Club in Boston on 27 January 1889, Washington tried to persuade his audience of the practical and moral importance of industrial education. Tuskegee turned out teachers, he said, who transformed the dismal landscape of cotton districts in the South and the sad existence of their inhabitants. In these districts, people lived in log cabins, and they did not have a school for their children. One of Tuskegee teachers went there, and destitution and desolation soon made room for comfort and new hopes. This teacher showed them how to help themselves. She told them how to save money to buy little farms and build a school. In Washington's own words:

Nothing tends more to develop moral back-bone than industrial training... The moral and uplifting influence exerted by each of these teachers in the communities where they labour is almost beyond calculation. I wish you could go, as I have gone, into one of these cotton districts where all is discouragement and demoralization resulting from debt, mortgaging, renting, and lack of school advantages, and go there two or three years later and see the change that I have seen, wrought by one of these teachers [177].

By and large, B.T. Washington eschewed involvement in politics. For instance, he forbade any discussion of political matters in Tuskegee conferences. His temporary acceptance of racial segregation might be conveyed by his famous Atlanta

Exposition Address of 18 September 1895. He declared: "In all things that are purely social, we can be separate as the fingers yet as one hand in all that pertains to our mutual interests" [178].

According to Washington, the two safest avenues for Afro-Americans to secure social and political rights were self-help and racial cooperation. Indeed, thanks to their industrial skill, their consequent wealth, and their faith in the Whites, the Blacks would finally acquire the socio-political status to which they were entitled. To quote him:

My own belief is... that the time will come when the Negro in the South will be accorded all the political rights which his ability, character, and material possessions entitle him to. I think though, that the opportunity to freely exercise such political rights will not come in any large degree through outside or artificial forcing but will be accorded to the Negro by the Southern White people themselves, and that they will protect him in the exercise of those rights [179].

Washington urged his countrymen to be patient for this socio-economic and political change would be a slow but sure process. "I think", he said, "that the according of the full exercise of political rights is going to be a matter of natural, slow growth, not an over-night gourd vine affair" [180].

Washington also focussed on the leading role of educated Blacks in that process. When Harvard University awarded him an honorary Master of Arts on 24 June 1896, Washington delivered a speech in which he stressed the necessity of a dialectical relationship between black intelligentsia and masses. From his standpoint, the former had to uplift the latter who should support their efforts. He declared:

...it seems to me that one of the most vital questions that touch our American life is how to bring the strong, wealthy, and learned into helpful touch with the poorest, most ignorant, and humblest, and at the same time make one appreciate the vitalizing, strengthening influence of the other [181].

Black leaders in South Africa cast their eyes on the American continent for two main reasons. They felt there was a kinship tie between them and Black Americans; they also wondered at the educational and economic progress these sons of former African slaves achieved. They namely looked up to B.T. Washington. His impact on black South Africans such as J.L. Dube, A.B. Xuma, O.D.T. Jabavu and S.T. Plaatje

was obvious. J.L. Dube acknowledged B.T. Washington as his model straightforwardly when he said:

He is to be my guiding star... I have chosen this great man firstly because he is perhaps the most famous and the best living example of our Africa's sons, and secondly because like him, I have my heart centered mainly in the education of my race [182].

During his stay in America, Dube did not fail to visit Tuskegee Institute. When he came back to his country, he set up Ohlange Native Industrial Institute in 1901 as Natal equivalent of B.T. Washington's school [183].

In a first step, Dube did not aim at challenging the white man's prerogatives. The field of skilled labour was his lot for Ohlange Institute would turn out only "unskilled labourers in the house, store, workshop, and farm" [184].

As time went by, however, Dube's vision of South African society apparently underwent a noticeable change. He gradually came to believe that justice would be done to Africans only when these would hold the reins of their country. African political hegemony was likely to occur for "where there was a pool, water would collect again", Dube said, or in Zulu: "Lapho ake ema khona amanzi ayophinde eme futhi" [185].

B.T. Washington also exerted an impact on A.B. Xuma who spent two years at Tuskegee. Like Washington, Xuma thought that South Africa as a whole could thrive only if the African section of the population was provided with a better education. As he put it:

Some of you may say that South Africa is too poor to educate the native. To that I would reply that South Africa is too poor not to educate the Native. Ignorance is more expensive and costlier to the State than any amount spent on education [186].

Plaatje also heard scholars such as P.A. Johnson and E.P. Roberts praise Washington's Institute. Dr Roberts asserted that "Tuskegee has made the state of Alabama famous, revolutionarized industrial training in this country, and sent its spirit abroad" [187]. Deeply impressed, Plaatje paid himself a visit to the famous school in 1922. The Principal of Tuskegee, Robert Moton gave him films which he displayed to his countrymen to make them learn Black Americans'

improvements. The show won large audiences in remote areas partly because films of any kind constituted a novelty there, as Willcox pointed out, and also because they identified themselves with black Americans. Newspapers conveyed their enthusiasm in the following statement:

None of the pictures, however, evoked so much enthusiasm as the work and duties of the students of the famous Booker T. Washington's great institution in Alabama. At the close, the visitors were loudly cheered and asked to "come again with their pictures [188].

The show he gave in Johannesburg drew a smaller audience, however. There were hardly one hundred people in the roomy Ebenezer hall where the show took place [189].

As late as the 1930s, black representatives still believed that Washington's biography should be read at school [190]. But, they stressed the impossibility of adopting his political attitude on the ground that the South African situation was different from the American one. In an article entitled "Within the Ambit", Thema explained that in the United States the Whites had fought for black emancipation, and Washington could reasonably rely on their understanding. However, in South Africa Europeans banded together in 1910 to keep Africans in permanent serfdom, and the latter had to express their grievances and claim for their rights. As he put it:

Why the Native Affairs should ask us to follow Washington's policy instead of asking the White man to do so, I cannot understand. There were no Negro Land Acts, no Pass Laws, no Colour Bar in the constitution and industries of the American Union, and he was speaking to men who a decade ago had fought the war of Negro Emancipation. We cannot speak in the language of Washington to people who ten years ago clubbed together to keep us in perpetual serfdom. White South Africa has to produce a Lincoln before Black South Africa could be asked to produce a Washington [191].

The ideology and activities of W.E.B. DuBois influenced black politicians' protests against the colour bar in South Africa, but to a lesser extent than B.T. Washington.

## 2. DuBois

In the main, William Edward Burghardt DuBois (1868-1963) tackled the socio-economic and political situation of Afro-Americans. He put forward a political

and an education programme for them, and essentially focussed on the former aspect of this scheme. Unlike B.T. Washington, DuBois urged his countrymen to rely first on themselves in political matters. In a paper delivered in 1897, he stated that "the Negro people must not expect to have things done for them - they must do for themselves" [192]. He warned the Blacks against the danger of a blind faith in the Whites. From his standpoint, it was the reliance of their ancestors on Europeans which led to the economic and political slavery of the black race. However, for some time, British imperial power found favour with him. In the past, British philanthropists struggled on behalf of the Blacks, and their efforts contributed to free them from their shackles. He hoped that in the future, British colonial authorities would carry on the work of those generous pioneers and would allow Africans and West Indians to manage their own country. During the first Pan-African Conference held at Westminster Hall in London from 23 to 25 July 1900, DuBois helped draw up a memorial calling the Queen's attention on a number of injustices in South Africa, and notably on the difficulty for Africans to secure the franchise there [193].

In 1903, DuBois attacked the persistent myth tending to present the African continent as a tabula rasa before European arrival. In his Souls of Black Folk, he stated that Africans had a cultural heritage, and the assertion of such a fact constituted one of the roots of African Nationalism and Pan-Africanism. He wrote:

To be sure, the darker races are today the least advanced in culture according to European standards. This has not, however, always been the case in the past, and certainly the world's history both ancient and modern has given instances of non-despicable ability and capacity among the blackest races of men [194].

DuBois condemned the political aloofness advocated by B.T. Washington. According to him, the Blacks were entitled to the same socio-economic and political rights as the Whites. Unlike B.T. Washington, he urged his countrymen to continuously claim for them until they get them. As he put it in his address of 16 August 1906:

We claim for ourselves every single right that belongs to a freeborn American, political, civil and social; and until we get these rights we will never cease to protest and assail the ears of America [195].

More exacting than B.T. Washington, DuBois proposed a more ambitious educational policy for Blacks. He stressed the importance of industrial training, and insisted on the fact that industrial schools should turn out not mere robots but skilful artisans who had grasped the underlying principles of their crafts. As he explained:

An industrial school... does not merely teach technique. It is also a school - a centre of moral influence and of mental discipline. As such it has peculiar problems in securing the proper teaching force. It demands broadly trained men: the teacher of carpentry must be more than a carpenter, and the teacher of the domestic arts more than a cook; for such teachers must instruct, not simply in manual dexterity, but in mental quickness and moral habits. In other words, they must be teachers as well as artisans [196].

DuBois also stood against any education aiming at strengthening a master-servant relationship between Whites and Blacks. In his address of 16 August 1906, he pressed for equal educational opportunities for black and white children. To quote him:

We want our children trained as intelligent human beings should be, and we will fight for all time against any proposal to educate black boys and girls simply as servants and underlings, or simply for the use of other people. They had a right to know, to think, to aspire [197].

DuBois insisted on the education of Africans at home and in famous universities abroad for he regarded it as a fundamental modernizing factor of their country. On 6 June 1919, he asserted that:

The chief effort to modernize Africa should be through schools. Within ten years, twenty million black children ought to be in school. Within a generation, young Africa should know the essential outlines of modern culture, and groups of bright African students should be going to the world's great universities [198].

DuBois's influence on black leaders in South Africa seems rather weak. They were aware of his Pan-African activities through brief personal contacts and through his writings. The SANNC representatives Oliver Dalindyebo, J.L. Dube and Walter Benson Rubusana personally knew him at the Universal Races Congress held at the University of London from 26 to 29 July 1911 [199]. Plaatje appears to have attended the Pan-African conferences in 1919 and 1921. In the latter year, he visited the United States. There he published the Mote and the Beam, a pamphlet

denouncing European sexual immorality in South Africa, and again got in touch with DuBois and his National Association for the Advancement of Coloured people.

In 1925, Mveli Skota, newly-elected Secretary-General of the SANNC, suggested in his report to the National Executive that Congress should convene "a monster conclave" of African spokesmen. But, dreading radical pressures, the Executive did not approve his scheme [200].

In the 1930s, when the disenchantment of Cape African voters seemed imminent, DuBois's claim for political rights gained support. According to D.D.T. Jabavu, DuBois held that:

In modern industrial civilization a disenfranchised class is worse than helpless; it will be diseased; it will be criminal; it will be ignorant; it will be the plaything of mobs; it will be insulted by caste restrictions [201].

Black leaders also adopted the same conflicting attitude toward Garveyism.

### 3. M.A. Garvey (1887-1947)

Writing on 26 March 1920 to Alfred Milner, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sydney Buxton who was serving as High Commissioner of South Africa, deprecated Garveyite activities in the country and in other parts of the world. He essentially looked upon Garveyism as a subversive movement. He stressed the "anti-white and anti-British" character of Garvey's Society: the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). He further drew his attention on the "destructive and pernicious" propaganda carried out by Garvey's newspaper, the Negro World, and warned him against the stockholders of the Black Star Line and its steamer "Yarmouth" soon to be known as the "Frederic Douglas". Garvey's agents, he asserted, were "expected to stealthily work among the Natives and stir up strife and discontent among them". He judged that stringent measures had to be taken to stop their evil influence [202].

Often in a garbled form, Garvey's views effectively started to circulate in South Africa, but they had little impact until the late 1920s. The 1921 Report of the Native Affairs Department pointed out the presence of Garveyist propaganda in Cape Town and Johannesburg. At this time, Garvey's UNIA opened four branches in the Western Cape, and they seemed to be fairly active there until 1924 [203].



By 1923-24, Garvey's ideology was also conveyed by James M. Thaele who had come back from the United States. After studying at Lovedale from 1906 until 1910, Thaele went in 1913 to America, and he stayed there for nearly ten years. He entered Lincoln University where he obtained a B.A. and a bachelor's degree in theology in 1921. After his return to South Africa, he set up a strong branch of the SANNC in Cape Town and became its President in 1924. In H.S. Msimang's opinion, "M. Thaele was an admirer, if not a follower of M. Garvey, who was running a campaign for a black Africa" [204]. H.S. Msimang also noted the influence of Garvey's ideas in the Cape. They "spread in the Cape so widely", he declared, "that when Masabalala and I visited Tetsikasma Hoek, we were met with enquiries as to when the fleet of ships would come with Marcus Garvey" [205].

Two facts, nevertheless, tempered Thaele's Garveyism. Congress appealed to Coloured supporters in the Western Cape, and Thaele was the son of a Basuto Chief and of a coloured mother. This combination of factors compelled him to avoid over-emphasizing the value of blackness [206].

Around 1925, Wellington Buthelezi, a Natal-born Zulu, contributed to herald a distorted version of Garveyism in the Transkei and in other parts of the country. He promised salvation to his countrymen, and preached that American armies were coming to free them from European yoke. In 1921, Wellington had enrolled as a standard VII student at Lovedale where every Wednesday morning, the teachers used to discuss contemporary affairs, the UNIA and its goals. But his encounter with a West Indian, Ernest Wallace, who lived at Qachas Nek, Basutoland, exerted a stronger impact upon him. After World War I, Wallace became a member of the UNIA, and with several Afro-Americans, strove to win over supporters in Basutoland.

Wellington expounded Garvey's message in the Transkei - notably in Queenstown, Herschel, and Aliwal North, - in Edendale, Bloemfontein, and Johannesburg. He usually started his well-attended meetings with prayer, scripture reading, and hymn singing. Two hymns became particularly familiar: "Nkosi Sikelel I-Afrika" ("God Bless Africa") and "Lizalis Idinga Laqo" ("God Fulfil Your Promise"). Other songs stressing the themes of freedom and unity or umanyano were composed by the Wellingtonites. Amongst the better known, there were:

## 1. Africa is the land of our fathers

The foreigners are claiming it

They will never have it

Because it is ours.

## 2. Chase away our enemies

And destroy their plans

And leave us in this world of ours

May unity continue forever

## 3. We are the family of Africa

We are the children of Africa

We shall die here

Bless our country [207].

Wellington claimed a membership of 25,000 at Queenstown where he held periodic congresses. However, his statement cannot be taken at its face-value. He ~~said~~ *said at different* times *to have been* born in Chicago, and *in* Liberia, and that he had attended Oxford and Cambridge. Moreover, Wellington's movement derived its initial impetus and strength from Africans' dissatisfaction with their political and economic conditions, and not so much from his charisma. In the 1920s, the Blacks had to give up their expectations of change after the First World War. They also smarted under the oppressive nature of White rule. In 1925, the Union government exacted a tax on cotton blankets and second-hand clothing. In the same year, they passed a Native Taxation and Development Act. In 1926, Prime Minister Hertzog introduced his Native Bills aiming at depriving Cape-Africans of the franchise in return for additional reserve lands. These Bills were not enacted for another decade, but their introduction in Parliament brought about a deep discontent.

A series of disasters heightened their malaise. The flu of 1918 killed about 1,000 Africans in the Queenstown region alone. The drought of 1919 destroyed crops and animals, and forced the Transkei inhabitants to live in a permanent state of destitution. A Cape paper later depicted their ordeal in the following terms:

...even in the Transkei, underfeeding, undernourishment and consequent rapid deterioration in bone and flesh and health is the rule among the young natives. It is no exaggeration to say that the majority of them live in a chronic state of hunger relieved at growingly long intervals by plenty. This plenty is too often marred by the sale of food to buy clothing to pay off debts. These are the general conditions of life; poverty growing into hunger, debt with no hope of escape. No people under the sun who have not been tamed and weakened by centuries of low diet and despotism can fail, in such conditions, to get into a state of unrest [208].

In these instances, attracting followers by promising them some relief did not constitute a difficult task. Garveyism as expounded by Wellington, however, apparently waned after his deportation from the Transkei in 1927 [209].

The SANNC leaders adopted an ambivalent attitude toward Garveyism. During S.T. Gumede's presidency from 1927 to 1930, the movement gained momentum. In his 1929 address to the League of African Rights, a body set up by the South African communists the same year and of which he became president, Gumede castigated imperial authorities who deprived Africans of their rights, and argued that "the four hundred million Negroes to be found all over the world claim Africa to be their only home". Gumede was also said to have been elected as delegate to the sixth Annual International Convention of the Negro Peoples of the World to be held at Kingston, Jamaica, from 1 to 31 August 1929 under M. Garvey's chairmanship [210].

During Gumede's presidency, too, Congress's mouthpiece - Abantu Batho - displayed Garveyist propensities in its leader columns. In May 1930, one SANNC representative viewed Garvey's movement as a spur on African political awareness. Garvey was a "dangerous man for all the great powers that are exploiting Africa", he explained. Another Congressman referred to the white robber nations firmly clinging to Africa, and supported Garvey's ideal of "Africa for the Africans". He further stressed the need for economic self-help. An article headed "Marcus Garvey urges Negroes to Build for Racial Uplift" signed by Marcus Garvey as President-General of the UNIA, pressed for an international fund of \$600 million to help the Blacks to rise from the status of slaves to become the masters of finance, commerce, science, art and nation-building. .

After 1930, Garvey's influence on the SANNC ebbed. Gumede was then removed from his office as President General, and W.B. Makasibe, one of his followers, broke away from Congress to launch a short-lived "African Party" of younger men

and women. Makasibe criticized the ineffectiveness of the new Executive. "What the Bantu need", he wrote, "is to be taught how to live without the assistance of other races who are not their friends when the truth must be spoken. I am one of these who put race before anything else day and night". P.D. Segale defended Congress's ideal of non-racial justice. He attacked Makasibe's argument as "sordid and scurilous", and advised the young men to avoid Makasibe who tried to weaken the nation by breeding hatred between Whites and Blacks" [211].

Traces of Garveyite influence on ICU representatives was rather scarce. Interviewed ~~at~~ Vrede by the Police who looked upon him as an agitator, Robert Dumah, asserted in 1929 that the ICU leaders had been corresponding with Garveyists for some years, and were trying to start a branch of the UNIA in the Orange Free State [212]. According to Thema, a prominent SANNC representative, many naive people believed that Kadalie was an American supporter of Garvey. Thema correctly stressed Kadalie's aloofness from Garvey's movement [213].

To summarize, black politicians in South Africa seemed relatively aware of Pan-African thought and activities. They generally displayed an ambivalent attitude towards the ideas of the main exponents of that school, namely B.T. Washington, W.E.B. DuBois, and M.A. Garvey. The influence of Pan-African thought on African nationalists cannot be exaggerated, however. The South African economic and political reality provided black spokesmen with the core of their ideology.

## CHAPTER X11

## PROBLEMS AND PROTESTS, 1912-1918

Labour requirements of white farmers and of mining companies governed land policy in South Africa. The proletarianization of Africans was effected through a gradual despoilment of their main asset: land. By right of conquest and through legislative measures, the ruling white minority provided itself with extensive tracts of the most fertile land, and pushed back Africans in the reserves.

The discovery of diamonds in Kimberley in 1867 and of gold in Johannesburg in 1886 further widened the gap between the two communities. It brought increased wealth to many Whites and fostered Africans' exploitation. Indeed, European mining companies made their labour needs known to a sympathetic government -- some of whose members -- like Cecil John Rhodes had personal interests in industry --, and both industrial and political authorities came to consider tribal land tenure in the reserves as a nuisance. Rhodes' Glen Grey Act of 1894 forced Africans out of them by restricting their rights on land, and by making them feel the burden of heavy taxation. The Natives' Land Act of 1913 was to complete the process of Africans' pauperization by impairing their rights on European-owned areas. Ousted from the reserves and from white rural areas, Africans flocked to the towns.

In urban centres, black workers had to put up with a new sequence of hardships. Victims of greedy labour recruiters and of the pass laws apparatus, debarred from skilled positions, they became part of a cheap labour force. To grow richer and to draw his labourers' attention off their appalling conditions in the mines, the white capitalist did not scruple to associate his economic pressure with means likely to bring about the moral degeneration of his labourers. He supplied them with cheap wine and prostitutes, but blamed their drunkenness and depravity to justify their enslavement.

The huge concentration of labourers from several tribes in the Transvaal mines contributed to the growth of a collective consciousness. However, their lack of stability, the absence of a common language hampered the development of a solidly organized working class. As a result, the protests of African labourers against

their exploitation remained individual.

From 1913 onwards, a few events likely to help the maturation of that embryo of collective awareness took place. African workers saw white miners who went on strike to better their own conditions and who won their case. A few became acquainted with western socialist ideology. Through their involvement in World War 1, Africans spent some time in France, a country where the colour bar was unknown.

The purpose of this essay is to assess how far this chain of events spurred on Africans' reactions against their oppression and to analyse the National Congress leaders' attitude towards their people. A prior study of the land question as a source of labour problems is needed.

### I. Land Question

Mainly composed of Northerners, Botha's government passed two segregationist measures: the Natives' Land Act No 27 in 1913 and the Native Affairs Administration Bill in 1917.

#### 1. The Natives' Land Act, 1913

Approved on 16 June 1913 by the Governor General and gazetted on the 19th of the same month, the Natives' Land Act followed the trend of early legislation against the so-called "squatting evil" on European farms. It also represented the outcome of recommendations made by the 1903-05 inter-colonial commission which set the principle of strict delimitation of areas for African occupation, and stressed the necessity to limit the number of squatters on European farms. As Gladstone put it, the commission mainly insisted:

1. That in the interests of both Europeans and Natives, purchase of land by Natives should be limited to certain areas to be defined by legislative enactment.
2. That whatever principles govern the question of purchase of land by Natives should apply equally to the leasing of land by Natives.
3. That unrestrained squatting of Natives on private farms, whether as tenants or otherwise, is an evil and that the principles of the Cape Act of 1899 should be adopted for dealing with it [1].

The Union government implemented these recommendations, and made it illegal for black people to purchase or lease land in white areas. This prohibition seemed fair for it was balanced by a similar restriction of Europeans' rights. Article 1 of the Bill read:

Except with the approval of the Governor General...

- a. a native shall not enter into any agreement or transaction for the purchase, hire, or other acquisition from a person other than a native of such land or of any right thereto, interest therein, or servitude thereover.
- b. a person other than a native shall not enter into any agreement or transaction for the purchase, hire, or other acquisition from a native of any such land or of any right thereto, interest therein, or servitude thereover [2].

This main provision allowed Botha to assert that the Natives' Land Bill meant separation not segregation, and to win the support of the Cape Liberal wing inside the government as well as of other influential personalities such as the High Commissioner Herbert Gladstone. Gladstone later declared:

The Natives' Land Act is an honest and interesting attempt to secure a reasonable separation of Natives and Europeans by the creation of districts assigned to natives and by the prohibition imposed on each race to buy land or settle in the territory of the other [3].

Another provision made the enactment of the Bill easier. According to the clause 15(2), the Bill did not apply to the Cape. This was to safeguard African franchise rights. J.W. Jagger explained to F.H.P. Cresswell that a £75 property qualification was required in that province. As a result, to debar Cape Africans from purchasing land outside scheduled areas would amount to depriving them of one means of obtaining registration as voters. Clause 15(2) stipulated that:

Nothing in this Act contained which imposes restrictions upon the acquisition by any person of land or rights thereto, interests therein, or servitudes thereover, shall be in force in the Province of the Cape of Good Hope, if and for so long as such person would, by such restrictions, be prevented from acquiring or holding a qualification whereunder he is or may become entitled to be registered as a voter at parliamentary elections in any electoral division in the said Province [4].

Very little hardship was also likely to result from the implementation of the Natives' Land Act in the Northern Colonies, it was argued. This act would mainly affect the Free State squatters who remained governed by Law No 4 of 1895 as amended by Ordinance No 7 of 1904, and by Chapter XXXIV of that province Law

Book. Law No 4 of 1895 allowed not more than fifteen families on European farms. Ordinance No 7 of 1904 reduced them to the status of servants. Chapter XXXIV of the Free State Law Book prevented them from buying or leasing land in European areas. In other words, the situation of black peasants in the Free State was worse than in the Transvaal or Natal where under Section 1(2) of the Natives' Land Act, they still enjoyed the right to continue existing agreements to buy or lease land [5].

It was further argued that African squatters jeopardized by the Natives' Land Act could always go back to their reserves. Gladstone reflected this opinion when he wrote:

This will... affect immediately native squatters in the Orange Free State. No very great hardship is likely to result. Number affected is relatively small. They are understood to have homes to which they can return [6].

That was the crux of the problem. Evicted squatters just could not go back to the reserves where land constituted only 7% of the country's area, and could barely hold its existing inhabitants [7]. The Union officials themselves implicitly acknowledged the scarcity of land at the disposal of Africans. Indeed, Section 2(1) of the Act empowered the Governor General to appoint a commission to set aside "additional areas" for their occupation [8].

Africans could not hope for an immediate redress of their grievances. The commission so appointed included only European members whose profession and political sympathies were likely to urge them to back up Botha's policy. Its Chairman, William Beaumont, served as a judge in Natal until 1910. Stressing his political bias, Gladstone wrote: "Politically, he is in sympathy with General Botha". C.H. Wessels, Minister of Public Works, Lands and Mines in the Orange River Colony, was a firm opponent of the Cape African franchise, and a wealthy farmer. Collins and Schalk William Burger were also landowners. William Ernest Mortimer Stanford served as a member of the 1903-05 Native Affairs Commission. As a result, he was bound to enforce the principles he put forward [9].

Forced out of the reserves and of European lands, Africans were driven into urban areas to become part of a cheap labour force. Land and labour were once more intimately linked. This tie might be conveyed by the fact that in 1913, too, Jacobus Wilhelmus Sauer, Minister of Native Affairs and author of the Natives'



Land Act, asked Parliament to set the principle that unskilled tropical labour should no longer be brought into the Union [10].

Drought and soil erosion further helped Africans' exodus towards the towns. To fight against their evil effects, the government enacted the Forest Act No 16 on 10 June 1913. This Act aimed at consolidating all previous measures dealing with the preservation of forests in the Cape, Natal and the Transvaal [11]. A new Act was needed to enforce the existing legislation against drought for several inhabitants were suffering from it. Drought was making havoc in Zululand. In the Zoutpansburg, too, the government planned to distribute mealies if drought did not stop [12].

Foreseeing the hardships the Natives' Land Bill held in store for their people, the SANNC leaders lobbied against it at once. Now and then, various missionary bodies from the four provinces backed up their protests. Some administrators such as Haggard could not help pointing out the justness of their cause. The SANNC politicians' basic arguments against the Union Land Policy might be summed up as follows: as a mouthpiece of the different tribes in the country, the National congress should have been consulted. However, the Union Parliament failed to do so, and hurriedly passed the new Bill to force Africans to serve the Whites. In March 1913, the SANNC held a meeting at Johannesburg. They passed a resolution against the Natives' Land Act prohibition to purchase or lease land in white areas. They also appointed a deputation to proceed to Cape Town and to present Africans' objections against the proposed measure to the government. The delegates were: J.L. Dube, President of the SANNC, W.B. Rubusana, D.S. Letanka, A. Mangena, L.T. Mvabaza, Chief W.Z. Fenyang, and the Reverend L. Dlepu [13]. W.B. Rubusana and A. Mangena asked the High Commissioner Gladstone to grant an interview to the National Congress deputation which represented African inhabitants in the four provinces of the Union. This step revealed their decision to act according to constitutional norms, they stressed [14]. On 23 June 1913, J.L. Dube again pressed for an interview. However, Gladstone turned down their request on the ground that the object of their visit was beyond his constitutional functions [15].

Between 25 and 28 July 1913, an important meeting presided over by J.L. Dube took place at Ebenezer Hall in Johannesburg. Sixty delegates, among whom there were twenty tribal rulers from all provinces attended. The following SANNC

representatives were present; S.M. Makgatho, Vice President of the conference, W.B. Rubusana, E.J. Mqoboli, Saul Msane, A. Mangena, R.W. Msimang and S.T. Plaatje. Amongst the chiefs who took part, there were: J.M. Nyokong from Thaba 'Nchu, Orange Free State, Kark Kekana from the Zoutpansburg, Stephen Mini from Natal, Nathaniel Umhalla and Councillor Enoch Mamba from the Cape. The delegates agreed to resort to constitutional methods to oppose the Natives' Land Act [16]. They appointed a deputation consisting of S.M. Makgatho, S.T. Plaatje, Saul Msane, Kark Kekana, the Reverend R. Twala, J.M. Nyokong, and E. Mamba. The delegates were received on 30 July in the Government buildings at Pretoria by F.S. Malan, acting as Minister for Native Affairs pro tempore after Sauer's death on 24 July, E. Barrett, his Assistant Secretary, Pritchard, a Johannesburg Commissioner, and Graham Cross, a Rand Magistrate. S.T. Plaatje stressed the alarming hardships Africans in the Transvaal, and especially in the Orange Free State, were facing as a result of the Natives' Land Act. He stated that Congress had decided to raise funds for paying the expenses of a deputation to England. He emphasized Congress wish to proceed on constitutional lines and their willingness to cooperate with the government.

Questioned about the desirability of sending a deputation to England, Saul Msane specified that Section 25 of the Union Act empowered the King to disallow any law within one year after it had been assented to by the Governor General. Congress could not wait for the commission, he said, for the period mentioned in Section 25 of the South Africa Act would lapse. Then, he expressed Congress wish to hold meetings throughout the country to lay the matter before their countrymen and to collect funds to meet the expenses of the deputation. Enoch Mamba said a few words to express people's anxiety about the families of African labourers living in the compounds.

Malan urged them to obey the law of the land. He deprecated the proposal to send a deputation to England before the commission submitted its report to Parliament, and alleged that the Act had only been in force for little more than one month, a period insufficient to assess its impact on African population. He expressed the hope that all cases of hardship which either had arisen or might arise in the future would be reported to Districts Officers and through them brought to the notice of the Native Affairs Department. Referring to Plaatje's assurance on Congress wish to cooperate with the government, Malan pointed out there was some inconsistency between this statement and Congress determination to

send a deputation to England to protest against the Union government action [17].

On 14 February 1914, J.L. Dube petitioned the Prime Minister. He specified he was acting on behalf of the National Congress, a body standing for all the tribes in South Africa. The Prime Minister knew they were raising funds to appeal to the King against the Natives' Land Act, he pointed out. However, they would first use every constitutional means to get the redress of their people's grievances from the local authorities. He stressed that Africans approved of the principle of separation if fairly implemented, but they did not see how a greater separation of Blacks and Whites could be possible. As Dube put it:

We make no protest against the principle of separation so far as it can be fairly and practically carried out. But we do not see how it is possible for this law to effect any greater separation between the races than obtains now [18].

In fact, Dube wrote, the Natives' Land Act was much more likely to bring about an intermingling of Europeans and Africans at the expense of the latter. Indeed, greedy land agents and European farmers were taking advantage of the unsafe situation of Africans under the new Act to increase their rents and to lower their wages. Africans should be allowed to purchase land, he pleaded [19].

The SANNC held new meetings of protest against the Natives' Land Act at Kimberley between 27 and 28 February and from 2 to 3 March, of the same year. The National Congress was mainly represented by J.L. Dube, President, S.M. Makgatho, Vice President, S.T. Plaatje, Honorary Secretary, Seme, Treasurer and T.M. Mapikele, Junior Treasurer. The conference attracted about eighty delegates from all over Southern Africa. There were tribal representatives such as Moraloa of the Bahurutshe in the Western Transvaal. Dinkoanyane of the Bapedi tribe, Lydenburg, Malinga, Prince Regent of the Swazis, Vilikazi, Secretary of the Queen Regent, and so forth. Dube notified the audience they had initially planned to gather at Nancefield in the Witwatersrand. The Premier who prohibited such a meeting could no longer withhold his permission after notices convening the conference at Kimberley had been sent. This meeting had to take place, he explained, for after 16 June, they would no longer have the opportunity to appeal to the King. Dube also expressed his gratitude to Doctor Abdullah Abderraham, the distinguished leader of the coloured people, for his support.

While the SANNC was sitting in early March 1914, the Secretary for Native Affairs Edward Dower and General Botha pointed out <sup>that</sup> the Union administrators were only carrying out the principle of "territorial separation" to which the SANNC President agreed. E. Dower reminded the National Congress that Africans raised the same irrational outcry against the Glen Grey Act. Africans again wrongly believed that the new measure aimed at despoiling them of their land when it allowed present African land-owners to hold on to their property.

In a letter to the SANNC, President Botha tried to correct what he called Dube's "misapprehension as to the effect of the Act". The Natives' Land Act did not prohibit but restricted the sale, lease or mortgage of land by or to Africans Botha specified. Furthermore, he pointed out, this restriction constituted only a temporary measure until further legislation based on the report of the commission could be passed. The government also intended to undertake the gradual expropriation of land owned by Europeans in scheduled areas for the settlement of Blacks on such areas.

However, according to Plaatje, the appointment of a commission after the passing of the Act was against common sense. He rightly highlighted the absurdity of enacting a law before collecting enough data. The government deliberately took such a step, he said, because they wanted to uproot Africans. As he put it:

Why legislate in the dark and then grope for information? Get the information and then legislate on the facts.; but it was preferred to legislate in the dark with result that natives were homeless and turned into vagabonds [20].

Dower himself advised Thaba 'Nchu inhabitants to sell their stock and to move to other quarters, Plaatje insisted.

At the closing session, the National Congress in Kimberley focussed on the appointment of a deputation to the King. Congress members were divided upon that issue. Chief Moiloa moved and Chief Manoegale seconded that the appeal to the King should wait the commission report. Saul Msane protested that such a question had already been settled by a congress of chiefs and other delegates on 25 July 1913. Besides, funds had already been collected for that purpose, and by going back on their decision, they would break the pledge they gave to their people. Moiloa's motion was finally dropped. The selected members of the deputation were:

J.L. Dube, S.T. Plaatje, S.M. Makgatho, Saul Msane, W.Z. Fenyang, Chief Mini, T.M. Mapikela, L.T. Mvabaza and S. Litheko. The Congress also encouraged all chiefs and other representatives to send a delegate at their own expense [21].

In May 1914, J.L. Dube and W.B. Rubusana had an interview with Botha. Dube informed him that the SANNC deputation was about to proceed to England to lobby against the Natives' Land Act. They heard that Parliament was very busy for the time being and, therefore, it could not pay immediate attention to the hardships which Africans all over the country were facing under the terms of the Natives' Land Act. They felt bound to appeal to the King before it was too late for their people.

Then Rubusana embarked upon matters irrelevant to the Natives' Land Act, object of his visit. His fondness for digressions brought upon him a rebuke from the Prime Minister who clearly looked upon all educated Africans as rabble-rousers. Very calm and collected, Rubusana insisted he was only voicing Africans' views. He told the Prime Minister about the predicament of some thirty Africans who were turned off a farm in East London. Botha reminded him that the Natives' Land Act did not apply to the Cape. Rubusana let Botha know Congress determination to carry on speaking on behalf of their people for silence could be dangerously interpreted as approval of the Union policy. They would lodge their protests with the King, and would do all in their power to alleviate their people's plight.

Botha repeated his arguments. He brought to their notice they were under a responsible government; the principle of "territorial separation" applied to Whites and Blacks alike; the Natives' Land Act did not constitute a final measure, and no law could be implemented without causing some inconvenience to a few individuals; the government provided magistrates with circulars allowing them to deal with cases of hardships brought about by the Natives' Land Act. Botha urged them to understand the uselessness of a deputation to England: His Majesty the King had already intimated he would not disallow the Act, and the Union government would not tolerate any interference in their affairs. However, his warnings did not shake Dube's firmness to try to influence British officials and public. The Premier enquired, then, what they intended to do if they failed. Dube replied they would let Africans know that the King like the Union government was indifferent to their welfare. The SANNC delegates finally returned empty-handed [22]

The National Congress representatives were not alone in their struggle against the Natives' Land Act. Various Missionary and other bodies backed them up. On 6 June 1913, H.S. Poho, Secretary of a Native Vigilance Society forwarded a petition to Gladstone on behalf of the Free State Africans. Save on some Thaba "Nchu farms, the bulk of Africans were reduced to a state of serfdom, he pointed out. The Natives' Land Bill put them under harsher conditions than in the other provinces. They relied on him to oppose the Bill if it again passed before Parliament [23].

At a public meeting held on 13 June of the same year, the Natal Native Affairs Reform Association expressed their firm belief that the new Bill should be repealed because of its "repressive tendency... to introduce conditions of forced labour" [24].

Between 8 and 10 July 1913, Missionary Societies and Churches labouring in Natal and Zululand and constantly in touch with African population held their annual meeting at Maritzburg. They emphasized the immediate and harmful effect of the Natives' Land Act. This measure uprooted several African tenants who found themselves homeless at a moment's notice. As they put it:

Scarcely any legislation had ever been enacted which has affected the native population with so much dismay... Already native farm-tenants have begun to feel the pressure of the Act and to find themselves ejected from their present homes with no possibility of finding homes elsewhere [25].

A "South African Society" set up in Cape Town by the beginning of January 1914 and including a few white liberals such as Theo Schreiner and Miss Schreiner asserted that the National Congress deputation to England represented a "large majority" of African people. The Society also pressed for the extension of scheduled areas to meet the wants of the rapidly increasing black population. They further insisted on the need for imperative and urgent action for the Natives' Land Act had already caused much hardship [26].

Lovedale Missionary Institution also backed up the SANNC protests against the Natives' Land Act, and pressed for the removal of this measure. The Natives' Land Act condemned scores of Africans to homelessness, Lovedale paper pointed out. The Native Affairs department dealt with the specific cases brought to its notice. However, the Blacks who had no one to represent them were turned adrift. The

commission was also powerless. Indeed, the Act provided for additional areas, but the present owners were not to be disturbed. The commission had to wait until European farmers were willing to sell. Furthermore, it did not dispose of funds to buy land. "This is not segregation; it is eviction", the Christian Express protested [27]. Africans were condemned to "vagabondage or conditions of farm labour akin to slavery", it carried on [28]. The Natives' Land Act might also be harmful to the government's interests. Indeed, till now tribal differences and jealousies divided Africans, and their lack of widespread unity eased the task of the government. However, the Natives' Land Act brought various tribes together, and no one but the government was to blame for this dangerous situation. As Lovedale paper put it:

A religious movement such as Ethiopianism might have been expected to unite native opinion, but such was not the case. Ethiopianism formed a few new combinations, but the fissures were more marked than the cohesion. The Land Act is the first thing that has united the Natives throughout the length and breadth of South Africa. The Native in the Transkei or Cape Colony, who is scarcely touched personally by the Act is deeply moved by the sufferings of Natives in the Transvaal, Orange Free State, or Natal. A common grievance or sense of injustice draws people together with greater power than even race or self-interest. Such a wrong had been done, and widespread unity and wounded feeling has resulted [29].

Kimberley and District Synod of the Wesleyan Methodist Church of South Africa also urged the Union administration to suspend the Natives' Land Act. Africans suffered many disabilities through its operation, it pointed out [30].

After a visit to Zululand, Haggard stated that any further infringement of African rights on their hereditary territory should be discouraged, and that land now occupied by Europeans should be expropriated and reconveyed to them. To sustain his arguments, he mentioned the case of Hlubi District where about 100 Whites owned 600,000 acres whereas 16,000 Africans occupied only 334,000 acres. Furthermore, the Zulus had no means of presenting their case to the local authorities except through a casual meeting with the magistrate. As a result, a deep tension opposed the two sections of the population. To avert the danger of a conflagration between the two races, colonial administrators should allow the Zulus to submit their grievances for discussion to a council headed by the local commissioner. They should also grant them a certain proportion of the moneys raised from them by direct taxation for the implementation of their decisions [31].

Despite the SANNC and other bodies' repeated petitions to get the Natives' Land Act repealed, the Union government remained staunch. As a result, by mid-May 1914, the National Congress delegates sailed to England, but there, too, their efforts were doomed to failure. Indeed, both the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society (APS) and the Colonial Office in London categorically refused to support their claims. A self-proclaimed guardian of the rights of the indigenous races throughout the world, the APS backed up the very policy Black South Africans opposed. Two major reasons led the APS to adopt such a paradoxical attitude. First, its organizing Secretary J.H. Harris believed that the Natives' Land Act constituted a piece of legislation very much in line with the progressive ideas of that time. He considered the principle of scheduled areas in the Natives' Land Act as a guarantee to exclusive land occupation for Africans. He wrote:

I have seen so many dangers through natives occupying land under insecure tenure that I am strongly attracted to Botha's principle which has as its bedrock secure holding [32].

Secondly, the APS felt it was impossible to interfere in the internal affairs of a country which had since 1910 a self-governing dominion. Such a step would alienate the Society from the Imperial Government whose tolerance they needed to carry out their activities. As a result, as early as October 1913, Travers Buxton, the other secretary of the APS, informed J.L. Dube that the Society could not assist the SANNC in its campaign against the Natives' Land Act. Dube was very disappointed. He nevertheless tried to persuade the APS to use at least its influence to interest the British Parliament in the plight of his people. "You may at least get some of the members of Parliament to take an interest and ask questions in the House", he wrote back [33].

Despite the Society's reluctance to help them, and against the advice of both the South African Premier and the High Commissioner, Lord Gladstone, the SANNC sent its deputation. The National Congress decision caused much embarrassment to the APS which saw its authority and prestige threatened. The Society could not call into question the imperial authorities' views on South African politics, nor could it allow this group of educated Africans to present their case without the Society's guidance and assistance. To preserve its role as a mediator between the indigenous races and the Imperial power, the APS sought a compromise. It offered its help to the SANNC delegates, but covertly undermined their action. To muzzle



the delegates, Harris advised Dube, the leader of the deputation, against any public agitation before getting in touch with him. In a letter dated 18 May 1914 and which reached Dube at Madeira, Harris wrote:

I am hastening to send you this note of welcome to assure you of the deep sympathy of our Society in your efforts, but still more to ask you to consider the advisability of saying nothing to the press until we have had an opportunity of discussing matters. I am quite sure you will obtain a far more sympathetic hearing from Mr Harcourt if, in the first instance, you refrain from public agitation and proceed by diplomatic methods [34].

On their arrival in England in June 1914, Harris did his best to present the SANNC deputation -- which included J.L. Dube, S.T. Plaatje, W.B. Rubusana, Saul Msane, and T.M. Mapikele -- as a clique of fools. Indeed, on 15 June he made them sign a document which far from requesting that the Natives' Land Act be disallowed asked, on the contrary, for imperial endorsement of Botha's "principle of separation". The document was not clearly drafted, and contained conflicting statements. By requesting the suspension of Clause 1 embodying the "principle of separation" in the Natives' Land Act, one might think that they disapproved of it. However, by accepting Botha's proposal to expropriate land owned by Europeans in scheduled areas for the settlement of Africans on such land, they conveyed their approval. Furthermore, in his petition dated 14 February 1914 to Botha, Dube stated that the SANNC did not protest against the "principle of separation". One might conclude that the SANNC delegates accepted the government policy as a fait accompli. What they finally came to request was just more land for African occupation [35].

By signing the document, the SANNC representatives put themselves under the thumb of the APS which proposed to send two or three of its members to assist the delegates during their interview with the Colonial Secretary. However, Lambert at the Colonial Office considered a deputation on the part of the APS as pointless for Dube spoke English fairly well, and did not need any help. He nevertheless agreed to receive the SANNC leaders. For Lambert, the South African question was settled, but he was determined to teach the SANNC a good lesson on constitutional law. He wrote:

In any case, Harcourt is not able to receive the deputation in the near future...

Nor am I sure that the Aborigines Protection Society should be allowed to come with them. Dube talks English well, so no assistance is required from

outside. It is necessary to point out that the act has been sanctioned. It is law and His Majesty had no power to interfere with its operation.

Also to read them a little lesson on the relations of the nations to the Crown...

It might be added that they treated Lord Gladstone who is the representative of the Crown in South Africa with scant courtesy in rushing him as they did. General Botha has already declared he will not tolerate interference [36].

The Colonial Office refusal to see the APS delegates allowed the National Congress delegates to more forcefully express their objections against the Natives' Land Act but with no avail [37]. The SANNC representatives were again reminded they were under a responsible government, and any interference would be inconsistent with it [38]. Harris sent Dube a letter to express his Society's "deep regret" about their failure. However, he was compelled to let them address the British public. Harris wrote:

It is a cause of great satisfaction to our Committee that your deputation consented to follow our advice in two directions: first to modify your original programme in view of certain developments. Secondly to exhaust every constitutional means before embarking upon any form of public agitation [39].

In a document drafted by R.W. Msimang, and entitled "Natives' Land Act. An appeal to People of England", the National Congress leaders once again denounced the oppressive character of the Natives' Land Act. It was an unfair piece of legislation, they said, because the Union government did not wait for the report of the commission. The act did not affect Whites and Blacks alike, they pointed out, for the former who numbered less than the latter owned the great bulk of the land: in Natal 98,000 Whites possessed 7,000,000 morgen whereas 1,200,000 Blacks had 3,625,000 morgen; in the Free State, 143,000 Whites owned 15,200,000 morgen whereas 245,000 Africans occupied 74,289 morgen; in the Transvaal 300,000 Whites had 32,300,000 morgen while 1,000,000 Blacks owned only 882,000 morgen [40]. The Natives' Land Act ousted them from a land which initially belonged to them, and reduced them to the status of servants. The Imperial Government argued they had no right to interfere in South Africa's internal affairs, but they could not escape their "obligations to subject races". Furthermore, the King was entitled to veto under Section 65 of the Union Act. The people of England would certainly not tolerate any measure for "forced labour and veiled slavery", they said [41].

The outbreak of the war at the beginning of August 1914, and Harris's injunction to the SANNC delegates to be out of the country "on or before September

30, 1914" did not mean the end of their campaign [42]. All went back to South Africa save Plaatje. On 1 October 1916, the SANNC held a meeting at Pietermaritzburg, Natal, to protest against the report of the Beaumont commission. The report confirmed all their previous apprehensions against the Natives' Land Act, they said. Indeed, the commission set aside only barren, marshy and malarial districts unsuitable for human occupation as well as for agricultural or pastoral purposes, especially in the Transvaal and Orange Free State. This was again a means aiming at the economic enslavement of Blacks in agricultural and industrial centres. Their present situation resulted from their lack of representation, they asserted. As they put it:

Finally this Congress begs to point out that the great bulk of the Native population in South Africa has no protection or any privilege under the Constitution of the Union, no legal safeguard of their interest and vested rights as subjects of the British Empire, no channel for any other intervention on their behalf in the redress of their just grievances, no recognised means whereby they can effectively make their legitimate objections felt on any proposed legislation in the Union Parliament [43].

By the beginning of June 1917, the National Congress leaders had to deal with a serious crisis. Dube, President, and R.V.S. Thema, the Secretary, were forced to resign on the ground that their approval of "territorial separation" allowed Harris to compromise their cause [44].

Plaatje who stayed in England carried on a hopeless struggle through appeals to the British public. In his book Native Life in South Africa which he published in 1916 despite Harris's plotting to prevent him from doing so, he described the shock the Natives' Land Act gave to his people. He wrote:

Awakening on Friday morning June 30, 1913 the South African Native found himself not actually a slave but a pariah in the land of his birth [45].

He also pointed out the relationship between Africans' despoilment of their land and Europeans' labour needs. The object of the Natives' Land Act was "to prevent the Native from ever rising above the position of servants to the Whites", he pointed out [46]. According to Harris, of course, Native Life in South Africa was pure fiction.

(The book) is not <sup>only</sup> entirely full of the most unfortunate inaccuracies, the distortions and misrepresentations are of such a nature that they can only do

serious harm to the cause of native races [47].

Plaatje nevertheless managed to win the support of two liberal members of the APS: Miss Georgiana Solomon, the widow of Saul Solomon, and Mrs Jane Cobden Unwin, the daughter of Richard Cobden. The two ladies spoke out against the support of Botha's policy, and denounced Harris's obstructionist manoeuvres. In October 1916, they accused Harris of pretending to be "a friend of the Natives... while all the time he was secretly working against them"<sup>4</sup>[48]. Harris obtained the two ladies' expulsion three months after Plaatje's departure to South Africa in January 1917. At a farewell reception they gave to Plaatje on 10 January 1917, the ladies who did not give up struggling, set up a committee with Alice Werner as its secretary "to keep in touch with Native Affairs in South Africa", and "especially to watch the working of the Lands' Act". They enlisted the backing of Sir Richard Winfrey, a minister in Lloyd George's government [49]. The committee exerted a very limited impact, however. A "Society for the Protection of Peoples of African origin" a new organization founded in 1918 included several members of that committee [50].

The SANNC leaders then fought against the Natives' Land Act, a measure prejudicial to the economic and political interests of their people. It would be interesting to analyze how far the National Congress represented their countrymen in that struggle.

The SANNC leaders tried to explain the goals of the Natives' Land Act to their people and the constitutional means they intended to use to combat it. They saw the close relationship between land and labour policies and pointed out that the Act aimed at their economic enslavement by mining companies and white farmers. Henry Selby Msimang later said:

The important thing we did was just to send out people throughout the country to bring the purpose of the Act to the knowledge of the people generally [51].

They also informed their people about the difficult procedure they were to adopt, and set out to report their action to them. To Botha who inquired what the SANNC would do if their deputation failed, Dube replied that "they would then report on their mission to the natives, and advise them that they found the King, like the Union government, had no interest in their welfare" [52]. The SANNC members tried

to get in touch with people from all walks of life. Saul Msane told the Eastern Transvaal Native Land Committee on 23 October 1917 that the National Congress committees were meeting the people everywhere even "the most primitive" [53]. Later H.S. Msimang also wrote that the SANNC "launched a countrywide campaign for resistance and fund raising" [54].

To the Union government, the SANNC could by no means claim to speak on behalf of the whole African population in South Africa. The Secretary for Native Affairs' reply to one of Dube's petitions read:

Your statement that as President of the South African Native National Congress you are making this petition on behalf of practically all the native tribes of South Africa is scarcely correct as the Government is well aware that there are large and important tribes and various sections of the natives of the Union which your Congress cannot truly claim to represent in this matter [55].

Some officials' statements tended to present the SANNC as only a Zulu body. To quote Haggard, for instance:

Dube, president of the SANNC, is on his way to England with a deputation before the King for the disavowal of the Natives' Land Act. This fact alone shows that the Zulus, rightly or wrongly, still look upon the Home Government as a final court of appeal [56].

The National Congress effectively included some important Zulu members such as J.L. Dube, J.T. Gumede, A. Mangena, Chief Stephen Mini, Saul Msane, the Reverend Abner S. Mtinkulu, H.S. Msimang and his brother Richard, and Seme [57]. However, by its composition, the National Congress constituted a Union-wide body. Indeed, it attracted leaders from the other provinces, too. From the Cape, there were, H.I. Bud M'Belle, O. Dalindyebo, T.M. Mapikela, G.D. Montsioa, <sup>H. R. Ngcayiya</sup> L.T. Mvabaza, M. Pelem and W.B. Rubusana [58]. The presence of these Cape members might explain the rather bizarre attitude of the National Congress toward Great Britain. Greatly attracted to the Cape relatively liberal policy before union, they failed to see that since 1910 they were under a responsible government. The National Congress also drew prominent politicians from the Orange Free State such as Plaatje, and W.Z. Fenyang [59]. Other outstanding representatives came from the Transvaal such as D.S. Letanka, S.M. Makgatho, and R.V.S. Thema [60].

However, the SANNC failed to rally some personalities such as J.T. Jabavu and

tribal authorities. Tied by his allegiance to J.W. Sauer who was sometimes referred to as a "White Kaffir", J.T. Jabavu supported the Natives' Land Act. Plaatje challenged him to discuss the issue in public, but he failed to answer. Four years later, Jabavu condemned the Act in Imvo, but it was too late [61].

Appointed by the government, the chiefs felt bound to approve of their policy. Interviewed several years later, H.S. Msimang vividly remembered how much the political quietism of the Chiefs in Sekukuniland and Lydenburg Districts angered Dube. Msimang declared:

I accompanied the Reverend J.L. Dube to Sekukuniland and Lydenburg District. While there we had an opportunity of attending a meeting of chiefs called by the Magistrate of the District to explain the Natives' Land Bill and to obtain their opinions. The chiefs had scarcely anything to say which sent Dube into a frenzy [62].

Dissensions between the educated elite on the one hand, as well as between the educated elite and tribal rulers, the lack of a clear and common policy hampered the SANNC struggle against government oppression. The Natives' Land Act remained in force creating new problems in urban centres. As H.S. Msimang pointed out, "Most of them went to the towns, and there created another situation -- slum areas developed all around the towns" [63].

In 1917, the SANNC had to fight against another segregationist measure: the Native Affairs Administration Bill.

## 2. The Native Affairs Administration Bill, 1917

Although Africans were still struggling against the hardships imposed upon them by the Natives' Land Act of 1913, they were again confronted with a measure prejudicial to their interests: the Native Affairs Administration Bill of 1917. The new Bill reaffirmed the principle of territorial segregation put forth by Lagden commission of 1903-1905, and implemented by the Natives' Land Act of 1913. Certain locations scheduled under the Natives' Land Act now fell in European areas. There were twenty-eight such locations in the Transvaal, nine in the Cape, and one in Natal. Africans were not allowed to remain in white areas unless they

paid licence fees which might be as high as £3 in the case of squatters, and which were fixed at 10s in the case of tenants. Once again, the new Bill put Africans before the alternative of either going back to the reserves, or occupying the position of full-time servants [64]. The new Bill also empowered the Governor General to legislate by proclamation, and created a permanent commission to help the government administer African areas [65].

Some Blacks, particularly in Natal, reacted against it at once. At an extraordinary meeting convened in February 1917, the SANNC spoke out against it. The new Bill represented the outcome of that "deplorable mistake": the Natives' Land Act of 1913. Once again, the government curtailed their right to purchase land, and undermined their bargaining power in the labour market. Their oppression resulted from the absence of African representatives in all government bodies. Dube asked the Native Affairs Department to grant them some "small share in the government of the land" [66]. W.B. Rubusana also pressed for the representation of African interests in "all council, commissions, and in the government of South Africa" [67].

Determined to get the Bill repealed, the SANNC met at Bloemfontein on 31 May 1917. Despite the failure of their deputation in England, they still persisted in considering the Union government legislation as a serious infringement of British constitutional principles of justice and freedom. The government had no "right to rob natives of their human rights and guarantees of liberty under the Pax Britannica", they protested [68].

Between 15 and 18 June 1917, J.T. Gumede, Stephen Mini, and Abner S. Mtinkulu -- all Zulu members of the SANNC -- put forward the same basic arguments against the Bill before the Select Committee on Native Affairs. According to Mini, the government applied the "principle of separation" against the spirit of the Proclamation of 1843 and 1848 as well as against the provisions of Letters patent of 27 April 1864. The 1843 Proclamation extended the protection of law to all the inhabitants of Natal regardless of race, colour, or creed. It stated that:

... there shall not be in the eye of the law any distinction or qualification whatever, founded on mere distinction of colour, origin, or language, or creed; but that the protection of the law, in letter and in substance, shall be extended impartially to all [69].

The 1848 Proclamation aimed at educating black people to enable them to follow government legislation. Letters Patent of 27 April 1864 set apart reserves for the Blacks in Natal, but allowed them to acquire land from European farmers. The Native Affairs Administration Bill took away that former right.

The Acting Chairman of the Committee disapproved of the SANNC leaders' complaints. The Union government did not infringe the law of 1843 because they applied the same restriction to the Whites, too. As he put it:

You cannot complain that we are infringing the law of 1843 because that law says what you do to the Native you do to the white man, and we do not interfere with that law [70].

However, Gumede denied his argument on the ground that Europeans agreed to those restrictions whereas the government did not bother to consult Africans. To quote him:

The white man makes that law, and the Native is not consulted. The white man is represented in Parliament and his Parliament can restrict him, but Parliament is also restricting me without consulting me, and taking away my freedom and liberty -- restricting me against my will [71].

The Reverend Mtinkulu also regarded the lack of African representation in government bodies as a source of their woes. He objected to the appointment of the Commission members by the government. African people themselves should be allowed to choose the commissioners, he suggested. As he explained:

This Commission being the only outlet by which the Native people can keep in touch with the Administration, and seeing that most of the Native people at *the* present time are not directly represented in Parliament, we consider that if the Commission were to be appointed by them, it would serve as some kind of relief. The men they appoint would be their mouthpieces, and would be able to redress any grievances [72].

The Natives Affairs Administration Bill never became law. Two hypotheses might be put forward to explain this rather perplexing withdrawal of the Bill. On the one hand, there was Africans' opposition, but it certainly did not weigh much against such a strong government. On the other hand, during the same year, the government desperately tried to recruit Africans for the various war fronts, and these exceptional circumstances maybe prompted the colonial authorities to adopt a



conciliatory attitude.

The National Congress leaders' reactions against both the Natives' Land Act of 1913 and the Native Affairs Administration Bill of 1917 revealed their awareness that the government land policy was used as a means to compel Africans to serve the Whites. They rightly traced their hardships to the absence of African representatives in government bodies. The repeal of the latter measure raised the spirit of the SANNC, and gave some hope to Europeans going on reformist lines. As a result, a stronger opposition on the part of black politicians against government legislation might be expected.

## II. Labour Problems

The purpose of this essay is to study African workers' conditions, their reactions and the SANNC leaders' attitude toward them.

### 1. African Workers' Conditions

Considered historically, the South African labour market always included three major sectors of employment: agriculture, mining, and domestic service. African workers were subject to extreme forms of racial oppression: the pass laws apparatus, job reservation, and low wages. The pass system contributed to supply European capitalists with a cheap labour force, and helped the government control African population. Because of its advantages, some administrators like J.G. Keyter sought to strengthen it. Keyter pressed for the generalization of the OFS pass laws. Of the four provinces, the Free State engineered the most sophisticated and the most cruel pass laws apparatus. Indeed, whatever their sex and status, Africans were compelled to carry inward and outward passes until 1903 when British authorities provided for a few exemptions [73]. But, dreading the reaction of Africans who already smarted under the system, the government finally dropped a Pass Law Amendment Bill introduced under Keyter's influence [74].

In addition to decreasing the mobility of African labourers, the pass system and its supporting institutions of compounds, courts, and prisons brought about serious consequences. Indeed, infractions of pass laws compelled African workers and lumpenproletarians to rub shoulders, and as Van Onselen rightly pointed out, "produced a labouring population characterized by its high degree of 'criminal'".

experience" [75].

Job reservation, or body of laws and regulations imposing an occupational colour bar, constituted another means of racial discrimination. Under this system, black labourers were condemned to inferior categories of work, whatever their skill. Thus, although white workers were in the same relationship to the means of production as their black counterparts, they nevertheless formed an "aristocracy of labour". They derived their privileged position from their belonging to the ruling race and from sharing its political power through their franchise rights. The Weekly Cape Times and Farmers' Record clearly conveyed the fact that the South African labour policy was subordinated to racial interests:

Native administrators in the past... have... preached consistently the doctrine that the white race in South Africa must remain a small privileged class, an aristocracy supervising vast hordes of native labour [76].

Non-Whites had been debarred from skilled work since the passage of the Mines and Work Act of 1911. The Status Quo agreement of July 1918 between the Chamber of Mines and the Mine Workers' Union extended the colour bar to certain semi-skilled occupations such as drill sharpening, waste-packing, pipe-laying, rough-timbering, drill-collecting, white-washing and similar other jobs. The main clause of the agreement read:

It is agreed between the Chamber of Mines and the Mine Workers' Union that the "status quo" as existing in each mine with regard to the relative scope of employment of Europeans and coloured employees should be maintained, that is to say, that no billets by European workmen should be given to coloured workmen and vice versa [77].

To protect white labourers' privileges, Africans were also denied admission to European trade schools, high schools and universities where they could get the necessary skills. European deeply-rooted privileges further contributed to maintain Africans in inferior positions. Although he spent thirty-one years at Lovedale, which was considered as the most progressive institution at that time, Dr A.W. Roberts thought that the African "has mental drawbacks and physical drawbacks" which hindered any competition with his white fellow [78].

Racial criteria also governed the distribution of wages. African workers received a remuneration at the level of or below subsistence [79]. The Low Grade

Mines Commission of 1919-20 pointed out that from 1914 to 1919, white miners' pay was at least 40% higher than African earnings. European miners also performed less hours than the Blacks [80]. African workers were sometimes even given a loafer's ticket which meant no pay [81]. Europeans put forward several reasons to justify this wage differential. They chiefly considered that Africans' standard of living was lower than Europeans'. They also argued that Africans were "target" workers who entered the cash economy only temporarily to acquire the necessary sum to buy certain items and return to the subsistence economy. They did not take into account the fact that the reserves were below subsistence, and that starvation led Africans to sell their labour power [82].

Yet, despite their low wages, Africans performed the hardest tasks. They usually worked underground, sometimes at the expense of their life for they could be buried by the falls of rock at any time. Because dust was not yet scientifically fought, African miners also caught tuberculosis, silicosis, phthisis, and many died [83].

Again, because they belonged to the dominant race, white miners were granted further privileges in the event of illness. European miners suffering from phthisis received compensations which, in some cases, made the spread of the disease easier. Indeed, the higher benefit of £400 paid to European patients in the secondary stage as compared with the £200 paid to those in the primary stage, encouraged some who had the disease only in a mild form to work on underground to get the highest possible compensation. To cope with the situation, the new Miners' Phthisis Act No 44 of 1916 provided that after 1 August 1918, there would be only one rate of compensation: a maximum of £375 for any man found suffering from the disease [84].

The system of compounds constituted another form of racial segregation. In their crowded barracks, they did not have enough space for an individual bed, and their close contact increased the spread of any infectious disease such as pneumonia, tuberculosis, or cerebro-spinal meningitis. The large aggregation of men also vitiated the air, and undermined their health. They further suffered from the lack of a proper diet, and of frequent cleaning. In the best quarters, destroying bugs and white-washing were done only about once a month. Drink and prostitution prodigally provided by their exploiters further impaired their health. In the four principal mining districts - Boksburg, Germiston, Johannesburg and Krugersdorp -- there were only five females to every one hundred

males. Cut off from their wives for several months, African workers became an easy prey of the low white prostitutes [85].

African miners' awful conditions gradually gave birth to their collective awareness. Infringing the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 which deprived them of the strike weapon, African miners stopped work in 1913. On 23 November of the same year, a serious riot involving about 5,000 Africans occurred at the Premier Mine. A body of fifty police arrived at the mine, and quelled the outbreak, killing three and wounding twenty-two others [86]. In June 1914, another African revolt which required the implementation of martial law took place at Jagersfontein compounds. Once again, the rebellion was smothered in blood: eleven Africans were killed, and many others were injured [87]. In 1915 and early 1916, there were strikes on three different mines, followed by a widespread and well organized boycott of mines stores in 1917 [88]. In April 1918, about 5,000 poorly-paid municipal sanitary workers in Johannesburg went on strike to get higher wages under the leadership of the SANNC [89].

African miners' conditions were always appalling. As a result they could not constitute the only cause of the new collective consciousness noticeable amongst them. New factors exerted a strong impact on black workers: there were the white trade unionists' example, European socialists' attempt to organize them, and African involvement in World War I. Africans witnessed a dispute which started on 21 May 1913 on the New Kleinfontein Mine, near Benoni, between the manager and five mechanics, and which culminated in the most serious strike in South Africa. The men pressed for an eight-hour day, but the mine representatives turned down their requests. The Transvaal Federation of Trade Unions' Strike Committee including some hot-blooded Scots such as James Thomas Bain, born in Dundee, Scotland, Archibald Crawford who in early 1902 joined the Scottish Corps of Yeomanry, David McKerrell born in Ayrshire, Scotland, William Livingstone born in Aberdeen, and Andrew Watson also born in Scotland, called white miners to come out, and take up arms to overawe the strike breakers [90]. African miners watched Europeans' strike, and some of them were directly involved. On 12 June 1913, Robert Burns Waterston, one of the ringleaders, addressed a crowd of Africans, and drew applause by dwelling on the advantages of less work and more pay. He also encouraged them to set up their own trade unions to struggle for an eight hours' day and a minimum wage. Another speaker informed Africans that revolutionary socialist literature had been translated into Basuto to wake them up. White

strikers also tried to enlist African miners in their fight. Inspector Betts said: "quite a number went to the native compounds, and tried to get hold of the boys to come over. They succeeded in some instances" [91].

By the end of July, European miners won their case. They secured substantial concessions. Mine owners declared themselves willing to acknowledge trade unions provided they complied with certain requirements: the constitution of the unions was to be approved by employers; their funds were not to be used for political purposes; they had to represent a large number of employees who should not be debarred from directly approaching their employers, if they so wished; European miners also obtained an eight-hour day as well as thirty additional minutes in getting to and from their working place. They were offered ten days' vacation on half pay after twelve months' continuous service underground, or after two years' continuous service on the surface [92].

White miners' successful strike altered Africans' behaviour toward their European employers. They became pluckier, and openly expressed their discontent. When asked about the grievance that led to disturbances in some compounds during the white miners' strike, H.O. Buckle, Magistrate of Johannesburg, declared:

I do not think it was any special grievance. It was a desire for more pay in some cases, and it was the fact that they believed that the white man had by force of arms obtained their demands, and they said to themselves: "why should we not do the same?" [93].

Transcending tribal barriers, African miners displayed a great solidarity, and presented a united front to the police. H.O. Buckle again noted:

The natives were absolutely united amongst themselves. All tribal divisions were thrust on one side, and they were perfectly prepared to fight the Police. The only thing that cowed them was the soldiers with fixed bayonets [94].

Trade unionists' successful strike made Africans understand the importance of organization. A Government Inspector deplored that "some natives are realizing that it is in their interests to form a combination, and they are engaged in bringing into existence what they called 'the Native Workers' Union'" [96]. According to the same Inspector, Africans came to think that only a trade union of their own would enable them to successfully hold out against their exploitation. One African told him:

Our people are now holding a big meeting in Tembuland, and are going to form a branch of the union there so as to ... unite all our people who will refuse to go to work except for better wages [96].

The black worker's consciousness continued to ripen. A year after the strike, Gladstone summed up the ideas simmering in his mind:

he is becoming more and more conscious of his own capacities and rights. He is considering why he should be excluded from trade unions or socialist ideas and practices. Is his living wage to be always an absolute bar to his own improvement and development? May he not sell his labour at its economic value? Why should he not refuse to work for the white boss? [97].

About the same period, members of the I.S.L. developed an interest in African workers, and tried to organize them. In October 1915, its General Secretary David Ivon Jones (1883-1924) stressed the necessity of granting Africans some rights to free white workers. As he put it:

An internationalism which does not concede the fullest rights which the native working class is capable of claiming will be a sham... If the league deal resolutely in consonance with socialist principles with the native question, it will succeed in shaking South African capitalism to its foundations. Then and not till then, shall we be able to talk about the South African proletariat in our international relations. Not till we free the native, can we hope to free the White [98].

At the first national conference of the ISL, on 9 January 1916 the other militant member Sydney Percival Bunting (1873-1936) moved a "petition of rights" requiring the end of African workers' exploitation. His petition read:

That this League affirm that the emancipation of the working class requires the abolition of all forms of Native indenture, compound and passport system, and the lifting of the Native worker to the political and industrial status of the White [99].

D.I. Jones, S.P. Bunting as well as other ISL members such as Dunbar and Gibson regularly met African labourers at a Mr Neppe's shop in Johannesburg in July 1917 to acquaint them with the socialist doctrine [100]. For the ISL class seemed more important than race. Europeans as well as African workers in South Africa were exploited, they explained, but passes constituted the most important difference between them. To be on a par with their white fellows, African labourers had first to organize themselves and struggle against pass laws. On the initiative of one

African adherent, the group also agreed to produce and to distribute pamphlets in Zulu and Sesutu to all Africans on the Rand. Such meetings allowed the emergence of an African socialist body, the Industrial Workers of Africa (IWA) on 27 September 1917 [101].

According to Johnstone, the activism of both the ISL and of its offshoot the IWA influenced the industrial unrest of African workers on the Rand from 1918 to 1920, and paved the way for the rise of the ICU. The ISL and IWA activities certainly made Africans feel the necessity of organizing themselves to fight against the colour bar, and improve their material conditions. However, the ISL contributed to slow down African national awareness. Indeed, they acted as a disruptive force by stirring up the IWA against the SANNC which they considered as a middle class body indifferent to African working class struggle against exploitation. On 16 August 1917, S.P. Bunting told the future IWA founding members that "the National Congress organize themselves so as not to have their lands and exemption certificates taken away from them. They don't want to get their race free from slavery" [102]. On 29 March 1921, D.I. Jones also referred to the SANNC as a "small coterie of educated natives... satisfied with agitation for civil equality and political rights" and unfavourably contrasted it with the IWA although this organization existed only on paper at that time [103]. In fact, the IWA was too small -- the number of its members ranged from twelve to fifty -- and too short-lived a body to exert a decisive impact on African masses. Pass laws, Africans' fear to be deceived by the white men and to be arrested by the police, the difficulty to communicate in English, financial problems contributed to check its career [104].

In the cities, Africans also worked as servants or "houseboys". They, too, were victims of racial oppression. They were subject to pass laws and to corporal punishments. They were poorly-paid, and sometimes had their wages withheld. Their private life was under the close scrutiny of their householders. In some working class homes, they had no room, but slept on the kitchen floor at night. Their employers further debarred them from their humanity by giving them the names of commodities or objects such as "Saucepan", "Shilling", "Brandy", "Sixpence", or "Matches".

African houseboys expressed their discontent in several ways. Some left their jobs, or poisoned the hated employer. Others found an outlet by joining Ethiopian movements launched by John Whitesun, a Marolong "Kitchen boy" and Cross Degomaile,

a Makwena herdsman. Others swelled the ranks of the Ninevites under the leadership of Jan Note, and resorted to crime rather than politics to sort out their problems [105].

## 2. The SANNC and African Working Class

How far were the SANNC leaders aware of African workers' burdens? Were they as cut off from African working class as European socialists argued? In fact, black politicians protested against the pass system which curtailed Africans' bargaining power in the labour market [106]. They pressed for higher wages. They opposed the myth of the so-called "black peril" which could be used to justify oppressive measures. By 1911, RVS Thema attacked the pass laws apparatus as "the source of many evils: the organizers of the Amalaita gangs and originators of the forging companies" [107]. According to S.T. Plaatje, Africans' difficult conditions in the Transvaal industrial districts were at the root of the "black peril" [108]. In his pamphlet The Mote and the Beam, he blamed the colour bar as the source of African criminal class [109]. Then, Plaatje fiercely attacked Lord Harcourt who justified the Natives' Land Act as a means of stopping black peril cases. Plaatje highlighted the absurdity of Lord Harcourt's argument. "Black peril" reports were more frequent in Johannesburg than on the farms, and the Natives' Land Act explicitly said it did not operate in urban centres. As a result, he wondered how the Natives' Land Act could be expected to put an end to the "black peril" where it did not operate? [110].

The SANNC leaders were sometimes closer to African workers than the ISL suggested. Some of them had a direct knowledge of their conditions. For several years, Saul Msane worked as a compound manager for the Jubilee and Salisbury gold mining company in Johannesburg. On 16 May 1899, he addressed an eight-hundred strong working class gathering to call for a total prohibition of liquor on the Rand [111]. H.S. Msimang, too, realized African miners' wretchedness when he served as an interpreter for a labour controller between 1907 and 1910. He later stated:

My first employment in Johannesburg was that of an interpreter under an Inspector of Native Labour. The function of this department was to enforce labour regulations applicable to the mines and to collect arrear poll tax from mine workers. Looking back over the years, I realize that it had afforded me a unique opportunity, for through it, I gained a knowledge of conditions under which our people worked in the mines [112].



Congress leaders' awareness of African labourers' difficulties materialized in the "bucket strike" launched in April 1918 by the Rand sanitary workers. Five Congress representatives were charged with incitement, and arrested. Amongst them, there were D.S. Letanka, H.S. Msimang, and L.T. Mvabaza [113].

Furthermore, black politicians belonged to the oppressed race, and they did not enjoy as many privileges as the ISL statements inferred. The SANNC were themselves subject to the colour bar. W.P. Schreiner who opposed Keyter's proposal for a general pass system commented on the inequity of compelling prominent educated men like J.L. Dube to carry one. Once, Dube was stopped on the Free State borders, he said, and was kept for twenty-four hours before being freed although he held a certificate of exemption the late governor of Natal granted him [114]. S.M. Makgatho had to jump into a second class compartment and to put up with the hardship of a trial before winning improvements in train facilities provided for Africans. To quote H.S. Msimang:

Makgatho took the bull by the horns, and jumped into a second class (compartment), and was arrested... This came to court, and Makgatho won it. It was through that action that we were able to travel second class on the railways. You had to travel third class whatever your standing, whatever your financial positions... The only way an African could travel by train was to go in the third class [115].

On the whole, then, the SANNC leaders were certainly closer to their people and more aware of their problems than the ISL fully privileged Whites.

### III. War Service

An important factor -- the involvement of Africans in World War I -- contributed to the growth of their political awareness. When the war broke out between Great Britain and Germany in August 1914, the SANNC set out at once to hang up some of their grievances against the Union government to prove their loyalty to the King in the hope that their help would enable them to bargain for political rights when hostilities ceased. Under the leadership of Dube, the SANNC Executive proceeded to Pretoria to offer their services. W.B. Rubusana also wrote to General Smuts, then Minister of Defence, <sup>offering</sup> to raise and accompany 5,000 able-bodied men to the German South West African front. The Union government turned down his suggestion straight away. They feared that an experience on the part of Africans in bearing arms would lead to a breakdown of the colour bar. Rubusana received the

following reply from the Secretary of Defence:

The government does not desire to avail itself of the services, in a combatant capacity, of citizens not of European descent in the present hostilities. Apart from other considerations, the present war is one which has its origins among the white people of Europe, and the government are anxious to avoid the employment of its native citizens in warfare against Whites [116].

Despite such guidelines, and against white popular opinion, the Union government despatched some 35,000 black labourers to take part in the German South West campaign in a non-combatant capacity [117]. A further 19,000 served in the East African campaign also as a labour force in transport, sanitation, and different other services [118]. However, service in Europe met a strong opposition when first announced in South Africa in late 1916. Even Cape liberals such as J.X. Merriman disapproved of the project because of the likely impact of European social conditions on Africans. Merriman wrote to Smuts in East Africa:

I wish the thousands of Zulus that are being sent to Europe could be diverted to you. It would be a much less dangerous, and possibly disastrous experiment than the other. But as it is, we must, I suppose, make the best of it. It is not only the professional mischief maker who views the experiment with disfavour, but some of the wisest and most solid friends who regard the introduction of our natives to the social conditions of Europe with the greatest alarm [119].

General Botha, nevertheless, by-passed the South African Parliament opposition to the scheme and ordered Africans' recruitment which started in September 1916. As Director of Native Labour, Colonel Pritchard discussed the question of recruiting with African leaders in January 1915. The National Congress members who felt their influence tacitly acknowledged favourably reacted. In its issue of 22 January 1915, Ilanga Lase Natal commented as follows:

He (Colonel Pritchard) was the one official of the government who was administering Native Affairs in the right direction -- namely, by consulting the Natives in matters in which they are interested and for not hesitating to take them into confidence... They as members of the Native Congress would not shrink from assisting the government [120].

In March 1917, General Botha sought the services of Plaatje who had just come back from Great Britain. He asked him, Plaatje specified, "to use his influence in obtaining recruits, and said this would help the native people better than any propaganda work in which he could engage" [121].

In June 1917, special recruiting meetings addressed by white and black personalities took place in various parts of the country. The predominant theme was loyalty to the King and country. Plaatje stressed the educational opportunities of service abroad. Some officials pointed out more practical advantages of joining up: better pay, food, and clothing [122]. In July, Botha distributed notices calling for further recruits to white and black clergymen. One of them had been given to the Reverend R.M. Tunzi from Kokstad. The appeal tried to instil a feeling of equality and solidarity into Africans by reminding them they were members of the British Empire just like English people and Europeans in South Africa. The King did not force them to join the army and to fight, but all loyal Blacks in South Africa should help their country. It also made them vie with other Africans. Algerians were fighting in France, it pointed out. Sudanese, Egyptians, and the West African King's Rifles were also supporting Great Britain. The Blacks in South Africa should join them, it concluded [123].

Notions of loyalty, education, and self-improvement attracted educated Africans. On the whole, however, the recruiting campaign failed. By mid-July, Botha decided to bribe the chiefs to recruit African labourers. By the end of July 1917, the government sought to send prisoners from South African gaols to France.

There were several reasons for the lack of response. Dreading acute shortages of labour and higher wages, mining companies and white farmers discouraged the recruiting campaign. Still smarting under the effects of the Natives' Land Act, and fearing that more land would be seized in their absence, Africans distrusted the local Native Commissioners and Magistrates despatched to enlist them. On 22 August 1917, Ilanga Lase Natal explained the poor response as follows:

We are not much surprised at this, knowing as we do the feeling of our people at the present time towards the powers that be. Recent legislation does not deceive even the most unsophisticated amongst us as to our ultimate destination as the result of the Natives' Land Act, and worse still the so-called Native Administration Bill [124].

The sinking of the ship Mendi, the high death rate affecting South African labourers in East Africa, and maybe bad news from the South African Native Labour Contingent (SANLC) in France further hampered the recruiting campaign. On 27 November 1916, the steamer ss Mendi left Lagos for Calabar where she picked up the third Nigerian regiment. After disembarking the West African frontier force

companies at Dar-Es-Salaam, the Mendi sailed to the Cape where she took on board a large contingent of Africans for the Western front [125].

On 21 February 1917, the Mendi collided with the ss. Darro, a ship more than twice her size, while crossing the English channel all lights out to Le Havre and sank, 615 Africans died [126].

In 1917, too, news from the East African front alarmed several black families in South Africa. On 24 April, 1188 deaths had already occurred. 130 sick Africans perished on board His Majesty's ship Aragon, and 35 others followed within five days after landing in Durban. The high mortality rate urged the government to appoint Major H.S. Cooke, then Assistant of Native Labour, to carry out an investigation. It was found out that Africans were serving in unhealthy places such as Dar-Es-Salaam, Dodoma, Kilwa, Korogoro Makere where malaria and dysentery were rife, especially during the rainy seasons [127].

In France, Black South Africans became the special target of Germans. Indeed, despite the Union government's specific orders to segregate them in compounds far from the fighting zone, the two first battalions of the SANLC found themselves, in fact, close to the front lines. Germans' awareness that the Union government instructions were infringed provided an additional incentive to attack the SANLC units. In 1917, German aircraft shelled one of the camps near Dieppe, and dropped propaganda leaflets especially addressed to Africans: "In this war, I hate black people the most. I do not know what they want in this European war. Where I find them, I will smash them" [128]. The bitter cold of the winter of 1916-1917 increased the plight of black South Africans, and many of them lost limbs as a result of frostbite.

Service overseas had an immediate impact on the SANLC units. Some began to question their conditions in South Africa. For instance, one of the camps in Dieppe received the visit of French dignitaries, including some members of the French Parliament. A black man -- probably Blaise Diagne, a deputy from Senegal who served as a recruiting commissioner in 1917-18 -- was a member of the deputation. Africans thought he was merely accompanying his white masters. However, when he was introduced as holding a high position in the government, they expressed their astonishment. Similar things they saw or heard exerted a lasting influence on them, and many later found it difficult to readjust to the hard

realities of South African life [129].

Others acquired some education which allowed them to take part in African political and trade union activities. One of them was S.M. Bennett Ncwana, a cobbler from Port Elizabeth who became prominent from 1919 onwards. "When he returned", Selby Msimang related several years later, "he impressed us by the standard of education he had acquired" [130]. As a member of the All African Convention (AAC) held in Bloemfontein between 16 and 18 December 1935, Ncwana called into question the policy of segregation against urban Africans in the northern provinces, and pressed for some modicum of representation in the government's councils [131].

Africans such as the Reverend Tunzi who gave a hand in the recruiting campaign and expected some civil rights in return, sensed a certain frustration and became later more assertive: At the AAC, "the Reverend R.M. Tunzi... said that the Natives should not have to go on bended knees for what they were entitled. They should have equal rights in this country" [132].

The SANLC's contribution to the war effort had a wider effect. On 16 December 1918, the SANNC held a special meeting at Johannesburg, and drew up a Memorial to the King, reminding him of the various ways they expressed their loyalty and devotion, and asking him to grant them some rights. They offered 5,000 men to go and fight in German South West African, but they were refused to do so on the ground that the war was waged between white people only. However, thousands of men served as drivers, and helped in the railway construction for military purposes in that territory. Other Africans took part in the East African campaign, suffered from hardships and privations, and many of them died with malarial fever. 25,000 performed manual work in French docks and behind the trenches in Flanders. Hundreds of Africans died on the Mendi. At home they also rendered many valuable services. They provided labour for gold mines on the Rand, coal mines, and other industries necessary for war purposes with a steady supply of labour. They also gave contributions in money and in kind to various war funds. Although oppressed, they remained quiet during that dangerous period of unrest. The authorities in the Union and in Great Britain acknowledged all these contributions. After the Mendi disaster, Botha described the remarkable generosity of Africans to Parliament. He said:

Nearly all my life long I have had to deal with Native questions, but I have never experienced a time, when the Natives have displayed greater tact and greater loyalty than they have done in the difficult and dark days through which we are now going. It has never happened in the history of South Africa that in one moment, by one full swoop, such a lot of people perished and I think that where people have died as they have done, it is our duty to remember that they have come forward on their own accord, of their own free will, and they have said: "If we can help, we'll do so, even if we have to show our loyalty with our hands" [133].

The King himself appreciated the importance of Africans' help. On 10 July 1917, he addressed representatives of the SANLC at Abbeville in France as follows:

This work of yours... is second only in importance to that performed by the sailors and soldiers who are bearing the brunt of the battle. But you also form part of my great Armies which are fighting for the liberty and freedom of my subjects of all races and creed throughout my Empire. Without munitions of war, my Armies cannot fight; without food, they cannot live. You are helping to send these things to them each day, and in doing so, you are hurling your spears at the enemy, and hastening the destruction that awaits him [134].

On 8 December 1918, Lord Buxton then Governor General of the Union, also paid a tribute to Africans for their cooperation. He declared to tribal representatives then gathered for the Peace Thanksgiving at Johannesburg:

My... duty... is to thank you on behalf of His Majesty the King for the assistance and loyalty which you and the natives you represent throughout South Africa have shown to him and to the Empire during four years of strain and stress. To thank you also for the help that you have in various ways given to him against his enemies... The war has proved to you that your loyalty was well placed; and I can assure you it will not be forgotten [135].

The SANNC leaders finally appealed to the protection of the King and asked him to apply Wilson's principle of self-determination to them. They reminded the King that Great Britain, and her allies went into war "to grant every nation, great and small, the right to determine its sovereignty, and the free choice of its government and flag". They also brought to his notice that the Blacks in South Africa were living under an oppressive regime careless of all British constitutional ideals. Africans had no voice in the management of their affairs save in the Cape Province; their land-ownership rights were constantly curtailed; they had no say in the labour market; their freedom was restricted under the pass system. All these encroachments upon their inherent rights aroused "serious alarm and mistrust" [136].

By the 1950s' the sinking of the ship Mendi became a powerful symbol in nationalist propaganda. The men on the Mendi sacrificed their lives for a better future, E.C. Mango stated. In his poem entitled "the Mendi", he delivered their message as follows:

When you reach our homes  
Tell them all about us and say  
We all died today so that  
They might be well tomorrow [137].

Others stressed the great solidarity that united several tribes. J.S. Matsebula wrote the following poem under the title "The Mendi Sinking":

Be all quiet and cool  
People of our land  
What's now happening here  
Is what we came here for  
You are dying  
Swazis, Suthos, Pondos, all  
We are all sons of Africa [138].

John Albert Luthuli, President General of the National Congress from 1952 until his death in 1967, also referred to the Mendi to explain Africans' coolness when World War II broke out. Africans felt it was not worth making sacrifices for the Whites would soon forget about them. To quote him:

In South Africa as distinct from the Protectorates, Africans were unenthusiastic about the war. It did not have the attraction of World War I. We had answered the call of the Whites then, and thereafter, our position had steadily deteriorated. The disaster in which a large number of Africans were drowned, when the troopship Mendi went down, was speedily forgotten by South African Whites who tend to take our loyalty for granted [139].

To sum up, one might assert that the Natives' Land Act constituted the most important measure passed by the Union government before 1918. The Natives' Land Act affected African peasants in the Northern provinces, and made their socio-economic situation worse. They could no longer purchase or hire land in European-owned areas. Nor could they hope to stay in the reserves which were already congested and hardly-hit by drought and soil erosion. The Natives' Land Act aimed, therefore, at condemning Africans to forced labour in urban areas.

In urban centres, Africans usually worked as miners or servants. Both

categories belonged to an exploited class. Victims of the pass laws apparatus, they could not choose their employers and bargain for better wages. However, working conditions in the mines were certainly more appalling than those in European residences. Herded in prison-like compounds, African miners became the easy prey of diseases. Cut off from their families for several months, they generally yielded to the temptation of liquor and of prostitution lavishly provided by their employers to further exploit them.

The SANNC leaders saw that the ultimate goal of the government was to compel Africans to serve the Whites, and they were also aware of their countrymen's ordeal. They set out to represent their people and to resort to constitutional means to redress their grievances. The National Congress branches and rallies all over the country allowed them to keep in touch with African masses to whom they explained the nature and the scope of government legislation. They considered themselves as British subjects, and opposed the Union government segregationist laws on the ground that they infringed British constitutional principles of freedom and justice.

The SANNC representatives pressed for a right of partnership in the management of their country. However, the Union government displayed a scornful attitude toward them, and looked upon African organizations as private societies of rabble-rousers expressing their own views, and not voicing <sup>their</sup> people's grievances.

The Union government divided the educated elite on the one hand, and very early cut off the new black intelligentsia from tribal authorities on the other hand. However, Black people in South Africa were unlikely to accept the government ruthless rule. Long before European arrival, the bulk of African masses used to have a say in the generally democratic institutions of their tribes. Trade unionism, socialist organization, and the World War I, spurred on their ideas of solidarity, equality, and freedom.



## CHAPTER XIII

## PROBLEMS AND PROTESTS, 1918 - 1930s

After World War I, the Union government built an impressive corpus of legislative measures which enforced the existing racial discrimination. The Apprenticeship Act of 1922 and the 1926 Colour Bar Act denied Africans the right to perform skilled work. Under the 1923 Native Urban Areas Act and the 1925 Native Taxation and Development Act, Africans continued to suffer from the pass system which condemned them to accept low wages, checked their movements, and exposed them to constant humiliation. The 1913 Natives' Land Amendment Bill of 1927 reduced African labourers on white farms to the status of servants. The 1932 Native Service Contract Act further intensified the distress of black rural workers in the Transvaal and Natal by subjecting them to corporal punishments.

The Union government simultaneously enacted several segregationist measures designed to muzzle Africans' discontent. The 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act prevented them from expressing their grievances to their employers. The 1927 Native Administration Act and the 1930 Riotous Assemblies Amendment Act made African agitation a criminal offence liable to fines, imprisonment, or deportation.

The 1920 Native Affairs Act and the legislation promoted by Hertzog in 1927 and 1935 supplemented economic oppression with racial discrimination at the political centre. The 1920 Native Affairs Act aimed to compel African leaders to concentrate their attention and efforts on local situations rather than on national problems, or to use Mills's terminology, to deal with "troubles" instead of "public issues". Under Hertzog's premiership, the northern principle gradually superseded the Cape liberal franchise already crippled in 1910.

After the gre~~at~~ hopes raised by the First World War, Africans experienced a series of frustrations exacerbated by the rising cost of living, natural catastrophes, and the hostility of the poor Afrikaners who, owing to a series of economic setbacks, fled from the platteland, and used colour to acquire privileges and to protect them.

The leaders of the SANNC, and those of the Transvaal branch in particular, struck to secure higher wages and the repeal of the pass laws. Although they struggled for a place within a multi-racial society and upheld constitutional methods, government pressure curbed their activities. The emergence of alternative bodies - the ICU in 1919, the Native Conferences in 1920, the Joint Councils of Europeans and Natives and the CPSA in 1921, the All-African Convention (AAC) in December 1935 - pushed the SANNC into the background of African political scene. Personal antagonisms and other weaknesses further condemned Congress to ineffectiveness.

### I. Government legislation

To protect the poor Whites from African competition in the labour market, the government issued a whole armoury of legal weapons. The Apprenticeship Act of 1922 aimed at preventing Africans from performing skilled work by requiring standard VI as a minimum educational qualification [1].

To further strengthen the master-servant relationship between Whites and Blacks, the Union government passed the Native Urban Areas Act in 1923. This measure allowed Africans in the towns only if they served the Whites. Section 12 compelled non-Whites entering urban centres to report their arrival within a prescribed period, to get a document certifying they had so reported and to produce such a document on demand to an officer. Under the terms of the same clause, Africans were required to find a job within a given period after their arrival, or after the end of a former contract. Those who failed to secure employment were forced to leave the towns within a specified time. Section 16 empowered the local authorities to check African inhabitants' occupations. Section 17 provided for penalties against unemployed Blacks in urban centres. They could be brought before a magistrate to give an account of their means of livelihood. If they failed to do so, they were removed or fell under section 50 of the Prisons and Reformatories Act of 1911. In the latter case, they were condemned to forced labour for up to two years [2].

The Colour Bar Act of May 1926 excluded Africans from a variety of well-paid jobs, whatever their skill. They were denied the positions of mine managers, overseers, surveyors, engineers, blasters, and boiler attendants. To compel black workers to accept their dreadful conditions, Parliament again resorted to

coercion. Indeed, the Colour Bar Act strengthened the Masters and Servants Act which provided that breaches of contract or refusal to obey orders were criminal offences [3].

Africans in the reserves or on white farms also smarted under the same racial oppression. The Native Taxation and Development Act No. 41 of 1925 imposed a financial burden on Africans whose earnings were already too small, and forced them to carry additional passes. Sections 2 and 19 compelled every eighteen year-old African male to pay a one-pound general tax in addition to a one shilling hut tax. Under the terms of section 4, Africans who paid an income tax of one pound or more were exempted from the general tax and received "certificates of exemption" which were to be renewed every year. Section 7 allowed the police, chiefs and headmen recognized by the government to require the production of tax receipts or certificates of exemption for inspection. Under the provisions of the same section, Africans who failed to produce one of the documents were liable to be arrested [4]. Taxation of Africans had been devised regardless of their earnings which varied only from ten shillings to one pound a month. In contrast to this, the incidence of income-tax on Europeans was so light that their first £400 were tax-free. A married man with three to four children enjoyed more privileges. He could earn £600 a year and remain free from income tax [5].

To reduce African labourers to the position of servants, the government passed the 1913 Natives' Land Act, Amendment Bill in 1927. According to section 16, the government could prevent Africans from living outside reserved areas unless they owned land or worked for the Whites as squatters, labour tenants, or servants. Squatters were defined as Africans occupying land in return for a payment of rent, either in the form of crop or of cash. Labour tenants were bound to offer their services to their employers for at least one hundred and eighty days out of a year. Under the provisions of section 18, they were liable to penal sanctions if they failed to perform their one hundred and eighty days of labour. Servants were Africans permanently employed by European land-owners [6].

To further exploit Africans, the Union government passed another oppressive measure in 1932: the Native Service Contract Act. This Act compelled European farmers in the Transvaal and Natal to turn African squatters into wage-labour tenants, or to send them to African areas. It allowed the White master to assault or whip his labourers who often had to accept their fate. Indeed, the

deterioration of the reserves and the Native Urban Areas Act prevented them from choosing another alternative [7].

In 1935, the government passed a Native Trust and Land Bill which again aimed at forcing Africans to serve white farming and mining capitalists at the lowest possible rate.

Chapter IV of the Native Trust and Land Bill governed African labourers' conditions of residence on white farms. To get rid of the "black spots" on European land, section 25 forbade unregistered owners, squatters, labour tenants, or servants to stay on such land. Africans who infringed the former provision could be summarily removed by the police from the land they unlawfully occupied.

On the European farmer, a few provisions imposed administrative duties and financial burdens likely to urge him to get rid of some of his labourers, or to mercilessly exploit them to recover his expenses. Section 31 compelled him to register any squatter on his land within three months after the beginning of the Act. If he failed to comply with this provision, the squatter could no longer be legally considered as such. Under the terms of clause 32, the European farmer was also bound to pay increasingly high yearly licences for his squatters. He had to give ten shillings for the first and the second years, one pound for the third and fourth years, two pounds for the fifth and sixth years, three pounds for the seventh to the ninth year, five pounds for the tenth and every subsequent year. After the expiration of thirty years, the white land-owner could no longer get a licence from the native commissioner.

These provisions aiming at forcing Africans to serve white farming and mining capitalists at the lowest possible rate were quite commonplace in South African land legislation. However, the Native Trust and Land Bill introduced a new interesting feature. Under the terms of section 33, the European land-owner could, with the native commissioner's assent, allow any recognized chief, headman, clergyman or teacher to remain on his land without obligation for these persons to pay a registration or other fee [8]. This clause undoubtedly constituted a master-stroke on the part of the European legislator. It was a direct challenge to African leadership. Would African representatives who most of them fell into these categories transcend their personal interests in favour of the national cause, or would they be lured by material advantages and adopt a short-sighted policy?

Although they performed the same function in the process of production as European workers and suffered greater hardships than the latter, Africans were debarred from the right to protest against their economic conditions. In 1924, the Union government issued the Industrial Conciliation Act, another segregationist measure aiming at making the exploitation of African labourers easier. This Act set up industrial and conciliation boards allowing only European and coloured employees to air their grievances and to settle disputes between them and their employers. Industrial councils were established in industries where employers and employees were organized; conciliation boards were created in industries where European management and labour were not organized. Section 24 excluded Africans from the scope of both bodies. As a result, the Industrial Conciliation Act protected Europeans and Coloured, but left African workers at the mercy of their employers [9].

Another measure, the Native Administration Act of 1927 also aimed at smothering African grievances. Sub-section (I) of clause 29 commonly referred to as "the hostility clause" read:

Any person who utters anything or does any other act or thing whatever with intent to promote any feeling of hostility between Natives and Europeans shall be guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or to a fine of £100 or both [10].

In 1930, the government passed the Riotous Assemblies Amendment Act No. 19 again to crush any attempt of rebellion. This new measure gave the Minister wider power than the existing laws aiming at checking the so-called "agitators", or in other words, people who contributed to make Africans aware of the colour bar, and who urged them to protest against it. Under the terms of this Act, the Minister was allowed to prohibit public meetings if he thought they were likely to undermine the relationship between Whites and Blacks. He might prevent any person who, in his opinion, could rouse trouble from attending meetings, expel him from any area, or deport him if he was born outside South Africa. He might also prohibit the publication and distribution of reading matter likely to antagonize the two communities. This measure applied to Europeans and to Africans in principle. In practice, however, it aimed at preventing Africans from protesting against European laws [11].

To control African leaders who became particularly outspoken after World War I, the South African government also issued a series of apparent political reforms. These were Smuts's Native Affairs Act of 1920, Hertzog's Bills of 1927 and 1935. The Native Affairs Bill was carried by 97 votes against 16. It received the assent of the governor general on 20 July 1920 and was promulgated in a Gazette Extraordinary at Cape Town on 5 August of the same year. According to European commentators, this measure sought to achieve a two-fold goal. On the one hand, it would give Africans a say in the local government of their affairs in their own areas. On the other hand, it would allow official authorities to get acquainted with their opinions and their feelings in regard to administration or legislative measures likely to affect them [12].

To attain these objectives, the Act provided for the creation of several bodies: a permanent native affairs commission, local and general councils and native conferences. Section I of the Act empowered the governor general to set up a permanent native affairs commission. This body included the Minister of Native Affairs as well as three to five other members from either House of Parliament. The Minister of Native Affairs presided over the commission. In his absence, a deputy chairman selected by him performed his duties.

According to sections 2 and 3 (I), the permanent Native Affairs commission dealt with legislation in so far as it might affect Africans, and with the administration of their affairs. The commission was bound to submit its recommendations to the Minister of Native Affairs. If the Minister and the Commission disagreed, the latter was allowed to lay a memorandum of its views on such matters before the governor general. If the governor general turned down the proposals of the commission, this body could require that all papers on the subject be submitted to both Houses of Parliament.

Section 5 empowered the governor general to establish local councils on the lines of Rhodes's Glen Grey Act in the tribal areas Parliament set aside. These councils included nine African members and an official chairman - usually a magistrate - who were to act in an advisory capacity. The presiding magistrate had a veto, especially with regard to finance.

Sections 6 and 9 specified the functions of the local councils. They were to perform various tasks related to agriculture, education, and sanitation. To carry

out their purposes, they might acquire land and levy a yearly tax not exceeding one pound upon each adult male.

Upon the recommendations of the commission, the governor general might set up general councils. Section 16 empowered him to convene "native conferences" which might include members of the local councils, and African delegates from any association or union representing African economic and political interests. Officers appointed by the Minister of Native Affairs were to take part in their deliberations [13].

In his Smithfield Speech of 25 November 1925 and at Malmesbury in May 1926, the Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs - General Hertzog - proposed to take away the Cape African franchise, and to substitute European representatives to speak on behalf of Africans in Parliament. In July 1926, Hertzog's government published the texts of four independent bills: the Representation of Natives in Parliament Bill, the Union Native Council Bill, the Coloured Persons Right bill, the Natives' Land Act 1913, Amendment Bill. In March 1927, these bills were formally submitted to Parliament. The three first measures dealt with African political rights. The Native Representation in Parliament Bill aimed at taking away the Cape African franchise, and provided for the election of seven European members in the House of Assembly to represent Africans.

Two such representatives would come from the Cape, the Transvaal, Natal, and one from the Free State. Unlike the Parliament members elected by Europeans, the representatives of Africans in the House of Assembly would be debarred from two main privileges: they could not vote on a question of confidence in the government; neither could they vote for an increase in their numbers [14].

In his Smithfield speech, too, General Hertzog referred to the Union Native Council Bill. He claimed that under its provisions, Africans would enjoy a large autonomy. According to him, the council:

...will provide scope for the talented native who is today compelled to go to the white man for anything necessary for the improvement of the natives, including their representation in Parliament. The opportunity will be vouchsafed him of representing his own people in his own country without mixing with the white man, except where white leadership is essential. Where a white leadership is no longer essential, it will not be forced down the throat of the native [15].

In fact, under the Union Native Council Bill, Africans were to feel the white man's control everywhere, and in every sphere of their activities. The Union Native Council Bill provided for the setting up of an annual "native council", presided over by the Secretary of Native Affairs and including fifty additional members. Thirty-five members were to be elected, ten each by the Cape, Natal, the Transvaal, and five by the Free State. The fifteen remaining members were to be appointed. There would be five from the Cape, four each from Natal, the Transvaal, and two from the Free State. These members were to serve for a three-year term, and one third of them ~~was~~ to retire annually. Representatives of Africans living in tribal areas were to be selected by chiefs and headmen who were themselves government nominees. The representatives of Africans dwelling in urban centres were to be government appointed. In the final analysis, then, all the Council members were government appointees.

This council was to dispose of limited powers. It could discuss the socio-economic conditions of African people, and any proposed legislation dealing with them. However, the council could not discuss political issues, a provision with which it was difficult - if not impossible - to comply [16].

The third measure, the Coloured Persons Rights Bill, also aimed at affecting Africans' political rights. Indeed, to bring their scheme into being, Hertzog's government sought an alliance with the Coloured community against African population. With the Coloured people's support, European rulers believed that the repeal of the Cape African franchise would be easier.

This Bill entitled the Coloured Community to send a European representative in Parliament for each province, save in the Cape where they already voted on the same basis as Europeans. Coloured electors were compelled to meet educational as well as property requirements, and to have a European standard of life. They were to enjoy franchise rights only for a period of seven years. When this period elapsed, the government might put the Coloured electors on the ordinary voters' lists.

The new bill introduced a very sophisticated system of differentiation between "Coloured" and "Natives". Persons born before the Act and whose father or mother was a European or a member of the Cape Coloured race were considered as Coloured and were consequently granted political rights. Persons whose father and mother were members of an African tribe were regarded as "natives".



A board including a Supreme Court judge as chairman and two assistants was entrusted with the task of differentiating between the two categories. The Board was to draw lists specifying the names, residences, and professions of all male and female "coloured" persons who had reached the majority. Then, it would submit these lists to the Minister of the Interior who after supervision would publish them: the people whose names appeared on the lists were declared Coloured, and thereby, given franchise privileges [17].

In 1935, the African franchise issue came up again. This time, Hertzog's Representation of Natives in Parliament Bill reached the bull's eye: the disenfranchisement of the Cape African voters. This Bill was published in the Union Gazette Extraordinary on 31 December 1935. Section 2 of the Bill defined four electoral areas: the Province of Natal, the provinces of the Transvaal and the Free State, the Transkeian Territories,<sup>and</sup> the province of the Cape excluding the Transkeian Territories. The same clause empowered the governor general to increase the number of electoral areas up to six. Section four provided for an electoral college composed of chiefs, local councils and advisory boards in each electoral area. Clause five allowed each electoral college to return one senator. In accordance with section six, the senators thus elected were to hold their seats for a period of seven years. Section 13 provided for a Native Representation Council (NRC) which was to consist of twenty-two members: six of them were to be official members, four nominated members, and twelve elected members. The six official members included the Secretary of Native Affairs, or in his absence, a substitute appointed by the Minister as well as five chief native commissioners again selected by the Minister. The four nominated members were appointed by the governor general for each province. The elected members were returned as follows: the electoral college for the Transkeian Territories would return three members; the electoral college of the three remaining electoral areas would choose two members. In this case, the electoral colleges were to function without the native advisory boards. The native advisory boards themselves were to select three additional candidates. According to section four of the Bill, the nominated and elected members of the NRC were to hold their seats for a period of five years. Their powers were merely advisory. Indeed, according to section 20, the NRC consisted only in reporting on government legislation [18].

Thus, on the ground of colour, Africans were denied economic and political privileges. As the mouthpiece of the black people, the SANNC voiced their grievances, but seemed unable to achieve much.

## II. The SANNC's reactions

The European miners' strike of 21 May 1913 and the substantial concessions they secured as a result of their action impressed African workers, but they reacted against the forced labour system only from 1918 onwards. As a result, one might deduce that the SANNC wartime experience exerted a strong impact on them, stimulated their militancy, and urged them to protest against racial discrimination.

On 19 June 1918, the Transvaal branch of the SANNC called a mass meeting of nearly 1,000 Africans from all over the Rand. All Africans thus gathered agreed to press for a one-shilling increase daily for every worker on the Rand from July onwards. They also set out to start a general strike if their employers failed to meet their claim. They felt entitled to use the same means as European workers. A Congress leader reminded them that "the white workers do not write to the governor general when they want more pay. They strike and get what they should. Why should we not do the same"? [19].

Congress leaders forwarded their request to employers. African labourers' earnings were constantly decreasing owing to the rise in the cost of living, Congress complained. They also pointed out that Africans constituted the only segregated class because they had no channel to voice their grievances. They urged European managers to consider African workers' problems. As they put it:

Other sections of the working class community, being articulate and more influential have, in many cases, secured increase of pay to meet the increased cost of living... it was felt that the time had arrived for the native workers to press for consideration of their case [20].

The Transvaal Congress convened other mass meetings characterized by increasing militancy in both their speeches and their behaviour. On 29 June 1918, a Congress representative urged his audience consisting of nearly one thousand Africans to realize that the white dominant class had been exploiting them for ages and would certainly carry on doing so if they did not react. He said:

God gave you Africa to live in. He gave you anything he knew was necessary for you. He gave you a land, and gold which you gave away to other people. After you gave them the country, they treated you worse than dogs. Today you are carrying passes. Today you have got no place in heaven. There is one

thing my friends, it is this, if you have no place on earth you have no place in heaven [21].

The next day, a crowd of about 10,000 Africans tore a Union Jack. The signal triggered off a general confusion. The throng stopped trams and threw stones at them. However, Congress decided to call off the threatened strike when General Botha expressed his willingness to discuss African grievances. In July, he met a deputation. Then the government appointed a commission to determine the cause of Africans' unrest on the Rand, and told black politicians to address their complaints to J.B. Moffat, Chief Magistrate of the Transkei and principal commissioner. Africans who probably viewed the commission as a device to postpone the solution of their problems went on strike in the same month. On one mine, they stopped work, and many of them were arrested. On another mine, 1,500 African labourers marched out of their compounds, and claimed higher wages. But the Moffat commission which reported in September 1918 asserted that the rise in the cost of living was not seriously affecting African workers. It consequently did not recommend an increase in wages, nor did it press for a removal of passes [22].

In March 1919, in Johannesburg, the resentment of Africans against the pass system as an obstacle to higher pay reached a climax. The SANNC leaders - mainly I.H. Bud M'beke, J.W. Dunjwa, D.S. Letanka, C.S. Mapaso, and L.T. Mvabaza who were later arrested - decided to mobilize the discontented Africans. The colour bar was again the root of African labourers' wrath. H.S. Msimang declared:

wages among African people were static. They remained as they were before the war; We felt that the reason that the wages were low was the result of pass laws... The Master and Servants Act made it difficult... to get an improvement in... wages. So our people fought on these grounds [23].

On 31 March and on the following days, the SANNC convened several meetings of protests. On the first day, shortly after 8 o' clock, several thousand Africans marched to the Pass Office, and requested the government official, a Mr Laurence, to receive a deputation. Ten of the ring leaders of the movement then submitted their case. They objected to carrying a pass, they said, for it hampered any effort to better their situation. However, Mr Laurence warned them they were breaking the law by collecting passes. The delegates then departed, and the crowd held a mass meeting right behind the pass office. They all agreed that they were not fairly treated. One speaker declared:

Our voice is not heard, and will never be heard so long as the present conditions exist. We count for nothing in Parliament, although we are the majority of the population of the country. We are increasing every day, and we have a right to be heard [24].

The organizers went on to explain the tactics they were to adopt: strike and decline to carry passes. Hundreds of supporters applauded and gave them their passes. When the speeches were over, "Rule Britannia" was sung, and warm cheers were given for the King, the governor general, and President Wilson. Like their white countrymen, they claimed their rights, and were prepared to fight to get them. When interviewed, a leader asserted:

The white man fights for his rights and when he does not get them, he goes on strike. You see that today with the builders and the men at the Power Station and you do not put them in gaol. But if we want to fight for our rights the police locks us up. If a white man can fight for his rights, why can't we? That is all we are doing now. We do not want to make any trouble, but we want our rights [25].

In the afternoon, African pickets collected not less than two thousand passes. A Johannesburg paper, the Star, commented: "The pickets are meeting but little opposition, so that it may be inferred that the majority of the natives approached are in sympathy with the movement" [26]. The police tried to break up the pickets, and apprehended many of them. Amongst those arrested, there were several women. In the Transvaal, however, women were not required to carry passes, and their involvement in the movement was sympathetic [27].

The trial of the strikers led to a demonstration outside the Court House in Johannesburg. The first batch to come up before the magistrate included two women and one male. The magistrate, a Mr Bovill, had to wait some fifteen minutes before he could deal with the case owing to the noise outside the Court House. When the accused were sentenced, they took up a defiant attitude, and their remarks created a great din amongst the throng. The magistrate then castigated the mob, and warned them that if they did not behave properly, they would be fined £25 or would be jailed for three months for contempt of the court. Armed with staves, the mounted police broke up the crowd [28].

On 1 April 1914, I.H. Bud M'belle, the SANNC general secretary, J.W. Dunjwa, the Transvaal secretary, and P.J. Motsoake, a Baralong from the Free State, explained that they did not aim at challenging the government in any way, and owed absolute

allegiance to the King and to the British Constitution. However, they protested against the colour bar and its important component, the pass system, which denied them their rights of citizenship, and belittled them. They expressed their determination to oppose the pass laws which were "nothing more and nothing less than a system of slavery", and urged all African labouring in stores, houses, or on the mines to stop work [29].

In his presidential address of 6 May 1919 in the Cape, S.M. Makgatho condemned the government segregationist policy. He pointed out that there was one law for the Whites and another for the Blacks. When well-paid Europeans receiving as much as one pound daily or more struck for higher pay, they got it. However, when Africans stopped work for two shillings six pence, they were fined and jailed and shot. Africans were more vulnerable, he explained, because their strike was considered as a criminal offence. In July 1918, he added, the SANNC Johannesburg branch passed a resolution requiring the abolition of passes. In March 1919, the Johannesburg branch followed by the Benoni branch and other Witwatersrand branches threw away their passes to secure the government attention to their grievances. But the government refused to repeal the pass laws on the ground that they served to deter crimes. Makgatho stressed the absurdity of this allegation. Before 1893, there were no passes in Johannesburg, and there were fewer crimes, but with the multiplication of passes, Johannesburg became a "University of crime". In fact, the government maintained the pass laws apparatus for it constituted an important source of revenue. The Transvaal Provincial Council alone got £340,000 annually from the scant earnings of the poorly-paid Africans to build schools for European children. Then, the SANNC president suggested sending a deputation to England to lobby against the Union Government racial discrimination [30].

The SANNC seemingly attached excessive importance to an assurance Richard Winfrey, Parliamentary Secretary for Agriculture in Lloyd George's Ministry, and supporter of Alice Werner's short-lived Committee "to watch the working of the Natives' Land Act" gave to S.T. Platje during his stay in England in 1917. Winfrey promised that:

At the close of the war, we shall do all in our power to help you... regain that justice and freedom to which, as loyal British subjects, your people are justly entitled [31].

Now the war was over, and Africans felt that such promises should be fulfilled. In 1920, the Rand again knew an explosive situation. Under the influence of the Transvaal branch of the SANNC, a sequence of sporadic incidents took place in the mines before a serious strike broke out on 16 February. Indeed, on 5 January 1920, Knights' Central miners stopped work until the Native Recruiting Corporation general manager, Taberer, granted them twopence a shift extra. On 26 January, troubles occurred on Witwatersrand Deep, then in Benoni and Boksburg. In Benoni, a strike affected Modder Deep Mine. On 13 February, Simmer and Jack in Boksburg started similar action which soon degenerated into clashes between the police and one thousand armed Xhosas on the mines. On 13 February, Rose Deep began a boycott, and three days later, Glen Deep followed suit. On 16 February 1920, two Zulu miners named Mobu and Vilikati were arrested on the Cason section of East Rand Proprietary Mines for urging fellow workers to strike for higher wages. The following day, 2,500 men out of 2,900 requested the release of the two arrested miners, higher pay to stave off famine in the reserves, and a number of other concessions. From Cason, agitation quickly spread to other mines. On 18 February, the Comet and Hercules sections of the East Rand Proprietary Mine, as well as three hundred workers from Nourse Deep and Nourse West struck. On 19 February, over 30,000 labourers from Johannesburg West, Johannesburg Central, Roodeport and Germiston East decided to follow suit. On Saturday 21 February, the movement seemed to break up: only two new mines struck while those in Germiston East set out to resume work. However, on Monday 23 February, 46,000 miners came out, the highest figure for any day of the strike. The following day, the strike was almost as strong with 38,000 workers out. Calm was restored only once the ringleaders had been arrested. On 25 February, the police and South African mounted riflemen came into conflict with African labourers on one of the mines. Two Africans were killed, thirty-one others together with nine policemen were injured. Police repression decreased strikers' numbers to 10,000, and then to 5,000. On 28 February when the strike ended, some 71,000 workers had taken part in the strike with over 30,000 being out on six consecutive days.

The February 1920 mineworkers' strike constituted a serious movement of working class opposition: it virtually touched every mine on the Rand; it involved nearly two-thirds of the labour, and groups of almost every ethnic origin took part. On Simmer and Jack, one thousand Xhosas barricaded themselves in their compound, and struggled against the police when they tried to force their way. At Witwatersrand

Deep, East Coasters started the boycott of stores. They were also prominent at South compound, where they urged their colleagues to strike, and stoned the Mpondos when they refused to take part. They again played a leading role in Consolidated Langlaagte and Langlaagte Main Reef when the strike formally broke out. At Modderfontein, Modder, and Nourse Deep, the Transvaal Sothos were singled out as agitators and arrested. At Meyer and Charlton, the Pondos requested the Shangane to join them in the strike.

Of these ethnic groups, East Coasters emerged as the most militant. A few reasons might be put forward to explain their position at the heart of the strike. They were the predominant group of miners with 80,000 out of a total of 206,000. Unlike any other ethnic group in South Africa, they worked during an average period of 18-19 consecutive months on the mines whereas Transkeians, for instance, often spent only four months. East Coasters' longer stays entailed several effects. Over their longer periods on the mines, they acquired greater experience, and usually secured the best jobs. Their better positions and better wages often encouraged them to become more permanently rooted on the Rand. In such instances, they would usually marry and move out of the compounds into the neighbouring towns which were less controlled. Their stabilization influenced their attitude in two ways. It made them more keenly aware of the job colour bar, all the more as some of them attended the Transvaal Congress meetings at Vrededorp and elsewhere. It also compelled them to provide for their wives and for their children, and consequently, rendered them more vulnerable to wartime inflation [32].

Through its paper, Abantu Batho, the SANNC largely viewed the February 1920 Strike as an indication of African miners' awareness, in the growth of which the Transvaal branch played a relatively important role. Better pay urged Africans to work in urban rather than in rural areas, Congress asserted. Indeed, in the mines and towns, unskilled labourers earned two to five shillings per day, but they got a much lower figure on white-owned farms. As they put it:

There is a persistent cry over the lack of native labour, especially by farmers. The root of the trouble seems to be in the price paid for labour. The natives today had developed intelligence enough to know which side his bread is buttered on, and to know where his labour commands the best pay [33].

As a general rule, however, African labourers felt European capitalists exploited them. Their wants increased, and so did the cost of living whereas their wages remained stationary. On the contrary, European workers received higher pay to cope with inflation. A Congress paper voiced Africans' discontent as follows:

Native Workers are beginning to wake up. They are finding out that they are slaves to the big capitalist. Food and clothing are costing more and more, but they want to rise. Why not? They want better housing, and better clothes... and a higher standard of life. They have seen the Whites getting more and more wages to meet the rising cost of living [34].

Africans saw how European miners banded together and struck to improve their conditions. In their turn, they set out to press for better wages. Very lenient with white workers, industrial and political authorities suppressed any attempt of organization on the part of African labourers to improve their conditions. To quote the Congress mouthpiece:

Failing to get an increase or even the smallest consideration from employers, natives have learned that it is a custom of civilization in the history of labour to force employers to terms by means of organized strikes. They have seen the white workers combine together and by means of organized strike compel the employers to give them more money. They have also seen that these employers as well as the government are ready to overlook breaches of the law by white workers with impunity. To their bitter experience, native workers have learnt day by day that the employers are ready to go hand in hand to suppress any organized efforts on the part of the natives to obtain a mere living wage by recognized constitutional methods [35].

Congress deprecated the intervention of the police whom they viewed as an instrument of coercion used to enforce capitalist will. Abantu Batho once again expressed Congress leaders' resentment against the exploitation of African labourers. It declared:

The police are more the instruments by which the will of capitalists is carried into effect. It is said that the police merely went into the City Deep and Village Deep Compounds for the purposes of protecting those who were willing to work. If that is so, then it offers all the greater reason that the police had no business to interfere in a matter of a civil contract between the master and the servant [36].

One of the most prominent leaders of the SANNC Transvaal branch - RV\$ Thema - claimed that the Blacks in South Africa had sympathizers in America, the West Indies, and Africa. These men protested against the South African government's despotic rule, he asserted, and shared their plight. As he put it:



All our kinsmen in America, the West Indies, and Africa are viewing with the deepest concern the atrocities and cruelties which are being perpetrated upon us... Casely Hayford cannot write the affairs of West Africa without mentioning the tyrannical manner in which we are governed [37].

A few months later, Congress made a fresh start. They again raised the problem of wages given to Africans and emphasized their inability to face up to inflation. In his presidential address of 24 May 1920, S.M. Makgatho reported that the pre-war pound was now worth only 13/7, while the price of foodstuffs such as mealies and "kaffir-corn" had gone up some 300% [38].

Despite the Transvaal branch involvement in economic issues, the SANNC remained cut off from African population, especially in the countryside, as might be revealed by Chief Sadrach F. Zibi (1879-1954). Zibi was an unusually articulate chief. His European education, his connection with Lovedale where he served for fourteen years as teacher, choirmaster, and interpreter, his participation in World War I certainly contributed to make him more exacting than the ordinary heads of tribes. In 1924, the lack of land compelled him to move with some of his people from Middel-drift to the Rustenburg district of the Transvaal where he established a multi-tribal settlement called Kaya Kulu, or the Great Home. At the first non-European conference held in City Hall, Kimberley, from 23 to 25 June 1927 he could therefore speak for several tribes. According to him, African people in rural areas needed educated men to arouse their political awareness. As he put it:

...people in the country were fast asleep, and they wanted enlightened men to go out to awake them. He hoped one day they (the delegates) would have the conference not in the town, but out in the country to reach the ignorant masses [39].

In 1927, Congress tried to reorganize its loose coordination with African workers in general. At its annual conference held at Bloemfontein in July 1927, Congress decided to set up an "African labour Congress" or "trade union". The resolution creating the new body conveys Congress desire to bridge the gap between them and African working class:

Whereas it is of vital importance to secure close cooperation between our economic and political forces, and whereas the unity is lacking owing to the fact that Congress has not in the past delved deeply into the question of the working class, be it resolved, therefore, in terms of section 141(b) of the

Constitution of the ANC that a Labour Department with a ministry and secretariat under the control and direction of the Executive Committee be formed, the same to be called the African Labour Congress [40].

Allison Wessels George Champion (1893-1975) held the portfolio of "minister of labour" in the National Congress under several presidents from J.T. Gumede until Dr A.B. Xuma, elected head of Congress in December 1940.

Two major reasons might be put forward to explain the appointment of AWG Champion to a key post in the SANNC. Congress members generally believed in cooperation as a path to success. They also trusted Champion whose organizing talents allowed the ICU to thrive. Indeed, when Kadalie started to build the ICU branch in Natal in 1924, these very reasons had prompted him to appoint Champion secretary of that province in 1925. Kadalie's interpretation of Champion's quick rise within the ICU conveys these two motives:

I at once realized that as a Zulu he would do well in Durban among his people where Alexander Maduna had failed. Without hesitation Champion was transferred to Durban to succeed Maduna who, in turn, was sent to Bloemfontein. Immediately Champion took charge of Durban, the ICU flourished there beyond our expectations [41].

However, state coercion legalized by the 1927 Native Administration Act and the 1930 Riotous Assemblies Amendment Act undermined the SANNC decision to deal with African problems more consistently. Congress considered both measures as iniquitous and strongly resented them. Both Acts, they asserted, stifled the freedom of speech of African spokesmen, and aimed at crushing their political activities. On 30 May, RVS Thema attacked the government policy in the following terms:

The object of the Riotous Assemblies Act is not to cure Native unrest but to suppress Bantu organization politically and industrially, to force the Bantu people by means of brute force to submit to the will of the white man, to suffer injustice and insult without raising a voice of protest. The Act is intended to deal with the new leadership of the Bantu people [42].

On 19 June 1930, Congress leaders renewed their virulent protests against state oppression. According to them, Oswald Pirow was a "naughty little minister of justice" and a "Mussolinic serpent", and Hertzog, "the biggest political conspirator in the British Empire, stood like a sphinx" at his back. Both Pirow

and Hertzog made all and sundry believe that the Riotous Assemblies Act aimed at curbing the activities of "wild men" who came to the country to stir up trouble between Whites and Blacks. In fact, they directed their legal measures against African leaders. On 11 June, the Minister of Justice prohibited Kadalie from attending public meetings on the Rand from Springs to Randfontein. This kind of persecution was likely to bring about racial animosity and public violence, they asserted [43].

In his paper read before the Conference of European and Bantu Christian Students' Association held at Fort Hare from 27 June to 3 July 1930, A.B. Xuma deprecated the ostrich philosophy of European rulers. They pretended that the discontent of Africans was groundless, and passed both the Native Administration Act and the Riotous Assemblies Amendment Act to silence them. As he put it:

Here and there the African begins to express himself. The pressure is getting too great. He must express his hopes and despair. Instead of finding out what his real grievance is, the government has tried to muzzle him by section 29 of the Native Administration Act of 1927, and by the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1930. Through this legislation freedom of speech and the airing of even the most legitimate grievances... are driven underground [44].

On 30 May 1930, in an address delivered before a public meeting of the Bantu Studies Club of the University of Witwatersrand, A.B. Xuma once again criticized Hertzog's policy. From his standpoint, such policy ignored the problems of Africans and was, thereby, likely to stir them up against the white population. To quote him:

The Riotous Assemblies Amendment Act, 1930 is intended to control assemblies... or persons who do anything that may arouse hostility between the sections of Europeans on the one hand, and Natives on the other. These laws have, without doubt intimidated many useful Native critics of the government's policy, but have not removed their grievances [45].

African leaders, then, clearly saw government's intentions and the trouble they expected occurred. The government arrested several African leaders. Amongst them, there were two prominent Congress members: HS Msimang and JM Thaele [46].

With the help of colonial administrators in the neighbouring countries, the South African government curtailed Congress leaders' activities. In 1927, the SANNC made an interesting attempt to cooperate with a Basutoland body - the

Lekhotla La Bafo - which had to deal with labour problems on the Rand as thousands of Basuto used to leave their country every year to work there. But the combined repression of the two Southern governments hindered a rapprochement between the two bodies.

#### 1. The SANNC's relations with the Lekhotla La Bafo

The combination of three main forces urged Basuto to stream into the Union and to sell their labour to the mining companies. Their own chiefs deprived them of their land and subjected them to compulsory labour. The Basutoland government saddled them with increasingly high taxes; the Union industrial authorities attracted them to the mines through their policy of advances. In many cases, shortage of labour forced the Basuto out to the mines to earn a living. In olden times, the paramount chief held all land in trust for their people, and subordinate heads of tribes provided each man with three plots: one for Kaffir corn, one for mealies, and a third for forage wheat. They could also redistribute the land already granted according to their people's needs. Law 28 of Basutoland "indigenous" code or Laws of Lerotholi stated that:

all chiefs and headmen must by law provide people living under them with lands to cultivate. Further, it is their duty to inspect lands, and if it is found that some people have more than is necessary, then the chiefs or headmen shall deprive such people of such surplus lands and grant them to those who have not sufficient [47].

However, chiefs took advantage of this clause and gradually increased their land holding at the expense of commoners. In return for the land they allotted, Basuto chiefs exacted tribute called letsema from their people. Letsema was initially limited to four days of work per year. The people then helped their chiefs with spring ploughing, and in return, they received their food. As the size of their fields increased, and a number of men went away to the Johannesburg mines, the chiefs required their people to perform twelve days of letsema. In some instances, they did not feed their men who had still to comply with their orders. Indeed, anyone who refused to obey became liable to a fine not exceeding ten shillings or to two days' work. In 1921, an anonymous African wrote to the Bloemfontein Friend:

The Chiefs have turned the Basutos into a nation of slaves by making them plough and hoe patches of land belonging to the Chiefs' many wives without food

or payment. While at work, those in charge of them even refused to allow them to go for a drink of water. Some time ago several men were reported to have been killed by the young chiefs where this "free" labour was in progress [48].

The Basutoland government further impoverished African inhabitants by imposing heavy taxation on them. Before 1899, chiefs enjoyed full responsibility for the collection of taxes which were turned over to the British government. At that time, the rate amounted to ten shillings a hut. However, after the Boer war tax doubled and its collection became more difficult. In 1905, the government appointed European assistant commissioners to collect it, and the chiefs merely helped them compile tax registers. In 1920, the Basuto had to pay twenty-five shillings. In 1925, they were compelled to give two shillings more.

Africans who failed to pay their tax within six months after it was due were liable to a fine of five pounds or to imprisonment for three months. However, their sentence did not cancel their indebtedness. In 1925, members of the Basutoland Council pointed out that the longer a man stayed in jail, the more his taxes increased. They suggested that instead of putting them in jail, the government should allow them to pay off their taxes by working on roads. The Resident Commissioner, Sir Edward Garraway, turned down the proposal on the ground that forced labour was against British principles. Instead, the government urged indebted Africans to sign a contract with a labour recruiter to go out and work for six months on the mines [49].

In close connection with the Native Affairs Department, the Native Recruiting Corporation in Johannesburg devised "the Engcobo Voluntary Scheme" - Engcobo being the district in which it was first introduced. In 1928, W. Gemmill, general manager of the Recruiting Corporation requested the government secretary at Maseru, the capital of Basutoland, to introduce the new scheme. This recruiting system now ran side by side with the ordinary one. According to the ordinary recruiting system, Africans contracted for nine months with a particular mine. They received an advance of three pounds as well as their railfare to the mine. Under the "voluntary scheme", Africans usually agreed to work for a period ranging from one to six months, the average being four months. They received up to twenty-eight shillings, and were further entitled to claim an advance of two pounds as soon as they started work [50]. The number of Basuto hired under the "voluntary scheme" every year from 1918 to 1927 was as follows [51]:

TABLE II  
BASUTO WORKERS IN THE TRANSVAAL, 1918 - 1927

<u>Year ending 30th June</u>	<u>Basuto voluntaries</u>
1918	2,043
1919	2,224
1920	2,306
1921	2,102
1922	2,100
1923	3,276
1924	4,328
1925	4,561
1926	4,482
1927	4,167

In the Transvaal mines, the Basuto became the victims of the colour bar like their black fellows from the Union. The Basuto were compelled to perform underground work, and only in exceptional cases such as unsuitable physical condition, were they allowed to do surface work. They were also to live in compounds away from their families, and had to carry passes [52]. Moreover, under the provisions of section 3 of Proclamation 48 of 1912, Basuto miners who deserted or failed to carry out the terms of their contracts were liable to a fine or to imprisonment [53].

On 27 September 1919, Basuto set up the Lekhotla La Bafo, or Council of Commons as a reaction against the abolition of their Pitso of Thoba-ea-Moli in 1903 and its substitution with a National Council in the same year. The National Council was a government appointed body composed of one hundred members. It was presided over by the President Commissioner, the only European, and included ninety-nine other members. Ninety-four chiefs and other Basuto were selected by the Paramount Chief with the assent of the Resident Commissioner; the five remaining members were usually former officials, teachers, or ministers appointed by the Resident Commissioner [54].

No precise figures about the Lekhotla La Bafo membership existed. It apparently varied from five hundred to nine thousand [55]. The president of this

body was Eliazare Willia Lerata Masupha. H.M.D. Tsuene served as vice-president of the Lekhotla La Bafo and its founding-member Josiel Lefela as adviser.

The Lekhotla La Bafo other members included: Justinus Ratsui, Maphuteng Lefela, Sekoto Letsoane, Leseletsa Nbosa, Joshua S. Macheli, and the Reverend Makonko. The Lekhotla La Bafo followers had to pay an admission fee of two-shillings six pence and an additional sum of two shillings six pence was used for the purchase of paper, stamps, and ink used in the convening of meetings [56].

The Lekhotla La Bafo proclaimed goal was to represent and to safeguard commoners' interests. It elected to be a law-abiding body, loyal to government and to chiefs. According to the preamble of its constitution, the Lekhotla La Bafo resolved:

- a. to form an association to safeguard, promote, protect the best interests and welfare of its members and persons other than the chiefs and their advisers.
- b. to seek official recognition of the said association and adequate representation in the Basutoland National Council.
- c. to uphold the principles and to insist upon the revision of the constitution of the Basutoland National Council.
- d. to encourage and insist upon the strict observance by members of law and order, to maintain loyalty to government and the chiefs [57].

The Lekhotla La Bafo constitution provided for two headquarters, one at Mapoteng, in Basutoland, and another in the Union. Branches were to be set up throughout Basutoland and in the neighbouring countries where Basuto had gone for several purposes.

The Lekhotla La Bafo sought to spread its doctrine and to get in touch with the masses mainly through rallies and newspapers [58].

The Lekhotla La Bafo then presented itself as the mouthpiece of the nation, and people laid down their grievances before its leaders. One of the major complaints related to labour problems. On 24 September 1928, Qopane Letsuala summed up the main causes which aroused the discontent of the people in his ward as follows. Before leaving their country, the Basuto had to swear to a Police Officer that they would not come back to their country until the expiration of their contracts

whatever the circumstances. When they arrived at the mines, they had again to assert that they would pay back the advances granted to them. They were not allowed to go and look for a better job even when they had finished paying off their advances. They performed the most dangerous tasks underground whereas "the white people merely point at the work with their fingers". Some of them were killed by falls of rock, but their children and relatives received no compensation. The Lekhotla La Bafo dealt with people's problems through various means. It held mass meetings. It took up cases of certain Basuto who had got into trouble in the courts of either the Assistant Commissioner or of the Paramount Chief [59]. It sought to send deputations to England to lodge African people's complaints. In so doing, the society's leaders were following a long-established tradition. Indeed, as early as 1842, their traditional ruler Moshesh whose fame was well-known by the new African intelligentsia in the Union, resorted to this means. He asked the Home Government to protect him and his people against European imperialists who sought to deprive them of their land and to enslave them. The Lekhotla La Bafo members could hope to get some support since the British government was still responsible for their country. However, some of their people advised them to drop that scheme on the ground that other countries such as South Africa through the SANNC appealed to England for the redress of their grievances, but without avail [60].

That labour problems constituted an important issue might be seen in the arguments Josiel Lefela resorted to in his appeal to the Basuto in and outside Basutoland for funds to defray the expenses of a deputation to England. Josiel Lefela reminded them how their chiefs made them weed lira, or chief's personal land, and how unlike the great Moshesh they let them starve [61].

The Lekhotla La Bafo certainly paid attention to Basuto labourers' problems in the Transvaal, too. Its interests might be conveyed by the society's goal to set up its second headquarters in the Union. It might also be revealed through the society's attempt to cooperate with J.T. Gumede who was then under the influence of communists.

Because of their activities, the Lekhotla La Bafo leaders soon became the victims of government repression. The Basutoland European rulers closely watched the movements of the Lekhotla La Bafo representatives. On 1 November 1920, the Resident Commissioner, Edward Garraway, suspended and subsequently dismissed Josiel



Lefela from the National Council of which he was a member for his bitter articles in the newspaper Naledi [62]. In 1924, the government refused to acknowledge the society. In 1925, European rulers returned the society's letters of complaints. In October of the same year, the assistant commissioner at Berea called the society's leaders, and again informed them they would not get official recognition. Later, the Resident Commissioner renewed his threats. The Lekhotla La Bafo replied that if he aimed at preventing them from holding their meetings, he might start arresting them because the meetings would take place [63].

The Basutoland rulers also discouraged the Lekhotla La Bafo from getting in touch with other national bodies. They kept up to date a complete file of all SANNC and ICU members likely to come to Basutoland, and waited for them to order them to leave the country [64].

In addition to government repression, the SANNC's own shortcomings contributed to hamper its functioning. Personal rivalries divided the ranks of Congress. Dube who kept the leadership of the Natal Native Congress after his resignation from the SANNC presidency in 1917 took umbrage at Champion's success. Later, H.S. Msimang asserted that "Dube and Champion always got into clashes and Dube said: "that is my domain; you cannot interfere" [65]. In 1927, Dube brought an action against Champion on the ground that the latter published defamatory statements against him in his paper Udibi Lwase Afrika. On receiving a letter from Dube's lawyers, - Messrs Nicholson and Thorpe, - Champion expressed his astonishment and his disappointment. Champion was puzzled for he did not know when he failed to pay homage to the national leader. He was also unhappy for Dube's action made them the laughing stock of their foes who were certainly pleased to see them "going to logger heads". Then Champion defied Dube, but expressions of deep and long-lasting respect mitigated his challenge. To quote him:

If you are satisfied that your reaction is in the interests of everything we all wish to see then. I have to say - you can go on my friend. I desire to write you this letter to show you that even at this stage, I still wish to show you my respect for you as I have always done. What I wrote about was with the best of my intentions in the interests of our race [66].

Dube felt the same antipathy towards his own vice-president in the Natal Congress - J.T. Gumede - who set up an independent Natal African Congress in

1926. He also refused to cooperate with the National Congress under Gumede's presidency. In 1930, the Natal split embittered the battle for the SANNC presidency, Dube backed the conservative Seme, while Champion supported the radical Gumede. Gumede's defeat allowed Dube to become a member of Seme's executive. However, Dube soon fell out with Seme [67].

Moreover, Congress representatives did not always promote national interests. Politicians like A.S. Mtimkulu favoured their private concerns. Indeed, A.S. Mtimkulu yielded to the temptation the white legislator inserted in section 33 of the Native Trust and Land Bill, granting the social categories making up Congress the privilege of staying on white areas without giving a registration or other fee. A. Luthuli described Mtimkulu's strange attitude at the government sponsored conference of chiefs and other African representatives held at Pietermaritzburg in October 1935 to examine Hertzog's Bills. Giving his general impression about the conference, Luthuli asserted that "it was an odd affair". Mtimkulu was appointed head of the committee to report on the findings of the conference, but as he stayed away from some sessions, A. Luthuli performed his task. The completed report was submitted to A.S. Mtimkulu who under the influence of a clerk in the Native Affairs Department discarded it after a casual glance. A. Luthuli described the dismay Mtimkulu's attitude aroused amongst African leaders and the glee it brought about within European circles as follows:

...he substituted his own report and the committee's findings were discarded. The upshot was that Natal Africans appeared completely indifferent to the fate of their disenfranchised brothers in the Cape, and the conference appeared to accept without criticism the proposals relating to land. The white newspapers gladly reported the Zulu people as being solidly in agreement with the generals. We younger men were shocked and taken aback, but we did not see how to make an issue of it with a politically entrenched older man [68].

The rise of alternative bodies also swamped the ICU.

## 2. Rise and fall of the ICU

The ICU might have served as a useful wing to Congress. They shared the same economic goals. Sometimes, their membership was overlapping. The ICU came into being in Cape Town in January 1919, after an encounter between Clements Kadalie and A.F. Batty, a socialist candidate for Parliament [69]. On 17 December 1919, the ICU launched a successful strike involving about 8,000 dock workers to

get a minimum wage of six shillings a day. Two white trade Unions - the Cape Federation of Labour Union and the White National Union of Railway and Harbour Servants supported the movement [70].

Moves toward a possible cooperation between the SANNC and the ICU were attempted in July 1920 when Kadalie and H.S. Msimang called all existing organizations of African workers to meet in Bloemfontein to set up a country-wide body. Both Kadalie and H.S. Msimang agreed on a constitution for the new association which was to be called the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, or ICWU. H.S. Msimang who had drafted the constitution was elected president. Despite Msimang's support, Kadalie was defeated as general secretary and Mocher, a Kimberley teacher, was appointed instead. Disappointed, Kadalie and the Cape delegates carried away all the documents, and walked out of the conference. Kadalie continued to run the ICU, and Msimang subsequently resigned from the ICWU when it became clear that Kadalie refused to cooperate with him. At the end of 1921, the ICU absorbed the ICWU, and Kadalie became its undisputed leader [71].

On 17 October 1920, Samuel Makama Masabalala, a leader of both the ICU and of the Cape branch of the SANNC, urged African labourers to strike for higher wages. They readily supported him, and assaulted the well-known Congress leader W.B. Rubusana, despatched by the Superintendent of Natives in Port Elizabeth to pacify them [72].

The police arrested Masabalala without warrant on Saturday 23 October. In the forenoon, the news of his arrest spread like wildfire. Africans who had gone to their work as usual that morning became angry, and gathered on the market square to hold a meeting of protest. After they had made some speeches, African leaders set out to interview the magistrate and the inspector to secure the release of Masabalala. They came back empty-handed for the inspector of police turned down their proposal. When they announced this unfavourable decision to the meeting, feelings ran high. They resolved to send a warning to the police that unless Masabalala were free by five o'clock that afternoon, they would release him by force. This warning was duly given to the police shortly after one o'clock. About three thousand Africans armed with sticks, knob-kerries, and even hatchets congregated near the police station. The police and some returned soldiers who offered their services were also armed with rifles and bayonets. The demonstrators attacked the police, and the fire hose turned upon them failed to

disperse them. Four mounted constables were ordered to charge the crowd. Africans struck the constables, managed to throw one of them to the ground, and rushed at him with uplifted sticks. However, by firing a shot in the air, a constable brought them to a temporary halt, and succeeded in retreating. Africans then grew more determined, and pushed back the police into the vestibule of the station. At this stage, a couple of shots rang, followed by a rapid fire. Twenty-one demonstrators fell and others fled. The police followed up the retreating Africans to prevent reassembly within the town area. No further attack was made on the police station but during the evening, a body of four hundred Africans threatened the Power Station. A patrol of half a dozen men fired on them, shot down one, and wounded four [73].

Masabalala was later removed from Port Elizabeth to Grahamstown for trial. The ICU hired the services of William Stuart to defend him, and he was finally acquitted. The ICU also sent the government a resolution requiring that a non-European be included in the commission appointed to enquire into the riot. For the first time in the history of South Africa, a non-European - Dr Abdullah Abdurahman - was appointed as member of the commission [74].

The commission carried out its enquiry from Monday 22 November until Saturday 4 December. They chose the year 1914 as a basis for comparison between the rates of wages and the cost of living prevailing at Port Elizabeth until the date of the disturbance. In 1914, the minimum earnings of unskilled African and Coloured labourers amounted to 2s 6d. As the cost of living considerably increased, Africans now and then pressed for higher wages. At the eve of Port Elizabeth disturbances, they received a minimum wage of four shillings per day, save the men employed in the building trades who worked on at the daily rate of 3s 6d. Even so, wages did not increase proportionately to the rise in the cost of foodstuffs and other items usually bought by Africans. Between 1914 and 1920, wages rose to 60%. However, the price of goods went up by 260% as shown by the following table:

TABLE III  
PRICE OF GOODS, 1914 - 1920

		1914	1920
		£. s. d.	£. s. d.
Meal	per bag	1 5 0	3 17 0
Mealies	"	0 12 6	1 4 0
Mealie Meal	"	0 14 6	1 8 0
Kaffir Corn	"	0 15 0	1 12 0
Samp	"	0 16 6	1 14 0
Coffee	per lb.	0 0 8	0 1 0
Tea	"	0 0 10	0 1 6
Sugar	"	0 0 3	0 0 8
Meat	"	0 0 5	0 0 8
Shirts	each	0 2 0	0 4 0
Boots	"	0 8 0	0 15 0
Trousers	"	0 3 6	0 8 0
Jackets	"	0 6 6	0 12 0
Caps	"	<u>0 1 0</u>	<u>0 2 0</u>
		£ 5 6 8	£13 19 10

The condition of domestic servants was generally better than that of the casual labourer, the commission found out. Their wages ranged between thirty shillings and two pounds for women. As far as men were concerned, their pay varied between two and three pounds. Their employers provided them with food and, in most cases, with lodgings. This class of African workers did not bring any grievance to the notice of the commission [76].

The ICJ again raised the problem of wages and the issue culminated in the Bloemfontein riots of April 1925. The average daily wage paid to African workers in Bloemfontein ranged only between two and three shillings. Even the municipality which were considered as the highest payers in the town gave just over three shillings per day. The situation of African women who earned not more than one shilling and six pence a day in 1914 and two shillings in 1920 was worse. To try and survive, many of them were compelled to brew beer or to

prostitute themselves. However, the whites raised a general outcry against these 'loose' women; the police persecuted them and launched frequent raids on their kwela-kwela or pick up van; in 1924, the government ordered the police to arrest, jail, and deport any black woman found in the streets without a night pass. Low wages, pass laws, persecution by the police, high rents, as well as Kadalie's visit and public claims for better pay brought about a state of unrest. On Sunday 19 April, the Blacks welcomed the police with a volley of stones. The police then fired and killed a bystander.

James Mpinda, a member of the ICU local branch, urged a crowd of about one hundred to two hundred and fifty to go on strike the next day as a protest against the shooting of the man. On Monday, Bloemfontein found itself without a black labour force. The magistrate and the police tried to discuss with them, but only a volley of stones answered them. The police once again started shooting. This time the number of casualties rose to five dead and eighteen injured [77].

By February 1926, the ICU organizers again pressed for a minimum wage of six shillings six pence a day, and threatened to bring the railway workers out on strike. Mainly to counter their action, the Town Council set up a Native Wages Commission which after a hot debate offered a three shilling wage. On 1 May several employers granted an increase in the wages of their black labourers. Many felt grateful to the ICU, and subsequently swelled its ranks. Many firms did not acknowledge the authority of the Wages Commission, however, and refused to raise their employee's pay [78].

While Kadalie was abroad in 1927, Champion who became the second man in the ICU tried to protect African workers in rural areas against the exactions of European land-owners and chiefs. Although they worked from sunrise to sunset together with their wives and their children, African labourers in Natal, the Transvaal, and Free State received not more than twenty or thirty shillings per month. From their small income, African farm-hands were compelled to pay fees for dipping their cattle which often died afterwards, the dipping solution being too strong. As their contract was consensual, their employer could end it whenever he wished. The threat of eviction was, thereby, constantly looming over their head.

Deprived of their land and of their cattle, they were compelled to sell their labour force in urban centres. Greedy chiefs often speeded up their

proletarianization by acting as recruiters for the mining companies. They sometimes became guilty of financial extortions from their own people.

Thanks to the ICU, African agricultural labourers became aware of their exploitation, and they complained about it. In 1927, ICU officials apparently toured the country, and urged them to require a daily wage of eight shillings. According to the Communist weekly Unsebenzi of 1 July 1927, too, African farm labourers thought of the strike weapon to redress their grievances, but no other source confirms its statements. It is certain, nevertheless, that in 1927, the ICU started to have a certain impact on black rural workers who came to its offices to complain about their ordeal. The branch secretary of Eshowe in Zululand stated:

I have a group of men in the office now, having come to report themselves as homeless wanderers in the wilds of Babanango and who have left their families in the open velds of the district as a result of ejection orders against them... [79].

In some instances, the ICU took their case to courts and won [80]. This fact must have contributed to increase its prestige and its following. The ICU which started with twenty-four African and Coloured members drew growing numbers of adherents. There were 30,000 in 1924, 39,000 in 1926, and 100,000 from 1927 to 1929 [81].

However, personal antagonisms between Champion, Dunn, Lenono, Kadalie and Ballinger brought about the ICU's decline. Samuel Dunn was an able Coloured provincial secretary in Natal, whose achievements Kadalie acknowledged. According to Kadalie, Dunn had been responsible for the opening up of many ICU branches in Northern Natal and Zululand. At Vryheid, he also convened the largest public meeting Kadalie ever addressed in Northern Natal. However, with the appointment of Champion as provincial secretary in Natal in 1925, conflicts between the two ICU officials became apparent. To avoid further clashes, Kadalie then transferred S. Dunn to headquarters in Johannesburg where he did not stay long [82].

George Lenono, a Basuto member of the Durban branch, disapproved of the way Champion handled the ICU funds, and consequently published a pamphlet against him [83]. According to Lenono, when Champion arrived in Natal, he had nothing, save his salary. Some time later, however, he acquired two properties in the borough

of Durban, became the sole partner of a limited liability company, the Vuka Ntrika Company Limited, of a refreshment establishment located at 113 Queen Street in Durban, of a boot repairing and tailoring establishment, of a paper Udibi Lwase Afrika, and of an African Workers' Club. Champion also lent ten pounds to a "gaoi-bird" who afterwards refused to pay the money back. When questioned about these funds, Champion declared that as provincial secretary of the ICU, he could lend out monies to his friends. He also urged that Lenono was against him because he refused to lend him the sum of one hundred pounds he required [84].

The affair went to the courts, and Champion lost the case. Long reports published by the press jeopardized the ICU prestige, and the confidence of the public in the Union became shaky. As a result, Kadalie who had just arrived from overseas, publicly stated that thorough investigation into the Durban financial management would take place. He at once proceeded to Durban. Great was his astonishment when he found out that the ICU had no bank account. All funds were deposited in the bank under Champion's name. Kadalie then ordered the transfer of the monies under the Union's name. Champion resented the transaction, and from that time onwards, misunderstandings arose between headquarters and the Natal branch [85].

Suspended by the National Council for misappropriation of the ICU funds, Champion decided to break away from the parent body and to set up the ICU Yase Natal in April 1928. According to its 1919 Constitution, the Union's head office was to be located in Durban, Natal, and branches were to be established in the Union and in other parts of Africa. The ICU Yase Natal aimed at attracting all workers whatever their profession. It set to itself manifold tasks to better its members' conditions. As stated in the two first clauses of its constitution it sought:

1. to organize wherever possible branches of the ICU Yase Natal, to protect, regulate and increase the wages of its members, and to obtain and maintain just and proper hours of work and conditions of employment.

2. to establish a Land Fund, to acquire, lease, mortgage, hold or otherwise deal with land... to find homes and employment <sup>for those</sup> who are or may be thrown out of work.

6. to assist financially or otherwise members in distress, sickness, old age, and to make provisions for mortality allowance and funeral expenses on the death of a member [86].



The ICU Yase, Natal chose to use constitutional methods to achieve its targets. Under the terms of clauses 4, 7, and 8 of its constitution, it intended:

4. To investigate and settle differences and disputes between the members of the Union and their employers and other persons through... collective bargaining, agreements, conciliation boards, industrial boards, or other legal action.

7. To provide legal advice and assistance to the Union and its members wherever it is necessary or expedient.

8. To strive constitutionally for political emancipation and the full rights of citizenship, free primary and secondary education and ultimately equality in churches, State and social life [87].

The ICU Yase Natal also sought to get in touch with the masses by establishing schools, leagues, debating societies, churches, clubs. To educate the masses, the Union aimed at publishing pamphlets, journals, newspapers or "other literature that may be deemed necessary for the material, intellectual and spiritual welfare of its members."

The ICU Yase Natal also strove to cooperate with local, national and international trade unions. Section 5 of the Constitution stated that the Union sought:

5. To participate, affiliate, financially or otherwise, directly or indirectly with all properly constituted trade unions, federations, congresses or other organizations having for their objects the furthering of the interests of labour and trade unionism locally, nationally, and/or internationally as may be deemed expedient [88].

Other clashes opposed Champion and Kadalie. The former resented the latter's inconsistency and complained:

Kadalie lost nearly all his old friends. After spreading a gigantic spirit of mistrust against the white man and his government, he came back from overseas with a revolutionized mind. He wanted a European private secretary, (and) white girls as shorthand typists [89].

In 1928, the British Independent Labour Party sent a Scottish adviser to Kadalie's ICU - William G. Ballinger (1894 - 1974) - whose tactlessness was to alienate Kadalie [90]. In an attempt to reorganize the ICU, Ballinger attributed to Kadalie the post of organizing secretary instead of his position as chief

executive of the organization since its inception. Kadalie found the orders of Ballinger irritating, and he quarrelled with him. In January 1929, he left Ballinger and set up an Independent ICU. Various branches all over South Africa backed Kadalie, and money flowed in. These funds allowed the publication of a newspaper, New Africa, edited by Kadalie and H.D. Tyamzashe, and chiefly devoted to violent attacks on Ballinger who had been left with the remnants of the old body, now referred to as "ICU of Africa" [91].

In the meantime, both Kadalie and Champion tried to bury the hatchet. They stressed the necessity of banding together to free African people from their exploiters. On 5 July 1928, Kadalie wrote to Champion:

Today Durban is talking about the Great Zulus to stand alone and to have nothing to do with greater South Africa. Are we going to allow this? And if you do not allow it, can you come out as that great officer and condemn this foolish action in Durban and not to allow ourselves to play in the hands of our exploiters. I ask you that you should get up as a man and advise the comrades in Durban not to leave the great ICU which is the only means of bringing the economic and political emancipation of our people [92].

Champion also stressed the importance of unity to win the battle against African masses' exploitation. On 18 November 1929, he wrote back to his old friend:

All the past differences that divided us in the past should be forgotten and buried. It is our desire that the two organizations: ICU Yase Natal and the Independent ICU be merged in one body - thus once more presenting a united front in African trade unionism [93].

In addition to these internal conflicts, the ICU had to face the hostility of African and European sections of the population. Because of the enmity of white trade unionists in South Africa, Kadalie was compelled to seek recognition abroad in 1927. In the same year, European farmers threatened to oust all the ICU members from their lands and to make it impossible for anyone of them to be employed in Natal rural areas. They also persuaded the government to harshly legislate against Africans [94].

Government's efforts to suppress Kadalie's activities compelled the ICU's influence to ebb away. At the beginning of African trade unionism, the government did not dispose of the armoury of legal weapons it subsequently built, and it was unable to deport the National Secretary of the ICU. Before the 1921 general

election, the SAP which sought to take advantage of the ICU members' votes cancelled a deportation order, implicitly conferring rights of residence upon Kadalie. To curb the ICU representatives' activities General Hertzog, then Prime Minister, and Tielman Roos, then Minister of Justice, drafted a Prevention of Disorders Bill. As the measure would have forbidden normal trade union activity, Hertzog withdrew it. He nevertheless sought to achieve the same goals through the Native Administration Bill which became law in 1927. As an interim measure, the Bill banned Kadalie from Natal, and virtually restricted his movements to the Johannesburg area on 1 March 1926 [95].

Kadalie was advised to cross <sup>the</sup> Natal border to test the legality of the ban. On 24 September 1926, he travelled to Durban to perform his work of trade union organization, but he was arrested. He appeared in the criminal court on the charge of entering Natal without an "inward pass". On 15 October, he was found guilty and sentenced to a three pound fine or to fourteen days' imprisonment with hard labour. However, Kadalie appealed to the Supreme Court and won his case [96].

ICU leaders clearly saw that government's legislation aimed at crushing African trade union activities. Referring to section 29 of the Native Administration Act No. 38 of 1927, Champion explained:

It is evident that this clause has been especially framed by government for direct action against leaders of the ICU with the "intention" of stopping the growth and ultimately crushing the movement [97].

However, European political authorities paid no heed to Africans' protests, and the new Riotous Assemblies Amendment Act No. 19 of 1930 further contributed to the eclipse of African leaders. On 11 June 1930, under the provisions of section 1 of the new law, Oswald Pirow debarred Kadalie from attending any public meeting within the area including the magisterial districts of Krugersdorp, Johannesburg, Germiston, Boksburg, Benoni, and Springs. The Minister of Justice feared <sup>that</sup> Kadalie would stir up antagonisms between Europeans and Africans [98].

Despite State coercion, on 16 January 1930, Kadalie's ICU ventured to call out East London African railwaymen who like miners and domestic servants were mere tools in the hands of European capitalists. Victims of the colour bar, African railway workers were compelled to toil ten hours a day for very low wages, whereas white employees had to work only eight hours a day, and got a much higher pay.

Under Kadalie's leadership. African railwaymen demanded that their daily wage of three shillings should be increased to six shillings six pence. To make the success of the strike certain, Kadalie requested the help of various European bodies. He called on the International Transport Workers' Federation in Amsterdam, and the Anti-imperial League in Berlin to send the strikers some funds. He also got in touch with the European Trades Union Congress in Johannesburg, and asked them to hinder scabbing by Europeans. The ICU also despatched agents to Port Elizabeth and to the Transkei to prevent the recruitment of scabs. On 17 January, 1,500 Africans were said to be out. On 18 January, African women held a meeting in the location to support the strikers. They decided that domestic servants should not work on 20 January, and that their wives should not cook for them if they went. The movement was getting momentum. To counteract it, the local authorities enrolled European Constables, and the police closely patrolled the location. Their movements angered the strike committee which protested against the "provocation and unnecessary display of military force... during a quiet and sober strike". On 20 January, all employees went out. Up to 4,000 persons gathered twice daily. They attended a religious service in the morning, and a political meeting in the afternoon. The constables and the police did not have to intervene. Indeed, Kadalie asked the strikers to avoid drink, and no outbreak of violence took place. On 22 January, the movement was still strong, although the number of the strikers varied from one source to another. The Daily Despatch informed its readers that 50% were on strike. According to the evidence given by employers in the subsequent trial, 86% were out. The strike committee asserted that 95% of Africans refused to work. On 24 January, Kadalie ordered the strikers to begin picketing, and to defy the police. On the basis of this speech, he was subsequently condemned. Two days after the arrest of Kadalie and of eight other leaders, the strikers began to give up. From prison, Kadalie ordered the strikers to resume work on 28 January, and they did so. Found guilty of incitement to public violence, Kadalie was sentenced to a fine of £25 or to three months' imprisonment with hard labour. The other leaders were acquitted on the ground that their use of the term "bloody" applied as an adjective to Europeans was not "inciting". Africans only imitated their employers who used it, and their struggle was an economic, not a racial one.

By and large, the strike failed. One firm raised the minimum wage it gave to its employees from two shillings six pence to three shillings per day. A few servants saw their earnings practically doubled. Railway workers who did not go

out received extra pay for the period of the strike. However, Africans did not generally get an improvement in their wages, and a number of strikers lost their jobs. People complained they obtained nothing with their subscriptions, and the ICU found it increasingly difficult to pay its officials, its office rent, and its general secretary's travelling expenses [99]. The Riotous Assemblies Amendment Act further dismantled the ICU. Under its provisions, Kadalie was banned from the Rand in June 1930, and Champion from Natal in September of the same year [100].

### 3. New Channels of protest for the SANNC

The system of Native Conferences and of the Joint Councils of Europeans and Natives also overshadowed the SANNC. Indeed, some of the main criticisms against the oppressive legislation came from these two bodies. The Native Conferences were set up under the Native Affairs Act No. 23 of 1920.

Meeting at Pretoria in November 1926, the Native Conference which included a handful of SANNC leaders, chiefs, clergymen, and other appointed members rejected the 1913 Natives' Land Act, Amendment Bill of 1927 in toto. The Native Conference members generally saw the fundamental relationship between government land policy and labour needs. Chief Walter Kumalo from Natal requested its repeal for it deprived Africans of their land, and gradually forced them into slavery. A delegate from Middleburg objected to the 1913 Natives' Land Act, Amendment Bill of 1927 on the ground that it might turn Africans into servants. RVS Thema clearly shared his opinion. He proposed a resolution seconded by DDT. Jabavu. Its opening lines required that "the whole of chapter II be deleted as the ultimate effect of its application will bring about an economic enslavement of Natives". They proposed instead a chapter "dealing with native development in agriculture and industry".

The same Conference put forward a flood of protests against the Native Representation in Parliament Bill. RVS Thema opposed the repeal of the Cape African franchise. Chief Tombela from Natal did not see why Africans should be denied seats in Parliament. According to the Reverend A. Mtimkulu, Africans would be reduced to nought without political rights. R.M. Tladi from the Witwatersrand also disapproved of indirect representation. DDT. Jabavu gravely pointed out that the Bill further lowered Africans' status. He pleaded for more justice to Africans who otherwise would become "a real menace to the white people" [101].

The Joint Council movement started shortly after the visit of the Gold Coast intellectual James Emman Kwegyr Aggrey to South Africa from 19 March to 16 June 1921. Aggrey had always advocated cooperation between Whites and Blacks. During his visit, Aggrey held meetings all over the country, and explained his philosophy to African population. H.S. Msimang later recalled:

The important thing I know about Aggrey is that he used to picture a situation where the various tribes came together, and he said you cannot get harmony, or proper rhythm in music unless you use both the black and the white notes (of the piano). Without that you cannot get proper music, so even in the question of race relations, you cannot achieve harmony between races unless there is communication [102].

The Council European members were: Howard Pim, president, W.M. Macmillan, vice-chairman, J.D. Rheinallt Jones, secretary, C. Albu, Dr C.M. Doke, W. Fearnhead, W. Gardiner, C. Godwin, DC. Greig, Professor T.J. Haarhoff; Miss Haarhoff, JA. Hamilton, Professor RFA. Hoernle, Mrs Hoernle, Blair Hook, H. Hosken, AB. Karney, Mrs Macmillan, SK. McKenzie, H. Mayer, P. Millin, Dean Palmer, W. Parker, Ray E. Phillips, WH. Ramsbottom, OD. Schreiner, Saul Solomon, HM. Taberer, W. Webber, the Revs. Winter, E. Carter, PHA Fouche, H.B. Catlin and E.W. Grant, Francis Hill, and D. Theron.

The African members were: Rev. GM. Sivetye, Vice-chairman, RVS. Thema, assistant-secretary, C.M. Maxeke, HS. Msimang, SP. Mqubuli, P. Bell, LJ. Buthelezi, PA. Gajana, T. Jamuda, DS. Kekane, GS. Mabeta, WB. Mabona, JM. Makhote, PM. Mallinga, PM. Mohlala, JL. Moorosi, LR. Mothlabi, SB. Maama, SM. Mphahlele, JK. Mrupe, S. Mtoba, J. Nyakale, HP. Piliso, JM. Pooe, ZP. Ramailane, EDS Ramushu, I. Rathebe, JY. Tantsi, S. Tlale, the Revs. B.S. Dhlepu, Mabiletse, Hlabangane, M.M. Maxeke, and J.H. Mahlanvu.

Like the Pretoria Native Conference of November 1926, the council pointed out the relationship between government land policy and African forced labour. From its standpoint, the 1913 Natives' Land Act, Amendment Bill of 1927 included too many restrictions hindering Africans from buying land, and condemning them to the status of full-time servants.

They stressed the unbearable situation of African labourers who were compelled to offer their services for food to avoid being turned adrift. The Council resented the cost of squatters' licences. Fees were too high, and would prompt

European farmers to get rid of their squatters. To find an employer was difficult, and the evicted squatters would be bound to accept the status of permanent servants. Should they fail to find an employer, their lot became hopeless. Indeed, the Native Urban Areas Act denied them the right to stay in towns. Even if they were allowed to settle there, the Colour Bar Act would limit their chances of employment.

The 1913 Natives' Land Act, Amendment Bill of 1927 brought African workers under a system of forced labour, the Council stated. African labour tenants did not have a say in the choice of their masters. Labour requirements alone determined their situation.

The families were also condemned to insecurity, did the European land-owner decide to fire them. Indeed, no provision prevented the White farmer from evicting labour tenants' dependents unless they were prepared to perform the services he might require.

Furthermore, African labour tenants had no guarantee of fixed residence on any farm for more than one year. After that period elapsed, boards would again sit in each magisterial district throughout the Union, and would distribute labour tenants' force amongst European farmers. Under such instances, labour tenants might lose the crops which constituted the unique source of support for themselves and for their families if they were compelled to leave before they reaped the crops.

The position of servants was worse. Indeed, this category of agricultural workers could never hope to put aside enough money to purchase land in the released areas for very few farmers paid them in cash. If they set out to migrate to the cities, the Colour bar Act would preclude them from improving their situation [103].

\* \* \*

The advent of the CPSA in 1921 brought about splits within the SANNC, and therefore, contributed to destroy its influence. The CPSA was established by white immigrants who had learned socialism in Europe. From its inception in 1921 up till 1924, the CPSA had its own colour bar, and refused to admit Africans. In 1924, communist leaders perceived the need for the cooperation of African workers. They started a process of Africanization of the party and aimed at

granting African members a position of leadership. An article in the party's paper, the South African Worker, discussing the forthcoming party congress reported:

We realize that sooner or later the backbone of the Party in South Africa must inevitably be formed of Native workers, and in view of this our immediate task should be to get down to training our present Native Comrades along the lines of being branch and executive officials. They should be drawn more and more into the work of directing committees. Their initiative should be developed in every possible direction for these comrades form the nucleus of the future leadership of the South African Proletariat. More attention to our native comrades and more opportunity given to enable them to become party leaders should be one decision adopted without question [104].

The CPSA steadily carried out its Africanization policy.

Unlike the SANNC leaders, very few of the CPSA's African members received formal schooling, and took up teaching posts. None of them was a lawyer. J. Gomas was a tailor by profession; E.J. Khaile became a qualified book-keeper; M. Kotane alternately served as domestic servant, miner and bakery worker. J. Nkosi worked as a farm labourer and a domestic servant [105].

Only a handful managed to qualify as teachers. Amongst them, one might mention J.B. Marks, E.T. Mofutsanyana, A.T. Nzula. J.B. Marks (1903-1973) entered Kilmerton Teacher training college in 1919, and graduated about two years later. He taught in Pochefstroom and Vredefort in the Free State, but owing to his political activities, he was dismissed from Vredefort. E.T. Mofutsanyana worked at various times as a teacher, a miner, a full-time political organizer and journalist. A.T. Nzula (1905-1935) received his formal training at Bensonvale, Orange Free State, and at Lovedale where he qualified as a teacher. S. Silwana was also a teacher [106].

Nevertheless, African members improved their education by attending the party's schools at home and abroad. Thibedi organized and ran the party night school at Ferreirastown [107]. J.B. Marks, E. Mofutsanyana, A.T. Nzula, and M. Kotane studied at the Lenin school in Moscow. Both Kotane and Nzula attended the same classes. Their teachers were Ivan Potekhin, Zusmanovitch, and the Hungarian Marxist Endre Sik. The curriculum at the Lenin School appeared so extensive to Kotane that his first reaction was to go back home at once. Indeed, the syllabus included such subjects as trade-unionism, political economy, the history of the



Soviet Union CP, and so forth. The CPSA black members learned that theories were to be judged by their impact on the masses. Policies could be considered as successful only if they achieved the mobilization of all workers, irrespective of colour [108].

Like the SANNC, the CPSA recruited Africans from the four provinces. From the Cape, there were E. Tonjeni, J. Gomas, E.J. Khaile, G. Makabeni, J. Nkosi came from Natal, and M. Kotane as well as J.B. Marks from the Transvaal. Both E.T. Mofutsanyana and A. Nzula were from the Free State. Their belonging to the different states might bring out the activities of the CPSA which strove to become a union-wide mass organization. To get in touch with African people, communist leaders set <sup>up</sup> several branches. J. Gomas served as general secretary of the Cape Town branch of the party in the late 1920s [109]. J. Ngedlane ran the sub-branch at Ndabeni, a location situated about five miles from Cape Town [110]. In 1929, the party sent J. Nkosi, one of the few Zulu members to organize the Durban branch. Josie Mpama acted as branch secretary in Pochefstroom in the Transvaal [111].

The CPSA African members often owed allegiance to the SANNC and to the ICU, alternatively or concurrently. M. Kotane and J.B. Marks, for instance, belonged to both the CPSA and the SANNC. M. Kotane enrolled in the SANNC in 1928, but its ineffectual organization repelled him, and he became a member of the CPSA a year later.

J.B. Marks became a member of the CPSA in 1928. He thereafter studied for a period at the Lenin school in Moscow. Once back in his country, he served as a full-time party and trade-union organizer. He also swelled the ranks of the SANNC in the late 1920s, and a decade later, he played a leading role in strengthening the Congress Transvaal branch [112].

Africans involved in both the CPSA and the ICU included J. Gomas, and T. Mbeki, J. Gomas served as secretary of the Cape Town branches of the CPSA and the ICU. He exerted his parallel activities until 1926 when after clashes between the CPSA and the ICU, he was dismissed from the latter body [113].

About 1924, T. Mbeki (1900-1940s) began to attend the CPSA night school in Ferreirastown, Johannesburg. In late 1924, too, Mbeki served as provincial

secretary of the newly-established eastern Transvaal branch of the ICU. According to Kadalie, T. Mbeki was an able leader: "it was a treat to hear him address big audiences", Kadalie asserted. When the CPSA members were pushed out of the ICU executive in 1926, T. Mbeki chose to remain loyal to Kadalie [114].

E.J. Khaile, B. Ndobe, J. Nkosi, A.T. Nzula, and E. Tonjeni simultaneously shared their activities between the CPSA, the SANNC, and the ICU. In the 1920s, E.J. Khaile served as financial secretary of the Cape Town branch of the ICU and as member of the CPSA. In 1926, he was compelled to leave the ICU when its national conference voted to exclude communists from the executive committee. When J.T. Gumede became President General of the SANNC in June of that year, Khaile was elected general secretary of the National Congress [115].

B. Ndobe joined the SANNC western Cape branch in the late 1920s. Together with E. Tonjeni, he helped organize Congress branches between Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. He also became a member of the ICU and of the CPSA until about 1929. He was one of the few African leaders who sustained Gumede's policy of closer cooperation between the SANNC and the CPSA [116].

J. Nkosi (1905-1930) took part in the SANNC campaign of 1919 while still in his teens. He also worked as labour organizer in the ICU. In the 1920s he began attending a communist-run night school in Johannesburg and in 1926 he joined the CPSA. [117].

A.T. Nzula acted as secretary of the ICU branch at Aliwal North, in the Cape. In 1928, he became a member of the CPSA. As a member of the National Congress, Nzula backed J.T. Gumede's unsuccessful efforts to put it on more radical lines [118].

S. Silwana was one of the first African recruits of the CPSA. He joined the Young Communist League in 1923, and attended the party's night school set up in 1925 in Ferreirastown, Johannesburg. He helped organize the ICU in the early 1920s and together with T. Mbeki was instrumental in setting up an ICU branch in Johannesburg in 1924. He later moved to the western Cape where he became an organizer for the SANNC [119].

E. Tonjeni (1895-1962) was active in the CPSA, the SANNC, and the ICU. In 1929, he left the CPSA, but went on cooperating with left-wing leaders. In 1930, he supported J.T. Gumede's bid for election as president of the SANNC [120].

Marxist philosophy considered religion as "the opium of the people", and aimed at a classless society, but outstanding Congress leaders were clergymen and tribal rulers. Antagonisms between the CPSA and the SANNC were then likely to occur.

The SANNC president - J.T. Gumede - became responsible for some clashes between the two bodies. Indeed, Gumede was slipping towards the left, and his apology for communism antagonized Congress, and soon brought about his own defeat. In February 1927, Gumede attended the first international Conference of the League Against Imperialism in Brussels. In June of the same year he went to Moscow to take part in the celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the Russian Revolution. In December 1929, the CPSA set up a League of African Rights as a direct rival to Congress, yet Gumede became its president! His speeches which bore a strong communist flavour created a certain malaise within Congress. All ministers of religion were "tools of the dominant race and class", he once declared. He also asserted that the Soviet Union inhabitants were happy after having slain the Czar and all "the drones who lived upon the sweat of the brows of other peoples".

Such provocative statements must have chilled some respectable clergymen and tribal rulers utterly devoted to the welfare of their people. Reactions were very prompt, and a member of the audience enquired: "Do you intend to kill our chiefs?" Gumede warded off the attack by replying that the Russians rebelled because their rulers summarily dealt with them. His remarks, nevertheless, sowed the seeds of discord, and T.M. Mapikela, a founding member of the SANNC, warned the chiefs that they were being dragged by hook and by crook into the hands of the CPSA which aimed at overthrowing all rulers, be they white or black [121].

The nineteenth annual conference of the SANNC held at Bloemfontein in 1930 saw Gumede's fall. It was attended by J.T. Gumede, J.L. Dube, C.S. Mabaso, S.M. Makgatho, Z.R. Mahabane, T.M. Mapikela, H.S. Msimang, L.T. Mvabaza, R.V.S. Thema, P.I. Seme, A.W.G. Champion, T.B. Lujiza, A.Z. Mazingi, W. Bulhose, B. Ndobe, E. Tonjeni. A European representative of the CPSA, S. Markenson, attended the meeting. Once more Gumede upheld communist ideology and tactics. He said:

We have to rely on our strength, on the strength of revolutionary masses of white workers the world over with whom we must join forces. We have to demand our equal economic, social and political rights. That cannot be expressed more clearly than to demand a South African Native Republic with equal rights for all, but free from all foreign and local domination [122].

Most SANNC members disapproved of his speech. Leaving aside Gumede, they elected Seme as president of Congress. For the next year, the Executive Committee of Congress was to include: Z.R. Mahabane, senior chaplain and parliamentary reporter on native legislation, T.M. Mapikela, speaker, C.P. Matseke, deputy-speaker and chairman of committees, T.D. Mveli Skota, secretary general, R.V.S. Thema, corresponding secretary, S.M. Makgatho, senior treasurer, Xuma assistant treasurer, C.S. Mabasb, financial secretary, J.L. Dube became responsible for education, H.S. Msimang for labour, Dr Xuma for health and urban areas. Stephen Mini was to preside over the chiefs' council, D.S. Letanka became Secretary of the Upper House; Mrs Mahabane and Mrs Matambo were to serve as chairwomen of Women's Auxiliary [123].

Gumede's fall was, first and foremost, due to his leftist propensity. H.S. Msimang later complained that Gumede failed to consult his Executive Committee, and sought pieces of advice from outside. As he put it:

As a member of his executive I can say without fear of contradiction that Mr Gumede never took his Executive Committee into his confidence; and he could not do so, for the simple reason that he had no policy, and had no faith in his own people. He had, of course, certain ambitions which he kept to himself, but he seemed to look for advice and assistance elsewhere than within his own Executive or among his own people [124].

Personal ambitions also played an important role. To the interviewer who asked him whether people opposed Gumede because he was a communist, H.S. Msimang replied:

I don't think it was because he was thought a communist. He had just lost his grip, his influence with the people. A number of fellows were aspiring to the presidency, and they wanted to get the fellow out [125].

The SANNC representatives refused to cooperate with the communists who made them responsible for the failure of the pass burning campaign they organized on 16 December 1930. For the CPSA, Congress became an instrument of Imperialism, the CPSA organization. On 4 July 1931, the CPSA central committee passed a somewhat paradoxical resolution. It read:

The ANC is now openly a servant of the imperialist bourgeoisie, and uses its endeavours to damp down the revolutionary activities of the masses. Their role during the recent pass-burning campaign was a role of complete betrayal, openly appealing to the masses not to break the law. The influence of the ANC increasingly declines; it functions only as a committee of Native petty bourgeoisie. Organizationally it has no existence, but it is still able to wield considerable influence by its decisions [126].

Such attacks might have repelled eventual members of the SANNC.

\* \* \*

In December 1935, P. Seme and D.D.T. Jabavu summoned the All-African Convention (AAC) which overshadowed the SANNC [127]. About four hundred delegates from all over Southern Africa attended the meeting held at Bloemfontein to protest against Hertzog's legislation. Two hundred came from the Cape, one hundred from the Transvaal, seventy from the Free State, thirty from Natal, ten from Basutoland, and one from Swaziland. Four committees were created: the Executive Committee of the Convention, a Franchise Committee, a Land Committee, and a Council Committee. DDT Jabavu from the Cape presided over the Executive Committee. Dr AB. Xuma and HS. Msimang both from Johannesburg respectively served as Vice-president and as general secretary. RH. Godlo was appointed recording secretary. ZK. Matthews and SD. Ngcobo from Amanzimtoti, Natal, were clerks, Dr IS. Moroko from Thaba Nchu, Orange Free State, acted as treasurer.

The executive Committee consisted of all chiefs ex-officio and of delegates from the four provinces. From the Cape there were: ZR. Mahabane, from Kimberley, AM. Jabavu from King William's Town, CK. Sakwe from Idutiya, P. Mama from Cape Town, and JM. Dippa from Port Elizabeth.

Natal was represented on the Executive Committee by JL. Dube from Phoenix, AS. Mtimkulu and AWG. Champion, from Durban, J. Kambule from Ladysmith, <sup>and</sup> W. Ndlovu from Vryheid.

The Transvaal delegates serving on the Executive Committee were RVS. Thema, LT. Mvabaza, TD. Mveli Skota, and PAM. Bell, all from Johannesburg, as well as ET. Mofutsanyana from Pretoria.

The Franchise Committee was composed of AM. Jabavu (convener), AB. Xuma, AWG. Champion, ZR. Mahabane, T.M. Mapikela, A. Mtimkulu, SM. Molema, CK. Sakwe, Chief H. Bikitsha, J. Moshesh, RH. Godlo, JS. Mazwi, JM. Dippa and LGE. Bam.

The Land Committee included the following delegates: Chief W. Kumalo (Convener): J.L. Dube, L.T. Mvabaza, Seme, H.S. Msimang, J. Marks, I.S. Moroka, P.A. Bell, Chief C. Mopeli, A. Mazingi, W.M. Ndlovu, T. Poswayo, P.T. Xabanisa, J. Madupuna, W.M. Mlandu.

The Council Committee was made up of EC. Bam (Convener), R.M. Tunzi, S.P. Mqubuli, the Rev. J. Likhong, G. Dana, M. Balfour, H. Ntintili, N.S.P. Matseko, S.D. Ngcobo, J. Mpanza, Chief I. Mgudlwa, C. Moikangoa, Tsala Kambule, G. Dana, Tsoai, Motshobi, Labere, Molaltou, and Ramailane.

The mayor of Bloemfontein, A.C. White, opened the conference. To temper the convention members' eventual reactions, he told them of the Town Council's decision to spend £1000 on a new native dispensary, £20,000 on the betterment of sanitary conditions in the locations, and £20,000 on the setting up of new schools. He pointed out to them that the Representation of Natives in Parliament Bill aimed at improving the consultative machinery between the government on the one hand, and African leaders on the other hand. He also exhorted them "to take what was offered" [128].

H.S. Msimang, general secretary and member of the Land Committee, condemned the present land policy. From his standpoint, the government had been legislating "in the dark" and they had no intention to grant Africans more land. The seven and one-fourth million morgen promised would bring about some relief, he admitted, but they were set aside without knowledge of the population affected and without precise estimates of the land to be released. The convention, therefore, urged the government to start a Union-wide census to ascertain the distribution of African people in the reserves, on European-owned land, and in the proposed released areas. The Convention also required the government to accurately determine the actual amount of land available for African settlement. He mentioned the example of a chief's farm in the Transvaal. The property was now released although it had been bought and scheduled before 1913.

Then H.S. Msimang proceeded to demonstrate the link between land restriction and European labour needs. "There seemed to have been a conspiracy against the Native people with the object of condemning them to economic slavery", H.S. Msimang complained. Indeed, the problems of African labourers directly resulted from the inadequacy of land. Squatters, labour tenants and servants were pitilessly

exploited. They worked from dawn to sunset, but were not paid. Instead of wages, they received plots of land to plough and not more than ten bags of grain. Moreover, the European employer might require the tenant's wives to do some housework. He could likewise use the tenant's oxen without payment, and take the milk from the tenant's cows. However, the Native Trust and Land Bill did not safeguard the interests of African labourers, and all these difficulties tended to drive them off the land. But where were these men to go? HS. Msimang asked. They could not stay in the towns for the government kept them away. Evicted from both rural and urban centres, Africans were compelled to sell their labour power for a song [129].

The Convention also reacted against the Representation of Natives in Parliament Bill. Seconded by AS. Mtimkulu, HS. Msimang stated that "the political segregation of the two races can only be justly carried out by means of the creation of two separate states". The Convention refuted official arguments tending to present African political rights as a threat to social order. The example of the Cape where "harmonious and peaceful relations" prevailed disproved government's statements.

The Convention members further stressed the "vital importance of the Cape franchise to Africans all over South Africa. They could not "bargain or compromise with the political citizenship of African people by sacrificing the franchise", they added. They once again pressed for the extension of political rights to Africans in the northern provinces, and said they were not averse to the imposition of educational, property or wage qualification to acquire it.

I.B. M<sup>4</sup>belle reminded the conference members that in 1926, General Smuts protested against the disenfranchisement of Cape African voters on the ground that it would be a direct violation of the constitution. From his standpoint, much of Europeans' fear was manufactured. Indeed, "the Natives, if given the vote, would never be able to swamp the white man because the white man and the white woman had the vote".

B. Mashologu from Basutoland explained that the Cape vote was not the franchise. Indeed, Cape Africans were not allowed to return the persons they wanted to Parliament. They were compelled to send already selected European candidates. "No race could be adequately represented by another! he rightly

pointed out. "The Cape Native had the shadow but not the substance", he added.

Dr Goolan H. Gool, a Cape Town radical Indian, and Dr Abdurahman's son-in-law called for extreme measures. He urged the convention to discard Hertzog's Bills without discussion and to launch a national liberation movement to end the colour bar. As he put it:

... In the Cape the colour bar had been smashed and it was up to the Convention to smash the colour bar in the rest of the Union. The Cape delegates were not present to discuss the Native Bills, but to reject them in toto, and lay the foundations of a national liberation movement to fight against all the repressive laws of South Africa [130].

Echoing G.H. Gool, the African leftist J. Marks from Johannesburg advocated militant methods to stop the exploitation of Africans. He declared:

The time has arrived for the consolidation of the African people against their offenders. The present policy of subordinating the Natives and Chiefs was bound to end in bloodshed. An active policy should be adopted by the Natives, who should refuse to pay taxes until their rights were recognised [131].

However, the convention as a whole upheld constitutional means. They once more elected to appeal to the British King and Parliament as "the original beneficent donors of the Cape franchise", were it be repealed. They resolved to send a second deputation to present their viewpoint at the bar of the House of Assembly. C. Kadalie from East London pointed out that past experience taught them the uselessness of such a course. J. Gunas from Cape Town moved that the convention delegates should organize protest meetings in towns and villages [132].

The SANNC "Bantu women's league" headed by Mrs Maxeke also took part in the convention proceedings. Mrs Maxeke pointed out the representative character of the convention which gathered male and female leaders from various parts of the country. Non-European unity, she explained, was necessary to protect their very lives. "The Natives had no other country to which they could go", she added [133].

The vice-chairman of the APO, T. McLeod, urged African and coloured communities to band together for both had their franchise rights curtailed.



The Convention then thanked European sympathizers, but they stressed the necessity to rely first on themselves. As they put it:

The non-Europeans, while thanking their European friends for their support, had to go ahead themselves. The natives were not a peculiar people who had to be carried on the backs of others for ever. They had to be helped to help themselves [134].

All members finally set up the AAC as a body and empowered the Executive Committee to draw up a constitution. They also allowed its treasurer Dr JS. Moroka to collect funds. The AAC aimed at being a Union-wide body. The total funds should be five million shillings, they reckoned, if the five million African people were to give one shilling each. The delegates paid their membership fee on the spot, and tribal rulers were particularly entrusted with fund-raising [135].

Hertzog's Bills became laws despite the virulent attacks of the AAC and of its supporters, and split the Convention into two hostile factions. A few leaders like AB. Xuma refused to run for the NRC, but most AAC members preferred to use the NRC together with parliamentary representation as channels for protecting African interests and denouncing racial segregation. In 1937 and again in 1942, JL. Dube won a seat representing rural Natal on the NRC. From 1937 to 1942, AM. Jabavu stood for the Cape rural areas on the NRC. From 1937 to his death in 1945, T.M. Mapikela served on the NRC as a representative of the Transvaal and the Free State rural areas. In 1937, RVS. Thema ran as a candidate for the Transvaal and Free State rural areas on the NRC where he remained until its dissolution in 1951. Both JS. Moroka and Z.K. Matthews served on the NRC from 1942 to 1950 [136].

To sum up, black politicians in South Africa were generally aware of all forms of racial oppression affecting their people, and tried to combat them. They opposed the pass system which swelled the colony's revenue for the benefit of Europeans, contributed to depreciate African labourers' wages, controlled the latter's movements, humiliated them, and led some of them to criminal activities. They also protested against the exploitation of African workers who were reduced to the status of servants on white farms. They further stressed the inequity of the double standards which allowed the Whites to use the strike weapon to improve their material condition, but denied Africans the same right.

Despite state coercion and its more covert methods to direct Africans' attention and energies on "troubles", most SANNC leaders understood government intentions, and did not lose sight of "public issues". Their political activism received popular support on the Rand, but they felt the necessity of reorganizing Congress to exert a stronger impact on African working class in general.

However, government repression, the multiplication of newly-formed bodies, personal squabbles reduced the SANNC to impotence. In 1935, the AAC stood out as the most prominent non-white mouthpiece. Like the SANNC, the new body was characterized by moderation, a tendency to view the United Kingdom as the final court of appeal, and a strong rejection of separate development in favour of an assimilationist position.

## RETROSPECT

African nationalism should be viewed as a reaction to the aggressive and dehumanizing nature of imperialism. Economic and political reasons led European powers to found colonies which would be sources of raw materials as well as consumption markets. Jules Ferry, Premier of France in 1885, explained the origins of imperialism as follows:

It is not clear that the great states of modern Europe, the moment their industrial power is founded, are confronted with an immense and difficult problem, which is the basis of industrial life, the very condition of existence - the question of markets? Have you not seen the great industrial nations one by one arrive at a colonial policy? And can we say that this colonial policy is a luxury for modern nations? Not at all ... this policy is for all of us, a necessity, like the market itself [1].

Exploitation of African resources went hand in hand with the exploitation of African people, and a master-servant relationship between Europeans and Africans was set up. As P. Worsley, a Professor of Sociology at Manchester University, pointed out:

Men had to be induced to work in new ways for new people and new ends. The exploitation entailed in colonialism, therefore, was not an exploitation of things, fetishistically concerned, but an exploitation between the classes of men. Geographers may speak of the exploitation of resources. But to utilize or valorize resources, colonialism has to exploit men [2].

Rivalries between the main European powers fostered their search for economic wealth and political sway. However, when different European populations occupied the same territories racial bonds helped them willy-nilly transcend their economic and political antagonisms. They clubbed together as in the South African case to share African land and riches, and devised policies to control African populations rather than to develop them.

To legitimize their intrusion in alien countries and preserve the upper hand on them, colonial authorities deliberately veiled their real intentions under the cloak of a civilizing or a divine mission towards African inhabitants. They belittled Africans who became savages, lazy, ignorant, drunkards, sexually obsessed and so on and so forth. With these prejudices in mind, bourgeois anthropologists, physiologists and philosophers evolved racial theories to prove the mental

inferiority of the African race. However, since the outset of the colonization process, some upright European witnesses and scholars contributed to demystify colonists' ideology and to bring truth to light. African countries were not no man's lands. The state of their agriculture answered the wants of their inhabitants who enjoyed a relative well-being and security. There were institutions to promote broad participation in government. Djemaate discussed questions affecting Algerian tribes. Bodies of elders and councillors or begwafu as well as linguists or Kyiamis embodied popular will in the Gold Coast. Councillors or amaphakathi and national assemblies variously called pitsos by the Sothos, ibunga by the Xhosas, khoros by the Venda tempered chiefly authority in South Africa. As Worsley put it:

The European conquerors did not build their empires in a cultural vacuum; instead, they found themselves dealing with cultural traditions of great antiquity and diversity which rarely resembled the cultures of Europe [3].

*To conquer new territories and maintain their hegemony, colonial rulers resorted to two main methods: force and collaboration.*

Machiavelli (1469-1527) who held an official post at Florence and undertook diplomatic missions to European countries wrote: "For although one may be very strong in armed forces, yet in entering a province, one has always need of the goodwill of the nations" [4]. Later, General Joseph Simon Gallieni (1849-1916) who became "one of the heroes of French colonialists" also recommended the alternative use of violence and politics or of what he called la tâche d'huile and la politique des races [5].

By and large, European colonists upheld violence. Unlike South Africa and Algeria, in the Gold Coast force was used as an ultimate means in the colonization process. The success of the transactions between King Kwamina Ansa and the Portuguese Don Diego Azambuja on 20 January 1482 allowed the first European infiltration in the country [6]. In an attempt to promote legitimate trade hampered by the constant wars between Ashantis and Fantis, the British signed a treaty with the former in 1831 and the famous Bond of 1844 with the latter. By 1870, the British nevertheless adopted the general pattern of domination. They sought to expand their sphere of influence in the Gold Coast. However, their aims conflicted with those of the Ashantis who tried to recover the provinces of Akyem, Assin and Denkyira. The cold war between the two powers culminated with the occupation of Kumasi and the arrest of King Prempeh by the British on 20 January 1896 [7].

The French in Algeria, the Dutch and the British in South Africa imposed their presence from the very start. They believed it essential to overawe the original inhabitants of both countries to deter any attempt of rebellion against their law. Machiavelli's remark could be applied to the colonial context, he advised: "The injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge" [8]. In both countries, African populations reacted against the violation of their territories, the expropriation or destruction of their property, and their forced subjection. However, Europeans mercilessly stamped out african uprisings one after the other. Rebellions only contributed to further put Africans under the thumb of their oppressors who took over more land and fined them.

Colonial powers fostered oppression, not only vertically between their administrators and the governed but also horizontally between the ruled themselves. Taking advantage of the old adage divide et impera colonial authorities kept alive tribal feuds and created rival factions. They strove to cut off African elites from the masses, opposed tribal rulers and the rising intelligentsia, and worked up members of the elites against one another. On the whole, colonial authorities recruited their collaborators from amongst tribal rulers. They tried to win them over through the payment of stipends and the distribution of other privileges. But, Europeans took care to shield their political supremacy. They wrecked traditional rulers' power and prestige, and reduced many of them to the rank of petty executive officials. They namely entrusted the latter with tasks likely to alienate them from their people such as the collection of taxes, the recruitment of workers for forced labour on the roads or in the ill-famed South African mines. Not all collaborators were despicable puppets, however. Nana Ofori Atta in the Gold Coast, M'Hamed Ben Rahal in Algeria, tried to improve the lot of their countrymen.

The policy of collaboration presented several advantages, and colonial rulers greatly resorted to it. The consent of the most important segments of African populations somehow legitimized their rule, and helped them keep their colonies. Machiavelli stated:

He (the ruler) has only to take care that they do not get hold of too much power and too much authority and then with his own forces and their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of them, so as to remain entirely master in the country and he who does not properly manage this business will

soon lose what he has acquired, and whilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and troubles [9].

The acceptance by some of the ruled of the colonial order under which they lived, and more importantly its internalization, put off the growth of national awareness. Some collaborators altogether identified themselves with their masters, and became unable to realize and to denounce their people's grievances. As Paolo Freire rightly pointed out:

The oppressors do not favour promoting the community as a whole, but rather selected leaders. The latter course by preserving a state of alienation, hinders the emergence of consciousness and critical intervention in a total reality and without this critical intervention, it is always difficult to achieve the unity of the oppressed as a class [10].

In addition to armed forces and collaborators, another social category - European settlers - strengthened colonial rulers' position where ecological and economic conditions favoured settlement. Under British rule, land continued to belong to African population in the Gold Coast, and no European settlement took place therein. By 1911, there were less than 1,389 Europeans. In Algeria, European population amounted to 833,000 in 1926 and to 881,600 in 1931. In the Union of South Africa, there were already 1,276,242 in 1911 [11]. As far as the numerical strength of Europeans were concerned, the Gold Coast was the weakest, then came Algeria and finally South Africa.

European settlement undoubtedly constituted an important variable in the process for independence. On 6 March 1957, the Gold Coast became the first independent country partly because its inhabitants met with the least resistance. Algerians got rid of French colons in 1962 after a seven year armed struggle and a heavy loss of nearly one million lives. South Africa still remains the theatre of a bitter struggle between black and white races. Machiavelli already stressed the relationship between the power and durability of a colonial regime and the size of its settler communities. He wrote:

...When states are acquired in a country differing in language, customs or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside there... This would make his position more secure and durable [12].

These various considerations allow the formulation of the following proposition: the strength of a colonial regime is proportional to its own force, the success of its policy of collaboration, and the importance of its settlement.

Colonial administrators paid little heed to Africans' wants. Inadequate representation of African inhabitants allowed them to preserve a master-servant relationship between the two races. Their knowledge of Africans' socio-economic conditions helped them devise several means to curtail Africans' franchise, and thereby, to debar them from the right<sup>to</sup> influence government decisions. Because they knew the widespread destitution and illiteracy of African populations, European officials exacted high property, income, literacy or other requirements. Because they were aware of Algerians' strong attachment to their Muslim status, French colonialists compelled them to give it up to secure full citizenship rights. Algerians' reluctance to be stripped of their identity further encouraged the French to use the same device in 1865, 1919 and in 1936 to safeguard their economic and political supremacy. As a result, the following general statement might be put forward: to protect their economic interests and maintain their political hegemony, colonial rulers exacted franchise qualifications incompatible with the socio-economic conditions of the subjected populations. Racially exclusive devices turned apparently democratic institutions into sophisticated instruments of coercion.

The inadequacy of Africans' representation at the political centre allowed colonial rulers to enact despotic measures prejudicial to the former's interests. Before European advent, indivisibility of land, its inalienability, the absence of a salaried proletariat constituted the salient characteristics of African modes of production. In Algeria and South Africa, colonial administrators seized the land, and shattered the socio-economic structures of these two countries. By the decree of 8 September 1830, the French took away habous and beylik land. The Ordinance of 31 October 1845 despoiled rebellious or supposedly hostile tribes of their land. The policy of cantonement which started in 1845 and reached its climax during the period 1857 to 1863 again allowed French rulers to secure tribal land. Thanks to the code de l'indigenat, the senatus consultus of 22 April 1863, to the Warnier law of 26 July 1873 as well as to the law of 1887, further land became available for European settlers. Land tenure in Algeria underwent two main alterations during French colonization. First, individual property superseded communal land-ownership. Secondly, the most fertile lands became concentrated within European hands.

Owing to the disruption of communal land-tenure as well as to the accumulation of French and Arab taxes such as ushur, zekkat, hukur and lezima, Algerian rural masses underwent a process of pauperization so much so that malnutrition, starvation and disease resulted in a high death-rate amongst them. To survive, they were condemned to hire their labour power at low rates on colonial large estates or in the industrial sector in Algeria or in France. In Algeria, the absence of welfare services further impoverished them. In France their short-term-contract, the lack of professional training prevented them from improving their situation. In the metropolis, Algerian proletariat nevertheless came to be acquainted with trade-unionism which instilled a feeling of solidarity and militancy amongst them. The absence of a colour bar, their wartime services, the speeches of Algerian nationalists like Emir Khaled further stirred up their growing consciousness. Their awareness of being exploited both at home and in France crystallized in the foundation of the ENA in March 1926 under the leadership of Messali Hadj.

French concepts and practices led to contradictions within Algerian society. In opposition to the meskines or paupers, there emerged a landed bourgeoisie. Colonial rulers granted land to their collaborators. As a result, a handful of bashaghas, aghas, shaykhs and financial delegates acquired extensive demesnes. They developed a capitalistic outlook, and considered the small fellahin as fatigue-men. Some had their lands tilled with modern tools, and could hardly be distinguished from the most well-to-do colons. Community of interests with their rulers, their subservience prevented them from becoming a revolutionary force. They nevertheless indirectly contributed to the national movement. The scholarships their sons received increased the number of literate Algerians who spearheaded the national struggle against colonial yoke.

In South Africa, too, the dominant class restructured African mode of production, and introduced a process of stratification within the black community. Three main categories of African peasants existed by the end of the nineteenth century. The first category included African peasants living in the reserves and using traditional methods of production to meet their wants. Overcrowding due to an increase in the population, intensified by the impossibility for Africans to buy land in European areas after the promulgation of the 1913 Natives' Land Act No. 27 brought about soil exhaustion, a decline of production and the subsequent destitution of Africans. The second category of African peasants worked on white-owned farms and consisted of squatters, labour tenants and servants. Their



divorce from the means of production, the insecurity of unemployment, the imposition of heavy taxes, made them and their families utterly dependent on the will of European land-owners for their subsistence. The third category was composed of a nucleus of African "kulaks" who tilled their land according to modern techniques and produced a marketable surplus. However, government legislation forestalled their development. Like Algerian rural masses, the South African peasantry then suffered from extreme wretchedness, and might potentially provide African leaders with mass support. Territorial segregation nevertheless slowed down the rise of black peasants' awareness in South Africa.

The poverty of the reserves combined with government control over residence and over african movements through a sophisticated pass laws apparatus gave birth to a cheap migrant labour-force required by European mining companies. European capitalists subjected the Blacks in South Africa to high-handedness experienced to a lesser degree in Algeria and almost unknown in the Gold Coast. From Marx's standpoint, "the labourer is the owner of his labour-power until he has done bargaining for its sale with the capitalist" in western countries [13]. In South Africa, the destitution deliberately maintained in the reserves, European and African recruiters' misrepresentations of working conditions in the mines, pass laws, precluded a pre-employment bargaining. Unlike their European counterparts, African miners received wages reckoned on "historically determined" subsistence needs [14]. The use of prostitution and cheap liquor, the colour bar legislation which condemned Africans to the lowest positions, the lack of professional education, the problem of poor Whites further decreased their wages. The inadequacy of compensation in the event of illness or accidents in the mines, their exclusion from European trade unions also contributed to weaken them economically.

As in Algeria, black labourers in the South African towns showed more readiness for organization than peasants. The concentration of workers from all over the country in the mines broadened their outlook, and allowed the emergence of a collective awareness. White trade-unionists' activities and successful strikes helped them realize the importance of organization. However, during the pre-war period, African labourers expressed their discontent only through individual desertions and complaints,

Algerian and South African workers' involvement in World War I, their introduction to a more hospitable world, exerted a decisive impact upon them. They became more resentful of the hard realities in their countries. Their strikes against exploitation conveyed their growing political maturation. Algerians' service in a combatant capacity, their common language, hastened the development of their nationalist feelings.

European communists also shaped the ideas of Algerian and South African labourers. However, communist movements in the two countries presented some differences. Communism in Algeria was mainly a European concern whereas the CPSA actively carried out a policy of Africanization. The ratio between European and Algerian communists was 10 to 1 in 1935 and 5 to 1 in 1936. On the contrary, the CPSA's black members outnumbered the Whites by 1.6, and held responsible posts within the party. Furthermore, before 1936, French communists in Algeria depended upon the PCF and lacked precise guidelines. At the same time, the CPSA was directly linked to the Comintern, and had a relatively more coherent programme. As a result, communist propaganda was more likely to carry weight with South Africans whereas Islam weakened communist influence on Algerians who became more aware that they had to rely on themselves during hard times.

Compared with Algerian and South African peasantry, the Gold Coast rural masses were better off as long as they continued to enjoy the possession of their land under the colonial regime. The Gold Coast cocoa-growers nonetheless had to struggle against European trading firms which offered them low prices whatever the quality of their product, and against the middlemen who, they believed, exploited them. However, their societies failed to undermine European merchants' power. The lack of financial help, the rising cost of living, the world economic depression, the scarcity of rainfall, soil erosion chiefly after the 1939 earthquake, swollen shoot attacks increased their ordeal. Therefore, as Rosa Luxembourg correctly pointed out:

Capital in its struggle against societies with a natural economy pursues the following ends:

1. To gain immediate possessions of important sources of productive forces such as land, game in primeval forests, minerals, precious stones and ores...
2. To "liberate" labour power and to coerce it into service.
3. To introduce a commodity economy
4. To separate trade and agriculture [15].

African peasants and labourers' deeply-felt economic grievances provided the nationalists in the three countries with opportunities to win over mass support.

Although the progress of education was rather slow, an educated elite gradually came out and spearheaded African opposition to colonial rule. Colonial authorities deliberately maintained African populations in a general state of ignorance to better subdue them. To hinder educational expansion, they put forward a series of biological, ideological, financial and economic arguments which did not always form a coherent philosophy. On the one hand, their racial prejudices led the vast majority of them to look upon Africans as being impervious to western thought. On the other hand, they dreaded the impact of European ideological principles of democracy and equality before the law which might be turned against them, and jeopardize the whole colonial system. They naturally refused to be their own grave-diggers, and preferred to spend capital to foster their own interests rather than to build up schools. Moreover, the development of education implied promotion and a parallel increase in the salaries of those Africans who would benefit from it. It then ran counter to colonial policy of job reservation and discrimination. These various reasons as well as Africans' reluctance to study when they realized they were condemned to the lowest posts hampered the spread of education [16].

A few distinctions between the three colonies must be stressed, however. Missionary enterprise failed in Algeria. As a result, Algerians were less indoctrinated than their fellows in the Gold Coast and South Africa. Besides, the French government supplied Algerians with a dual type of education: French and Islamic. These different cultures brought about two kinds of intelligentsia, and moulded their outlook: members of the westernized elite such as Belkacem Benthami, Ferhat Abbas and Bendjelloul were more integrationists than the ulama who insisted on the preservation of their "ethnic nationality". Various factors nevertheless helped them bridge the gap between them. Islam drew them nearer for educated Algerians generally kept their Muslim status. Some leaders like Emir Khaled managed to get a double culture, and this fact contributed to weaken the dichotomy between the two groups. Algerian elites also experienced segregation embittered by the presence of settlers. Although not perfect, their union crystallized in the Muslim Congress first held on 7 June 1936. They identified themselves with the Muslim population, and their personal troubles blended with the existing public issues.

How did missionary bodies which constituted a component of colonial expansion simultaneously contribute to turn out nationalist leaders opposed to colonial rule in the Gold Coast and South Africa? The quality of staff, the presence of pupils from all over the country, the absence of the colour bar in institutions such as Lovedale and the even more progressive University College of Fort Hare widened African pupils' outlook, and made them more self-confident. Missionary emphasis on brotherhood and equality led them to question colonial oppression and conversely. African leaders resented the destruction of their identity and their subsequent alienation. They reacted by asserting their Africanness. Some Gold Coast leaders like Attah Ahuma adopted African names. A few SANNC leaders tried to reconcile their Christian faith and their African style of life. Charlotte Maxeke, the Reverends Henry Reed Mngayi and E.J. Mqoboli were affiliated to African churches. In so doing, they came near their people.

Lawyers, teachers, medical doctors in the three colonies, clergymen in the Gold Coast and South Africa, led national movements. Two major reasons might explain their phenomenon. Their professions allowed them to get used to wide audiences and to become more articulate. They also knew the language of the rulers and the ruled, and thereby, could serve as mediators between the government and the governed. The oneness of language in Algeria in contrast to the various tongues spoken in the Gold Coast and South Africa allowed an even more effective contact with the masses.

Why did lawyers play an important role? By and large, their economic independence, their acquaintance with legislation, their permanent use of language for defensive purposes ranked them among the natural leaders of their people. In fact, the preponderance of lawyers is not a special characteristic of African societies. In western politics, too, they became part of the "power elite". To quote Mosca:

...and in our western world as in ancient Rome, an altogether privileged position is held by lawyers. They know the complicated legislation that arises in all peoples of long-standing civilization, and they become especially powerful if their knowledge of law is coupled with the type of eloquence that chances to have a strong appeal to the taste of their contemporaries [17].

However, if educated Africans provided the leadership, above all, the ENA recruited some of its prominent members from the lower strata of Algerian society.

Colonial administrators and after them some European historians grudgingly applied the term "intelligentsia" to educated Africans. They sought to imply that Africans received too rudimentary an education to deserve being called such, or that they thought too highly of themselves because they lived in an illiterate milieu.

When applied to African leading groups, the definition of the term "intelligentsia" reveals that European officials and historians adopted an extreme position. According to Bottomore:

The term was first used in Russia in the nineteenth century to refer to those who had received a university education which qualified them for professional occupations; subsequently, its denotation has been extended by many writers to include all those who are engaged in non-manual occupations [18].

The original as well as the extended meaning of the word are then both adequate in the African context. Lawyers and medical doctors acquired university degrees, and their small number, imposed by the colonial order and not by an intellectual deficiency inherent to the African race, does not exclude the fact that they did constitute members of a growing intelligentsia.

Some African leaders might even be regarded as "intellectuals". From Bottomore's standpoint:

The intellectuals... are generally regarded as comprising the much smaller group of those who contribute directly to the creation, transmission and criticism of ideas; they include writers, artists, scientists, philosophers, religious thinkers, social theorists, political commentators [19].

Owing to his concepts of "ethnic nationality" and "political nationality" as well as to his concern with education, Ibn Badis might be included in this category without difficulty. The writings of Casely Hayford and J.M. Sarbah also command an ever-lasting respect.

The elites' personal grievances, their professional activities as well as government action which compelled them to focus their energies on local situations, allowed them to perceive "personal troubles of milieu". The resolution of troubles lay within the scope of their immediate environment. When the elites and communities became conscious of their common problems, they organized themselves

to cope with them. Therefore, local focus brought about protest movements.

The interaction of several "personal troubles of milieu" drove men's awareness to a higher stage. They began to discover "public issues" which had to do with the socio-economic and political institutions themselves. The resolution of these public issues therefore lay in structural change. Educated Africans' political activities, their constant scrutiny of government legislation allowed them to transcend "personal troubles of milieu". They detected and denounced public issues created by colonial rulers' land, labour, education and employment policies as they affected the bulk of African populations. To sort out these issues, they all pressed for self-government, or, to put it differently, for a restructuring of the state apparatus.

In Algeria, the Gold Coast and South Africa, educated elites viewed themselves as mediators between the government and the governed. They sought to explain government legislation to their people and to enlighten colonial authorities on the latter's wants. They displayed a general awareness of urban as well as rural populations' hardships and aspirations and presented holistic programmes to their respective governments.

African elites in the twenties harboured the same faith in the imperial power, hence the "moderate" appearance of nationalist elites. They chose constitutional means to redress their people's grievances, and addressed petitions and deputations to the local and the metropolitan governments. They heard about western principles of equality and justice, and used them in their claims for socio-economic and political reforms. They notably believed that the metropolitan government would acknowledge their wartime services. However, they smarted under the same disillusionment when they realized that Thomas Woodrow Wilson's principle of self-determination applied exclusively to European communities. Their technological inferiority, the ineffectiveness of uprisings also impelled them to uphold constitutional channels. In the 1930s, however, the rising cost of living, the world economic depression of 1929-30 heightened the accumulation of long-felt sufferings. This combination of factors brought about widespread outbursts of discontent. Feeling less safe, colonial administrators resorted to ruthless methods to curb public unrest in the three countries.

African nationalists understood the importance of mass support, and the same call for unity and cooperation resounded in Algeria, the Gold Coast and South Africa. To win followers, they devised the same means: they fostered cultural revivalist activities, launched newspapers, set up branches and organized rallies. Ancestral values and symbols were available in Islam whereas the Christian faith of black politicians in the Gold Coast and South Africa: somehow hampered their search for and appeal to a traditional past. Yet, even in Algeria where Islam prevailed, the door still remained open to the European model. The same willingness to get acquainted with western science and technology which defeated them was noticeable in the three countries.

African leaders considered newspapers as necessary vehicles of information about government measures and as spurs of national consciousness. To sort out the problem raised by illiteracy, and reach larger audiences, they tried to use their people's language: Arabic in Algeria, the vernacular in the Gold Coast and South Africa. Branches and rallies also proved to be crucial means for the mobilization of African masses for they allowed a direct contact with them.

A series of factors especially government pressure, the emergence of alternative or rival bodies, the national movements' own weaknesses, threatened to impair the organization of a "mass nationalism" and to reduce it to an "elite nationalism" [20]. As already suggested, colonial officials strove to wipe off African growing national consciousness both indirectly and directly. They distracted African leaders' attention from national focus and set it toward local situations. For instance, as early as the 1880s, the Gold Coast politicians pressed for an increased African representation in the Legislative Council. However, the British rulers opposed their claims, but gradually set up town councils in Accra in 1894, and Cape Coast in 1905. Since its inception on 8 January 1912, the SANNC called for the restoration and extension of Africans' direct representation in the House of Assembly. However, the Union government proposed instead local councils under the Native Affairs Act No. 23 of 1920. The Mouvement Jeune Algérien insisted on Algerians' direct representation in the French Parliament, and with this end in view sent a deputation to Paris on 26 June 1912. But, the Governor General Charles Jonnart turned down their request, and allowed them to have a say in the administration of the communes de plein exercice.

To hold back the wave of nationalism, colonial authorities also deemed it necessary to behead African nationalist movements. In Algeria, the local government confronted Emir Khaled with an ultimatum: he had to "choose" between internement administratif or voluntary exile. Khaled opted for the latter alternative and went to Egypt in August 1923, but even in Egypt the French government hunted him down. The metropolitan government also relentlessly harassed Messali and dissolved the Etoile on 24 April 1929 and again on 26 January 1936. In South Africa, clause 29 of the Native Administration Act of 1927, the Riotous Assemblies' Amendment Act No. 19 of 1930 aimed at smothering African radicals' protests against colonial rule. The former condemned them to imprisonment or a fine, the latter to banishment. British officials first acknowledged the ARPS as a mouthpiece of the Gold Coast people. In 1932-1933, they considered that "it had always been a thorn in the side of the government". As a result, they enacted the Criminal Code (Amendment) Ordinance in 1934.

Conflicts between rival bodies could also be inimical to the national cause. For instance, several bodies nearly swamped the SANNC. From 1917 onwards, the ISL acted as a disruptive force. Looking upon Congress leaders as petty bourgeois indifferent to African working class struggle against exploitation, the ISL turned the IWA against them. Likewise, the system of Native Conferences initiated under the provisions of the Native Affairs Act No. 38 of 1920 and the Joint Councils of Europeans and Natives started at the time of James Kwegyir Aggrey's visit in 1921 exerted a disintegrating influence upon the SANNC whose leaders came to rely on them. Clashes also occurred between Congress and the CPSA. On the one hand, some of the most outstanding Congress representatives were clergymen and tribal rulers. On the other hand, communists denounced religion as the opium of the people and looked forward to a classless society. Embittered by personal ambitions to take over Congress leadership, these ideological antagonisms culminated in the fall of Congress pro-communist president - J.T. Gumede - at the Bloemfontein Conference of 1930. Finally, the setting up of the AAC in December 1935 deprived the SANNC of its raison d'être.

Algerian national movements had also to ward off the challenges of competitive societies as well as to overcome their divergences. French communists' authoritarianism and consequent tactics to come into sight as the undisputed leader of the proletariat in the metropolis hindered the development of the ENA. However, Messalists resented their interference and reacted. In 1931 they



compelled Algerian communists to choose the Etoile or the PCF. In Algeria, the Fédération des Elus Musulmans d'Algérie and the AUMA were divided over the issue French citizenship versus Muslim status, and the Elus' hostility against the ulama in 1936 somehow justified government repression against the latter.

Organizational shortcomings, factionalism, personal squabbles further vitiated African nationalist bodies. The Mouvement Jeune Algérien, the Fédération des Elus Musulmans d'Algérie, the NCBWA were deprived of a solid base, and the absence of branches lessened their impact on African populations. The ARPS rules and regulations provided for local branches in Cape Coast, Accra and Axim to secure following. However, they were loosely connected, and the ARPS showed signs of a bad functioning very early. From the time of its foundation in 1912 up to 1919, the SANNC representatives did not dispose of a definite Constitution. They worked without a precise programme and without a clear idea of the methods to be used to implement it. The lack of a specific and common policy brought about internal conflicts, and undermined Congress struggle against government oppression. In June 1917, Congressmen compelled J.L. Dube, then president, and RVS Thema, his secretary, to resign on the ground that their approval of the principle of territorial separation implied in the Natives' Land Act No. 27 of 1913 compromised their cause.

Factionalism plagued African nationalist movements and impaired their effectiveness. In the Gold Coast, it provoked a crisis in 1903 when the Cape Coast rump tried to impose its dictate on the society. A dissident group led by Casely Hayford, Kobina Sekyi and F. Nanka Bruce gave another blow to the ARPS unity in 1920. So far, modern and traditional elites banded together and successfully opposed the government measures they deemed prejudicial to their people's welfare. However, the franchise issue, combined with educated Africans' desire to secure more independence from tribal rulers who had become government nominees, and had lost their power and prestige, led to internal strife. The colonial government successfully exploited the cold war between the two factions. They namely devised separate franchise schemes for the intelligentsia on the one hand, and for tribal authorities on the other hand, and purposely favoured the latter.

Factionalism also crippled the SANNC, and contributed to its steady waning. It reached a climax in 1930, and reduced the SANNC to impotence. J.L. Dube's thirst for power and provincialism caused much confusion within Congress. His dispute

with J.T. Gumede who wished to maintain a coordination between the National Congress and Dube's Natal Native Congress after 1927, his dislike for Congress "Minister of Labour" - AWG Champion - and for what he considered his rabble-rousing methods, his falling out with Pixley Ka Isaka Seme, introduced tensions within Congress, and frittered away its members' energies. Seme was guilty of this discord, too. He sought to strengthen the "esprit de corps of the Zulu nation", and thereby, revived tribal feuds instead of healing them [21].

Factionalism divided Algerian leaders, too. In 1919, the Mouvement Jeune Algerien split up into two rival groups, one led by Dr Belkacem Benthami and standing for integral naturalization, the other spearheaded by Emir Khaled and upholding Islamic values. Khaled's charisma and popularity further widened the gap between them. However, the common fear of an Algerian dominion where they would be the prey of the local government drew the Jeunes Algeriens nearer. Therefore, in their case, the national imperative triumphed over all other considerations.

Like Emir Khaled, Ibn Badis was a moderate man, and tried to foster unity among African nationalists. He had been instrumental in setting up the Muslim Congress in 1936. However, members of the Fédération des Elus Musulmans d'Algérie threatened to open breaches in this united front. Alienated by his French culture, victim of the colonial rulers' manoeuvres, Bendjelloul called for oppressive measures against Arabs'. On 5 October 1936, the Congress executive committee expelled him from its presidency. The withdrawal in 1938 of the Blum-Viollette Bill which allowed certain categories of Algerians to return a deputy to the Chamber of the French Parliament shattered his faith in the imperial power, and reminded him that he had to share the fate of the Arab section of Algerian population. The colonial rulers' iron hand, then, contributed to cement Algerians' bonds.

The criteria posited by Lonsdale's model were central focus, radical programmes and mass support. Algerian national movement seems to be the closest to Lonsdale's definition, then come African Nationalism in South Africa and the Gold Coast. After World War I, African politicians pressed for the application of T.W. Wilson's principle of self-determination to their countries. However, Algerians started to lose faith in the imperial power whereas South African and Gold Coast leaders clung to it. On 10-12 February 1927, Messali called for an independent

Algeria, endowed with its own Parliament, and this question continued to be his pet subject in 1936 [22].

In South Africa, the government ruthless policy and especially the abolition of the Cape African franchise sought by Hertzog's Bills of 1927 increasingly led some African politicians to think of "an Africa for the Africans" and of revolutionary means to achieve political freedom [23]. But, the political naivete of the majority of them always turned the scales. They nursed the dim hope that the Union government might grant them some modicum of representation in the Union Parliament and agreed to use the NRC offered them by the Representation of Natives in Parliament Bill of 31 December 1935 as an alternative to shield Africans' rights. Congress leaders such as J.L. Dube, T.M. Mapikela, J.S. Moroka and Z.K. Matthews ran for it [24].

In the 1930s, Algerian leaders were not only more politically mature, but also better prepared to take on their responsibilities in difficult times than their counterparts in South Africa and the Gold Coast. One element of Algerians leaders' strength lay, above all, in the belief that they belonged to a Muslim community. This assertion implied ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural unity. Islam constituted a strong factor of cohesion between elites and masses. Therefore, Algerian politicians could easily win over mass support. Algerians also took part in World War I in a combatant capacity in Europe. This experience strengthened Algerian recruits' patriotism and solidarity, and allowed them to view weapons as useful instruments against oppression. These factors associated with government repression, the blatant class opposition between Algerian and French communities in both Algeria and the metropolis, later urged Algerian nationalists to take by force what they could not by constitutional channels.

Compared with Algerians, Black South-Africans were less ready to follow such a course for three major reasons. First, the latter formed a fragmented society. The absence of a common language, the destruction of their identity by an alien culture, the introduction of different religious loyalties by the various Christian denominations, provincialism, tribalism, the system of migratory labour and Africans' subsequent lack of stability in a milieu where their collective consciousness could ripen through contacts between members of different tribes, cut them off from one another. Secondly, their involvement in World War I exerted a less strong impact upon them than upon Algerians for the SANLC did not fight in

Europe. Thirdly, territorial segregation in South Africa contributed to slow down Africans' awareness of class antagonisms. Unlike Algerians who had no experience of the colour bar, it blunted their need to change society for the better.

The NCBWA leaders put forward less radical proposals than Algerian or South African politicians. In the 1920s, they looked forward to a self-governing British West Africa within the British Empire, and did not press for the implementation of this scheme in the near future [25]. In 1927, they consistently called for only more seats in the existing legislative council. At no time did they seek to overturn the political regime under which they lived. The absence of settler communities, the possession of their land made them feel more secure than Algerians and Black South Africans. Two decades later, the Gold Coast Nationalists nevertheless became more exacting. Indeed, British rulers' reluctance to hand over political power to the Gold Coast inhabitants compelled Kwame Nkrumah's Convention People Party set up on 12 June 1949 to ask for "Self-government Now" [26].

African elites in Algeria, the Gold Coast and South Africa saw themselves as part and parcel of their people, and displayed a general awareness of their problems in both urban and rural areas. They strove to record their grievances and presented national programmes to their respective governments. Algerian and South African leaders realized the relationship between their people's despoilment of their land and their proletarianization. The ENA, more than the SANNC representatives, had a first-hand knowledge of Africans' working conditions. As a result, they put forward a more comprehensive and far-reaching programme. They called for the confiscation of colonial estates and their allotment to the fellahin, agricultural loans, social security, reserve funds, unemployment benefits, family allowances.

Although they hit the nail on the head, the SANNC leaders adopted a more general approach to the problems of African working class. They deprecated the pass laws apparatus which curtailed Africans' bargaining power in the labour market, and thereby, condemned them to starvation wages.

In the Gold Coast, African economic grievances were less acute than in Algeria and South Africa. The NCBWA members nevertheless noted the divorce between the production performed by African farmers and trade monopolized by European firms.

To put an end to African cocoa growers' exploitation by European merchants, they pressed for an adjustment of prices as well as for the expansion of the market which was restricted to Britain and to her allies.

African nationalists emphasized the crucial importance of education as a means to develop their countries. By and large, they called for more schools, for a free, compulsory training at all levels and adapted to the local conditions and needs. They sometimes set up schools on their own initiative. They insisted on agricultural instruction, and particularly focussed on industrial training. They realized their dependence on the West to acquire the know-how of different skills, but stood against neo-colonialism, and sought cooperation on an equal basis. They did not seem to understand that the essence of European capitalistic mode of production, and the competition it implied rendered their requirement difficult, if not impossible, to fulfil.

African leaders were confronted with another momentous question: the language in which education had to be given. Algerians felt that Arabic should be put on the same footing as French to preserve their identity. African politicians in the Gold Coast and in South Africa looked upon the vernacular as an instrument of division, cast it away, and wished to be acquainted with the rulers' language to protect their rights.

They also protested against racial discrimination in the public service, and demanded equal opportunities for African and European civil service. Owing to the stern colour bar in South Africa urban centres, the problem was still latent.

Mass support conveys the effectiveness of a nationalist movement, and in this respect, too, Algerians took the lead. In 1927, the ENA managed to mobilize 3,000 North Africans. Their numbers rose to 4,000 in Paris and its neighbourhood in 1929 [27]. The SANNC reached the latter figure in 1939 [28]. The ARPS and NCBWA did not seem to have a recorded membership.

The Gold Coast, Algerian and South African leaders launched the basis of an African nationalism. Their colonial situation as well as their similar goals led them to believe that cooperation on a large scale would be more fruitful than an individual, isolated struggle. E.W. Blyden, a West Indian of African descent, and J.A.B. Horton, an African of Ibo origin, who both suffered from segregation

triggered the movement in British West Africa. Under their influence, Casely Hayford together with other British West African leaders sought to lay the foundation stone of a British West African nation. They were aware of the impediments likely to thwart their joint undertaking. British rulers acquired their countries and governed them through different methods. Linguistic differences tended to cut them off from one another. However, they thought they might overcome them. Examples of successful movements in other parts of the world as in India, Canada, and Australia spurred on them. The model of the United Kingdom and that of the American nation further stimulated them. The former consisted of different ethnics; the latter included an amalgam of languages, creeds and institutions.

Seeing no insuperable obstacle, they consequently set up the NCBWA during the conference held at Accra from 11 to 29 March 1920, and issued a number of resolutions. However, from the very start, British authorities denied Congress a representative character, and opposed it. Owing to this and other difficulties, the NCBWA leaders were unable to meet once a year as they had agreed at Accra in 1920. The other general meetings took place at Freetown, Sierra Leone, in January - February 1923, at Bathurst in the Gambia from December 1925 to <sup>January</sup> 1926, and at Lagos from December 1929 to January 1930. This embryo of African Nationalism survived. Although he did not mention the NCBWA in his Africa Must Unite, Kwame Nkrumah followed the path of its leaders. He proposed a "Union of African States", and thereby, gave to the incipient African nationalism of the 1920s new dimensions [29].

Algerian nationalists contributed to the rise of African nationalism and Arab nationalism. As stipulated by article 3 of its statutes of 19 February 1928, the ENA called for the independence of the three North African countries and sought to promote their socio-economic and political interests [30]. Messali's denunciation of Italian invasion of Ethiopia, his relationship with Amir Shakib Arslan, their discussion about <sup>Libyan</sup> Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian problems constitute further clues to his broad vision [31]. He saw himself as an Algerian, a Maghribi, a member of the African continent as well as of the Arab world. However, the neglect of the organizational aspect of their common struggle against imperialism as well as the French government ruthless repression condemned it to impotence.

In the Southern part of Africa, African nationalism also emerged. Between 1927 and 1929, the SANNC and the Basutoland Lekhotla La Bafo tried to cooperate. However, the Basutoland administrators were determined to kill the nascent movement in the bud. They kept detailed records of the SANNC representatives likely to go to Basutoland, and waited for them to drive them back [32].

African nationalism then stemmed from Africans' experience of colonialism. Pan-Africanism exerted little influence on Black politicians in the Gold Coast and South Africa and even less on Algerian leaders. In the Gold Coast, Casely Hayford deprecated the provincialism of both B.T. Washington and WEB DuBois [33]. Casely Hayford, J.K. Aggrey and Kobina Sekyi held Garveyism at arms' length, too, their ideal of racial cooperation being incompatible with Garvey's radicalism. Casely Hayford, in particular, looked unfavourably upon Garvey's claim to leadership and upon his settlement scheme [34].

The SANNC leading men adopted an ambivalent attitude toward Pan-African thinking. A few members such as J.L. Dube, S.T. Plaatje, and A.B. Xuma endorsed B.T. Washington's idea of self-help. Others like R.V.S. Thema sounded the bell against his faith in the Whites' understanding. The Whites in South Africa lacked the altruism of an Abraham Lincoln, he pointed out, and therefore it would be incongruous to rely on them [35]. The disenfranchisement of Cape Africans in 1935 proved the correctness of his viewpoint. By and large, then, national movements in Africa were influenced by special rather than general characteristics of imperialism.

## NOTES

PREFACE, pp. 1-9

1. See R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (London, 1946) pp. 26-27.
2. El Moudjahid, 3 Nov, 1981.
3. T. Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (New York, 1957) p. 23.
4. J. Lonsdale, "The Emergence of African Nations. A Historiographical Analysis" African Affairs (1968) 67 p. 11.
5. M. Mahdi, Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History. A study in the Philosophic Foundation of the Science of Culture (London, 1964) 2nd Ed. (London, 1971) pp. 71, 147.
6. W.H. Walsh, An Introduction to Philosophy of History (London, 1963) p. 49.
7. B. Croce, History. Its Theory and Practice (New York, 1960) pp. 134-135.
8. Collingwood, p. 269.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 214.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 234-236, 274.
11. C.W. Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York, 1951) pp. 14-15.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.
13. P. Burke, Sociology and History (London, 1980) pp. 82-83.
14. T.B. Bottomore and M. Ruel (Eds), Karl Marx. Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1956) p. 75.
15. K. Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (London, 1859) New Ed. with an introduction by M. Dobb (London, 1971) pp. 20-21.
16. A. Gramsci, Selection from Political Writings, 1910-1920 (London, 1977) p. 3.
17. Paolo Freire gave a very illuminating analysis of the relationship between oppressors and oppressed in his Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Harmondsworth, Middlesex), 1972.
18. See: P.L. Berger, Invitation to Sociology. A Humanistic Perspective (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1963) pp. 52-53.
19. Burke, p. 33.
20. See: H.A. Wieschoff (Ed)., Colonial Policies in Africa (Philadelphia, 1944) pp. 40, 43 has influenced my thinking.

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1. R.F. Betts, Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914 (New York and London, 1961) p. 20.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 115-116.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 97.
4. Hectare (ha): one hectare equals 24.71 acres. Metric measures are used in this study to comply with the system used by the vast majority of writers on Algerian questions. This part of the thesis is based on a prior study of land-policy in Algeria : see B. Lahouel, State and Self-management in Algeria 1962-1969 (Unpublished D.E.A. thesis, University of Oran, 1977) pp. 53-84.
5. Dey and Beys: Ottoman officials in Algeria.
6. Sahel: Sea-shore. It also refers to the desert.
7. J. Ruedy, Land Policy in Colonial Algeria (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967) pp. 7-9. See also Le Mobacher, 24 May 1893.
8. Bilad: (bled) country or countryside as distinct from city.
9. C.R. Ageron, Histoire de l'Algérie Contemporaine (Vendome, 1964) p. 18.
10. M. Lacheraf, L'Algérie, Nation et Société (Paris, 1965) p. 78.



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11. Y. Lacoste, A. Nouschi and A. Prenant, L'Algérie, Passé et Présent (Paris, 1960) p. 228.
12. Ibid.
13. W. Esterhazy: French Marshal.
14. Lacoste, Nouschi and Prenant, p. 354.
15. Lacoste, Nouschi and Prenant, p. 354.
16. Lacoste, Nouschi and Prenant, pp. 160-161.
17. Ibid., fellahin (singular fellah): Algerian "peasants".
18. R.J. Brace, Ordeal in Algeria (New York, 1960) p. 7.
19. W.O.: A.1537(6). J. Mirante, "La France et les Oeuvres Indigènes en Algérie" Cahiers du Centenaire de l'Algérie (1930) XI, pp 98-99. See also Ruedy, p. 67.
20. D. Sari, La Dépossession des Fellahs (Algiers, 1978) pp. 11, 13.
21. Ruedy, p. 22.
22. Ibid.
23. Brace, p. 17.
24. W.O.:A.154 Campagnes d'Afrique, 1835-48; Lettres adressées par les Maréchaux Bugeaud, Clauzel, Valée, Canrobert, Forêt, Bosquet et les Généraux Changarnier, De Lamoricière, Le Flo, De Negrier, De Wimpffen, Clerr (Paris, 1898) p. 273 (hereafter quoted as: Campagnes d'Afrique, 1835-1848). See also Lacheraf, p. 93.
25. W.O.:A.154. Campagnes d'Afrique, 1835-1848, p. 339.
26. C.R. Ageron, Les Algériens Musulmans et la France, 1871-1919 (Paris, 1968) p. 216; F. Lavagne, J. Feller, and Y. Garnier-Rizet, Les Origines de la Guerre d'Algérie (Paris, 1962) p. 41.
27. Sari, La Dépossession des Fellahs, p. 14.
28. Ibid.
29. C.R. Ageron, Politiques Coloniales au Maghreb (Paris, 1972) p. 228.
30. Sari, La Dépossession des Fellahs, p. 14.
31. Ruedy, p. 92; M. Cornaton, Les Regroupements de la Colonisation en Algérie, (Paris, 1967) p. 28.
32. L. Hahn, North Africa, Nationalism to Nationhood (W.ington, 1960) p. 136.
33. L'Union, 16 Nov, 1927.
34. Douar: Muslim village or tribal unit.
35. V. Confer, France and Algeria: The Problem of Civil and Political Reforms, 1870-1920 (New York, 1966) pp. 23-24; Lacoste, Nouschi and Prenant, p. 398; A. Megherbi, La Paysannerie Algérienne Face à la Colonisation (Algiers, 1973) p. 73. Admiral de Geydon prepared the Code de l'Indigénat: Ageron, Histoire de l'Algérie Contemporaine, 1964, p. 45.
36. Ageron, Les Algériens Musulmans et la France.., p. 207.
37. Lacoste, Nouschi and Prenant, p. 378.
38. M. Launay, Paysans Algériens (Paris, 1963) p. 132.
39. W.O.:A.1537(6). Mirante, "La France et les Oeuvres Indigènes en Algérie" p. 104
40. C.R. Ageron, Histoire de l'Algérie Contemporaine 2 Vols. (Paris, 1979) pp. 90-91, 99.
41. G. Meynier, L'Algérie Révélée, La Guerre de 1914-1918 et le Premier Quart du XXe Siècle (Genève, 1981) pp. 22-24; Priestley, France Overseas. A Study of Modern Imperialism (London, 1966) p. 144.
42. W.O.:A.1537(6). Mirante, "La France et les Oeuvres Indigènes en Algérie" p. 26.

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43. Ibid., pp. 26-27; Meynier, p. 142; P. Rimbault, "Une Grande Réforme Algérienne. Les Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance" En Terre d'Islam (1931)VI, No. 44, pp. 69-72.
44. Lacoste, Nouschi and Prenant, p. 374.
45. Meynier, p. 146. French quintal is equivalent to 220.46 pounds.
46. C. Chaulet, La Mitidja Autogérée (Algiers, 1971) p. 26
47. J. Tiquet, "L'Emigration des Indigènes Algériens en France. Conséquences Economiques". En Terre d'Islam (1930)V, No. 39, p.286.
48. Ibid., pp. 288-289.
49. C. Lainné, "Notre Politique Indigène. Historique", En Terre d'Islam (1929)IV, No. 28, p. 121, Launay, p. 108.
50. M. Lazreg, The Emergence of Classes in Algeria. A Study of Colonialism and Socio-Political Change (Colorado, 1976) p. 52.
51. Meynier, pp. 201-202.
52. See: M. Kaddache, Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien, I, pp 172-173; Meynier, p. 474.
53. Meynier, pp. 466-467.
54. "Sarrazins" : pejorative term applied to Algerians.
55. Sidi : form of polite address in Algeria.
56. Meynier, pp. 469-476.
57. Ibid., p. 482.
58. Ibid.
59. R.V.C. Bodley, Algeria From Within (London, N.D.) p. 46.
60. Confer, pp. 35-36.
61. H.J. Liebesny, The Government of French North Africa (Philadelphia, 1943) pp. 83-87.
62. Ibid. See also Confer, p. 23.
63. Bodley, pp. 51-53.
64. Ibid., p. 46; Liebesny, p. 89.
65. W.O.:A.71 L. Horrie, Le Cadi, Juge Musulman en Algérie (Algiers, 1935) pp. 121-128.
66. Liebesny, pp. 93-104; See also W.O.:A.1488(5). C. Legrand, De l'Organisation Judiciaire en Algérie, 1830-77 (Paris, 1877) p. 2.
67. Lacheraf, p. 60.
68. D. Sari, L'Insurrection de 1881-1882 (Algiers, 1981) p. 70.
69. Ibid., pp. 71-72. Couscous: Algerian basic meal.
70. Sari, La Dépossession de Fellahs, p. 63.
71. See Meynier, pp. 203-206, 268-270, 545-546, 587-589.
72. Betts, p. 19.
73. Le Mobacher, 30 Jan. 1892.
74. Y. Turin, Affrontements Culturels dans l'Algérie Coloniale. Ecoles, Médecins. Religion, 1830-1880 (Paris, 1971) p. 31.
75. A. Djeghloul, "M'Hamed Ben Rahal et la Question de l'Instruction en Algerie" Madjallat-et-Tarikh (1977) 4-5, p. 62.
76. WO:8027. A. Challamel (Ed.) les communes Mixtes et le Gouvernement des Indigènes (Paris, 1897) p. 101.
77. W.O.:A.1030. M.C. Lutaud, Discours Prononcé à la Chambre des Députés par M. Ch. Lutaud, Gouverneur Général de l'Algérie au cours de la Discussion des Interprétations sur la Politique Indigène du Gouvernement de l'Afrique du Nord, Séances des 3 Juil. et 9 Fev 1914, p. 166.
78. X. Yacono, Les Bureaux Arabes et l'Evolution des Genres de Vie Indigènes dans l'Quest du Tell Algerois: Dahra, Chélif, Oarsenis, Sersou (Paris, 1953) pp. 220-221.

## PART I, CHAPTER I, pp. 43-47

79. T.I. Urbain married a Muslim girl before a qadi in Constantine in 1940. A year later, he was appointed to the Direction des Affaires de l'Algérie or Bureau of Algerian Affairs in Paris. In 1960, he became Conseiller Rapporteur au Conseil du Gouvernement or Councillor-Reporter to the Government Council. See: C.R. Ageron, L'Algérie Algérienne de Napoléon III à De Gaulle (Paris 1980) pp. 19-20.
80. Ibid., p. 24.
81. WO:8027. Challamel, p. 40; Meynier, pp. 215-216, 547, Djeghloul, p. 61-79; Priestley, p. 146.
82. As quoted by Djeghloul, p. 67.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid., p. 68.
86. Ibid., pp 74-75. Ulama (singular alim): doctors in Muslim law; Talaba (sing. talib): students.
87. J. Ferry (1832-1896) from a middle class family, he studied in Paris where he chose the profession of lawyer. In 1873, he took the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. In March 1891, he was selected as Chairman of an eighteen-member commission to analyse the needs of Algeria. After a trip to Algeria with some members of the commission, he drew up a report embodying major proposals for change put forward by colonial experts as well as by a few Algerians: see: Confer, p. 15; J. Ganiage, L'Expansion Coloniale de la France sous la Troisième République, 1871-1914 (Paris, 1968) pp. 45-55.
88. Djeghloul, pp. 76-77; C.A. Julien Etudes Maghrébines Paris, 1964) p. 219.

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1. C.A. Julien, Etudes Maghrébines (Paris, 1964) p. 217.
2. Ibid., p. 219.
3. Ibid., p. 220.
4. Ibid.
5. Ageron, Histoire de l'Algérie Contemporaine, 1979, pp. 316-317; Algérie Actualité, 6-12 March 1980.
6. Julien, Etudes Maghrébines, pp. 226, 229.
7. C.R. Ageron, Politiques Coloniales au Maghreb (Paris, 1972) p. 250; spahis: Algerian cavalry corps serving under French Government.
8. W.O.: A.1030. Lutaud, pp. 116-117. the
9. Ibid., pp. 254-259. See also Ageron, Politiques Coloniales au Maghreb, pp. 254-259.
10. Kaddache, Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien., I, pp. 180, 184-188. Jacques Doriot was well-known for his radical views. On 25 May 1925 he asserted at the chamber that Moroccans were entitled to independence, that Muslims were with Abdulkrim, and that the example of the Riff would urge the oppressed in other parts of Africa to rise up against France: Ibid., p. 180.
11. F. Abbas, Guerre et Révolution d'Algérie. La Nuit Coloniale (Paris, 1962) p. 135.
12. C. Collot and J.R. Henry, Le Mouvement National Algérien Textes, 1912-1954 (Algiers, 1981) p. 38.
13. R. De Rochebrune, Les Mémoires de Messali Hadj, 1898-1938 (Paris, 1982) pp. 141, 199, 293. Kaddache, Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien, I, pp. 188, 481-488.

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14. De Rochebrune, p. 94.
15. Ibid., p. 289. See also pp. 86-106.
16. Ibid., pp 59, 124, 136, 157. Algérie Actualité, 6-12 March 1980
17. See texts in Collot and Henry, pp. 38-39, 48-51.
18. W.O.: B.373 (II). La Barre de Nanteuil, Ferhat Abbas et le Mouvement revendicatif (Mémoire de Stage de l'Ecole Nationale d'administration, March 1948) pp. 1-5.
19. See text in Collot and Henry, pp. 40-43.
20. Collot and Henry, p. 44.
21. M. Tegua, L'Algérie en Guerre (Algiers, N.D.) p. 48.
22. W.O.: B.375(2). P. Merle to Pierre Lambert, prefect of Oran, Les Ulama Réformistes Algériens (1955) pp. 14-19; Kaddache, Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien, I, P. 333; Abbas, Guerre et Révolution d'Algérie, p. 126.
23. See text in Collot and Henry, pp. 44-47.
24. Kaddache, Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien..., p. 333.
25. Ibid., p. 285.
26. Ibid., p. 289.
27. Ibid., p. 300.
28. Ibid., p. 296-297.
29. Ibid., p. 296-377.
30. Ibid., p. 334.
31. S. Chikh, La Révolution Algérienne. Projet et Action, 1954-1962, 3 Vols. (Thèse de Doctorat d'Etat des Sciences Politiques, Grenoble, May 1975) I, p. 31.
32. See text in Collot and Henry, pp. 66-67.
33. Ibid., p. 68.
34. A. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (London, 1962) p. 120.
35. Ibid., p. 232.
36. Ibid., pp. 103-244.
37. Ageron, Politiques Coloniales au Maghreb, p. 255
38. M. Kaddache, La Vie Politique à Alger de 1919 à 1939 (Algiers, 1970) pp. 66-67.
39. See Hourani, p. 222.
40. A Noushi, La Naissance du Nationalisme Algérien, (Paris, 1962) p. 62.
41. De Rochebrune, p. 124, 133, 152-153, 186, 196, 289.
42. Kaddache, Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien, pp. 474, 933.
43. De Rochebrune, p. 137-172.
44. Kaddache, Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien, pp. 220-221.
45. Ibid., p. 221.
46. Ibid, See also: J. Desparmet, "Contribution à l'Histoire Contemporaine de l'Algérie. La Politique des ulama Algériens, 1911-1937" L'Afrique Française (Juillet 1937) p. 354; Chikh, p. 27.
47. Lavagne, Feller and Garnier-Rizet, p. 69.
48. J. Gillespie, Algeria, Rebellion and Revolution (London, 1960) p. 46
49. M.A.D. "Le Réformisme Musulman dans l'Aurès". La France Méditerranéenne et Africaine (1938), No. 1, pp. 92-97.
50. Abbas, Guerre et Révolution d'Algérie, p. 121.
51. F. Abbas, De la Colonie vers la Province. Le Jeune Algérien suivi du Rapport au Maréchal Pétain (Paris, 1981) p. 27.
52. See text in Collot and Henry, p. 41.
53. Abbas, De la Colonie vers la Province, p. 77.
54. See M. Lazreg, p. 37.

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55. Abbas, De la Colonie vers la Province, p. 15.
56. Abbas, Guerre et Révolution d'Algérie, p. 45.
57. Abbas, De la Colonie vers la Province, p. 114.
58. Abbas, Guerre et Révolution d'Algérie, p. 121.
59. Abbas, De la Colonie vers la Province, p. 134.
60. Ageron, Histoire de l'Algérie Contemporaine, 1974, p. 316; Julien, Etudes Maghrébines, p. 223.
61. Kaddache, Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien, pp. 103, 266-270, 335.
62. W.O.: B.373(II). La Barre de Nanteuil, p. 10; Abbas, De la Colonie vers la Province, p. 26.
63. De Rochebrune, pp. 180-181, 226-227, 235.
64. See texts in Collot and Henry, pp. 107, 123-124.
65. De Rochebrune, p. 228.
66. A. Merad, Le Réformisme Musulman en Algérie de 1925 à 1940. Essai d'Histoire Religieuse et Sociale (Paris, 1967) pp. 140-142.
67. A. Laroui, The History of the Maghrib (Princeton, 1977) p. 362.
68. W.O.: B.373(II). La Barre de Nanteuil, p. 10.
69. Kaddache, Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien..., p. 194.

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., pp. 60, 91-95.
4. See text in C.A. Julien, Une Pensée Anti-coloniale. 1974-1979 (Paris, 1979) pp. 26-28.
5. Meynier, pp. 96-99, 280-282; C.R. Ageron, L'Algérie Algérienne de Napoléon III à de Gaulle (Paris, 1980) p. 112; one douro: 0,05F.
6. W.O.: A.465(9). Note sur les Mesures Demandées par les Musulmans Français d'Algérie en Compensation de la Conscription Militaire (Paris, June 1912).
7. Confer, pp. 55-59, 64-92.
8. Ageron, Histoire de l'Algérie Contemporaine, 1964, p. 73.
9. Confer, pp. 99-102.
10. A.1470(10). Jonnart, Discours prononcé à la Chambre des Députés sur le Projet de Loi relatif à l'accès des Indigènes de l'Algérie aux Droits Politiques, 7 Novembre 1918.
11. L'Ikdam, 7 March 1919.
12. Ageron, Histoire de l'Algérie Contemporaine, 1964, p. 75. See also L'Union, 16 December 1927.
13. L'Ikdam, 7 March 1919.
14. Ibid., 15 March 1919.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 5 April 1919.
17. Algérie-Actualité, 6-12 March 1980.
18. Ibid.
19. Ageron, Politiques Coloniales au Maghreb, pp. 261, 265.
20. Meynier, p. 720.
21. Ibid., pp. 717-719, 727.
22. Ageron, Politiques Coloniales au Maghreb, pp. 267-271.
23. W.O.: A.1488(2). A Lavenarde, La Représentation des Indigènes Musulmans non-naturalisés de l'Algérie au Parlement Français (Paris, 1922) pp. 26-27.

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24. See text in Kaddache, Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien. II, p. 890.
25. Ageron, Politiques Coloniales au Maghreb, pp. 268-273, Kaddache, Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien. I, pp. 116-117.
26. W.O.: A.1470(8). Emir Khaled, La Situation des Musulmans d'Algérie. Conférences faites à Paris le 12 et 19 Juillet devant plus de 12000 auditeurs (Algiers, 1924) pp. 3, 24-28.
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28. Ageron, Histoire de l'Algérie Contemporaine, 1979, pp. 392-393.
29. A.1189(9). J. Melia, Pour la Représentation Parlementaire des Indigènes Musulmans d'Algérie (Paris, 1927) pp. 35, 39, 43.
30. L'Union, 16 November 1927.
31. See Text in Collot and Henry, pp. 70-73.
32. Kaddache, Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien, I, pp. 435-445; De Rochebrune, p. 226.
33. See Text in Kaddache, Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien, II, pp. 920-921.
34. See Text in Collot and Henry, p. 110; Kaddache, Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien, I, p. 436.
35. Kaddache, Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien, I, p. 459.
36. See Text in Collot and Henry, p. 110.
37. Ageron, Histoire de l'Algérie Contemporaine, 1964, p. 91.
38. De Rochebrune, p. 239.
39. See Text in Collot and Henry, pp. 39, 84.
40. De Rochebrune, p. 37; L'Ikdam, 7 March 1919.
41. W.O.: A.1470(8). Khaled, La Situation des Musulmans d'Algérie, p. 15.
42. C. Martin, Histoire de l'Algérie Française, 1830-1962 (Paris, 1963) p. 275.
43. See Text in Collot and Henry, p. 73.
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45. W.O.: A.1470(8). Khaled, La Situation des Musulmans d'Algérie, p. 4; Collot and Henry, p. 53; Abbas, Guerre et Révolution d'Algérie, pp. 15, 45-46, 130.
46. See Text in Collot and Henry, p. 76-77.
47. W.O.: B.373(8). La Barre de Nanteuil, p. 25.
48. Ageron, Politiques Coloniales au Maghreb, p. 151.
49. Ibid., p. 152.
50. Ibid., pp. 163-172.
51. Kaddache, Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien..., p. 128.
52. Ageron, Politiques Coloniales au Maghreb, p. 181.
53. Kaddache, Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien, I, p. 130.
54. Collot and Henry, p. 35.
55. Ageron, Politiques Coloniales au Maghreb, p. 185.
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61. De Rochebrune, p. 171.
62. Kaddache, Histoire du Nationalisme Algérien, I, pp. 299-300.
63. Collot and Henry, pp. 54-59, 85.
64. Ibid., p. 54; Kaddache, Histoire Du Nationalisme Algérien, I, p. 146.

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5. E.W. Blyden, "African Life and Customs" in Langley, Ideologies of Liberation in Black Africa, 1856-1970. Documents on Modern African Political thought from Colonial Times to the Present, (London, 1979) pp. 78-79.
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14. R.H. Lynch, "Edward Wilmot Blyden: Pioneer West African Nationalist" JAH (1965) p. 385.
15. The Gold Coast Leader, 10 Sep. 1904.
16. C. Fyfe, Africanus Horton, 1835-83: West African Scientist and Patriot (New York, 1972) pp. 22-34; see also CO.96/60, Pine to Duke of Newcastle 36, 5 May 1963.
17. See CO.96/64, Hackett to Duke of Newcastle 51, 12 May 1864; CO.96/71, Conran to Cardwell 4583, 2 April 1866; CO96/74, Usher to Duke of Buckingham 67, 30 Oct. 1867; CO.96/74 Usher to Duke of Buckingham 83, 13 Nov. 1867; Fyfe, Africanus Horton, p. 43.
18. CO/96/94, Letter from Horton to Earl of Kimberley, 13 Aug. 1872
19. CO/96/94, Pope Henessy to Earl of Kimberley 90, 24 Oct. 1872.
20. CO/96/94, Minute by Woodehouse, 20 Nov. 1872.
21. JAB. Horton, West African Countries and Peoples (Edinburgh, 1868) pp. 113-114.
22. Ibid., pp. 105-106.; JAB. Horton, Letters on the Political Conditions of the Gold Coast (London, 1870) New Impression (London, 1970) p. 142.
23. The Gold Coast Leader, 10 Sept. 1904; Horton, Letters on the Political Conditions of the Gold Coast, pp. 142-143.
24. Horton, West African Countries and Peoples, pp. 185, 191, 232.
25. Ibid., p. 107.
26. Ibid., pp. 4-9, 31-52.
27. Ibid., p. 28.
28. Ibid., pp. 58-59.
29. Fyfe, Africanus Horton..., p. 156.
30. Horton, Letters on the Political Conditions of the Gold Coast, p.i.
31. Ibid., pp. ii.
32. Fyfe, Africanus Horton..., pp. 96-99; see also CO.96/6, Lilley to Stanley 18, 28 Feb. 1845; CO.96/13, Winnett to Earl Grey 44, 30 June 1848; CO.96/41, Pine to Labouchere 83, 26 Nov. 1857.
33. H.S. Wilson (Ed.), Origins of West African Nationalism (London, 1969) p. 150.

## PART II, CHAPTER IV, pp. 140-147

34. J.D. Hargreaves, A Life of Sir Samuel Lewis (London, 1958) pp. 13-17.
35. B. Davidson, Africa in Modern History. The Search for a New Society, (London, 1978) p. 176.
36. J.D. Hargreaves, A Life of Sir Samuel Lewis, pp. 11-17.
37. The Gold Coast Leader, 9 Jan. 1904.
38. Hayford, Ethiopia Unbound, p. 192.
39. The Gold Coast Leader, 24 Feb. 1906.
40. Hayford, Ethiopia Unbound, p. 18.
41. SRBA. Ahuma, The Gold Coast Nation and National Consciousness, (Liverpool, 1911) 2nd Ed. (London, 1979) pp. 6-7.
42. Ibid., p. 10.
43. Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions, (London, 1903) New Impression (London, 1970) p. 226.
44. Hayford, Ethiopia Unbound, p. 21.
45. J.W. De Graft Johnson, Towards Nationhood in West Africa (London, 1928) 2nd Ed. (London, 1971) p. 89.
46. Hayford, Ethiopia Unbound, p. 174.
47. Horton, West African Countries and Peoples, p. 60.
48. The Gold Coast Aborigines, 8 Jan. 1898.
49. The Gold Coast Independent, 23 Nov. 1918.
50. The Gold Coast Aborigines, 22 Jan. 1898.
51. Ibid.
52. Horton, West African Countries and Peoples, p. 59; The Gold Coast Aborigines, 26 Feb. 1898; Hayford, Ethiopia Unbound, pp. 171, 194-195.
53. Ahuma, The Gold Coast Nation..., p. 25.
54. The Gold Coast Leader, 10 Oct. 1903.
55. Ibid.
56. Hayford, Ethiopia Unbound, p. 164.
57. Ahuma, The Gold Coast Nation..., p. 60.
58. Ibid., p. 11.
59. The Gold Coast Aborigines, 8 Jan. 1898.
60. Ibid., 11 June 1898.
61. Ahuma, The Gold Coast Nation..., p. 9.
62. De Graft Johnson, p. 50.
63. The Gold Coast Methodist Times, 15 Sept. 1897.

## PART II, CHAPTER V, pp. 148-149

1. J.M. Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws (London, 1897), 3rd Ed. with a new introduction by H.R. Lynch (London 1968), p. 271.
2. CO.96/247, Griffith to Ripon Conf., 29 August 1894
3. CO.96/673/4305/27, Guggisberg to Amery Conf., 21 April 1927, encl.; 2, PP. 19, 12-13, LIX, Cmfd. 62 73, Report (by H.C. Belfield) on the Legislation Governing the Alienation of Native Lands in the Gold Coast and Ashanti, with some observations on the Forest Ordinance, 1911, pp. 8-9. Belfield was born in 1855, and died in 1923. He served in the Malay States from 1888 to 1911. He was Governor of East African Protectorate from 1912 to 1918. See G.C. Metcalfe Great Britain and Ghana Documents of Ghana History: 1807-1957 (London, 1964) p. 536.
4. CO.96/673/4305/27, Guggisberg to Amery Conf., 21 April 1927, encl. 2.
5. CO.96/673/4308/27, Slater to Amery Conf., 861, 12 Nov. 1927.
6. CO.96/614, Slater to Milner 596, 7 July 1920, encl. 1.
7. CO.96/673/4308/27, Slater to Amery Conf., 861, 12 Nov. 1927. encl.



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8. J.E. Casely Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions (London, 1903) New Impression (London, 1970) p. 63.
9. CO.96/583, Ofori Kuma II to CO Secret, 26 Dec. 1917.
10. CO.96/673/4308/27, Slater to Amery Conf., 861, 12 Nov. 1927, encl.
11. J.M. Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution, (London, 1906), 2nd Ed. with a new introduction by H.R. Lynch (London 1968), p. 32.
12. J.E. Casely Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions, p. 73.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
15. J.M. Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution, pp. 32-33.
16. CO.96/673/4305/27, Guggisberg to Amery Conf., 21 April 1927, encl. 2; see also F. Agdobeka, The Rise of the Nation States, (London, 1965) p. 112.
17. W.E.F. Ward, A History of the Gold Coast (London 1952) p. 747.
18. J.M. Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution, p. 8.
19. CO.96/673/4305/27, Slater to Amery 861, 12 Nov. 1927, encl.
20. CO.96/614, Slater to Milner 596, 7 July 1920, encl. 1; See also encl. 6 of the same despatch.
21. J.M. Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution, p. 30.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
23. CO.96/593, Clifford to Long Conf., 3 Oct. 1918.
24. J.M. Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution, pp. 43-44.
25. CO.96/704/7259, Northcote to Cunliffe-Lister Conf., 3 May 1932.
26. CO.96/689/6456/29, Slater to Passfield 717, 27 Sept. 1929, encl. II.
27. CO.96/673/6305/27, Guggisberg to Amery Conf., 21 April 1927.
28. Ka Busia, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti (London, 1968) p. 44.
29. C.W. Newbury, British Policy towards West Africa, (Oxford, 1965) II, p. 523.
30. *Ibid.*, See also CO.96/247, Griffith to Ripon Conf., 29 Aug. 1894, encl. 1; Busia, pp. 44-45.
31. J.M. Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws, p. 273.
32. E.P. Skinner, "Strangers in West African Societies" Africa 33 (1963) pp. 307-320. See W.A. Shack and E.P. Skinner (Ed.), Strangers in West African Societies (London, 1973) p. 14.
33. D. Kimble, A Political History of Ghana (Oxford, 1963) p. 18.
34. S. Johnson, The History of the Yorubas (Lagos, 1956) p. 95.
35. Busia, p. 44.
36. CO.96/247, Griffith to Ripon Conf., 29 Aug. 1894, encl. 1; Busia p. 47.
37. J.M. Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws, pp. 7-8.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
39. Busia, p. 47. Polly Hill who had spent some time in the Gold Coast points out that the individual members of the family never farm jointly as they used to do in the past: See: The Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana. A Study in Rural Capitalism, (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 76, 86.
40. CO.96/247, Griffith to Ripon Conf., 29 Aug. 1894, encl. 1.
41. J.M. Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws, p. 86; Hill, The Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana, p. 138.
42. Sarbah, *Ibid.*
43. J.M. Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws, p. 90.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.
45. J.M. Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws, p. 90.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 274; Hill, The Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana, p. 123.

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47. Busia, p. 43.
48. J.M. Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws, p. 62. In the Gold Coast, there were two types of property: moveable, and immoveable. Moveable property included sandals, cloth, a gold ring... but a house or land belonged to the second type: Ibid., p. 57.
49. Ibid., p. 62.
50. Busia, p. 43.
51. J. Goody, Death, Property and the Ancestors (London, 1962), p. 286.
52. J.M. Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws, p. 272.
53. F. Agbodeka, Ghana in the Twentieth Century (Accra, 1972) p. 30.
54. Gustav Adolph Wanner, Die Basler Handels Yesselchaft A.G., 1858-1959 quoted by Hill, The migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana, p. 171.
55. CO.96/433, Rodger to Lyttelton 607, 1 Dec. 1905, sub. encl. to encl. 1.
56. P. Hill, Ibid., p. 172; Agbodeka, Ibid., p. 30.
57. W.T.D. Tudhope, "The Development of Cocoa Industry in the Gold Coast and Ashanti" JRAS 9 (1909-10) pp. 34-45; Metcalfe, Great Britain and Ghana: Documents of Ghana History, 1807-1957 (London, 1964) p. 439.
58. F. Agbodeka, The Rise of the Nation States (London, 1965) p. 163; Agbodeka, Ghana in the Twentieth Century (Accra, 1972) p. 30; Hill, The migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana, p. 172; Tudhope, p. 35.
59. CO.96/433, Rodger to Lyttelton 607, 1 Dec. 1905, sub. encl. to Encl. 1.
60. CO.96/356, Hodgson to Chamberlain 18, 9 January 1900; Agbodeka, Ghana in the Twentieth Century p. 30;
61. Gold Coast Sessional Paper No. XI, Petition of the Delegation from the Gold Coast and Ashanti, 1934; Ganiage, p. 334.
62. W.K. Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs 2 Vols. (London, 1942) II, ii, p. 274.
63. CO. 96/583, Ofori Kuma II to CO Secret, 26 Dec; 1917.
64. Hill, The Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana, p. 39.
65. W.K. Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs II, ii, p. 281.
66. CO.96/247, Griffith to Ripon Conf., 29 Aug. 1894, encl. 3.
67. Metcalfe, p. 476.
68. Hancock, p. 184.
69. CO.96/342, Maxwell to Chamberlain 316, 19 Aug. 1895.
70. CO.96/342, Maxwell to Chamberlain 316, 19 Aug. 1895.
71. CO.96/247, Griffith to Ripon Conf., 29 Aug. 1894, encl 7.
72. CO.96/295, Maxwell to Bramston 306, 15 July 1897.
73. CO.96/247, Griffith to Ripon Conf., 29 Aug. 1894, encls 1 & 2.
74. Ibid. encl 5.
75. CO.879/46, Chamberlain to Maxwell 513, 13 March 1896.
76. CO.96/300, Hodgson to Chamberlain 495, 23 Dec. 1897.
77. CO.879/47, Chamberlain to Maxwell 513, 13 March 1896.
78. CO.96/311, Hodgson to Chamberlain 69, 12 Feb. 1898, encl. 9.
79. CO.96/542, Clifford to Harcourt 169, 17 March 1914.
80. C.U. Illegbune, "Concessions Scramble and Land Alienation in Southern Ghana, 1885-1915" African Studies Review 19 (1976) pp. 24-25.
81. CO.96/247, Griffith to Ripon Conf., 29 Aug. 1894, encl. 5: The chief Justice Hutchinson who drafted the Land Bill of 1894 wrote: "the practice of making such grants and concessions is quite modern, and is probably illegal according to native law and customs"; CO.96/295, Maxwell to Bramston 306, 15 July 1895, encl. 5: Maxwell under whose governorship the Land Bill of 1897 was issued believed that "the practice of alienating stool land has grown up in recent times". The opposite thesis may be seen

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- in Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution, p. 55; CO.96/583, Kuma II to CO Secret, 26 Dec. 1917, and Kimble, p. 19.
82. J.M. Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution, p. 55; W.E.F. Ward A History of the Gold Coast (London, 1948) 2nd Ed. (London, 1952); R. Howard Colonialism and Under-development in Ghana, (London, 1978) p. 27.
83. J.M. Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution, pp. 55-57. M. Priestley, West Trade and Coast Society. A Family Study, (London, 1969) p. XIV.
84. J.M. Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution, pp. 61.
85. *Ibid.*, pp. 61-65; Ward, p. 66.
86. CO.96/692/6569/30, Slater to Passfield 933, 16 Dec. 1929, encl. 4; Ward, p. 70.
87. J.M. Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution, pp. 72.
88. Ward, pp. 75-76.
89. C. Fyfe, Africanus Horton: 1835-1883. West African Scientist and Patriot, (New York, 1972) p. 14.
90. Gold Coast Leader, 24 Feb. 1906.
91. CO.96/583, Kuma II to CO Secret, 26 Dec. 1917, encl.
92. *Ibid.*
93. Casely Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions, p. 172.
94. CO.96/358, Drayton to Antrobus 97, 6 March 1900.
95. *Ibid.*
96. CO.96/358, Drayton to Antrobus 97, 6 March 1900. See also T.N. Tamuno, The Evolution of the Nigerian State, (London, 1972), p. 311.
97. CO.96/247, Griffith to Ripon Conf., 29 Aug. 1894, encl. 1.  
CO.96/295, Maxwell to Chamberlain 306, 15 July 1897, encl. 4.
98. CO.96/293, Maxwell to Chamberlain 198, 18 May 1897.
99. CO.96/358, Hodgson to Chamberlain 97, 6 March 1900.
100. William Brandford Griffith was brought up in Barbados where his Grand-father had emigrated from Wales. The first job he took up was clerkship in a Colonial Bank at Antigua. From 1861-1874, he served as senior member of Barbados legislature. Greatly unpopular with the planters who resented his support of a confederation of several islands, he went to England in 1878 to apply for an appointment elsewhere. He was consequently posted to Lagos as Lieutenant Governor on 1 December 1880. He displayed his interest in Agriculture as early as 1882 when he introduced into Lagos some West Indian fruits and vegetables from Trinidad and Barbados. He was appointed Governor of the Gold Coast in 1885 and remained in this office until April 1895, two years before he died of black water Fever in Barbados: See J.D. Hargreaves, West Africa: Partitioned. The Loaded Pause, 1885-1889, (London, 1974) 1, p. 264; Polly Hill, The Migrant Cocoa Farmers in Ghana, pp. 73, 173. Metcalfe, p. 427.
101. Kimble, p. 331; O. Omosini, "The Gold Coast Land Question, 1894-1900. Some issues raised on West African Economic Development" IJAHS (1972) 5 p. 455.
102. R. Dumett, British Official Attitudes in Relation to Economic Development in the Gold Coast, 1874-1904, (Unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of London, 1966), pp. 67-68.
103. Omosini, p. 455.
104. CO.96/247, Griffith to Ripon Conf., 29 Aug. 1894.
105. This motive seems to be conveyed by his letter to a friend. He always strove to be fair to Europeans as well as to Africans who never failed to express their gratitude to him in return: see The Gold Coast Aborigines, 8 Jan 1898.

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106. See Metcalfe, p. 476; The Gold Coast Aborigines, 8 Jan 1898.
107. CO.96/243, Hutchinson to Hodgson 56, 26 Feb 1894. Sarbah was supposed to be the Editor of the newspaper. Hutchinson asked Commissioner Holmes to carry out enquiries as to the ownership of the paper, and as to the author of the letter. His enquiries were<sup>not</sup> successful. Hutchinson then sent a letter to Sarbah to ask him whether he was the owner of the paper and whether he had read the letter before its publication. Sarbah denied both assumptions.
108. CO.96/247, Griffith to Ripon Conf., 29 Aug. 1894.
109. Ibid., encl. 1.
110. CO.96/247, Griffith to Ripon Conf., 29 Aug. 1894, encl. 1.
111. Ibid.
112. CO.96/247, Griffith to Ripon Conf., 29 Aug. 1894, encl. 2.
113. Ibid.
114. CO.96/247, Griffith to Ripon Conf., 29 Aug. 1894, encl. 4.
115. CO.96/247, Griffith to Ripon Conf., 29 Aug. 1894, sub encl. to encl. 8.
116. A. Moloney, Sketch of the Forestry of West Africa With Particular Reference to its Present Commercial Products, (London, 1887) p. 3.
117. Hargreaves, West Africa Partitioned 1, p. 134.
118. Ibid., p. 135.
119. Moloney, p. 233.
120. Ibid., pp. 85-86.
121. Ibid., p. 213.
122. Ibid., p. 225.
123. Ibid., p. 238.
124. Ibid., p. 242.
125. Ibid., pp. 92, 234.
126. CO.96/247, Griffith to Ripon Conf., 29 Aug. 1894, encls. 3 and 5.
127. CO.96/247, Griffith to Ripon Conf., 29 Aug. 1894, encls. 5 and 6.
128. CO.96/247, Griffith to Ripon Conf., 29 Aug. 1894.
129. Ibid.
130. CO. 96/358, Hodgson to Chamberlain 95, 5 March 1900, encl. 3.
131. The Gold Coast Leader, 21-28 January 1922; Kimble, p. 335.
132. Kimble, p. 336.
133. Ibid.
134. CO.96/307, Brew to Chamberlain 12616, 10 June 1897. The Nigerian Pioneer, 14 May 1915, P.C. Lloyd, The New Elites of Tropical Africa (London, 1966) pp. 92-93. Brew was involved in the Fanti Confederation scheme of 1863-1873.
135. Metcalfe, p. 475; See also The Gold Coast Chronicle, 27 May 1897.
136. See Gold Coast Aborigines, 31 January 1899; The Gold Coast Leader, 6-13 Sept. 1919.
137. CO.96/257, Maxwell to Ripon 196, 11 May 1895, encl. 2.
138. J.M. Crabbe, John Mensah Sarbah 1894-1910 (Accra, 1971) p. 16.
139. CO.96/257, Maxwell to Ripon 196, 11 May 1895, encl. 2.
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid., encl. 1.
142. Ibid.
143. Ibid., see also Agbodeka, Ghana in the Twentieth Century, p. 8.
144. CO. 96/307 Brew to Chamberlain 12616, 10 June 1897; Kimble, p. 339.

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145. The Gold Coast Aborigines, 22 Jan. 1898; The Gold Coast Chronicle, 3 Jan. 1898; Metcalfe, p. 43
146. CO.96/583, Kuma II to CO Secret, 26 Dec. 1917, encl.
147. Ibid.
148. J.M. Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws, pp. 65-66.
149. CO.96/583, Kuma II to CO Secret, 26 Dec. 1917, encl. Agbodeka, African Politics and British Policy in the Gold Coast, 1868-1900, p. 4.
150. The Gold Coast Aborigines, 26 Feb. 1898,
151. Ibid., 12 March 1898.
152. The Gold Coast Leader, 3 Jan. 1903.
153. CO.96/583, Kuma II to CO Secret, 26 Dec. 1917, encl. CO.96/257, Maxwell to Ripon, 9 May 1895, as quoted by Metcalfe, p. 476.
154. Dumett, British Official Attitudes in Relation to Economic Development in the Gold Coast, 1874-1905, p. 192.
155. Dumett, British Official Attitudes in Relation to Economic Development in the Gold Coast, 1874-1905, p. 10.
156. Kimble, p. 339; CO.96/295, Maxwell to Bramston 306, 15 July 1897, encl. 5.
157. The Times, 12 February 1901.
158. CO.96/295, Maxwell to Bramston 306, 15 July 1897.
159. CO.96/257, Maxwell to Ripon 172, 2 May 1895.
160. CO.96/583, Kuma II to CO Secret, 26 Dec. 1917, encl.
161. CO.96/358, Hodgson to Chamberlain 95, 5 March, 1900. Kimble, p. 340.
162. CO.96/257, Maxwell to Ripon 172, 2 May 1895.
163. The Gold Coast Aborigines, 5 Feb. 1898.
164. CO.96/295, Maxwell to Bramston 306, 15 July 1897, encl. 5.
165. The Gold Coast Aborigines, 3 Sept. 1898.
166. CO.96/295, Maxwell to Bramston 306, 15 July 1897; CO.96/317, Hodgson to Chamberlain Conf., 25 June 1898; Kimble, p. 341; De Graft Johnson, Toward Nationhood in West Africa, (London, 1928) 2nd Ed. With a new introduction by Drah (London, 1971).
167. The Gold Coast Leader, 25 Feb.-3 Mar. 1918; The Gold Coast Times, 3 March 1928.
168. The Gold Coast Leader, 25 Feb.-13 Mar. 1918.
169. S. Tenkorang, "J.M. Sarbah, 1864-1910" THSG (1973)XIV p. 70; Boahen, Ghana: Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, p. 63; Crabbe, J.M. Sarbah, 1864-1910. His Life and His Works, pp. 3, 55: these prominent historians do not seem to agree on the date of the Society's foundation. Tenkorang asserts it was set up in 1887. Boahen and Crabbe think it was founded in 1889. Sarbah being in England in 1887, the latter was probably right.
170. Boahen, Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, p. 63. Tenkorang, p. 70. Crabbe p. 55.
171. The Gold Coast Nation, 11 April 1912 and 6 Feb. 1913.
172. CO.96/295, Maxwell to Bramston 306, 15 July 1897 encl. 4.
173. The Gold Coast Nation, 8 April 1915; Kimble, p. 341.
174. Kimble, p. 341; Tenkorang, p. 71.
175. CO.96/333, Minute by Winfield, 3 Aug. 1898; CO.96/673/4305/27, Guggisberg to Amery Conf., 21 April 1927, encl. 2; CO.964/21, Sakji Adjan to Aitikin, 8 May 1948; Gold Coast Aborigines, 3 Dec. 1898; Gold Coast Leader, 26 March 1904; Gold Coast Nation, 8 April 1915; E.W. Smith, Aggrey of Africa. A Study in Black and White (London, 1929) 8th Ed. (London, 1932) p. 52. Tenkorang, p. 71.
176. The Gold Coast Nation, 11 April 1912.

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177. The Gold Coast Leader of 12 Dec. 1906 pointed out that nine and three quarters of the population were illiterate. See also The Gold Coast Methodist Times, 15 April 1897.
178. The Gold Coast Aborigines, 3 Sep. 1898; CO.96/307, Brew to Chamberlain 12616, 10 Jan. 1897.
179. The Gold Coast Aborigines, 1 Jan. and 3 Dec. 1898; Tenkorang, p. 71. To inform the maximum number of people, the ARPS later opened branches in Accra, Axim, and Elmina: see CO.96/673, Guggisberg to Amery Conf., 21 April 1927, encl. 2; Gold Coast Nation, 10 Jul. 1913;
180. The Gold Coast Aborigines, 30 April 1898.
181. Ibid, 1 Jan. 1898.
182. The Gold Coast Methodist Times, 15 Sep. 1898.
183. Ibid.
184. The Gold Coast Leader, 2 July 1910.
185. Casely Hayford, The Truth about the West African Land Question (London, 1913) New Ed. with introduction by E.U. Essien Udom (London, 1971) p. 22.
186. CO.96/583, Kuma II to CO Secret, 26 December 1917, encl. CO.96/292, Maxwell to Bramston 169, 4 May 1897.
187. CO.96/295, Maxwell to Bramston 306, 15 July 1895, encl. 1.
188. Ibid, encl. 4; see also The Gold Coast Methodist Times, 31 Aug. 1897.
189. Ibid., encl. 3.
190. CO.96/295, Maxwell to Bramston 306, 15 July 1895, encl. 4; The Gold Coast Methodist Times, 15 Nov. 1897.
191. CO.96/295, Maxwell to Bramston 306, 15 July 1897, encl. 4;
192. Ibid; Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws, p. 289, see also The Gold Coast Methodist Times, 15 Nov. 1897.
193. CO.96/295, Maxwell to Chamberlain 306, 15 July 1897, encl. 4; Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws, pp. 294, 304.
194. CO.96/307, Brew to Chamberlain 12616, 10 June 1897.
195. Ibid. Joseph Herbert Cheetham was not later reappointed as Legislative Council member. According to British officials, his lack of fluency in English prevented him from taking part in the debates. Educated Africans seemed to imply the opposite. They asserted that Maxwell considered him as the person in whom focussed all protests: see: CO.96/317, Hodgson to Chamberlain Conf. 21 June 1898; The Gold Coast Aborigines, 22 Oct. 1898. John Vanderpuye entered Accra Wesleyan school. He was the chief of one division of Ussher Town, old Dutch quarter of Accra. He became unofficial member of the Legislative Council under Griffith's governorship: see CO.96/243, Hodgson to Ripon Conf., 27 Feb. 1804; The Gold Coast Leader 17 Oct. 1903.
196. CO.96/307, Brew to Chamberlain 12616, 10 June 1897, encl. 1.
197. The Gold Coast Aborigines, 3 Dec. 1898.
198. CO.96/295, Maxwell to Chamberlain 306, 15 July 1895, encls. 1 and 2.
199. CO.96/295, Maxwell to Chamberlain 306, 15 July 1895, encls. 1 and 2.
200. Ibid., encl. 4.
201. Ibid., The Gold Coast Aborigines, 3 Dec. 1898.
202. CO.96/307, Brew to Chamberlain 12616, 10 June 1897.
203. CO.96/295, Maxwell to Chamberlain 306, 15 July 1897, encl. 4.
204. Ibid.
205. CO.96/295, Maxwell to Chamberlain 306, 15 July 1897, encl. 4.
206. The Gold Coast Aborigines, 5 Feb. 1898.
207. CO.96/295, Maxwell to Chamberlain 306, 15 July 1897, encl. 4.
208. CO.96/307, Brew to Chamberlain 12616, 10 June 1897.

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209. Ibid.
210. CO.96/295, Maxwell to Chamberlain 306, 15 July 1897, encl. 4.
211. Ibid.
212. CO.96/583, Kuma II to CO Secret, 26 dec. 1917, encl. Financial Post of 24 May 1897, The Manchester Guardian 1 June 1897 as quoted by Kimble, p. 344 and Omosini, p. 462.
213. CO.96/294, Telegram of 5 June 1897.
214. Ibid., Telegram of 14 June 1897.
215. CO.96/295, Maxwell to Chamberlain 306, 15 July 1897, encl. 4.
216. CO.96/583, Kuma II to CO Secret, 26 dec. 1917, encl.
217. Sampson, Gold Coast Men of Affairs, p. 161.
218. Ibid., p. 161-162. Crabbe, pp. 1-3; The Gold Coast Aborigines, 1-8 April 1899; Sampson, Gold Coast Men of Affairs, p. 212-213.
219. The Gold Coast Nation, 29 April 1915; The Nigerian Pioneer, 14 May 1915; Sampson, Gold Coast Men of Affairs, p. 90; The Western Echo was issued between Nov. 1885 and Dec. 1887: see Metcalfe, p. 428; Kimble, p. 412.
220. The Gold Coast Aborigines, 22 July 1899; The Gold Coast Nation, 2 May 1912 and 8 April 1915; G. Padmore; The Gold Coast Revolution (London, N.D.) p. 37; Sampson, Gold Coast Men of Affairs. Past and Present, pp. 69-99.
221. The Gold Coast Nation, 27-28 Jan. 1922; Sampson, Gold Coast Men of Affairs, pp. 78-79; L.H. Ofusu Appiah, Joseph Ephraim Casely Hayford, The Man of Vision and Faith (Accra, 1975) p. 2.
222. E.W. Smith, Aggrey of Africa. A Study in Black and White, p. XI
223. Rex Niven, Nine Great Africans (London, 1964) pp. 151-152.
224. The Gold Coast Nation, 1 - 8 Oct. 1914; Smith, Aggrey of Africa. pp. 52-53.
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2. Shepherd, South Africa, pp. 30-31.
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8. Shepherd, Lovedale, p. 479.
9. Shepherd, South Africa, p. 31.
10. Shepherd, Lovedale, p. 496, see also G.551/56, Gladstone to Harcourt 128, 16 March 1914, encl.
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12. Hirson, Year of Fire, Year of Ash, p. 28.
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33. See X. 520 964. University of Fort Hare Golden Jubilee, 1916-1966, p. 22; F. Troup, Forbidden Pastures. Education under Apartheid (London, 1976) p. 14.
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36. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 118-119.
38. Matthews, p. 46.

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41. Ibid., pp. 54, 64-65, 74.
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44. Karis and Carter (Eds), IV, p. 138.
45. DO.9/5, Athlone to Amery 2, 25 Jan. 1926; DO.9/7, Honey to Athlone 294, 15 September 1927; Honey was Resident Commissioner.
46. Karis and Carter (Eds), IV, p. 24.
47. MS.380077. Msimang, Autobiography.
48. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, IV, pp. 46, 68, 94, 96, 134, 154.
49. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, IV, pp. 22, 89.
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52. R.L. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa 2 vols (New York, 1928)I, p.88; Bundy, p. 50; Saunders, p. 27.
53. Buell, I, p. 89.
54. Newton, Select Documents relating to the Unification of South Africa, I, pp. 135-136.
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56. Ibid., p. 94.
57. Buell, I, pp. 100-101.
58. Ibid., p. 104.
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68. Ibid., p. 57.
69. Ibid., p. 55.
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80. Umteteli wa Bantu, 14 June 1930
81. Ibid, 23 Aug. 1930.
82. P.I. Seme, "The Regeneration of Africa" Journal of Royal African Society (1905-1906) pp. 404-408 in J.A. Langley, Ideologies of Liberation in Black Africa, 1856-1970. Documents on Modern African Political thought from Colonial Times to the Present (London, 1979), p. 262.
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86. Ibid., p. 261.
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97. Wilson and Thompson (Eds), The Oxford University of South Africa, II, p. 74.
98. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, I, p. 37.
99. Ibid., p. 38.
100. Ibid., pp. 35-36.
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107. Abantu Batho, Feb-March 1920.
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109. Ibid., pp. 28, 105.
110. Ibid., I, p. 77: Chapter I of the said constitution.
111. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, I, p. 78: Chapter I of the said constitution.
112. Ibid., p. 79: Chapter V of the constitution.
113. Ibid.
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115. Ibid.
116. ~~Ibid.~~, pp. 2-4.
117. Ibid., p. 1.
118. ~~Ibid.~~, pp. 4-11.
119. ~~Ibid.~~, pp. 23-25.
120. Ibid., pp. 28-29.

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124. Ibid., pp. 36-38.
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143. Sundkler, Bantu Prophets in South Africa, p. 35.
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197. Ibid., p. 172.
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201. HT. 1545 Jab. D.D.T. Jabavu, Native Disabilities in South Africa, p. 16.
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203. Walshe, p. 92.
204. M.S. 380 077. Msimang, Autobiography, p. 80; see also Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, IV, p. 154.
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209. Walshe, p. 165.
210. DO.9/13, Athlone to Amery 165, 11 March 1929.
211. Walshe, pp. 167-168.
212. DO.9/13 Athlone to Amery 165, 11 March 1929.
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## PART III, CHAPTER XII, pp. 446-449

1. CO.551/44, Gladstone to Harcourt 761, 31 October 1913, encl. 2. The Cape Act of 1899 limited the number of squatters.
2. SP. AB-36-'13. Bill to make further provisions as to the purchase and leasing of Land by Natives and other Persons in the several parts of the Union and for other purposes in connection with the ownership and occupation of Land by Natives and other persons, p. 1.
3. CO.551/58, Gladstone to CO 565, 11 July 1914.
4. See SP. AB 36-'13. Bill to make further provisions as to the purchase and leasing of land by Natives and other Persons p. 12; see also: Weekly Cape Times and Farmers' Record, 14 June 1913; CO.551/95, Buxton to Long Conf., 2 May 1917.
5. SP. AB 36-'13. Bill to make further provisions as to the purchase and leasing of land by Natives and other Persons... p. 12; CO.551/44, Gladstone to Harcourt 761, 31 Oct. 1913, encl. 2.
6. CO.551/40, Telegram Gladstone to CO, 10 June 1913; CO.551/44, Gladstone to Harcourt 761, 31 Oct. 1913, encl. 3.
7. J. Hoagland, South African Civilizations in Conflict (London, 1973) p. 81.
8. SP. AB 36-'13. Bill to make further provisions as to the purchase and lease of land by Natives and other Persons. pp. 3-4.
9. CO.551/43, Gladstone to Harcourt Conf., 4 Sep. 1913, see also Thompson, Unification of South Africa, 1902-1910, pp. 115, 504.
10. CO.551/104, Buxton to Long Conf., 5 March 1918.

## PART III, CHAPTER XII, pp. 449-453.

11. CO.551/44, Gladstone to Harcourt 750, 31 Oct. 1913; see also CO.551/95, Buxton to Long 486, 22 July 1917.
12. CO.551/41, Gladstone to Harcourt 488, 10 June 1913; CO. 551/87, Buxton to Bonar Law Conf., 25 Oct. 1916.
13. Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa, p. 173.
14. CO. 551/40, Gladstone to Harcourt Conf., 14 June 1913, encl. 1.
15. CO. 551/41, Gladstone to Harcourt 489, 30 June 1913, encl. 2.
16. Abantu Batho, 1 Aug, 1913 in MS. 380 189, South African Press Cuttings re Black Peril, 1912-1913.
17. See E. Barrett's Memorandum of 15 August 1913 in MS. 380 189. South African Press Cuttings re Black Peril, 1912-1913.
18. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, I, p. 85.
19. Ibid, pp. 85-86.
20. CO.551/56, Gladstone to Harcourt 132, 7 March 1914, encl. 1.
21. CO.551/56, Gladstone to Harcourt 132, 7 March 1914. Early in 1913, Dube appointed a committee to raise funds from the people. The committee included Saul Msane as organizer, W.F. Jemsana as chairman, Elke M. Cele as treasurer, R.W. Msimang as assistant treasurer, his brother Selby as honorary secretary, C.S. Mabaso, H.D. Mkize, D. Moeletsi, M.D. Ndabezita, B.G. Phooko, D.D. Tywakadi. See MS. 375 495. Plaatje, Papers; Walshe, p. 49; Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, IV. p. 63.
22. Weekly Cape Times and Farmers' Record, 22 May 1914.
23. CO.551/40, Gladstone to Harcourt 444, 11 June 1913.
24. CO.551/41, Gladstone to Harcourt 489, 30 July 1913, encl. 3.
25. CO.551/42, Gladstone to Harcourt 518, 1 Aug. 1913, encl. 1; see also Weekly Cape Times and Farmers' Record, 10 May 1913.
26. CO.551/67, Buxton to Harcourt, 10 June 1914: the other members of the Society were Senator Stanford, Alexander Arnold Wynne, the Reverends Saul Solomon and G. Roston.
27. Christian Express, 1 October 1914.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. CO.551/70, Buxton to Harcourt 181, 28 Feb. 1915, encl. 1; see also CO.551/71, Buxton to Harcourt 238, 12 March 1915, encl. 1.
31. CO.551/67, Haggard to Harcourt Conf., 1 July 1914.
32. B.P. Willan, "The Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society and the Natives" Land Act of 1913" Journal of African History (1979)20, I, p. 86.
33. Willan, "The Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society and the South African Native Land Act of 1913", p. 87.
34. Ibid., p. 87-88.
35. CO.551/67, SANNC to Harcourt, 15 June 1914.
36. CO.551/67, Minute by Lambert 4 June 1914.
37. Willan, "The Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society and the Natives' Land Act", p. 89.
38. CO.551/67, Butler to Harris, 11 July 1914.
39. CO.551/67, Buxton and Harris to Harcourt Conf., 26 June 1914.
40. CO.551/67, Buxton to Harcourt, 10 June 1914; One morgen was approximately equal to two English acres.
41. CO.551/67, Buxton to Harcourt, 10 June 1914.
42. Willan, "The Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society and the Natives' Land Act", p. 89.
43. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, I, p. 87.

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44. Willan, "The Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society and the Natives' Land Act", p. 102.
45. Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa, p. 17.
46. Ibid., p. 50.
47. J.H. Harris, "General Botha's Native Land Policy" Journal of African Society (1916-1917)XVI p. 12.
48. Willan, "The Anti-slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society and the Natives' Land Act", p. 98.
49. Ibid., p. 99. Alice Werner was then a lecturer in African languages in Cambridge University. She raised funds for Plaatje's Native Life in South Africa: Ibid., p. 93.
50. Willan, "The Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society and the Natives' Land Act", p. 102.
51. MS. 380 077. H.S. Msimang, Autobiography, p. 47.
52. Weekly Cape Times and Farmers' Record, 22 May 1914.
53. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, I, p. 89.
54. Pam. G.A. 418 601. H.S. Msimang, Henry Selby Looks Back, p. 16.
55. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, I, pp. 85-86.
56. CO.551/67, Haggard to Harcourt Conf., July 1914.
57. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, IV, pp. 24, 73, 89, 104, 137.
58. Ibid., pp. 12, 22, 74, 96, 107, 111, 126, 134.
59. Ibid., pp. 127, 28.
60. Ibid., pp. 57, 68, 155.
61. CO.551/37, Gladstone to Harcourt Sec., 24 Jan. 1913, encl; Pam. Africa G.A. 418 601, H.S. Msimang, H.S. Msimang Looks Back, p. 6; Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, IV, p. 42.
62. MS. 361 018, HS. Msimang, Autobiographical Sketch and Transcript of an Interview, p. 5.
63. M.S. 380 077, H.S. Msimang, Autobiography (1976) p. 51.
64. CO.551/95, Buxton to Long Conf., 11 April 1917, encl. 1.
65. CO.551/95, Buxton to Long Conf., 2 May 1917.
66. Walshe, p. 58.
67. Ibid.
68. See Simons and Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950, p. 198.
69. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, I, p. 94.
70. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge. I, p. 96.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid., p. 97.
73. Weekly Cape Times and Farmers' Record, 6 March 1914; Hellman, Handbook on Race Relations in South Africa, p. 280.
74. CO.551/58, Gladstone to Harcourt Conf., 10 July 1914.
75. Van Onselen, New Nineveh, p. 179.
76. Weekly Cape Times and Farmers' Record, 30 Oct. 1912; see also CO.551/37, Gladstone to Harcourt Conf., 19 Feb. 1913.
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79. L. Kuper, Race, Class and Power. Ideology and Revolutionary Change in Plural Societies (London, 1974) p. 207.
80. R. Horwitz, The Political Economy in South Africa (London, 1967) p. 180.
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82. P.L. Van Den Berghe, South Africa, A Study in Conflict (Middletown, Connecticut 1965) pp. 198-199.
83. CO. 551/75, Buxton to Bonar Law 977, 26 Aug. 1915, encl; see also CO.551/67, Chamber of Mines to Harcourt, 29 April 1914.
84. CO.551/85, Buxton to Bonar Law Conf., 21 June 1916.
85. MS. 380 188, South African General Missionary Conference, 1912, Commission No. 6. The so-called "Black Peril". Synopsis of Evidence, pp. 24, 38.
86. Weekly Cape Times and Farmers' Record, 28 Nov. 1913.
87. Ibid., 16 June 1914.
88. A. Proctor, "Class Struggle, Segregation and the City: a History of Sophiatown" in B. Bozzoli, Labour, Townships, and Protest, Studies in the Social History of the Witwatersrand (Johannesburg, 1979) p. 54.
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91. Weekly Cape Times and Farmers' Record, 2 August 1913.
92. Ibid. In the Transvaal Act No. 20 of 1909, trade unions were not recognized as parties to a dispute. There was no legislation dealing with trade unions in the Cape, Natal, and the Free State: see CO.551/58, Gladstone to Harcourt 565, 11 July 1914.
93. CO.551/56, Gladstone to Harcourt 128, 16 March 1914, encl.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. CO.551/58, Gladstone to Harcourt 565, 11 July 1914.
98. B. Bunting, Moses Kotane. South African Revolutionary (London, 1975). p. 17.
99. Ibid, p. 18.
100. F.A. Johnstone, "The IWA on the Rand: socialist organizing among Black workers on the Rand, 1917-1918" in Bozzoli, p. 248.
101. Ibid., pp. 251-254.
102. Johnstone "The IWA on the Rand..." in Bozzoli, 251.
103. Bunting, Moses Kotane. South African Revolutionary, p. 20.
104. Johnstone, "The IWA on the Rand..." in Bozzoli, 253.
105. Van Onselen, New Nineveh, pp. 28-43.
106. CO.551/111, Buxton to Milner 108, 15 Feb. 1919.
107. Thema addressed his letter to the editor of Molomo wa bantu under the title "Re Native woman under the Pass Laws, and the Proposed Hostels". His letter was undated, and so was the press cutting, but it contained the following statement: "It is now twenty five years since I came into this world" which served as a clue to trace the date of his letter: see MS.380 189. South African Press Cuttings re Black Peril, 1912-1913.
108. Tsala ea Beacons, 8 May 1912 in MS.380 189. South African Press Cuttings re Black Peril, 1912-13.
109. G.2319. ST. Plaatje, The Mote and the Beam. An Ethic on Sex Relationship "Twixt White and Black in British South Africa (New York, 1921) p. 4.
110. G.2319. Plaatje, The Mote and the Beam..., pp. 4-14.
111. Van Onselen, Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand, 1886-1914, I, p. 83.
112. Pam. Africa GA. 418 601, H.S. Msimang, Henry Selby Msimang Looks Back. AN Address to the Students of the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg (Johannesburg, 1971) p. 3.

## PART III, CHAPTER XII, pp. 473-479

113. Karis and Carter (Eds). From Protest to Challenge, IV, p. 155.
114. Weekly Cape Times and Farmers' Record, 6 March 1914.
115. MS. 380 077. H.S. Msimang, Autobiography, p. 81.
116. S.T. Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa, p. 281.
117. B.P. Willan., "The South African Labour Contingent, 1916-1918", Journal of African History (1978)XIX, No. I, p. 64.
118. CO.551/96, Buxton to Long 619, 27 July 1917, encl. 1.
119. Willan, "The South African Native Labour Contingent, 1916-1918" p. 64.
120. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
121. *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.
122. *Ibid.*, p. 66.
123. R.M. Tunzi, "A Stirring and Patriotic Appeal to South African Natives", African Times and Orient Review (July 1917)V p. 8.
124. Willan, "The South African Native Labour Contingent, 1916-1918" p. 69.
125. M.D.W. Jeffreys, "The Mendi and After" in MS. 380 077. H.S. Msimang, Autobiography.
126. The Guardian, 21 February 1967 in MS. 380 077. H.S. Msimang, Autobiography.
127. CO.551/96, Buxton to Long 619, 27 July 1917, encl. 1.
128. Willan, "The South African Native Labour Contingent, 1916-1918", p. 73.
129. Willan, "The South African Native Labour Contingent, 1916-1918" pp. 76-79.
130. MS. 380 077, H.S. Msimang, Autobiography, p. 80.
131. Pam.Africa BI. 201 787, D.D.T. Jabavu, The Findings of the All African Convention (Lovedale, 1935) pp. 2, 33.
132. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
133. CO.551/111, Buxton to Milner 108, 15 Feb. 1919, encl. 1.
134. *Ibid.*
135. CO.551/111, Buxton to Milner 108, 15 February 1919, encl. 1.
136. *Ibid.*
137. MS. 380 077, H.S. Msimang, Autobiography.
138. MS. 380 077. Msimang, Autobiography.
139. Lutuli, Let My People Go, p. 69.

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1. Van der Horst, p. 243.
2. CO.632/8, Natives' Urban Areas Act, pp. 16-20. <sup>α Simons</sup>
3. Benson, The African Patriots, p. 59; Simons' Class and Colour in South Africa, pp. 341-342.
4. CO.532/9, Act No. 41 of 1925 to Consolidate and Amend the Law relating to the Taxation of Natives and to Provide Additional Funds for the Development, Education, and Local Government of Natives, pp. 1, 4, 10.
5. E.U.L. Box V. Miscellaneous Pamphlet. J. Mellor, Black and White in South Africa (London, N.D.) p. 10.
6. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa, I, pp. 139-141; DO.35/5, Athlone to Amery 625, 20 Oct. 1926, encl.
7. Pam. Africa GB. 418 510. Xuma, Reconstituting the Union or a More Rational Policy, p. 13; Magubane, p. 85.
8. No. 2319. Bill to provide for the establishment of a South African Native Trust and to define its purposes; to make further provision as to the acquisition and occupation of land by natives and other persons; to amend Act No. 27; and to provide for other incidental matters.

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9. Pam. Africa BK. 201 807. Johannesburg Joint Council of Europeans and Natives, Memorandum No. 3. The Natives in Industry (Johannesburg, 1927) paras. 18, 19, 24.
10. Pam. Af. GB. 418 510. Xuma, Reconstituting the Union of South Africa or a More Rational Union Policy, p. 12.
11. L. Marquard, and T.G. Standing, The Southern Bantu (London, 1939) pp. 156-157.
12. CO.551/127, Buxton to Milner Conf., 23 July 1920.
13. AB.24'20. Act to provide for the Constitution of a Commission and of Native Councils and for convening Native Conferences with a view to facilitating the Administration of Native Affairs, pp. 2, 4, 8; see also CO.551/126, Buxton to Milner Conf., 2 June 1920; CO.551/127, Buxton to Milner Conf., 23 July 1920.
14. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa, I, p. 137; DO.35/5, Athlone to Amery 663, 10 Nov. 1926, encl. 3; Tatz, p. 47.
15. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa, I, p. 139.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 138; see also; DO.35/5, Athlone to Amery 663, 10 Nov. 1926, encl. 4.
17. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa, I, p. 142; Tatz, p. 46.
18. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa, I, p. 137-138.
19. See Johnstone, p. 174.
20. *Ibid.*
21. Johnstone, p. 174.
22. *Ibid.* p. 175-176.
23. MS. 361 018. HS. Msimang, Autobiographical Sketch, p. 12.
24. CO.551/112, Buxton to Milner Conf., 23 May 1919, encl.
25. *Ibid.*
26. *Ibid.*
27. CO. 551/112, Buxton to Milner Conf., 23 May 1919.
28. *Ibid.*, encl.
29. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, I, p. 107.
30. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, I, p. 109.
31. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, I, p. 109.
32. PL. Bonner, "The 1920 Black Mineworkers' Strike. A Preliminary account in B. Bozzoli ~~(d)~~ Labour, Townships and Protest. Studies in the Social History of the Witwatersrand (Johannesburg, 1979) pp. 273-289.
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34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*
36. Abantu Batho, Feb, 1920.
37. *Ibid.*
38. Bonner, "The 1920 Black Mineworkers' strike..." in Bozzoli, p. 279.
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41. Miscellaneous Pamphlet. Haines, Reflections on African Protest in Natal, 1925-36, p. 2.
42. Umteteli wa Bantu, 31 May 1930.
43. Abantu Batho, 19 June 1930.
44. Pam. G. 1659. A.B. Xuma, Bridging the Gap between White and Black (Fort Hare, 1930) in M. 897(I). Selection of Pamphlets re African Political, Social and Economic History in the Twentieth Century.

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45. Pam. Africa. GB. 418 510. Xuma, Reconstituting the Union of South Africa or a More Rational Policy, pp. 12-13.
46. Umsebenzi, 24 Dec., 1926.
47. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa, I, p. 178.
48. Buell, The Native Problem in Africa, I, p. 179.
49. Ibid., pp. 179-180.
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51. DO.9/11, Anderson to Amery 543, 25 Sep. 1928, encl.
52. DO.9/11, Sturrock to Anderson 29, 24 Aug 1928, encl.
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56. DO.9/13, Athlone to Amery 147, 28 February 1929; Umsebenzi, 30 November, 1928.
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61. DO.9/12, Sturrock to Athlone 77, 29 May 1928.
62. EUL. Miscellaneous Pamphlet. Haines, "Reflections on African Protest in Natal, 1925-30" p. 10; Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, IV, p. 35. DO.9/12, Sturrock to Anderson 77, 2 Nov. 1928.
63. Umsebenzi, 30 Nov. 1928.
64. DO.9/13, Clifford to Commissioner of Police Conf., 19 Feb. 1929; DO.9/13, Athlone to Garraway 335, 19 Feb. 1929.
65. MS. 361 018. H.S. Msimang. Autobiographical Sketch, p. 22.
66. Champion to Dube, 30 Sep. 1927 in M. 844, Film 1-2, Reel I, ICU.
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68. Luthuli, Let My People Go, p. 86.
69. C. Kadalie, My Life and the ICU (London, 1970) p. 41.
70. Ibid., pp. 40-41; Tabata, p. 9.
71. MS. 361 018. H.S. Msimang, Autobiographical Sketch, p. 17, MS. 380 077. H.S. Msimang, Autobiography, p. 138; see also Du/foit, p. 102.
72. On 12 January 1921, the Acting Magistrate of Port Elizabeth sent Rubusana £10 "for injuries and indignities received at the hands of the mob": see: MS. 380 266. S.M. Molema, Inventory of SM. Molema. Collection of Political Ephemera relating to the ANC.
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77. B. Hirson, "The Bloemfontein Riots, 1925: A Study in Community Culture and Class Consciousness", Unpublished paper, pp. 1-12.
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79. A.B. to Champion, 30 May 1927 in M. 844. Film 1-2, Reel 2, ICU.
80. AWG. Champion, The Truth about the ICU (Durban, 1927) p. 8 in M. 844. Film 1-2, Reel 2. ICU.
81. Kadalie, My Life and the ICU, pp. 19, 40.

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82. Kadalie, pp. 96-97
83. Ibid., p. 160.
84. M. 844. Film 1. Reel 1. ICU.
85. Kadalie, p. 160.
86. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, I, p. 334.
87. Ibid.
88. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, I, p. 334.
89. AWG. Champion, Mehlomadala. My Experience in the ICU (Durban, 1929) in M.844, Film 1-2, Reel 2, ICU.
90. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, IV, p. 5.
91. Kadalie, My Life and the ICU, pp. 180-181; MS. 380 082. Wickins, The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Africa, p. 12.
92. Kadalie to Champion, 5 June 1928 in M. 844. Film 1-2 Reel 1, ICU
93. Champion to Kadalie, 18 November 1929 in M. 844. Film 1, Reel 1, ICU.
94. Umsebenzi, 1 July 1927.
95. MS. 380 082. Wickins, The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Africa, pp. 2-3.
96. Champion, The Truth about the ICU, p. 17 in M. 844. Film 1-2. Reel 2. ICU.
97. Ibid., p. 20.
98. Umteteli Wa Bantu, 21 June 1930.
99. Hunter, pp. 568-569.
100. Walshe, p. 227.
101. DO.35/5, Athlone to Amery, 10 Nov. 1926, encl. 1.
102. MS. 380 077. HS. Msimang, Autobiography, p. 111.
103. DO.35/5, Athlone to Amery 625, 20 Oct. 1926. encl.
104. Bunting, Moses Kotane, p. 48.
105. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, IV, pp. 33, 50-51, 120.
106. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, IV, pp. 75, 92, 123, 142.
107. Roux, Rebel Pity..., p. 67.
108. Bunting, Moses Kotane pp. 59-61.
109. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, IV, pp. 33, 50, 67, 75, 92, 120, 123, 158.
110. Roux, Rebel Pity... p. 75.
111. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, IV, pp. 102, 120.
112. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, IV, pp. 51, 75.
113. Ibid., p. 33.
114. Ibid., p. 84; Kadalie, p. 98.
115. Karis and Carter (Eds), IV, p. 50.
116. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, IV, p. 110.
117. Ibid., p. 120.
118. Ibid., p. 123-124.
119. Ibid., p. 142.
120. p. 158-159.
121. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, IV, pp. 35, 157;
122. Simons < Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa, p. 403.
123. Umteteli Wa Bantu, 3 May 1930.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid., 31 May 1930.
126. MS. 361 018. HS Msimang, Autobiographical Sketch, p. 22.
127. Bunting, Moses Kotane, p. 56.
127. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, IV, p. 40.

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128. Pam. BI. 201 787. DDT. Jabavu, The Findings of the All-African Convention (Lovedale, 1935) pp. 20-23.
129. Pam. BI. 201.787. DDT. Jabavu, The Findings of the All African Convention (Lovedale, 1935) pp. 12-15.
130. Pam. BI. 201 787. DDT. Jabavu, The Findings of the All African Convention (Lovedale, 1935) p. 34. G.H. Gool became president of the National Liberation League in 1937, but was ousted the following year. In 1943, he contributed to set up the Anti-Coloured Affairs department or AntiCAD, and was elected vice-chairman of the Non-european unity movement which he headed until his death in 1962: Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, IV, p. 33.
131. Pam. BI. 201 787. DDT. Jabavu, The Findings of the All-African Convention, p. 35.
132. Ibid., pp. 3-9. The writer of the present essay thought there was a misprint of Kadalie's name spelt "Kadale" in the pamphlet. In 1930, Kadalie had moved his residence from Johannesburg to East London, and as a member of the SANNC had opposed Hertzog's Bills: Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, IV, p. 47.
133. Ibid., p. 30.
134. Ibid., p. 31.
135. Pam. BI. 201 787. DDT. Jabavu, The Findings of the All-African Convention, pp. 18-19.
136. See Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, IV, pp. 26, 39, 74, 80, 98, 156, 165.

## NOTES TO RETROSPECT, pp. 531-534.

1. Quoted by K. Nkrumah, Africa must Unite (London, 1963) p. 20.
2. P. Worsley, The Third World (London, 1964) 6th Impression (London, 1978) p. 47.
3. Ibid. p. 65.
4. N. Machiavelli, The Prince (London, 1909) p. 16.
5. Hargreaves, West Africa Partitioned, I, p. 67; Betts., pp. 115-116.
6. Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution, pp. 55-57.
7. Agbodeka, African Politics and British Policies in the Gold Coast, 1868-1900, pp. 11, 41, 50, 170.
8. Macchiavelli, p. 19.
9. Ibid., p. 20.
10. Freire, p. 112. See also Worsley, p. 36.
11. 1,1389 refer to the number of Whites, Syrians included. No accurate census of the European population was taken. See R.R. Kuczynski, Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire 2 Vols (London, 1948) I, p. 415 (1964) pp. 77-78; Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, p. 486.
12. Machiavelli, pp. 17-18.
13. K. Marx, Capital. A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production 2 vols. (London, 1909) I, p. 323.
14. H. Wolpe, "Capitalism and Cheap labour-power in South Africa from segregation to Apartheid" in The Introduction of Modes of Production. Essays from Economy and Society (London, 1980) p. 303.
15. R. Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital (London, 1951) p. 369.
16. The same reactions were observed in Afro-American schools: see: G. Mosca, The Ruling Class. Elementi di Scienza Politica (New York, 1939) p. 24.

## NOTES TO RETROSPECT, pp. 534 - 554

17. Ibid., p. 60.
18. T.B. Bottomore, Elites and Society (London, 1964) p. 70.
19. Ibid.
20. Terminology used by Worsley, p. 50.
21. Walshe, p. 213.
22. See text in Collot and Henry p. 84.
23. RVS. Thema, "In defence of the Cape Franchise", p. 9. in M. 897(1). Selection of Pamphlets re African, Political, Social and Economic History in the 20th century; Pam. BI. 201 787, DDT. Jabavu, The Findings of the All-African Convention, p. 35.
24. Karis and Carter (Eds), From Protest to Challenge, IV, pp. 26, 39, 74, 80, 98, 156, 165.
25. The Gold Coast Leader, 15 March 1924.
26. Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, p. 51.
27. Kaddache, Histoire du Nationalism Algerien, I, p. 194.
28. Walshe, p. 242.
29. Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, pp. 142-143.
30. See text in Collot and Henry, pp. 38-39.
31. De Rochebrune, pp. 195-197.
32. DO.9/13, Clifford to Commissioner of Police Conf., 19 Feb. 1929; DO.9/13, Athlone to Garraway 335, 19 Feb. 1929.
33. Casely Hayford, Ethiopia Unbound, p. 163.
34. MS. 380 077, H.S. Msimang, Autobiography (1976) p. 111; CO.98/33, Clifford to Milner, 189, 7 March 1919, encl. Smith, Aggrey of Africa, p. 204; Clarke and Garvey, p. 411.
35. Abantu Batho, Feb-March 1920.

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